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          Abstract 
The aim of this project has been to explore the possibility of applying Phenomenology 
and Classical Indian Theories to cinema with the hope that their systematic application 
would generate new insights in a deeper understanding of cinema. This need has been felt 
in the context of the existing film discourse having reached a stage of stagnation, even a 
“crisis”, in recent times. The reason for this moribund state of contemporary film 
discourse has been analyzed in my thesis as due to the failure of the existing film theories 
to incorporate film audiences‟ ordinary experiences of cinema, viz. the romance, the 
thrills, and the emotions which motivate them to come to the cinema halls all over the 
world. The film theories have failed to acknowledge the importance of this phenomenon 
which is built on the audiences‟ embodied experiences of the world and their socio-
cultural practices that have grown on top of them which together form, at the very basic 
level, what constitutes the audiences‟ ordinary response to cinema. It has been argued in 
this thesis that, while this very basic response of the audiences to cinema has been 
entirely by-passed by the existing film theories, they have concentrated instead on how 
the audiences should ideally respond to cinema. As a result, the film theories present a 
sanitized version of the audience experiences that entirely miss the „gut-feelings‟ that 
cinema generates among them. 
It is unfortunate that film theorization has progressively moved away from this 
experience. Thus, while the schools of realism and montage, which together constitute 
the two contrary branches of classical film theory, deal with the nature of reality 
underlying the surface reality of cinema, contemporary film theory, based on the notion 
of disembodied vision, render the audiences into passive viewers manipulated by a 
subversive ideology operated by a schemeing bourgeoisie and cognitive film theory 
considers the audiences to be transparently intelligent entities, who, like an ideal buyer, 
infer the film narrative by optimally using the clues provided by the film and respond 
appropriately. It has been argued in this work that none of these theories acknowledge the 
film audiences‟ normal response to cinema, thereby missing the very starting point from 
where theorizations should have started in the first place. When phenomenology and 
classical Indian theories are applied to cinema, they do not assign extraordinary powers 
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of perception to the audiences who, by dint of it, should tear asunder the „fake‟ reality 
presented on screen; rather, they help to understand how normal processes of perception 
operate producing identifications and their corresponding affective states among the 
audiences that keep them glued to cinema all over the world.  
Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology and Nyāya theory are similar in revealing how 
the audiences‟ perception generates meanings and emotions on the basis of their 
embodied experiences of the world and the socio-cultural practices built up around them. 
In this connection, both Nyāya and Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of synaesthetic experiences 
make the audio-visual images to be so much richer than has been acknowledged so far. 
Further, Nyāya, by positing that the perception of things is a product of their mode of 
appearance and mode of presentation, offers a rare insight into how the perceptual 
process works under normal circumstances. Nyāya offers a further insight into the 
perceptual process by holding that, at the most basic level, the perceiver constructs an 
integrated whole of the elements occurring within view in order to ensure that the 
organism offers an unique response to whatever is confronting it essential for the survival 
of the organism. Since this integration occurs in terms of the organism‟s embodied and 
socio-cultural practices of life, it represents a process of narrative integration of a scene 
which remains in-built in the human psyche. This aspect assumes crucial importance in 
case of cinema.  
Bharata‟s theory of aesthetic pleasure or rasa delineates how various levels of 
identification develop between an artwork and its audiences which, in turn, evoke their 
corresponding affective states among them that enable them to relive a scene portrayed in 
the work. A question which had defied a satisfactory solution for a long time, why do the 
audiences enjoy tragedies, Abhinavagupta offers the solution that this happens because 
the audiences identify with the fictional mode of the artwork even before they have set 
their foot in the auditorium. By removing the audiences from their practical life, it has the 
effect of generalizing the audiences‟ future experiences in relation to the artwork. In this 
state, aesthetic experiences produce what has been called “ownerless” emotions among 
the audiences which are “tasted” from outside rather than personally “suffered” by them. 
Bharata‟s theory also anticipates Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the chiasm involving 
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subjective-objective alterations between subjects and objects in an artwork generating a 
much more enriching experience among the audiences.  
Ānadavardhana‟s theory of dhvani or suggestion conveys to the audiences the 
sense of a scene to the audiences that inheres beyond the meaning that occurs on the 
surface. Thus, the expression “The village is on the river Ganges” not only conveys a 
sense of „coolness‟ and „serenity‟ associated with a river, but also connotes „piety‟ and 
„holiness‟ to a section of people for whom Ganges happens to be a holy river. In a larger 
sense, this process, dhvani theory gives voice to certain experiences by human beings 
which they cannot express normally due to reaons such as social repression, existential 
crisis, or erasure of memory all of which keep influencing their actions on the surface. By 
helping human beings to confront what remains supressed within them, dhvani seeks to 
restore full subjectivity to human beings. In this sense, dhvani becomes one of the most 
potent instruments of understanding the deeper relevance that cinema has for the 
audiences.   
__________________________ 
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       Preface 
When I had started studying cinema in an informal course organized by Chitrabani, a 
Jesuit School of Social Communication, in Kolkata in 1989, its director, Fr. Gaston 
Roberge, had, with a missionary zeal, imbibed in us the need for studying Bharata‟s 
Nāṭyaśāstra, a classical Indian treatise on drama, in the context of studying cinema. He 
questioned if Aristotle‟s Poetics could still be useful for cinema, why could not his near 
contemporary Bharata‟s detailed compendium on drama, which is still practiced in India, 
be useful for cinema as well? The idea caught hold of my imagination which had not 
permitted me to „rest‟ since then. Since it was also the time of glasnost, which questioned 
existing thoughts, and perestroika, which called for new constructions in its place, it 
represented a time when conventional barriers were crumbling down all over the world. I 
asked myself why not new thoughts be infused into cinema at this moment of significant 
change occurring in the world? The charge that was ignited by Fr. Roberge at Chitrabani 
stayed throughout the period I taught film studies at St. Xavier‟s College, Kolkata 
thereafter, finally resulting in the present research work. 
However, it takes more than mere good faith to show that phenomenology and 
classical Indian theoris, some of the latter going back millenniums in India, are indeed 
applicable to a modern art-form like cinema. The six interviews that I took of eminent 
scholars and artists in Kolkata helped me to transform my long-cherished belief into firm 
conviction. Since these interviews occupy a central position in my whole research work, 
their import is being briefly mentioned below. 
Dr. Moinak Biswas, film scholar and filmmaker, who, while appreciating the new 
initiative, warned me that the existing film theories remain useful despite some of their  
purported gaps noticed in recent times. His advice that the new findings should not only 
be communicable to ordinary people but also should enrich their experiences of cinema 
has guided my efforts throughout this work.  
Prof. Amita Chatterjee, the Nyāya scholar, pointed out certain striking parallels 
between the Nyāya theory and the results of contemporary research in cognitive sciences. 
Her unequivocal mention that I was the first to apply Nyāya theory of perception may 
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meaningfully form the basis for aesthetic theorizations undertaken by Bharata and 
Ānandavardhana later on. This provided a scientific basis for uniting classical philosophy 
with the aesthetic field which had remained separate so far in the modern writings on 
Indian theories of art.    
The theatre director and filmmaker, Suman Mukhopadhyaya‟s practical insights 
as to how Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra makes sense in the theatres being staged even today and 
how its extension into cinema makes a lot of sense has been a revelation for me. His 
comparison between Greek and Indian drama and his demonstration of how he applies 
Bharata‟s insights to his own theatres and films, which are well-known for their 
innovative themes and sophisticated renderings, convinced me that, indeed, Bharata, like 
Aristotle, has a lot to contribute to cinema.  
A balancing factor for Mukhopadhyaya‟s advocacy has been the left art critic, 
Samik Bandyopadhyaya‟s insightful and, often relentless, exposé of the gaps in Bharata‟s 
theory when compared to Greek and Shakespearean drama. He argues that there is no 
historical proof that theatres were indeed staged in accordance with Bharata‟s ideas in 
ancient India. In contrast, concrete details of the staging of Greek and Shakespearean 
drama are available which helped a reading of these plays in their historical context. His 
timely warnings have put me on guard against any facile theorization throughout my 
research.  
Dr. Ashish Avikunthaka, Filmmaking Faculty at the Rhodes Island University, 
New York, USA, and an Experimental Filmmaker in his own right, repeatedly drew my 
attention to the often neglected ontological aspects of classical Indian theories in contrast 
to their much emphasized epistemic sphere. He argues that this unfortunate bias is a 
legacy of Renaissance which has considerably distorted our reading of Indian theories. 
As an example, he cites the neglect of the Tantrik base of Kashmir Śaivism, whose 
greatest practitioner, Abhinavagupta, is of immense value in studying artworks. His 
advise to had energized me to pay due attention to Abhinavagupta which he richly 
deserves.  
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Finally, interviewing the iconic actor and dramatist, Soumitra Chatterjee, who 
appears in as many as sixteen films of Satyajit Ray, has been an eye-opener as to where 
the Bengali film industry stood before the advent of Ray and the new outlook it 
incorporated after Pather Panchali (The Song of the Little Road, 1955). His insight has 
helped me to perceive the works of masters like Satyajit Ray, Ritwik Ghatak, and Mrinal 
Sen in a new light.   
In this connection, I sincerely thank the camerapersons Basab Mullik and Minarul 
for their patient video-taping of all the interviews and Minarul for diligently digitizing the 
voluminous material.  
The above interviews have been enclosed as Annexures 2 to 7 to this work. They 
may also be accessed directly from me at gmullik@hotmail.com. In this context, if 
“alternate methodology”, consisting of “piecemeal theories” and “local solutions”, paves 
the way for a greater understanding of cinema, I will consider my efforts to have been 
amply rewarded.     
_________________________ 
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Introduction 
The first lines in Richard Allen and Murray Smith‟s “Introduction” in their edited book 
Film Theory and Philosophy occur as follows: 
It is widely recognized that the field of film studies is in a state of flux, or even 
crisis or impasse…it is during such periods of relative intellectual insecurity that 
new connections and alliances may be forged, new perspectives discovered, and 
old questions recast in fresh and dynamic ways.
1
  
What is the nature of the “crisis” that the authors are talking about? David Bordwell and 
Noël Carroll have subsequently devoted a whole book, Post-Theory: Restructuring Film 
Studies,
2
 in tackling this problem. These authors hold that this “crisis” has primarily been 
caused by the existing film theories‟ deliberate suppression of ordinary film audiences‟ 
normal responses to cinema, a position which has been reinforced by my research here. 
Thus, the production of perception with its attendant levels of identification, affective 
states, and suggestive modes that generate the normal understanding of a scene among 
the audiences leading to the generation of different aesthetic experiences among them  
have generally been by-passed in favor of an „intellectualization” of the cinematic 
process by the film theories which sought to educate the audiences of how they should 
experience cinema rather than how they actually experience cinema.  
The basic tool of analysis employed by the existing film theories is disembodied 
vision which ignores the audiences‟ embodied experiences and their day-to-day socio-
cultural practices of life built around them which determine their most basic engagement 
with cinema. This excessive “intellectualization” of the cinematic process has created the 
“crisis” that has produced the “impasse” in film discourse in our times.  
In the above context, this research seeks to construct an „alternate‟ methodology 
involving basic levels of perception, identification, affect, and aesthetic pleasure 
                                                          
1
 Richard Allen and Murray Smith, “Introduction”, in Film Theory and Philosophy, Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997): 1-35, 1   
  
2
 David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, Ed. Post-Theory: Restructuring Film Studies (Wisconsin, Madison: The 
  University of Wisconsin, 1995) 
17 
 
involving film experiences based on the audiences‟ embodied experiences of the world 
and their socio-cultural practices based on them in order to recover what may be called 
normal aspects of the film viewing experience by the audiences. In this process, my 
research concerning cinema uses the theory of Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology and 
classical Indian theories in the following manner. First, it highlights the embodied aspects 
of the audiences‟ experiences of the world by applying the tenets of two philosophical 
schools involving Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of existential phenomenology and classical 
Indian theory of Nyāya. These theories, despite being born in different times and cultural 
environs, show remarkable affinity in holding that the body plays a crucial role in the 
human understanding of the world. A basic change that Merleau-Pontian phenomenology 
and Nyāya theory bring is that both mind and reason are embodied, which demolishes 
the idea that they represent centers of transparent intelligence or à priori center of 
“categories of understanding” that function beyond the body. The revolutionary change 
that embodiment entails is to shift focus from an objective, „out there‟ understanding of 
the world to a subjective, „lived‟ there experience of the world. This line of thinking, 
which is being increasingly supported by findings in cognitive research, has the potential 
to sweep away in one stroke much of the cherished pillars of Western thought as well as 
significantly alter the way much of Indian philosophy has been understood so far.  
Secondly, while both theories consider “consciousness” to be an effect of the 
bodys‟ interactions with the world appearing in the shape of body-memory, Nyāya 
additionally holds that human beings have an inherent urge to narratively integrate the 
elements occurring within human perceptual field into a perceptual whole and that 
perception is a product of “mode of appearance” of the integrated whole and its “mode of 
presentation” to the perceiver.  
Thirdly, based on the platform provided by the Nyāya theory, Bharata‟s theory of 
rasa or aesthetic pleasure analyzes various levels of identification that the audiences 
develop with artworks and the differing aesthetic experiences that they produce among 
them. Bharata also makes a seminal contribution in theorizing the production of an 
affective state among the audiences which makes their consciousness and their 
„unconscious‟ bodies relive a situation together.  
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Fourthly, Ānandavardhana‟s theory of dhvani or aesthetic suggestion builds-up on 
Nyāya and Bharata‟s theory to argue that art‟s basic purpose is to restore „full‟ word to 
individuals whose voice has been silenced due to reasons such as social repression, 
existential condition or erasure of archetypal experiences from their conscious memory. 
In this way, art helps individuals to regain their „lost‟ subjectivity. These aspects are 
expected to yield phenomenally rich dividends in understanding cinema.      
In my research, another important aspect comes to the fore. While there are 
remarkable affinities between Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and Nyāya theory, their 
underlying differences generate a number of insights about how cinema is experienced by 
the audiences. A significant difference between them, symbolic of the Western and 
Indian modes of thinking in general, is that while classical Indian theories analyze 
phenomena from a predominantly subjective hearer‟s point of view, the Western theories 
represent the more objectively inclined speaker‟s point of view to the reciever. The 
differential insight that Nyāya theory of perception generates in the process vis-à-vis the 
Merleau-Pontian theory may be briefly mentioned here to establish the point. Despite 
Nyāya being an arch realist school which holds that whatever one perceives are real in 
some form or the other, the reality, when analyzed from the perceiver‟s point of view 
presents a structured view of the percept as a product of the “mode of appearance” of the 
referent as its “mode of presentation” to the perceiver. The resulting reality is given by 
Nyāya in the following formula:  
            Perceptual Knowledge = Mode of Appearance of Referent + It‟s Mode of Presentation 
While significant progress has been made in applying Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology 
to cinema by film theoreticians Vivian Sobchack, Laura Marks, etc, discussed in detail in 
chapter 2, it is my contention that there has been no such systematic effort in applying 
classical Indian theories to cinema. In view of the enormous diversity of classical Indian 
theories (see „Genealogy of Classical Indian Schools‟ in chapter 3), which often presents 
an almost insurmountable difficulty for any researcher to negotiate them, my purpose is 
to construct a workable „primer‟ which would systematically „lead‟ us to the Indian 
aesthetic theories and the philosophical schools that underlie them. These aspects and 
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their implications for cinema would be explained in detail in chapter 3, 4, and 5 dealing 
with Nyāya theory of perception, Bharata‟s theory of rasa, and Ānandavardhana‟s theory 
of dhvani respectively. 
It may be pointed out that, while constructing phenomenological and classical 
Indian theories as “piecemeal” theories that offer „local‟ solutions, their application has 
been restricted to the most basic level of the audiences‟ understanding of cinema. 
Depending on the belief that only when this basic level is understood, does its political 
interpretation start making sense, care has been taken not to enter into the „politics‟ of 
such practices not only to restrict the scope of this research but also the argument that this 
primary level can serve the purpose of acting as the feeder grade for the existing film 
theories making them more „efficient‟ in understanding cinema.    
As far as the aesthetic field is concerned, the importance of ordinary experiences 
of the audiences in relation to cinema would be highlighted in terms of an important issue 
which had defied a satisfactory solution and which the existing film theories had 
„ignored‟: even though artworks create narrative situations modeled on real life 
experiences, emotions generated by artworks appear to be „pleasurable‟ in contrast to 
many of the emotions being „painful‟ in real life. Seeking an answer to the following 
question has, therefore, been the primary concern of aestheticians: “Despite being 
fictional in nature, how do artworks generate emotions among the audiences?” Called the 
“paradox of fiction”3 or the “paradox of junk fiction” as it has been recently called,4 it 
forms an essential part of the film audiences‟ ordinary experiences of cinema. The above 
question may be more precisely rephrased as follows: “Why do the audiences enjoy 
tragedies even when tragic sentiments are personally painful to them?” Since my research 
shows that existing film theories have either ignored or are unable to tackle this basic 
question, I will make it the central issue around which my whole research will evolve. In 
the process, I will seek to expose the limitations of the traditional aesthetic theories in the 
West as well as the contemporary film discourse. While the above limitations will be 
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discussed in sections of this Introduction and chapter 1, in chapters 2 and 3, I will discuss 
how Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology and classical Indian theory of Nyāya provide an 
effective platform for the aesthetic theories of Bharata‟s rasa and Ānandavardhana‟s 
dhvani theory, to be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, to make a useful contribution in 
unraveling the above question including the generation of an in-depth understanding of 
the processes of cinema. In chapter 6, I will sum up the “piece-meal” processes discussed 
so far with Conclusion indicating the reorientation in meaning that the determining 
concepts of the world like “the self”, “consciousness”, “the body”, “causality”, 
“rationality”, “meaning”, and “truth” undego in the hands of the embodied theories of 
Merleau-Ponty and Nyāya.      
In seeking a solution to the above paradox, I will start with the Western aesthetic 
theories like Aristotle‟s theory of purgation or catharsis, Kant‟s idea of disinterested 
observer, and Bullough‟s concept of psychic distance or Distance which will then be 
compared with the existing film theories for an indication as to where a gap occurs in our 
understanding of cinema.   
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) thought that tragedies act as instruments of purgation 
(katharsis) of the sentiments of pity and fear from the audience psyche.
5
 In this 
connection, Aristotle‟s use of the word „purgation” has been deeply puzzling. According 
to Filliozat, the Greek belief system is similar to the Indian belief system in the sense that 
acts of transgression are considered to pollute (miasma) not only the protagonists but also 
the people around them.
6
 Arguably, Aristotle held that, by identifying with the good and 
hating the bad in a tragic play, the audiences‟ reasons for pitying the protagonists and 
fearing the consequences of wrong-doings by them are both purged from their psyche, 
thereby providing a psychic relief among them.
7
 While Aristotle, thus, provides an 
answer to the question “how do the audiences enjoy tragedies?” it raises a fresh question 
about his position concerning other art-forms, like comedy, etc: what is purged from the 
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audiences‟ psyche in these cases? Since Aristotle is silent on them, his theory remains 
unclear about the basic purpose of arts: is it meant to be a vehicle for providing psychic 
relief to the audiences by educating them about the social conditions prevailing in the 
society, or to entertain the audiences with a make-believe world which would take them 
away, even if temporarily, from their day-to-day worries of life?    
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804 CE) holds that, bracketing human beings‟ practical 
concerns while contemplating art represents the “aesthetic attitude” of a “disinterested” 
observer which generalizes their “taste”.8 Devoid of selfish interests, such an experience, 
according to Kant, becomes „pleasurable‟ for the viewers concerned.9 However, in this 
theory, “disinterestedness” merely means the removal of the audiences‟ practical 
concerns of life during their contemplation of artworks. In this sense, it merely signifies a 
negative process; it does not offer anything positive as to why the audiences would 
engage in such a process at all while contemplating art. The crucial question is why 
would they feel compelled make the effort of bracketing their practical concerns during 
such a process? Clearly, a piece is still missing in this puzzle.  
The gap in Kant‟s theorization has been identified by Edward Bullough (1880-
1934) in his article on the “Psychical Distance” or “Distance”, published in 1912, 
instantly hailed as a seminal paper in this area.
10
 While following Kant‟s lead in holding 
that the audiences‟ personal concerns need to be removed during their art experiences, 
Bullough draws attention to the important problem that Kant‟s idea does not fully answer 
why are the audiences drawn to artworks at all? Bullough points out that, unless there is a 
basic concordance between the play and the audiences, they would not be drawn to it at 
all.
11
 In other words, mere “disinterestedness” while contemplating art is not enough; 
something like a “willing suspension of disbelief”, where the audiences “willingly” 
engage with the fiction of artworks necessary for them to engage with artworks at all.  
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This is a crucial idea which has been anticipated by the Indian aesthetes, Bhaṭṭa 
Nāyaka (c. 9th CE) and Abhinavagupta (c. 10th CE) in the Indian tradition. In considering 
Bharata‟s (c. early 1st millennium CE) seminal theory of aesthetic pleasure or rasa, which 
holds that the audiences invariably experience pleasure while engaging with artworks, 
including tragedies, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka holds that its reason lies in the fact that artworks 
generalize i.e. universalize audience experiences which do not affect them personally. 
Building on Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka‟s insight, Abhinavagupta holds that the above generalization 
occurs due to the audiences willing identification with the fictional mode of the artwork 
which makes them enjoy all artworks including tragedies. Dace notes the similarities 
between Bullough and Abhinava‟s ideas as follows: 
“Consent of the heart” is a key phrase in Abhinavagupta‟s dramatic theory and 
seems to anticipate Coleridge‟s idea of “that willing suspension of disbelief for 
the moment which constitutes poetic faith” in the theatre. This idea is not fully 
grasped in some quarters even today. There are still those who would agree with 
Samuel Johnson when he attacked the unity of place by arguing that it doesn‟t 
matter if Act I is laid in Athens and Act II in Rome, because we, in the theatre, 
know that we are neither in Athens nor in Rome anyway.
12
  
The fact of the matter is that the audiences willingly identify with the fictional mode of the 
play which makes them willingly suspend their disbelief that they are not in Athens or 
Rome during the play resulting in their experience as if they are indeed in Athens or 
Rome during the play! 
Above pre-modern thoughts set the stage for a meaningful discussion of the 
emergence and branching out of the film theories during the 20
th
 century. Developments 
in Psychology and Marxism during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century led to the idea that both 
human psyche and intelligence could be conditioned by forces beyond individual‟s 
conscious control. Thus, for Freud, repressed desires significantly motivate conscious 
human actions on the surface.
13
 Similarly, for Marx, the means of social production not 
                                                          
                
12
 Dace, “The Concept of ‘Rasa’”, 252 
13
 Refer to Sigmund Freud’s seminal work in 1905 Interpretation of Dreams (English translation published 
by London: MacMillan, 1913) among his other works all of which are based on this insight 
23 
 
only conditions human psyche but also significantly circumscribes human freedom of 
action, which, when used by oppressive social systems, become instruments of repression 
for the individuals concerned.
14
 Conditions for human freedom have subsequently been 
sought in the solutions prescribed by these two theories, viz. Freud‟s theory of 
sublimation where repressions are brought to the conscious level and dealt with and 
Marx‟s theory of social revolution where human beings own all means of social 
production which sets them free from repressive conditions.  
When these theories were in their prime during the first half of the 20
th
 century, 
cinema starts registering its presence in the world. In this context, the first significant film 
theory to emerge is the theory of montage formulated by the early Soviet filmmakers, like 
Lev Kuleshov, Psevolod Pudovkin, Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov   during the 
1920s and 30s, followed by the theory of realism formulated by the French film critic 
André Bazin and the German film historian Siegfried Kracauer during the 1940s and 50s. 
For both these theories, educating the masses about the conditions of freedom become 
their primary aim, though their modes of execution differ significantly.  
With the Russian revolution fresh in their minds, the Soviet filmmakers devised 
montage practices in cinema which opposed the conditioning process unleashed by the 
bourgeoisie. Thus, film montage juxtaposes discontinuous pieces of social reality to de-
naturalize the audience‟s conditioning effects. Eisenstein takes a step forward by 
advocating “collision montage” where montage pieces collide to generate radical new 
„meanings‟ among the audiences. For these filmmakers, medium specificity of the editing 
process becomes the ideal means for serving their purpose. In their zeal to educate the 
masses, these filmmakers disregarded the audiences‟ normal embodied experiences of the 
world and their socio-cultural practices on the ground that these meanings and emotions 
have been conditioned by bourgeois values which they are seeking to purge from the 
audience minds.    
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The realist theory of cinema, in contrast, points towards human beings‟ natural 
relationship with Nature and the world which generates their „lived‟ experiences of life 
among them. Cinema, by virtue of its ability to record reality as it is, is capable of 
presenting an un-manipulated reality in front of the audiences which makes them 
naturally partake in them. In this sense, the realists celebrate the medium specificity of the 
camera which has the unique ability to reproduce surface reality like a fingerprint of 
nature. While critiquing the editing process for its manipulative practices that interfere 
with reality, Bazin recommends the use of depth of field and long take as ideal forms of 
representation that respect the integrity of time and space for the audiences which 
generate an unmanipulated experience of the world among them.
15
  
Since both theories aim to educate the masses about the true nature of reality, they 
have no interest in dealing with the audiences‟ normal experiences of cinema on the 
surface. Naturally, questions like “why do the audiences enjoy tragedies?” hold no 
meaning for these theories. Bordwell critiques medium specific theories of both montage 
and realism on the ground that “no film lies any closer to the essence of the medium than 
others”.16 
During the 1950s and 60s, development of three distinct thought processes, e.g., 
Saussurian linguistics influenced by Sanskrit and Buddhist language studies,
17
 Lacanian 
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reading of Freud, and Althusserian reading of Marx motivated the formation of 
Contemporary Film Theory in the late „60s. Bordwell has categorized it as “subject-
position” theory which is solely geared towards analyzing how the audiences are 
conditioned or „fixed‟ by cinema, both psychologically and intellectually. On the 
question of the subject being fixed by cinema, Bordwell notes that for the new theory the 
subject is an empty signifier entirely constructed by the cinema: 
The subject is neither the individual person nor an immediate sense of one‟s 
identity or self. It is rather a category of knowing defined by its relation to objects 
and other subjects. Subjectivity is…unavoidably social. It is not a pre-given 
consciousness, it is acquired. Subjectivity is constructed through representational 
systems.
18
  
Bordwell mentions that this is the first “Grand Theory” to emerge in the domain of 
cinema in the sense that it brings psychology, social ideology, and communication 
together in the form of a unified theory.
19
 Contemporary film theory which holds that 
cinema is symptomatic of the larger conditioning process operating in the society.
20
 
Cinema reconfigures human subject‟s drives in terms of mental representations which are 
either repressed or channelized into social patterns acceptable to the bourgeoisie.
21
 The 
unity of the subject position constructed by the society is primarily based on Lacan‟s 
theory where the unity of human consciousness enables a person to speak from a coherent 
position. This unity is conditioned by two factors in the psychological register: an 
Imaginary, in which the subject is represented as a mental and bodily unity by the other, 
metaphorically represented as the “Mirror Stage” constituted by the Care-givers of the 
child and the Symbolic, in which the patriarchal society governs its subjects according to 
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social laws formulated “In the Name of the Father” where the “Father” symbolically 
remains the patriarchy which acts as the fountainhead of all wisdom in the society.
22
  
Althusser notes that the “Mirror” and “Symbolic” stages represent the 
“Ideological State Apparatus” constituted by „values‟ enshrined in social institutions such 
as family, religion, education, etc. These institutions “hail” the individual by a name and 
a position bestowed on him by the social hierarchy which the individual accepts 
„voluntarily‟ due to social conditioning.23 Lacan and Althusser hold that, in the above 
process the social subject is “split” psychologically and intellectually from his real self 
right from his birth.
24
 Saussurian linguistics contributes to the process by pointing out 
that meaning arises through differences occurring within a closed structure of such social 
signifiers.
25
 This idea replaces the notion of a homogenous society which generates 
meaning through social differences that is duly passed off as the “natural” order of the 
society. Cinema aids and abets this process by generating meaning along these given 
lines and channelizing audience responses accordingly.  
Bordwell notes that, since contemporary film theory leaves “no room for „agency‟ 
where ideological representations so thoroughly determine subjectivity”, it is not clear 
how individuals could ever be made to resist ideology.
26
 In this dismal picture propagated 
by contemporary film theory, Cultural Studies introduces socio-cultural variations as a 
factor that has the potential to subvert the above all-consuming process: 
Culture is a site of struggle and contestation among different groups. A culture is 
conceived as a network of institutions, representations, and practices which 
produce differences of race, ethnic heritage, class, gender/sexual preferences and 
the like. These differences are centrally involved in the production of meaning.
27
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In the form of new identifications and alignments, cultural studies shift focus from film 
as a text to its reception by the audiences. However, Bordwell has shown through an 
exhaustive analysis that contemporary film theory and cultural study of cinema intersect 
in the following areas: human institutions and social practices are socially constructed in 
all significant respects; theory of subjectivity is required to understand viewers‟ 
engagement with cinema; spectators‟ response to cinema depends upon processes of 
identification theorized by contemporary film theory; and linguistics provides the model 
for understanding how film images generate meaning among the audiences.
28
 In other 
words, according to Bordwell, even cultural studies continued to understand cinema in 
terms of the very same unitary paradigm provided by the contemporary film theory!  
Since contemporary film theory is considered to be a grand theory that 
purportedly „fits‟ all situations, Bordwell notes that “By the mid-1980s, subject-position 
theory had become sterile through repetition”.29 For example, in the subject-position 
theory, aesthetic questions like “why do the audiences enjoy tragedies?” are ultimately 
rendered irrelevant since they are ultimately ideologically constructed by the capitalist-
bourgeois society.  
Dissatisfaction with contemporary film theory signaled the emergence of 
Cognitive Film Theory during the 1980s. Reacting against the notion that the film 
audiences are the ultimate constructs of cinema who passively consume ideology, 
cognitive film theory holds that viewers interact with cinema in the same conscious, 
rational way as they do in the real world.
30
 Ultimately, cognitive film theory is an out and 
out intellectual theory of meanings where emotions arise only from expectations and their 
interrupted or delayed fulfillment in the world.
31
  
In the above sense, neither depth psychology nor the body form part of this theory. In this 
sense, cognitive film theory‟s empowerment of the subject remains an intellectual 
empowerment. Critics have since held this theory to be a prototype of the economic 
                                                          
                
28
 Bordwell, “Film Studies and Grand Theory”, 13-8 
                
29
 12  
                
30
 Kuhn and Westwell, “Cognitivism (cognitive film theory)”, in Oxford Dictionary of Film Studies, 86 
                
31
 Ibid 
28 
 
model where buyers optimize their choice in a market place by undertaking a rational 
cost-benefit analysis.
32
 Nowell-Smith notes: 
As a general model for aesthetic perception, it [cognitive film theory] is 
deficient…I would not deny that inference plays a role in aesthetic appreciation, 
in understanding a Bach partia or a Jimmy Hendrix guitar solo…or making sense 
of the hero‟s behavior in Hamlet…but there is more to it than that. There is more 
to films than is allowed for in the theory of narration, and more to mind than is 
allowed for in even the most sophisticated cognitivist model.
33
      
The intellectual bias of the cognitive film theory, where the audiences infer the plot of the 
film intellectually by piecing together clues given in the film as a detective surveying a 
crime scene, makes it ill-equipped to deal with aesthetic questions depth psychological 
issues like “why do the audiences enjoy tragedies?”  
While dealing with the limitations of film theories in chapter 1, I show how both 
Eisenstein and Bazin deal at length with the ideas of embodiment and film sensuality 
initially which they later abandon in favor of generating mathematically calculable 
audience responses. Eisensteins‟ ideas have since been rediscovered by André Gaudreault 
and Tom Gunning in their theorization of Early Cinema as a means of monstration or 
“showing” producing emotions and affects in the form of awe among the audiences, an 
aspect which is increasingly becoming important in the context of “awe-inspiring” digital 
effects of contemporary block-buster movies. I build on this insight of Early Cinema to 
show how conventional film histories and film studies have neglected the embodied 
sensual aspects of cinema and the socio-cultural practices built around them in favor of 
the narrative properties of cinema advocated by both contemporary and cognitive film 
theories.  
The primary resources consulted regarding Classical Film Theory have been 
Sergei Eisenstein‟s collected works on montage and André Bazin‟s collected articles on 
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realism in cinema.
34
 For a critique of both their theories, I depend on Brian Henderson‟s 
classic work on the respective roles that montage and realism play in understanding 
cinema.
35
 Regarding Contemporary Film Theory, the basic sources have been the original 
works of Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, and Ferdinand de Saussure.
36
 While the main 
secondary source has been Anthony Easthope‟s work, a critic of contemporary film 
theory has been variously culled from the works of David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, 
Richard Allen and Murray Smith, and Christine Gledhill and Linda Williams.
37
 The 
primary source for Cognitive Film Theory has been the detailed elaboration of its 
parameters in David Bordwell‟s work on narration in fiction films and its critic by 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Bill Nichols.
38
 For an insight into Early Cinema, my primary 
source has been the writings of André Gaudreault and Tom Gunning including their 
critique of the existing film history which I have accessed through Wanda Strauven‟s 
edited work.
39
 For a general critic of film studies, I have depended on Christine Gledhill 
and Linda Williams‟ edited work as well as on Bordwell, Carroll, Allen and Smith‟s 
works mentioned above.
40
 As an overview of film discourse, Thomas Wertenberg and 
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Angela Curran‟s edited work has proved to be useful in terms of the basic texts they 
incorporate and the informed analysis they undertake there.
41
                 
Since disembodied vision has been central to film theories which, arguably, has 
made normal response of the film audiences irrelevant to these theories, it becomes 
necessary to explore new areas of thought for incorporating the body and the film 
sensations it generates among the audiences. The two areas chosen in this paper are 
western theories of phenomenology and classical Indian theory of Nyāya, both of which 
are dominated by the role of the body and the attendant socio-cultural practices in terms 
of which cognitions and emotions are generated among human beings in these theories in 
the course of their normal interactions with the world.  
The phenomenological line starts with Kant who introduces à priori “categories 
of understanding” in human consciousness,42 like understanding space & time, causality, 
etc, elements which are purportedly based on the Newtonian worldview, which are 
imposed on reality (phenomena) for its understanding rather than understanding it in 
terms of things-in-themselves (noumena). Matilal notes the implication of this process: 
For realism, the familiar physical object not only exists but also exists 
independently. This crucial expression “independently” means that if by chance 
all the sentient creatures were annihilated, our familiar world would still continue 
to exist in the same way. Phenomenalism disputes this claim: the familiar objects 
exist but not independently of any sentient creature‟s being aware of them. If all 
“minds” were annihilated, it would be false to claim that a certain set of entities 
existed.
43
         
By signifying a basic difference between the objective and subjective experiences 
and their interpretations, between crude data passively received and their construction 
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into an understandable structure, the Kantian process raises certain questions regarding 
limits of knowledge.
44
 In this sense, “experience” means how the world appears to the 
subject rather than how it really is in itself. Matilal notes the paradoxicality of this 
situation: 
Empiricists try to make experience the “building blocks” of our knowledge, but if 
those building blocks are given in terms of appearances only, then the edifice of 
knowledge will show only appearance and not reality…[In this sense], we can at 
best talk about our knowledge of the appearances.
45
 
One can, thus, have a causal theory of appearances, as given in human experiences, but 
certainly not one of reality. A. J. Ayer calls this “the existence of an unbridgeable gap 
between the conclusion we desire to reach and the premises from which we set out”.46  
In sum, Kant‟s revolution in epistemology shifts focus from an objective 
understanding of the world, a „scientific‟ process from which human subjects are 
debarred, to a subjective understanding of the world in which pure objectivity of reality is 
no more available to human beings. However, since Kant never denies the existence of 
objective reality „out there‟, his account may be considered as a subjective-objective 
account of the world. Thus, for example, an “object” out there is „perceived‟ in its three-
dimensional form in terms of the spatial “categories of understanding” imposed on the 
“object” by the perceiver. This new mode of experiencing has important ramifications for 
understanding audience response to cinema.  
The phenomenological theory, starting with Husserl, which originally owes its 
allegiance to Kant, however, also signifies a shift from him. Husserl moves away from 
Kant‟s “categories of understanding”, which are given à prioris in human consciousness 
not directly involved with the body to human beings‟ „lived” experiences of the world 
where the body plays a significant role. He holds that “objects” are perceived through the 
imposition of archetypal elements of structure, called “eidos”, formed in human 
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consciousness during their embodied and socio-cultural living in the world. Thus, even 
though an “object” is actually perceived in 2-diemsions, the archetypal forms contained 
within human consciousness are imposed on the percept to make it appear as a 3-
dimensional entity. While this sounds similar to the Kantian theory of “categories of 
understanding”, Husserl‟s theory is different in the sense that he imposes “categories of 
experience” on reality in terms of human beings‟ „lived‟ experiences of the world. Husserl 
further holds that, in human perception, “objects” get related to other “objects” 
subjectively through the imposition of a functional relationship between them in terms of 
the perceivers‟ embodied and socio-cultural experiences of life called “motivational 
causality” by him.  
Coming next in the phenomenological line is Heidegger who expands the mode of 
human experience of the world by more explicitly including the human body within it. He 
holds that human beings deal with the world on the basis of their “tools” which both 
consciously and bodily orient them in particular ways towards the world. It is this 
orientation which acts as the basis for human understanding of the world. Heidegger‟s 
notion of “dasein” potentially represents all the relationships that human beings thus forge 
while being-in-the-world.  
While the notion of human consciousness remains present in both Husserl and 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty makes human being‟s embodied understanding of the world 
fundamental to his phenomenological theory. Thus, Merleau-Ponty holds that human 
beings‟ primordial experiences of living and responding to nature have already oriented 
their bodies in a certain way towards the world. Called “operational intentionality”, the 
body, in this sense, already knows how to react to things of nature, like trees, mountains, 
rivers, etc, which Merleau-Ponty calls wild meaning that remains as the innermost core of 
human understanding of the world on which all cognitive meanings are ultimately based:  
In a sense the whole of philosophy…consists in restoring a power to signify, a 
birth of meaning, or a wild meaning, an expression of experience by experience, 
which in particular clarifies the special domain of language. And in a sense…this 
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language is everything, since it is the voice of no one, since it is the voice of the 
things, the waves, the  forests.
47
  
Moreover, since the world is continuously being shaped and reshaped by human agency, 
the human body keeps reorienting itself in terms of human interventions in nature, a 
process which forms a second layer of instrumentality vis-à-vis the world which Merleau-
Ponty calls “bodily intentionality”. Since human beings understand the world in terms of 
these two bodily functions, Merleau-Ponty dispenses with the notion of human 
consciousness in his phenomenology.   
A striking example of the bodily processes is evident in Merleau-Ponty‟s notion 
of the synesthetic experience. Since vision and touch deal with the same area of reality, 
embodied experiences ultimately generate a synesthetic experience among the perceivers, 
like ice being perceived as cold, etc, an aspect which has significant implications for 
cinema detailed in chapter 2. Merleau-Ponty also develops his idea of chiasmic 
interaction where a perceiver subjectively alters his position of being a subject and object 
frequently which, according to Merleau-Ponty, forms the basis for inter-subjectivity 
among human beings. This aspect has been detailed in chapter 2.  
While the primary sources of phenomenological theories occur in the works of 
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
48
 for secondary 
sources, I primarily depend on the two compendiums of phenomenology edited by 
Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall, and Sebastian Luft & Søren Overgaard, both of 
which are invaluable for understanding the intricacies of phenomenological theories and 
their evolution in time.
49
 For a modern interpretation of Merleau-Ponty‟s thoughts on 
vision-touch equivalence which leads to synesthetic perception and his notion of the 
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chiasm that deal with the phenomenon of subject-object alteration, I have depended on 
Daniel Rycroft‟s article in his edited work.50 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson point out 
that Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the embodiment of mind has the potential to subvert most 
of the conventional tenets of Western thought. Since some of their findings find support 
from contemporary cognitive research, they gain added potency.
51
 While the first work 
that explores the embodied aspects of cinema belongs to Linda William, application of 
Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology to cinema has systematically taken off since Vivian 
Sobchack‟s work in 1992 followed by the works of Laura Marks in 2000 and 2002, both 
of them I have consulted extensively.
52
 For phenomenological explanations of film 
examples, I have primarily dependent on Hunter Vaughan‟s phenomenological analysis 
of Resnais and Godard and Nariman Skakov‟s detailed analysis of Tarkovsky‟s films.53 
In analyzing a particularly rich phenomenological sequence from Ray‟s Pather Panchali, 
I have critiqued both Geeta Kapur
54
 and her critic by Ravi Vasudevan
55
 as missing the 
real essence of the film which also portrays a significant difference in the way the East 
and the West perceive the ebb and flow of life in society.   
In chapter 3 dealing with “Nyāya theory of Perception”, it has been shown that a 
perceiver subjectively forms an integrated whole of the elements occurring within her 
perceptual field for generating her unified response to the view. This integration occurs in 
terms of the perceiver‟s embodied experiences and socio-cultural practices of life. The 
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“knowledge” necessary for the survival of an organism in the world ultimately means the 
formation of an “invariable sequence” between elements which serves the purpose of 
„integrating‟ them within view.56 Thus, both „fire burns‟ and „fire cooks‟ are 
“knowledge” produced from the formation of “invariable sequences” between „fire‟ and 
bodily „pain‟ on the one hand and „fire‟ and „food‟ on the other signifying the formation 
of socio-cultural practices built around fire in human society. In contrast to Western 
theories, there is nothing à priori in classical Indian theories in general and the Nyāya 
theory in particular,
57
 the whole process being an embodied process occurring at the 
deppest level of one‟s existence and the socio-cultural practices around them. In this 
sense, classical Indian theory of Nyāya holds that even abstract thoughts, like inference, 
hypothesis, etc, are ultimately based on observing such “invariable sequences” occurring 
in one‟s experience. Part 1 of chapter 3 deals with the production of Nyāya theory of 
perception including the production of emotions. Here I have added a section on 
„Perception and the Compositional Principles of Indian Art‟ to show the close affinity 
between the two. Part 2 illustrates the principles explained in Part 1 with the help of 
visual images. It specifically deals with instances of how meanings and emotions are 
formed by images in art-forms including cinema.  
Ideally one should use original sources like basic philosophical treatises, while 
dealing with classical Indian theories like the Nyāya theory. However, this is likely to 
prove counter-productive in the Indian case, particularly in case of a modern art-form like 
cinema. This is an important point which needs clarification. Dasgupta notes:  
The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences (sūtras) 
which did not elaborate the subject, but served only to revive in the reader the lost 
threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already 
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thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were 
like lecture hints, intended for those who already had direct elaborate oral 
instructions on the subject.
58
  
As time passed, these half-sentences needed to be elaborated not only because their 
original import was getting lost but also because questions were being raised on them by 
rival theories. Thus, the age of “commentaries” and “commentaries on commentaries” 
started. As far as Nyāya is concerned, its original source is attributed to Gautama, also 
called Akṣapāda, who composed the Nyāyasūtra in circa 2nd century CE. The earliest 
commentary on it was written by the Naiyāyika, Vātsyāyana, called the Vātsyāyana-
bhāṣya (c. 4th CE). This work was heavily criticized by the Buddhist theoretician 
Diṅnāga, in answering which the Naiyāyika, Uddyotkara, wrote a commentary on 
Vātsyāyana‟s commentary, called the Bhāṣya-vārtikka (c. 7th CE). As fresh questions 
appeared, the Naiyāyika, Vācaspati Miśra, wrote a commentary on Uddyotkara‟s 
commentary, called the Vārttika-tātparyaṭīkā (c. 9th CE). As questions still kept coming 
from the Buddhists and other rival theorists, the Naiyāyika, Udayana, wrote a 
commentary on Miśra‟s Vārttika, called the Nyāya-tātparyaṭīkā-pariśuddhi (c. 10th CE). 
In turn, the new commentary generated a further commentary, called Nyāya-nibandha-
prakāśa (c. 14th CE), and so on till almost the end of the 17th century CE.59 This surfeit of 
material, compounded by the changing meaning of the technical terms used by the 
commentators, makes it a forbiddingly complex process to be used meaningfully for a 
work which does not have philosophy as its core discourse. In general, Dasgupta suggests 
adopting the following course of action: 
System in the sūtras is weak and shapeless like a new born baby, but if we take it 
along with its developments down to the beginning of the 17
th
 century, the theory 
appears as a fully formed entity, strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is, 
therefore, necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the 
growth that it has acquired in its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole.
60
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I have heeded Dasgupta‟s advice and used the latest and the most rational (not „spiritual‟) 
interpretations provided by modern philosophers of classical Indian theories, like S. N. 
Dasgupta, Mysore Hiriyanna, S. Radhakrishnan, V. Raghavan, K. Krishnamoorty, Bimal 
Krishna Matilal, J. N. Mohanty, etc. They have preferred to write in English for a greater 
reach across the world despite their acknowledged expertise in Sanskrit. On the other 
hand, it must be mentioned that I have also always appreciated Western interpreters of 
Indian classical theories for the reason that they bring with them a different set of rational 
sensibilities to their work. We, thus, have Western experts like Daniel Ingalls, Karl 
Potter, Gerald Larson, Edwin Gerow, Sheldon Pollock, Wendy Doniger O‟Flaherty, etc, 
whose understanding and critique of Indian theories are extremely valuable in that 
respect. Thus, in the context of classical Indian theories, Indian scholars trained in 
Western thought and Western scholars trained in Indian thought complement each other 
beautifully in bringing us closer to the truth. While the continued study of Sanskrit as one 
of the mother languages of the world can never be underestimated, meaningful 
translations of all the salient texts in English have now reached a critical mass where 
Indian philosophy can now be studied in English alone for all works except for more 
dense research works. I believe a similar situation prevails now in the study of the ancient 
Greek philosophy or Marxism – while the knowledge of Greek or German may still be 
preferable, they are not essential for the pursuit of these studies any more.  
The primary source of the Nyāya School is Gautama‟s Nyāyasūtra (c. 2nd CE). 
However, as already discussed, since the original source belongs to 2
nd
 century CE, real 
import of the terms needed to be understood in the modern context, particularly since 
they are intended to be applied to a modern art-form like cinema.
61
 Bimal Krishna 
Matilal‟s two books, The Navyanyāya Doctrine of Negation and Perception have proved 
to be invaluable for my work.
62
 It may be acknowledged that without modern 
clarifications provided by Matilal of Nyāya concepts of perception, this thesis could not 
have been written. Matilal‟s other books have clarified various other points which would 
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have otherwise remained vague.
63
 Another modern Indian philosopher without whose 
brilliant analysis this work would have suffered immeasurably is Jiten Mohanty, whose 
classic works Classical Indian Philosophy and Gangeśa‟s Theory of Truth, have been 
repeatedly consulted to provide clarity to the ongoing research.
64
 Mohanty‟s expertise in 
Phenomenology has been an added advantage for this work. Two persons who are 
carrying on the good work of Matilal and Mohanty are Jonardon Ganeri and Amita 
Chatterjee, both of whom have been extensively consulted by me.
65
 My personal 
interactions with Chatterjee, including the valuable interview she gave me (see Annexure 
3), have helped me to get into the spirit of Nyāya thinking essential for this work. For 
Nyāya theory of vision-touch equivalence, apart from accessing Matilals‟ works, I have 
also consulted Diana L. Eck‟s celebrated work on Indian theory of darśana.66 No 
classical Indian theory can be discussed with authority without consulting the series on 
Indian philosophy, edited and published by Karl H. Potter.
67
 Similarly, though a bit dated, 
yet S. N. Dasgupta‟s five volume history of Indian philosophy is full of insights which a 
researcher can ill-afford to miss. As far as my area of research is concerned, volume 1 of 
the series has proved to be of real value to me.
68
 In interpreting meanings of images, 
Christopher Pinney‟s photographs taken during and after the colonial period69 and 
Jyotindra Jain‟s interpretation of folk and ritual art in terms of traditional Indian 
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painting
70
 has been extremely useful in understanding Indian social life and its 
manifestation in the domain of artconsulted.  
In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that, while applying Nyāya concepts to 
cinema, I have extended them in several places, all the time ensuring that the spirit of 
Nyāya does not suffer in the process.  
While the Nyāya theory of perception is a philosophical theory, the next two 
theories discussed in chapters 4 and 5 are full-fledged Indian aesthetic theories involving 
Bharata‟s theory of rasa or aesthetic pleasure and Ānandavardhana‟s theory of dhvani or 
aesthetic suggestion. One notes a significant difference here with the Western trend: 
while, in the West, all major philosophers have acted as aestheticians too, in India, the 
practitioners in the two domains have largely remained separate. Thus, while one may 
note a continuous line of philosopher-aesthetes from Aristotle to Kant to Merleau-Ponty, 
the sole exception in India is provided by Abhinavagupta who happened to be a 
polyvalent genius in many fields.   
Bharata‟s (c. early 1st millennium CE) theory of rasa or aesthetic pleasure is 
based on Bharata‟s well-known treatise on drama, called the Nāṭyaśāstra. I argue that 
Bharata uses Nyāya theory of perception to build up his aesthetic theory. Based on the 
“knowledge” of “invariable sequences” that appear as integrated wholes within view in 
the Nyāya theory and human response to it, Bharata builds up a theory involving four 
different states of “identification” (sama bhāva) occurring between the audiences and the 
artworks and the evocation of corresponding “affective states” (sthayī bhāva) among 
them. The latter, though implied in the Nyāya theory has not been theorized by them. In 
this sense, it remains a seminal „discovery‟ of Bharata which help the audiences to bridge 
the gap between their consciousness and their unconscious bodies in order to respond to a 
scene as one unified organism. Bharata‟s most celebrated discovery, however, occurs 
when he holds that the emotions produced as a result are invariably „pleasurable‟ for the 
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audiences, called the rasa, irrespective of whether these emotions are „pleasuable‟ or 
„painful‟ in real life.    
However, despite his path-breaking work, Bharata is unable to offer a satisfactory 
explanation of the question “why do the audiences enjoy tragedies?” A satisfactory 
answer to this basic paradox is eventually found by the philosopher-aesthetes, Bhaṭṭa 
Nāyaka (c. 9th CE) and Abhinavagupta (c. 10th CE), the latter also being the commentator 
of Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra. While Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka developed the idea that artworks have the 
effect of generalizing audience‟s experiences because such works are fictional in nature 
and hence removed from practical life, Abhinava finally answered the question by saying 
that it is due to a basic level of identification occurring between the audiences and the 
fictional mode of the artwork. Since the audiences identified with the fictional mode of 
artworks, they “willingly” engaged with such works. This preliminary level of 
identification with an artwork, generalizes all their future responses to the artwork, 
ensuring, in th process, that emotions are not personally „suffered‟ by the audiences as in 
case of their real life. In this sense, these emotions have been called “ownerless 
emotions” or “generalized emotions” which remain ever „pleasurable‟ for the 
audiences.
71
 It is this experience which has been called rasa or aesthetic pleasure by 
Bharata which, together with the inputs given by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta, as 
early as 10
th
 CE had offered a satisfactory solution to the “paradox of junk fiction” in 
India.               
Bharata‟s theory of identification, affective state, and aesthetic pleasure has been 
elaborated in chapter 4. The primary source is Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra with 
Abhinavagupta‟s (c. 10th CE) valuable commentary thereon.72 A classic rendering of 
Abhinava‟s aesthetic thoughts has been provided by Raniero Gnoli which acts as an 
indispensable guide for the purpose.
73
 For a modern rendering of Bharatas‟ concepts, 
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valuable secondary sources have been Edwin Gerows‟ works on Indian aesthetics.74 
Bharat Gupt‟s work, which compares the dramatic concepts of Greek and Indian theatres, 
is also an essential study on the subject.
75
 Similarly, the works of Maria Christopher 
Byrski‟s and Christopher Lane‟s PhD work on Indian drama, which analyzes various 
stages of an unfolding drama, has proved to be invaluable for me.
76
 In comparing 
Bharata‟s thoughts with the crucial discovery of “mirror neurons” in cognitive science, I 
have used the pioneering work of Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia on the 
subject.
77
 In rendering Bharata‟s concepts of aesthetic experience into cinema, I have 
used Sergei Eisenstein‟s writings, published in three volumes by BFI, and referred to 
André Bazin‟s articles, published in two volumes by California University.78 For 
discussing examples form suspense films, I have consulted Hitchcock‟s interviews by 
François Truffaut as well as Noël Carroll‟s work on horror films.79  
Ānandavardhana‟s theory of dhvani or suggestion (c. 9th CE) deals with the basic 
modes of artistic expression that help generate the suggestive sense of an artwork. In this 
sense, dhvani (lit., „echo‟) theory represents a crucial aspect of artworks where they 
express that which cannot be directly communicated by individuals in normal life due to 
various reasons like social repression, existential conditions, or erasure of significant 
memory, all of which, however, keep influencing individual behavior on the surface.  It is 
argued that by using dhvani as a means the above three types of unexpressed experiences 
n be brought to the surface. In this process, the dhvani theory uses the following three 
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suggestive means: suggestion through realistic modes of expression, suggestion through 
formal modes of expression, and a suggestive mode that directly evokes aesthetic 
experiences among the audiences. By giving „voice‟ to the „voiceless‟, dhvani theory 
helps restore „full‟ subjectivity to suffering individuals.  
All the above dhvani modes have been profusely illustrated with examples from 
world cinema, including Bollywood cinema. The continuing relevance of Ānanda‟s 
dhvani theory, including the valuable commentary made on it by Abhinavagupta, is 
emphasized when Lacan profusely acknowledges his indebtedness to their ideas in the 
course of firming up his own ideas on post-structural theory.   
Ānanda‟s original work, Dhvanyāloka (c. 9th CE), with Abhinavagupta‟s 
commentary Locana (c. 10
th
 CE), has been rendered into English by Daniel Ingalls, M. V. 
Patwardhan, and Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, with extensive critical notes by Daniel 
Ingalls. This authentic compendium, published by Harvard University, which has become 
a classic in its own right, is being used here as the primary source.
80
 As secondary 
sources, various elucidations of Ānanda‟s dhvani theory by the following writers have 
been used: Mukund Madhava Sharma, Mysore Hiriyanna, and K. Krishnamoorthy.
81
 
Since Ānanda‟s theory primarily deals with literary theories, I have used Edward Dimock 
Jr.‟s introduction to Indian literature, especially the portion dealing with Indian aesthetic 
theories written by Edwin Gerow. Dimock‟s introduction and Gerow‟s insight have 
offered me valuable clarifications on the theories prevailing in Ānanda‟s time which he 
had successfully challenged.
82
 For an in-depth understanding of the critical comments 
made by Abhinavagupta, I have found the two works of Harsha V. Dehejia to be 
extremely useful.
83
 For rendering the important concept of “darśan” in modern terms, I 
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have used Diana L. Eck, Jan Gonda, and Stella Kramrisch as my guide.
84
 For comparing 
Ānanda‟s thoughts with Jacques Lacan‟s post-structural thoughts, I have used Lacan‟s 
original writings in Écrits: A Selection (1989).
85
 For understanding some of the abstruse 
concepts in the practices of Tantra which Abhinava uses in his analysis, I have relied on 
Philip Rawson‟s important work on Tantra86 and SenSharma‟s book on Kashmir 
Śaivism.87 Sheldon Pollock‟s article “The Social Aesthetic and Sanskrit Literary Theory” 
has been a revelation in terms of social prohibitions and their transgression by artworks in 
the Indian society.
88
 Rachel Dwyer‟s works have given me an extremely useful insight 
into how narrative construction and other processes operate in Bollywood cinema.
89
 An 
important topical work on Indian cinema is Ashish Rajadhyaksha‟s Indian Cinema in the 
Time of Celluloid.
90
 His opening lines “any researcher who produces an account of 
something, by definition, also „produces‟ the object of the account” acts as the basis for 
his important effort at writing Indian cinema‟s account of itself, its self-description.91 
However, since Rajadhyaksha uses narrative contents as the means for industrial self-
legitimacy of Indian cinema where the film‟s „public‟ address system meant for the 
Censors acts as a possible third mode for guiding spectatorial action, etc,
92
 ideally an 
exploration into his ideas has to come after the basics of a „primitive‟ understanding of 
film images have been dealt with in my present research.   
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One must acknowledge that while applying dhvani theory to cinema, I have 
consciously extended Ānanda and Abhinava‟s thoughts, but always remaining within the 
bounds set by the authors themselves.             
The “piecemeal” theories being represented in this work, which generally signify 
“middle level” research as Carroll and Bordwell have said,93 have been summarized in 
chapter 6 titled “Cinema and Alternate Methodology: A Case of „Piecemeal‟ Theorizing”. 
They occur as part of an “alternate methodology” that aims to deal with areas left 
untouched by the existing film theories. The distinct advantage that these “piecemeal” 
theories provide is their ability to deal with the audiences‟ normal responses to cinema 
which have been suppressed in the contemporary film discourse. The primary task of the 
“alternate methodology” is to uncover meanings and processes that remain as wild 
meanings below the threshold of existing film theories. My research is aimed at 
uncovering these meanings for which the main motivation has come from the “piecemeal 
theorizing” undertaken by David Bordwell and Noël Carroll in their writings on the 
issue.
94
  
In the concluding section of my thesis, I have tried to clarify what “alternate 
methodology” means by the determining concepts of “the self”, “consciousness”, “the 
body”, “reason”, “causality”, “meaning”, and “truth” in the two philosophical schools of 
Merleau-Ponty and Nyāya, which make the body central to their theories. Since these 
crucial concepts not only underlie the way human beings relate to the world but also the 
manner in which the audiences experience cinema, a competent comprehension of the 
difference between an embodied and a disembodied analysis of phenomena becomes 
essential for this work.   
The general “methodology” I have followed in my work concurs with Bordwell‟s 
understanding of the term: “In film studies, as in its literary counterpart, „method‟ has 
been largely synonymous with „interpretative school‟.”95 This “interpretation” occurs in 
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terms of a semantic field involving theoretical concepts that seek to generate „meaning‟ 
from the field, a set of inferential procedures employed for the purpose of moving from 
point A to point B in the field, a conceptual map that determines the path of progression 
from A to B within the field, and a rhetorical practice that organizes arguments in order 
to reach the final “interpretation” or conclusion.96 The process delineated by Bordwell is 
duly supported by classical Indian theories which hold that the “method” of knowing 
something “starts with an initial doubt (saṃśaya) that sets in motion a process of 
investigation aimed at reaching certitude, resulting in a conclusion that finally generates 
conviction (nirṇaya)” in the enquirer.97 In adopting this process, the Indian method banks 
on resolving the doubts of a hypothetical party, called the madhyastha or “the person in 
the middle” who is neutral to the outcome, in order to resolve his/her doubts about the 
conclusion.
98
  
While the above arguments hint at a broad convergence between Western and 
Indian ideas concerning “methodology”, there are, however, significant differences 
between the two. As far as contemporary Western thought is concerned, it broadly 
believes that method may be separated from metaphysical reality which, when applied to 
reality from outside, is capable of reaching an objective and accurate conclusion about 
the state of reality. This idea is broadly based on the evolution of some of the following 
assumptions about “method” in Western thought: Descartes‟ notion of transparent reason, 
which often appeared as common sense, is based on the underlying assumption that a 
“transparent intelligence” exists among human beings; Kant and Bertrand Russel held 
that there exists a world of abstractions lying beyond empirical phenomena which, based 
on the underlying assumption that certain à priori “categories of understanding” exist 
among human beings, may be used in combination with mathematical logic to reach 
certitude; or Wittgenstein held that one can simply appeal to the ordinary usage of 
language to discover solutions relating to philosophical problems.
99
 Potter notes: 
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All these views shares a common assumption, which might be called the 
assumption that there can be method without metaphysics, i.e. methodological 
decisions can be arrived at…independently of any testing of the method in its 
application to philosophical problems.
100
 
This bifurcation between ontology and epistemology in Western thought is clearly due to 
the upheavals that the West had undergone during the 20
th
 century including the two 
world wars. It had led to an enthusiastic support for such ideas as existentialism, etc,
101
 
ultimately resulted in a conflating of meanings between “reason” and “transparent 
intelligence” which not only became synonymous but also existed independently of 
empirical reality.
102
  
In contrast, in India, theory and practice have always been considered together 
which makes methodology and reality remaining inalienably integrated with each other. 
Thus, “methods” of knowing reality, called the pramāṇas (lit., „proof‟), which are 
defined as that “by means of which true cognitions are arrived at” (pramīyate anena),103 
have a dual character: in causing cognitions to arise in the right sort of way, the pramāṇa 
mode serves the twin purpose of being knowledge as well as its proof simultaneoulsy. 
Matilal notes: “A pramāṇa is regarded as the „most effective‟ causal factor that gives rise 
to a particular cognitive episode; the theory of pramāṇas in this way becomes a theory of 
justification as well.”104 He gives an example from perception to clarify the point: “Any 
means of seeing a table is a pramāṇa of what I see to be there. The same means is also 
called a pramāṇa, an „authority‟ for my assertion of what I see.”105 Thus, seeing an object 
as a pramāṇa automatically represents certain “proofs” like the fulfillment of certain 
other conditions like the availability of optimum light, distance, etc, or else the whole 
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process would be considered as vitiated. A “method” or pramāṇa is, thus, both a means 
of acquiring “knowledge” as well as the “proof” of that knowledge.106 Mohanty notes: 
It is a peculiar feature of Indian epistemologies that the causal meaning of 
pramāṇa is also taken to imply a legitimizing sense so that cognition is true only 
when it has been brought about by a legitimate pramāṇa.107  
Largely classified by the Nyāya school, pramāṇas are primarily based on human beings 
embodied experiences and their common socio-cultural practices which gradually get 
internalized within them due to conditioning, thereby making “knowledge” and its 
“proof” appear together. In this process, there is no scope for the existence of à priori 
“categories of understanding” existing in human consciousness, all “experiences” and 
their “interpretations” being à posteriori, primarily based on the self‟s lived experiences 
of the world.  
However, a cautionary note needs to be introduced here. While an appropriate 
methodology is necessary for reaching certitude about phenomena, in case of humanities, 
it becomes more a case of forming one‟s conviction by circumstantial evidence rather 
than proof beyond doubt. This is because disciplines in the Humanities generate an 
“understanding (verstehen)” of the subject more based on „preponderance of probability‟ 
than conclusive proof, invariably resulting in “a degree of tentativeness about 
conclusions”.108 In order to reduce such “tentativeness” generated by artworks in general 
and cinema in particular, I have decided to adopt the following criteria for analyzing 
artworks and the meanings and emotions they generate for the audiences: 
i)     They should represent identifiable processes, 
ii)    There should be an identifiable product at the end of these processes,   
iii)   There should be repeatability of the processes under similar circumstances,  
iv)    The processes should be verifiable and falsifiable in case wrongly applied 
                                                          
106
 Matilal, Perception, 36 
107
 Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 16, modified 
                
108
 Bordwell, “Historical Poetics of Cinema”, 387, emphasis added 
48 
 
Since the above criteria are generally identified with processes involving „pure science‟, I 
may be misunderstood as conflating arts with science in my research. It is, thus, 
necessary that I make my position clear here.  
The word “science”, which originated from the Latin word “scientia” meaning “to 
know” or “knowledge gained by study” (Bloomsburg Dictionary of Word Origins), has 
now come to mean “a branch of knowledge conducted on objective principles of 
systematized observation and experimentation with phenomena” (OERD). In this sense, 
the experession “science” may be said to represent the adoption of a rational process in a 
systematic study of phenomenon. For Arsitotle, “science” meant not only the study of the 
objective „quantities‟ of a phenomenon, but also its subjective „qualities‟, like love, hate, 
etc, which it evoked among human beings. In the ensuing developments, the objective 
was split from the subjective by Galileo who declared that, henceforth, “science” would 
deal with only those things which could be empirically measured, i.e. „quantities‟ alone. 
The modern connection of „science” with the technical and the mathematical, or, broadly, 
the “non-arts” clearly belongs to the Galilean category. This is indeed an unfortunate 
development since we lack an alternate expression in English that has the same import for 
humanities viz. a mode of rational enquiry based on systematic observation of data and 
drawing conclusions therefrom. Thus, disciplines like the „social sciences‟ and the „arts‟, 
which continue to be as rigorous and as observant of worldly phenomena as possible, 
suffered in the process. In the absence of an equivalent word, I feel time has come to 
reclaim the word “scientific” for humanities as well, further justifications for which are 
provided below.    
The „social sciences‟ gather painstaking details of the socio-cultural practices of 
communities and collate them to reach conclusions about the value-laden behavior of 
those societies. This process is not only repeatable but also verifiable and falsifiable in 
case analysis diverges from reality. The importance of „social sciences‟ lie in the fact 
that, in contemporary times, different governments base their social and economic 
policies on the conclusions reached by them in the practical field.  
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The „arts‟ employ equally meticulous observations to understand the effects that 
an artwork has on its audiences, an aspect on which the entire art industry depends for its 
survival. Take, for instance, Bharata‟s formula for generating rasa or aesthetic pleasure 
among the audiences. He notes that when the audiences are made to witness „goal-
directed activities‟ undertaken by characters in a determining situation, it produces a 
similar affective state among the audiences which enable them to relive the scene both in 
terms of their cognition of the scene and their „unconscious‟ body together. This formula 
is eminently repeatable and hence verifiable and falsifiable in case audience responses 
are not as per the expected result.     
Even though all three disciplines viz. „pure sciences‟, „social sciences‟, and „arts‟ 
undertake systematic study and rational analysis of phenomena, their differences must, 
however, be factored in for reaching effective results. Thus, while „pure sciences‟ entirely 
deal with objective factors independent of human experiences, the latter two are primarily 
based on human beings‟ subjective lived experiences of the world. Their basic difference 
may be demonstrated through the following example: a person looks with nostalgia at a 
chair where his father used to sit and enjoy his morning cup of tea. „Pure science‟ would 
tell us what the physical intensity of the person‟s mental experiences are by measuring 
neuronal firings occurring within his brain; through a systematic study of the socio-
cultural norms and the family practices surrounding the individual‟s community, „social 
science‟ would tell us why the individual is feeling nostalgic about his father; finally, 
through a creative re-presentation of the situation, „arts‟ would make the audiences feel 
how the individual is responding to the situation. In Tarkovsky‟s terms, cinema re-creates 
a subjective time pressure surrounding the chair which would be felt by all those who 
watch the scene. In this sense, while the „pure sciences‟ and the „social sciences‟ are 
symptomatic processes of learning a state from its outside symptoms, an artistic process 
makes the audiences actually experience the scene from within themselves. Thus, despite 
their qualitative differences, each of these processes has every right to be called 
“scientific” because of the rational and systematic study they bring to their respective 
processes.  
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Finally, in this work, ideas have been illustrated with a number of film examples. 
Bordwell warns that often only those examples are cited which best support the 
arguments while ignoring counter-examples that might challenge its premises.
109
 He 
points out that such examples denote “enumerative inductivism” which remains “vacuous 
because any number of hypotheses can be supported by a set of such instances”.110 
Bordwell points out that the ideal solution lies in “eliminative inductivism” explained as 
follows:  
No conjecture about the world is in and of itself confirmed by evidence. It is 
always evaluated relative to some rival. The degree of its acceptance is simply the 
extent to which, at any particular time, it is considered better than its comparable 
rivals.
111
   
It is hoped that the film examples chosen here would meet Bordwell‟s criteria.     
In sum, what “piecemeal” theories of phenomenology and classical Indian 
theories and the “local solutions” they provide aim to achieve is to bring back the 
audiences‟ embodied and socio-cultural practices, which together constitute what may be 
called their normal response to cinema, into reckoning of contemporary film discourse, a 
process from which they have been progressively eliminated in the course of history of 
cinema. This happened even after promising starts were made by the early film theories 
formulated by Vachel Lindsay and Hugo Münsterberg.
112
 In place of teaching how the 
audiences should experience cinema, the “alternate methodology” shows us how they 
actually experience cinema which provides us with the necessary platform to identify the 
ideological drives operating within cinema, the domain of existing film theories.     
___________________ 
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Chapter 1 
Cinema and Sensuality 
         Limitation of the Existing Film Discourse and New Possibilities 
 
                      New modes of theorizing are necessary. We must start again. 
                                                                                                                         --------- Noël Carroll 
Existing film discourse is limited due to the following two reasons: first, its failure to 
incorporate the audiences‟ embodied and socio-cultural experiences of life and, secondly, 
despite cinema being a world-wide phenomenon, its failure to incorporate non-Western 
theories due to a predominant Eurocentric point of view. The present work identifies the 
root-causes of of the above failures as the existing film discourse‟s exclusion of the body 
and the film sensations that it generates among the audiences which predominantly 
determine their normal response to cinema all over the world. The present chapter further 
explores the possibility whether phenomenological and classical Indian theories, in which 
the body plays a determining role, offer a more meaningful solution to the problems 
posed in understanding cinema today.       
The points being made in this chapter are briefly summarized as under. After 
making a promising start of dealing with film sensations along phenomenological lines in 
their theories, both Eisenstein and Bazin become busy in containing film sensations 
within measurable control. While early Soviet filmmakers during the „20s and „30s 
remain busy in juxtaposing various „montage‟ pieces to generate new „meanings‟ from 
cinema signifying the essentially constructed nature of social reality,
113
 realists like Bazin 
and Kracauer, who championed in their early phase during the „40s that „unedited‟ pieces 
of reality recorded by camera signify a phenomenological response to reality as 
representing the natural way in which human beings interacted with the world,
114
 later 
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sought to „contain‟ these responses within measurable processes. In both these 
incarnations, the ultimate thrust of the classical film theory remains on „measuring‟ film 
sensations on which film theories could be securely founded, a requirement that both 
groups thought was necessary for securing the epithet of „art‟ for cinema, in those early 
days of film history.  
As classical film theory starts to decline during the late „50s, contemporary film 
theory emerges on the scene during the „60s.115 It was heavily influenced by the 
structuralist-semiotic paradigm of Sausssurian linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and 
Althusserian reading of Marx, all of which signified that meanings are not naturally given 
in reality but are artificially constructed through manipulative practices to safeguard 
vested interests. In seeking to identify the causes of such distortions, contemporary film 
theory earmarked film narration as the piece which leads a largely unsuspecting passive 
audience into „meanings‟ and „emotions‟ which are manipulated for them by the 
bourgeoisie. In this process, the theory excludes film sensations as being too „untamed‟ 
for effective theoretical purposes.   
When cognitive film theory arose as a reaction against contemporary film theory 
during the mid „80s, it held that the audiences, instead of being passive observers, are 
active agents who consciously construct film narratives from the clues given in 
cinema.
116
 However, since for cognitive film theory the crucial function of the audiences 
remained the construction of a film narrative by them – its only difference with 
contemporary film theory being a conscious piecing together of cues given in a film as 
against their passive manipulation in the latter – it also has no room for uncontrolled film 
sensations within its repertoire.   
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Significant writing of film history, which only starts during the late ‟50s, is 
influenced by contemporary film theory, the reigning theory from the late „50s to „80s, to 
focus on the evolution of film narration as the prime motif in cinema. In the process, film 
histories primarily concentrate on those techniques and technologies of the filmmaking 
process which aid this process. Similarly, when new film studies departments are 
instituted in Euro-American universities during the „50s and „60s, they start searching for 
a “scientific” criterion that would explain both the diversity and the world-wide 
popularity of cinema. Influenced by contemporary film theory and the existing film 
histories, they also identify film narration as the crucial piece that makes cinema a 
universal language.  
In this sense, the film discourse that came into being as a result of this process, 
constitute an essential part of the audience‟s pleasurable experiences of cinema. The 
body, thus, came to be relegated to the background by the discourse. In this scenario, two 
new possibilities hold promise. Phenomenology, primarily developed through the theories 
of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, progressively bring the body back into 
theoretical reckoning.
117
 A second line of development concerns classical Indian 
theories, where the school of Nyāya not only anticipate many of phenomenology‟s 
engagements with the body but also transcend them in significant ways, offer a 
significant new line of entry into film theorization from a non-Western perspective. It is 
argued here that the incorporation of the body in Indian aesthetic theories generate new 
insights when applied to cinema. 
         Limitation of Film Theories: Inability to Comprehend Film Sensations 
For the first time in Western thought, one comes across the words “sensuous knowledge” 
(cognitio sensitiva) in Alexander Baumgarten‟s Aesthetica (1750) which makes 
                                                          
 117 Seminal works on phenomenology are by Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology, Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1931) and Cartesian 
Mediatations, Trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960); Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time, Trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) and The 
Visible and the Invisible, Trans. Alfonso Lingis, Ed., Claude Lefort, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968) 
56 
 
“aesthetics” a new discipline of study.118 There he contrasts “clear and distinct 
knowledge” of conceptual understanding with “confused knowledge” of sensations.119 
Apparently because of its basic „untamed‟ nature, sensations are generally considered to 
be disruptive of conceptual knowledge. Due to this difficulty, efforts at theorizing 
embodied sensations have been few and far between. I will discuss below few such 
attempts at theorizing film sensations and the reasons for their progressive devaluation in 
the history of cinema. 
         Classsical Film Theory: Need for ‘Calculable’ Film Sensations  
The principle of montage, held sacrosanct by Soviet filmmakers, signify an expressive 
reconstruction of reality through editing of shots that generate new meanings for the 
audiences, which basically challenge the notion held by Hollywood cinema that meanings 
are given in the shots themselves. Arguably, Eisenstein‟s initial interest in film sensuality 
must have been aroused due to its disruptive role vis-à-vis bourgeois thought. Using the 
term “attraction” for the first time in the history of performing arts, Eisenstein notes in 
the context of theatre:  
An “attraction” (in our diagnosis of theatre) is any aggressive moment in theatre 
i.e. any element of it that subjects audiences to emotional or psychological 
influence, verified by experience and mathematically calculated to produce 
specific emotional shocks in the spectator in their proper order within the 
whole.
120
   
Clearly, immediately after recognizing its disruptive force that generates emotional 
shocks among the audiences by disrupting the narrative flow of the play, he seeks to 
„measure‟ the process that brings it about.121 While Eisenstein‟s formulation of “collision 
montage”, where ideas collide with ideas to generate new ideas in an eminently 
calculable measure, is a prime example of disrupting the narrative, Bollywood song and 
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dance sequences may be cited as an interesting example of narrative disruption which 
could not be measured in the same way.
122
 Irrespective of whether film sensations as 
“attractions” can be measured or not, Eisenstein crucially notes that it is not always 
necessary that film sensations should invariably be subversive of the narrative. He cites 
the example of Chaplin films where “attractions” are made to coexist with narrative 
cinema: “The lyrical effect of a whole series of Chaplin scenes is inseparable from the 
attractional quality of the specific mechanics of his movements”.123 In a wonderful essay, 
Lesley Stern describes how, for Eisenstein, the bodily somersault, which may be seen as 
an extension of Chaplin‟s body movements, is used as a trope to establish a relation 
between cinema and the body of the audiences.
124
 Peter Wollen notes that, inspired by the 
Symbolist movement, Eisenstein spent the latter part of his career investigating 
“synchronization of the senses” and “synaesthesia” along this line.125  
However, despite such brilliant thoughts, it is but strange that Eisensteins‟ ideas 
on film sensuality remained confined to his random musings alone. One of the basic 
reasons for this departure may be his idea that film viewing has to be an intellectual 
exercise rather than a bodily one, a basic requirement of making a performative process 
as „art‟ in those days: 
My artistic principle was therefore, and still is, not intuitive creativity but the 
rational constructive composition of affective elements; the most important thing 
is that the affect must be calculated and analyzed in advance.
126
 
Thus, despite a young Marx having warned that Western tradition privileges the intellect 
over the senses by proclaiming that “man is affirmed in the objective world not only in 
the act of thinking but with all his senses”,127 Eisenstein cannot get away from his 
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intellectual bias of containing film sensuality within mathematically calculable “units of 
impression”.128  
In contrast, the realistic theories of André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer champion 
an objective re-presentation of reality based on camera‟s ability to mechanically 
reproduce natural surfaces that have close affinity with human beings‟ normal response to 
the world, Bazin mentions “The photograph as such and the object in itself share a 
common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint”129 which “affects us like a phenomenon 
in nature, like a flower or a snowflakes”.130 This is clearly a promising phenomenological 
line. He even celebrates those moments of film sensuality which disrupt the narrative 
flow of a film. For example, his analysis of the final scene in Jean Renoir‟s Boudu Sauvé 
des Eaux (Boudu Saved from Drowning, 1932) revels in the tactile response of the 
audiences: 
The water is no longer “water” but more specifically the water of the Marne in 
August, yellow and glaucous…an extraordinary slow 360º pan…picks up a bit of 
grass where, in close-up, one can see distinctly the white dust that the heat and 
wind have lifted from the past. One can almost feel it between one‟s fingers.131 
Bazin criticizes the montage theory by noting that it “reinforces the meaning of one 
image by association with another image not necessarily part of the same episode”,132 
signifying thereby that montage “did not show us the event; it (merely) alluded to it”.133 
Similarly, his contemporary realist, Siegfried Kracauer, also has phenomenological 
aspirations. Vivian Sobchack mentions that Kracauer understands the spectator as a 
“human being with skin and hair” and that “the material elements that present themselves 
in films directly stimulate the material layers of the human being: his nerves, his senses, 
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his entire physiological substance”.134 Despite such phenomenological proclamations, 
none of the realist theorists develop their phenomenological ideas any further which merit 
comment. 
As far as Bazin is concerned, the legacy of linear perspective from the 
Renaissance underlies his notion of the window which seeks to „stabilize‟ vision along a 
static mathematical grid in front of the viewer.
135
 It militates against the idea that tactility 
of the film image is ultimately dependent on the audience‟s embodied experiences of the 
world by reinforcing the view that the whole process ultimately belongs to a static, 
disembodied vision from the window.
136
 Thus, one surprisingly notes that, even while 
dealing with film sensuality in very different ways, both Eisenstein and Bazin ultimately 
end up containing it within a mathematically calculable grid which represented a pre-
determined cinematic space for the audiences!  
Brian Henderson points out an important limitation of the above theories.
137
 
Based on their need for the measurability of audience response to artworks, both 
Eisenstein and Bazin‟s primary goal is to determine whether cinema can claim the status 
of being an art-form like that of literature or theatre. In the tradition of Aristotle, they 
attempted to identify a unique feature of cinema that would establish such a claim. While, 
for the Soviet formalists, this unique feature was editing, for the realists, it was camera 
which sought to reproduce reality as it is. Since, for both these theories, the starting 
points remain “reality”, it is necessary to understand what each means by the term “real” 
and “art”. Henderson notes: “For Eisenstein, as for Pudovkin, pieces of unedited films are 
no more than mechanical reproductions of reality…Only when these pieces are arranged 
in montage patterns, does film become art”.138 Arguing against such manipulative 
practices of montage that dissolves “the event” by substituting for it a synthetic reality,139 
Bazin notes:  
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The photograph and object in itself, the object freed from the conditions of time 
and space that govern it…shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, 
the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.
140
  
Thus, for Bazin, film art is fully achieved in the shot itself: “if the shot stands in proper 
relation to the real, it is already art”.141 Henderson notes that, on this ground, Bazin only 
allows a simple linkage between shots in cinema: “if the individual shot exhibits fidelity 
to the real, then it follows that a series of such shots, merely linked, must be faithful to 
the real also”.142 In the above context, Henderson sums up the limitation of both these 
theories:  
The sequence is as far as either theorist gets to in his discussion of cinematic 
form. The film theory of each is in fact a theory of the film sequence…The 
problem of the formal organization of the whole film is not taken up by either. 
This is the most serious limitation of both theories.
143
  
At the most basic level, extended narration remains an anethma to both theorists. Noting 
that whenever such discussions come up both veered off into literary theories, Henderson 
comments: “Their solutions in terms of literary models are a failure to take up the 
problem at all”.144  
The phenomenology of the audiences‟ bodily experiences, initially inherent in Eisenstein 
and Bazins‟ thoughts, however, declined with the establishment of Film Studies 
Departments in many Western universities since the „50s. In seeking to find that one 
“scientific” criterion which would explain cinema‟s appeal across the globe, their search 
had led ultimately led them to cinema‟s narrative, “story-telling” value. The theoretical 
basis for this new criterion they found in the contemporary film theory.
145
 As contours of 
this new theory started emerging during the late „60s, film studies departments, in order 
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to differentiate current efforts from the past, branded all earlier efforts at film theorizing 
as “classical film theory” retroactively. It is thus that, despite representing two entirely 
contrary trends of formalism and realism in them, theories of Eisenstein and Bazin come 
to be lumped together under the same banner in film history!  
Contemporary Film Theory: Need to ‘Shun’ Film Sensations  
In the new dispensation since the late „60s, the study of cinema starts being organized 
around one of Saussure‟s major linguistic findings: individual words have no meanings in 
themselves; rather, meanings arise differentially from the choice and arrangement of 
words within a sentential structure in which individual elements of a structure merely 
play their assigned parts. When these linguistic ideas, which ultimately form the basis for 
Western theories of structuralism and semiotics, are translated into cinema, they lead to 
the idea that „meanings‟ are not given in the film shots as Hollywood claims but are the 
result of the way the film is structured for the audiences. This idea shifts the focal point 
of film analysis to the selection and inter-se arrangement of characters and situations 
within a film.
146
  
In this “linguistic turn” of contemporary film theory, the key word becomes 
“concept”: the choice of words and their inter-se arrangement represent concepts which 
generate meaning for the receivers. In this sense, whatever can be conceptualized forms 
part of this theory, whatever cannot is debarred from the theory.
147
 Since sensuous 
experiences are normally disruptive of concepts, they automatically get banished from the 
domain of contemporary film theory. This debarment is further accentuated by the 
Marxist turn of contemporary film theory. Influenced by the May „68 events in France, 
contemporary film theorists sought to find an ideological binary between a privileged and 
exploitative bourgeois class and a manipulated and exploited proletariat class in the 
narrative structures of cinema. Films are, then, classified as “progressive” and 
“regressive” or “reactionary” depending on which class they belonged to. Under this 
dispensation, commercial cinema comes to be branded as “bourgeois cinema” since it 
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seeks to reinforce the conventional structure of the society. On the question why, then, 
ordinary citizens continue to frequent commercial cinema even though it manipulates 
them, two powerful theoretical tools, formulated by Louis Althusser and Jacques Lacan, 
are pressed into service by contemporary film theorists as explanations of this 
phenomenon.   
Louis Althusser, on the basis of his re-reading of Marx, explains “ideology” as the 
very process through which individuals are constituted as subjects.
148
 He mentions that 
this process works because “man is an ideological animal by nature”,149 which also, 
thereby, signifies that “man is by nature a subject”.150 Althusser‟s idea, thus, involves a 
double process of there being no ideology without subjects and no subjects without 
ideology: “The category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology in so far as all 
ideology has the function (which defines it) of „constituting‟ concrete individuals as 
subjects.”151 In the above sense, “individuals are always-already subjects”.152 Althusser 
holds that all social formations require ideology because it must be involved in a 
continuous reproduction of subjects who would thereafter be „willing‟ members for the 
bourgeoisie.
153
  
Thus, according to Althusser, the primary role that ideology plays in the 
bourgeois society is to construct subjects for capitalist consumption who would not have 
to be forced into submission but accept their position „voluntarily‟. This purpose is served 
by conventional institutions such as the family, education, religion, etc, called the 
“Ideological State Apparatus” or ISA by Althusser which constitutes subjects for 
bourgeois consumption. In case ISA fails, “Repressive State Apparatus” or RSA, 
consisting of the police, the army, etc, are to be pressed into service. In ISA, the subject 
constitution occurs by naming a person and offering her a role in the society. When the 
social institutions now „hail‟ her, she responds in a certain way. Carroll notes “the subject 
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is thereby constituted by or in the discourse, or to be positioned by or in the discourse”.154 
Carroll emphasizes the underlying assumption of the theory: “Discourse addresses the 
individual as a unified subject, and the individual mistakes the seeming intelligibility, 
unity, and coherence of the discourse and its address as his own unity as an autonomous 
„I‟.”155 Althusser calls this the process of interpellation of the subject psyche.156 Carroll 
clarifies that this Althusserian notion of interpellation has ultimately been extended to 
pervade all aspects of society: 
Under the sway of semiotic, these researchers have a rather expansive view of 
discourse. Almost every aspect of civilized life – from sentences to clothing – has 
an address or a discursive component. So, virtually every element in the culture is 
participating in the construction of subjects in an ideologically significant way.
157
 
For Althusser, the situation being such, beliefs of individual autonomy are imaginary, 
being instances of misrecognition by the individuals concerned: “relation of these roles 
and values to the real conditions of the social formation is imaginary”.158 Thus, even 
when a subject considers herself to be autonomous, free, and unified, it is actually mis-
recognition since she has already been constituted as a subject by the system. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis provides Althusser with the psychic mechanism 
necessary for an individual‟s misrecognition of himself or herself as a unified subject.159 
Along with Freud, Lacan feels that the human subject is constructed in several ways. 
While being in the womb signifies a state of plenitude for the child, birth means 
alienation and separation from the state of plenitude referred to as lack by Lacan. During 
the child‟s first six to eighteen months, the child feels this lack more acutely due to the 
absence of motor coordination within its own body. Against this background, the child‟s 
first desire is to acquire wholeness, i.e. a unified sense of identity. The faculty that 
bestows this subjecthood on the child is called The Imaginary, whereby the society 
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bestows an identity on it, metaphorically represented as the “Mirror Stage”: when the 
child looks at its own image in a mirror, it „represents‟ a sense of wholeness to the child 
which is not real but generated by its faculty of imagination.
160
 Lacan mentions: 
This form would have to be called the Ideal-I…But the important point is that this 
form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional 
direction which will always remain irreducible for the individual…161 
Carroll notes two points of importance in relation to the “mirror stage”. First, the child‟s 
sense of unity and autonomy both come from outside in the form of representations.
162
 
Lacan holds that The Imaginary operates as a psychic mechanism throughout one‟s life 
instilling in him or her illusions of subjecthood or unity through representations or 
discourse.
163
 Secondly, this process of representation or, misrepresentation, is brought 
about by the other, the care-givers like the parents, the society, etc, the mirror standing as 
a metaphor for the way they constitue the child by “hailing” it in specific ways. Carroll 
notes: “This sets forth what might be regarded as a continuing contradiction. We believe 
that we are unified, autonomous subjects, but this is based upon an extrapolation from the 
other.”164 This is the psychic mechanism that Althusser was looking for in his theory: the 
psychology of the “mirror stage” interpellates the subject‟s psyche to constitute it in a 
particular way.  
For Lacan, The Imaginary carries forth to operate in other developmental stages 
of the child as well. In the Symbolic Stage, roughly equivalent to what the Freudians call 
the “Oedipal Stage”, the child gets culturally constructed by the society.165 Carroll notes:  
It is the period in which the male child, putatively fearing castration by the father, 
leaves the quest for mother to emulate the father in a process called introjection. 
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That is, the boy child introjects the father which means that he attempts to take on 
the values, rules, and behavior of the father.
166
  
In other words, the father is now introjected in the child‟s social being resulting in the 
child now being sexed as “male” which is not merely a matter of biology, but also a 
cultural matter.
167
 The Freudians hold that culture reproduces itself through this process 
which forms the basis for Althusser‟s notion of social construction of individuals as 
subjects by the capitalist-bourgeois society.  
However, Lacan‟s theory soon moves beyond the above position. He re-reads 
Freud in holding that it is also the point in which the child enters the language. Lacan 
links up language with the Oedipus complex in terms of what is sanctioned and what is 
not taboo for marriages in tribal societies. Lacan considers social taboo to depend on how 
one is named i.e. positioned in a tribal network, with “the name of the father” acting as its 
anchor.
168
 Carroll notes that this leads the Lacanians to see social laws – called “The 
Law” by them – as a system, which uses “the name of the father” as its fulcrum, also 
called the “phallus”, the whole process signifying the centrality of the patriarch in the 
tribal organization represented by “The Law”.169 Carroll specifically points out why 
Lacan thinks that language is identical with “The Law”. By combining Saussurian 
linguistics and Lévi Strauss‟s laws of tribal society with his psychoanalytical theory, 
Lacan arrives at the following conclusion: “the meaning of the sign in a language is 
diacritical or differential, i.e. the meaning of the terms is not defined in isolation but in 
relation to other terms in virtue of their differences”.170 Thus, with the help of the 
Imaginary on the one hand, which projects an individual‟s unity and wholeness in terms 
of representations, and the Symbolic on the other, which operates on the basis of “The 
Law” of differences, the subject is „fixed‟ into a pre-determined hierarchy of cultural 
positions in the society in the same way language functions in the semiotic system.
171
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On the basis of Lacan, contemporary film theorists come to hold that mis-
identification of one‟s real self for one‟s „constructed‟ self is a psychologically given state 
for all individuals.
172
 By virtue of this psychological trajectory, an individual 
„voluntarily‟ accepts the hierarchical bourgeois order as the given order of the world of 
which she is a „natural‟ part. Contemporary film theorists hold that by projecting this 
unconscious aspect of their belief on the film screen – called “ideal projection” by Lacan 
– commercial cinema construct a „natural‟ order of things for the audiences.  
Since film sensuality, with its untamed affects, is likely to be disruptive of this 
„naturalizing‟ process, it has no place in the contemporary film theory. Instead, film 
sensations are castigated as being “excess” to narrative cinema. In reply to the persisting 
question why, then, do sensuality get represented in commercial cinema at all, which, 
after all, is a bourgeois instrument of manipulation, the theorists hold that its sensuous 
titillations primarily serve the purpose of bringing the audiences to the cinemas.  
In this kind of development, attention shifts from what makes cinema a unique 
art-form, like montage or reproduction of reality, to an analysis of the generic binary 
structure inherent within a film narrative. Carroll notes the consequences of this shift of 
emphasis for cinema: 
i) It makes all films – or at least all films that employ certain generic  
structures –  ideological, and  
ii) It makes them ideological in the same way 173  
The overriding ideological preoccupation of film theorists during this period is well 
reflected in the slogan of the „60s & „70s: everything is political. This tendency 
eventually leads to detecting ideology not only in the film narrative as such but also in all 
other aspects of cinema as well like characters, situations, filmmaking practices, and, 
even, in the filmmaking apparatus itself. Thus, for example, the monocular perspective of 
camera comes in for some sharp criticism on the notion that it ideologically instills in the 
viewer the illusion of being a unified and autonomous subject who is able to exercise full 
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control over the scene which engages her. Carroll critiques the above notion of 
“ideology” as being too broad: “By identifying ideology with subject construction, the 
concept has become roughly coextensive with that of culture, thereby losing its pejorative 
force”.174   
         Cognitive Film Theory: Need to ‘Relegate’ Film Sensations  
Even during its heyday, contemporary film theory was not free from murmurs of 
discontent. Feminist and other marginal groups found its idea of a unitary “subject 
position” biased in favor of the dominant male ideology. They further found that neither 
structuralism nor psychoanalysis leaves much space for an alternate gaze to challenge the 
male gaze. Newly instituted Cultural Theory departments in Euro-American universities 
also called for a rethink on the ground that spectators have cultural differences which 
influence their understanding of cinema in major ways. All these developments militated 
against contemporary film theory‟s notion of a largely „passive‟ audience becoming a 
subject for manipulation by the bourgeoisie. In response to such objections, a new line of 
thinking emerged which considered the audiences to be conscious subjects who are 
capable of critically responding to cinema.
175
 Called Perceptual-Cognitive Film Theory 
or, simply, Cognitive Film Theory, it was constructed by David Bordwell, Noël Carroll, 
Kristin Thompson, and others during the mid 1980s. Its basic premise is elaborated by 
Bordwell in his book Narration in the Fiction Film (1985) as follows:
176
  
i) A spectator is a rational agent who, based on her own experiences of 
living in the world, is capable of constructing a meaningful narrative on 
the basis of schemata of how objects occur and events unfold in the real 
world.
177
  
ii) A spectator infers the narrative on the basis of clues provided in the 
film.
178
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iii) Since perception and cognition are considered to be “goal-directed” 
processes, audiences invariably search for a “closure” in them.179  
iv) Since perceptual-cognitive theory primarily deals with the conscious level, 
the only form of psychology it uses is descriptive or folk psychology 
where emotions and affects result from immediate, interrupted, or delayed 
fulfillment of desires. According to Bordwell, for understanding deeper 
emotions and affects, one is required to refer to psychoanalytic theories of 
Freud and Lacan.
180
  
Needless to say that all the above elements in the cognitive film theory make it 
exclusively focus on the unfolding of the story element within a film. Calling it a 
Copernican revolution in its simplicity, Geoffrey Nowell-Smith notes that Bordwell 
replaces the entire semiotic apparatus of contemporary film theory with a single principle 
called film narration actively cognized by the audiences.
181
 Nowell-Smith, however, 
cautions against the inferential model employed by Bordwell in his perceptual-cognitive 
theory:  
The cognitivist model imagines the mind as an inferring machine. It asks the 
question “how can I get from point A to point B?”…it assumes that our minds 
work when watching a film as they do in a crossword puzzle or as policemen‟s 
mind do in detective stories.
182
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Noting further that this theory is hamstrung by the intellectualization of the spectating 
process, he notes that Bordwell‟s “rational agents” act as ideal consumers in the market 
place who optimize their choice by testing various alternatives. However, since there is 
more to cinema than a mere optimization of one‟s choices, Nowell-Smith notes that 
cognitive film theory is deficient as an aesthetic theory: 
Finding meaning has become an academic exercise in both good and bad senses 
of the phrase…films mean. But they do not just mean. Because they can be 
described with the aid of language, we can be led to think that description can 
substitute for the film. This is the perennial temptation of what I have called the 
linguistic analogy. But films also work…as painting or music does…partly in 
ways that have linguistic equivalence and partly in ways that do not.
183
  
With intellectualization as its basis, where “concepts” or “words” generate meaning, 
cognitive film theory has no place either for the body or the film sensations that it 
generates as well. Arguably, it is concept-laden positions like these which make Deleuze 
revolt in the course of his theorization of movement-images and time-images: how can 
one possibly explain in linguistic terms such phenomena as movements and affects in 
cinema?  
While castigating the intellectualization of the theory in no uncertain terms, Bill 
Nichols notes its other perverse socio-political consequences: 
Analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology cling to the same assumptions of 
abstract rationality and democratic equality that leads to a politics of consensus 
(based on a denial of bodily, material difference) and the repression of a politics 
of identity…Cognitive psychology and analytic philosophy, in fact, themselves 
exemplify a conceptual framework radically incommensurate with a politics of 
multiculturalism and social representation.
184
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One would like to sum up theoretical developments taking place in film discourse 
since the „50s. Since the notion of a disembodied vision – a kind of vision that „refuses‟ to 
acknowledge that the body has an important role to play in one‟s engagement with reality 
- ultimately underlies the notion of monocular perspective, it is necessary to understand 
its anti-sensuous nature here. In the field of painting, the Renaissance perspective 
involves a monocular viewing process first constructed by Alberti based on the idea that 
light rays travel in straight lines to the retina of the eye, forming an inverted visual 
pyramid of the source there. A cross-section of this view can, then, be converted into a 
picture plane that permits objects to be drawn in terms of pre-determined spatial 
calculations in relation to human beings‟ normal vision. Since the human retina is, 
however, curved, Leonardo subsequently incorporated foreshortening in all three 
dimensions of the picture plane. Together these ideas make the visible space of an 
artwork not only static but also quantifiable in a mathematical sense. Bordwell notes its 
consequences:  
With scientific perspective, the painting represented the spectator as a single eye, 
literally a point of view. What scientific perspective creates, then, is not only an 
imaginary scene but a fixed, imaginary witness.‟185  
He goes onto explain what the process does in terms of cinematic space: 
We witness the birth of a theatrical scenography of painting. Space is 
autonomous, a grid or checkerboard or stage preexisting any arrangement of 
objects upon it…in the Albertian perspective, the scene exists as a three-
dimensional event staged for a spectator whose eye is the picture‟s point of 
intelligibility but whose place is closed off from the event witnessed.
186
  
This process represents the disembodied and fixed Renaissance eye which underlies 
psychoanalytic film theory‟s notion of the “mastering gaze” of voyeurism in cinema. 
Standing in opposition to the body and the resulting sensations, it presumes a distanced, 
de-corporealized, monocular eye which masters all that it surveys without getting 
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physically involved in its vision.
187
 Linda Williams quotes Christian Metz‟s striking 
description of the disembodied nature of this vision: “spectator-fish taking in everything 
with their eyes, nothing with their bodies: the institution of the cinema requires a silent, 
motionless spectator, a vacant spectator”.188 Vivian Sobchack informs that in the film 
theories thereafter, the notion of this “mastering gaze” and the view which it encloses 
becomes the explanatory model for analyzing film spaces in cinema.
189
 Naturally, in this 
disembodied schema of the mastering gaze, the sense of embodiment that film sensations 
generate is ideologically debarred from entry!  
                 Rediscovering Film Sensations in Early Cinema 
While theorizing Early Cinema during the „80s, André Gaudreault and Tom Gunning 
revive ideas of film sensuality enshrined in Eisenstein‟s notion of “film attractions”. In 
the course of their research, they find that, at least till 1906, cinema predominantly 
performed in the mode of exhibition which foregrounds sensual experiences that disrupt a 
film‟s narrative line, its primary aim being to generate shock and awe among the 
audiences. This contrasts with the mode of narration progressively adopted since 1906 
where all pro-filmic elements are generally integrated within a cohesive and causal 
narrative structure.
190
 By re-defining “attraction” as being “dedicated to presenting 
discontinuous visual attractions, moments of spectacle rather than narrative”,191 Gunning 
says that, in contrast to the voyeuristic aspects of narrative cinema which wants to tell 
something to the audiences, cinema of attractions wants to show something to them.
192
 
He elaborates his stand by saying that while Actuality Films personify exhibitionist 
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cinema, even non-actuality films of this period exhibit similar tendencies.
193
 In this 
context, Gunning quotes Méliès as follows: “I can state that the scenario constructed in 
this manner has no importance, since I use it merely as a pretext for the „stage effects‟, 
the „tricks‟, or for a nicely arranged tableau”.194 More importantly, however, like 
Eisenstein, Gunning also mentions that “attractions” exhibited by film sensuality and film 
narratives aren‟t fundamentally opposed to each other: 
Although different from the storytelling exploited by the cinema from the time of 
Griffith, it is not necessarily opposed to it. In fact, the cinema of attraction 
doesn‟t disappear with the dominance of the narrative, but rather goes 
underground, both in certain avant-garde practices and as a component of 
narrative films, more evident in some genres (e.g. the musical) than in others.
195
  
However, the existing film discourse, with its pronounced bias towards film theories that 
generally shun the body and its associated film sensations, had remained oblivious to this 
development until recently. 
In sum, the occurrence of film sensuality may be mapped along a sliding scale 
constituting three basic forces in cinema: film sensations that „disrupt‟ the narrative, like 
non-integrated song and dance sequences in Indian commercial cinema; sensations that 
are in „excess‟ of the narrative, like scenes depicting gory violence in „excess‟ of the 
narrative requirement as in Hollywood cinema; and sensations that are fully „integrated‟ 
with the narrative, like Chaplin‟s walk in his films. Despite their various forms, film 
sensations invariably occur as pure forms of sensual energy in cinema which film 
theories utterly fail to engage with.  
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       Limitation of Film Histories and Film Studies 
     Absence of Film Sensations 
When one asks film history how it relates to film sensations, one comes up with the same 
disappointing answer: they form no part of their discussion. This situation becomes 
understandable when one considers that film histories have invariably been influenced by 
the dominant film theory or the theories predominant in its time. Since narrative cinema 
had become the center of analysis in film theories since the late „50s, the time when 
significant film histories start being written, they have generally been engaged in 
presenting „evolutionary‟ accounts of how film narration come to be „perfected‟ in 
cinema. Expectedly film sensuality finds no place in such historic accounts. In their 
critique, Gaudreault and Gunning point out how film histories ultimately become a 
catalogue of various techniques and technologies of the filmmaking process which are 
progressively moving towards an ever greater realization of the narrative potential of 
cinema. The authors argue that these historians assume that an ideal “film language” for 
narrative cinema already exist the “codes” of which only need to be „discovered‟ one by 
one for the institution of cinema to realize its full potential.
196
  
The emergence of Griffith as the „code‟ manufacturer par excellence of narrative 
cinema generally occurs as the starting point for these histories of cinema. Under this 
spell, these historians brand Early Cinema, which, in its early phase, professed an 
exhibitionist mode generally subversive of the narrative, as “primitive cinema”.197 
However, Gaudrault and Gunning note that since the category formation for Early 
Cinema hadn‟t yet happened, how could these historians lump the whole body of Early 
Cinema together and brand it “primitive” cinema as a whole?  Even though, there have 
been other histories of cinema, like the history of the evolution of film technologies, like 
3-D, etc, historians have generally focused on the fact how technological developments 
bring narratives ever closer to optimization in cinema. Despite his championing of 
realism in cinema, this happens even in the case of such a perceptive film critic as Bazin. 
Luca notes: 
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Bazin‟s thought is traditionally associated with the long take, yet his defense is 
only tangential to it…the sequence shot in Bazinian terms is the direct 
consequence of another technique – depth of field – which, as Wollen notes, is in 
turn subordinated to dramaturgic efficiency. For example, expounding on William 
Wyler‟s The Best Years of Our Lives (1948), Bazin justifies its lengthy shots with 
the fact that they are “necessary to convey the narrative clearly”.198     
In this context, based on the Russian Formalist Tynianov‟s theory, Gaudreault and 
Gunning argue in favor of setting up a new criterion of writing film history where 
substitution of one system by another would be based on the changes in the formal 
functions that particular film elements are called upon to perform in particular systems, 
„evolution‟ ultimately meaning a “substitution” of systems.199 Thus, if cinema is required 
to generate wonderment and awe among the audiences through spectacular showings, it 
would be one kind of cinema while narrative story-telling would call forth another kind 
of cinema. Under the circumstances, a close-up or a mid-shot in Early Cinema and a 
close-up or a mid-shot in narrative cinema would have two completely different 
functions.
200
 For example, the function of the mid-shot used in Edwin Porter‟s The Great 
Train Robbery (1903) is entirely different from the function of a mid-shot used in 
contemporary cinema. In Porter‟s film, it is used as a means of monstration, i.e. showing 
an “attraction” to the audiences. There is nothing “primitive” about this particular use at 
the time.
201
 In this context, these authors emphasize that while there is „progression‟ in 
the modes of cinema, there is necessarily no „progress‟ which stipulates that cinema 
should „naturally‟ evolves to the stage of film narration from a stage of “film 
attraction”.202 Clearly, a new film history needs to be written which would especially 
keep in view the functions that cinema is called upon to perform in different 
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circumstances for its audiences. It is expected that such an account would do full justice 
to the role film sensuality has played in the history of cinema! 
           As far as film studies is concerned, it is increasingly being felt that the existing 
discourse involving disembodied, culture-neutral theories and ideas, have resulted in a 
biased one-sided view of cinema. Gledhill and Williams advocate a reinvention of film 
studies as follows:  
Film studies‟ suspicion of the mass-ness of cinema rested to a large degree on the 
perception of dominance – by ideology, by complicit formal structures, by an 
underlying psychic substructure to which all differences would be reduced. 
Dominance locked film studies into an unproductive binarism of progressive 
versus reactionary text. The political point of analysis was to separate the 
progressive from the ideologically contaminated or the retrogressively 
nostalgic.
203
   
In this context, Gledhill and Williams recommend the inclusion of the body as a key 
factor in reformulating film studies: 
Reinsertion of the body and the affective into film re-conceives the social, 
cultural, and aesthetic as equally significant but distinct factors, mutually 
determining but not reducible to one another.
204
  
However, to make a largely “passive” body “active” again, a major reconfiguration is 
required. This is where significant insights from body-centric theories discussed below 
can provide an alternative framework, which, even if “piece-meal” for the time being, can 
help us deepen our understanding of cinema in radically new ways.   
      New Possibilities: Presenting “Piecemeal” Theories 
It is interesting to note that foregrounding of film sensuality during the early phase of 
Early Cinema during the period 1895-1906 and the latest phase of commercial 
blockbusters in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century show remarkable affinity with Tom 
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Gunning saying: “the two ends of the twentieth-century hail each other like long lost 
twins”!205 In the same vein, Vivian Sobchack notes: 
Certainly, the “cinema of narrative integration” that superceeded (by subtending 
and subordinating) the historical “cinema of attractions” has largely disintegrated. 
The plots and stories of most popular feature films today have become pretexts or 
alibis for a series of autonomous and spectacularly kinetic “monstrations” of 
various kinds of thrilling sequences and apparatical special effects – elements that 
characterized the early cinema of attractions.
206
  
There is no doubt that a striking recurrence and continuity of film sensuality is happening 
all over the world today! Much more seems to be at stake here than merely shock values 
that sensuality originally packed for the early film audiences. Embodiment, which is the 
missing link of film theories discussed so far, appear to form an important plank for 
understanding the new significations generated by cinema. In this context, two promising 
lines of research have opened. One of them is based on the audiences‟ phenomenological 
response to cinema based on Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of existential phenomenology, 
which is being pursued by contemporary film researchers, like Vivian Sobchack, Laura 
Marks, Jennifer Barker and others.
207
 The other line examines the applicability of 
classical Indian theory of Nyāya to cinema, which not only anticipates but also 
significantly exceeds many of the phenomenological principles visualized by Merleau-
Ponty. Both these processes, which foreground the role of the body in generating 
cognitions and their attendant emotions and affects among the audiences, hint at new 
possibilities of understanding cinema at a much deeper level than it has happened so far.  
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           Phenomenology 
While the influence of phenomenology on cinema will be dealt with in greater detail in 
chapter 2, the basic idea of why phenomenology is at all important for cinema is briefly 
explained here. Western thought is still largely dominated by Cartesian duality which, 
while separating mind from the body, makes the former the seat of all experiences and 
understanding.
208
 Since such reasoning mostly works on the basis of mental concepts, 
emotions and affects occur merely as their side-effects in the Cartesian system.
209
 Called 
the “theory of ideas”, it works on the scientific notion that raw stimuli, received through 
various sense organs, are synthesized into ideas or concepts by one‟s mind which makes 
them „meaningful‟ for the human organisms. One of the reasons for which Descartes 
distrusted the body is that it generates false representations of their referents, like the 
perception of diminished height of a person at a distance. In contrast, mental idea of the 
person suffers no such distortions.  
The phenomenologists, however, radically differ from this scientific “theory of 
ideas”. Maurice Merleau-Ponty holds that, rather than the mind, it is the lived body of a 
person that generates primary meanings of the world for him or her. In disputing 
Descartes, he holds that “there is no ego, transcendental or otherwise, standing behind it 
[the body] as a more fundamental subject” generating “meanings” for us.210 Rather, being 
always enclosed within their bodies, human beings experience the world invariably from 
a particular perspective as being “close”, “far”, “to the left”, “to the right”, etc, 
representations which determine their specific responses to the world. Merleau-Ponty 
further points out that the perception of a box lying on the table doesn‟t depend on 
isolated bits of data being synthesized by the mind, but is based on human being‟s bodily 
memory of such sensations, a process in which the body not only presents the box‟s 
position on the table, but also the knowledge of its heaviness, coolness, etc to the 
perceiver. If the box is not made of steel but of wood or glass, appropriate changes in its 
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tactility would become noticeable to the body directly and immediately.
211
 This bodily 
knowledge is best revealed in our motor intentionality or motility manifest in our skillful 
activities, like noticing, walking, reading, typing, etc, in which one doesn‟t consciously 
think of what to do next, but the body responds automatically. In fact, if a person 
becomes too intellectually conscious of a habitual act, it starts interfering with her 
performance. In other words, experiential knowledge of the world is already within our 
bodies.
212
 In this sense, for Merleau-Ponty, one generally learns skills based first on 
his/her corporeality, and only then intellectually, which makes it incumbent for him/her 
to be aware of the body‟s possibilities and limitations, every perceived object having a 
particular motor significance for human beings. Hopp notes: 
Being skilled in the use of a cane does not involve interpreting sensations of 
pressure on one‟s hands, but in perceiving with the stick. With this skill, the 
perceived world expands. „Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the 
world of feeble things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin of the hand, 
but at the end of the stick‟.213    
What Merleau-Ponty is trying to say is that the material body is endowed with an 
inherent power to discrimate other material entities. In the above context, the 
phenomenological notion of the intentionality of consciousness and orientation of one‟s 
body vis-à-vis other material bodies becomes extremely important. For example, when 
our body intends to move towards an object, it already knows what to expect and under 
what circumstances. Mohanty notes:  
As one‟s hand moves to grasp a tumbler of water, it is not that there is first a 
thought about raising and stretching one‟s arm and then this thought causes a 
mechanical bodily motion. It is the bodily movement that directs itself towards 
the object, and this movement has its own sui generis intentionality.
214
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This point is clarified by Sobchack in the context of cinema: “film experience is that 
cinematic „language‟ [which] is grounded in the more original pragmatic language of 
embodied existence whose general structures are common to the filmmaker, the film, and 
the viewer”.215  
In the above sense, phenomenological experience involves an evolutionary mode, 
where a particular aspect of the world, as and when incorporated in one‟s bodily 
experiences, becomes part of his or her expanded mode of perception. Clearly, this notion 
has tremendous implications for an image-saturated world: as we become more and more 
skilled in responding to audio-visual images, it tends to become incorporated as part of 
our body-language, which, in turn, influences our understanding of the world. The job of 
phenomenological research into cinema, then, becomes the unearthing of the “body 
language” operating both within cinema and among the audiences without which nothing 
would become intelligible to them. Mertens notes:  
The most important idea in Heidegger‟s and Merleau-Ponty‟s revision of the 
phenomenological account of subjectivity is the idea that the fundamental 
character of our existence is not found in the theoretical and cognitive capacities 
of a rational being, but rather in our capacities as essentially practically interested 
and engaged subjects or existences.
216
 
In sum, what phenomenology makes clear is the fact that the viewer‟s body generates a 
richer and more fundamental experience for the audiences at a fundamental level of their 
existence than a disembodied experience of the mind that film discourse has been 
advocating so far. These aspects will be elaborated in chapter 2.    
Classical Indian Theories 
Since there has been no systematic effort at applying classical Indian theories to cinema, 
it is necessary that specific areas are identified in which these theories can prove to be 
useful in analyzing cinema. In the present work, the areas identified by me are as follows: 
analyzing Nyāya theory of perception as forming the cognitive basis for what one 
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perceives on the stage or on screen and the roles that audience embodiment and their 
socio-cultural practices play in constructing it; taking Nyāya perceptual level as the basis, 
constructing Bharata‟s theory of rasa or aesthetic pleasure which analyzes various levels 
of identification that the audiences have with an artwork together with the evocation of 
their corresponding affective states among them which enable them to relive the scenes 
both in terms of their intellect and their bodies; and, finally, taking Bharata‟s theory as 
the basis, developing Ānandavardhana‟s theory of dhvani or aesthetic suggestion as the 
basis for generating suggestions that bring to the surface unexpressed experiences of 
human beings which not only generate various aesthetic experience among the audiences 
but also restores them their „lost‟ subjectivity, the latter function considered to be the 
highest function of art in Indian theories.    
In classical Indian thought, conceptual understanding has been classified as “six 
ways of knowing” consisting of perception, inference, word, comparison, postulation, 
and absence.
217
 While these “six ways” have the primary task of narrowing down and 
pinpointing „meaning‟ for human beings which is expectd to help them reach certitude in 
their interactions with the world, Indian aesthetes soon realized that, in the artistic 
processes, cognition of a thing or an object has an expansive mode of understanding 
which goes beyond its immediate utilitarian values. In this sense, in artworks, the 
cognitive process necessarily goes in the opposite direction than the practical way, i.e. 
their main purpose is to broaden the scope of human experiences in the world rather than 
limiting them to pinpointed „scientific‟ accuracy. In this connection, Indian aesthetic 
principles are based on the operation of certain concentric circles of meaning generation, 
each contained within the next bigger circle, operating within artworks:  
i) Living organisms as models of growth, decay, and renewal act as the basic 
motif in Indian arts;  
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ii) Though space, time, and movement operate as linear progressions within 
Indian arts, they are invariably circumscribed within the regenerative 
model of a living organism represented by a cycle;  
iii) The whole operation is further circumscribed within an overarching 
equivalence between the inner drives operating within a microcosm and 
those occurring in the macrocosm with the principles of growth, decay, 
and renewal in the microcosm in being a mirror reproduction of the 
principle of evolution, existence, and involution operating in the 
macrocosm.  
In the Western artistic tradition, space and time is singular, viz. it exists in one plane 
alone, is linear, and is continuous, the same model manifesting in both sequential and 
simultaneous occurrences. In this progression, time occurs in each moment as a loop 
through which the past and the future can be perceived as representing a linear and 
continuous chain representing causal change. In this schema, each moment acts like a 
moment of “becoming” where a particular space-time moment in a linear chain remains 
empty till it is filled by an unfolding action. In this sense, the space-time moments 
represent separable moments which, when linked up causally, form a continuos chain.  
In contrast, the best way to understand classical Indian thought is in terms of the 
functioning of a living organism. The Indian artists do not conceive immaterial passing 
moments, but identify the pivotal point of a living organism which is its „navel‟ (nābhi) 
in terms of which the passing moments act as a unity representing the process of renewal, 
growth and decay of whole system. The Indian system holds the navel to be the centre 
from which such developments occur both horizontally and vertically.  
Thus, a tree cyclically sheds old leaves and sprouts new ones, grows horizontally 
in terms of its trunk and expands vertically in terms of its branches, all of which are not 
only circumscribed within the cyclical limits prescribed by the growth, decay, and 
renewal of this microcosmic organism, but is also further circumscribed within a model 
of evolution, existence, and involution of the whole macrocosm or the universe conceived 
82 
 
by the orthodox Indian theories or the Hindu theories.
218
 Since, in the above sense, the 
centre of the wheel signifies the point where action is potentiality concentrated and from 
where it springs into manifest action, it is conceived as the seed (bīja) from which all 
actions sprout.
219
 Vatsyayana mentions: 
The chariot wheel (cakra) is the term of reference for power and movement in the 
Buddhist and Hindu conceptions. It denotes order (ṛta), [both] spatial and 
temporal, and symbolizes the ceaseless movement of time in cyclicity. The centre 
holds the circumference and vice versa.
220
  
The center ultimately represents the conjunction of two potential forces, the static force 
of being and the dynamic force of becoming contained within a dimensionless point 
(bindu, „drop‟) that eventually “spreads and flows”.  
In the above sense, the Indian process may be said to represent the systems view of 
an event where a moment remains much more loaded than the representation of an empty 
moment operating in a conveyor-belt system. While depicting a figure, the Indian artist, 
thus, abstracts the pivotal static state from its concrete flow of motions. The depiction of 
the Naṭarāja as the dancing figure of Lord Śiva signifies such a static center in midst of 
creativity. Dasgupta notes: 
It may be remembered that, according to Indian mythology, the whole universe 
was regarded as having emanated from the rhythmic dance of Lord Narayana on 
the waves of the great ocean at the beginning of creation. Thus, the movement of 
dance in itself represents the rhythmic motion leading to creation and the opposite 
rhythm of dissolution. From this point of view, the whole universe may be 
regarded as congealed or sliced off states of motion.
221
 
                                                          
218
 Kapila Vatsyayana, “Metaphors of the Indian Arts”, in Indian Art: Forms, Concerns and Development in 
Historical Perspective, VI Part 3, Ed. B. N. Goswami in association with Kavita Singh, in the series History of 
Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, Gen. Ed. D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Reprint (New Delhi: 
Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2005): 247-77; specially see her portion on “Navel”  
219
 Ibid, 258 
220
 Ibid, 248 
221
 S. N. Dasgupta, Fundamentals of Indian Art, 2
nd
 ed. (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 1960): 71-2,  
modified   
83 
 
Bharata‟s theory of drama represents the above artistic process where the sequence of 
actions (itivṛtta, „thus it happened‟, loosely translated as „plot‟) has been conceived in 
concentric circles of expanding cyclicality. The above idea, which generates the notion of 
being present at all instants simultaneously rather than sequentially, leads to the Indian 
view of modularity, in which, at each moment, elements relating to past and future keep 
impinging on the present. It is no wonder that, in both the Indian epics of Rāmāyaṇa and 
Mahābhārata, the future is foretold at the very beginning of these narrations signifying 
that each present moment is not only loaded with the knowledge of what has gone before 
but also with the knowledge of what is to come in future. It leads to one of the most 
abiding articles of faith in Indian thought: action recoiling upon itself. Richard Lannoy 
notes:  
The “continuous narrative” of the Ajanta frescos is cyclical and non-sequential. 
Similarly, the dramatized structure of a Sanskrit play is cyclical. Various devices 
are used, such as the dream, the trance, the premonition, and the flashback, to 
disrupt the linearity of time which enables action to recoil upon itself.
222
   
One may cite Indian classical music as an example which has a modular structure where 
an unmoving center signifying the seed (bīja) manifests in the form of a drop (bindu) 
from where developments start. The center of this compositional system is the navel 
(nābhi) from which cyclical „growth‟ and „dissolution‟ follow in the form of a wheel 
(cakra) within a fixed circumference (vṛtta). Within the limits set by the frame, there are 
near infinite possibilities of permutations and combinations allowed to the musician as 
long as s/he comes back to the center from time to time. This is similar to the basic 
designs (yantras) followed by Indian architecture and sculpture, as well as in Bharata‟s 
theory of drama.
223
 This concept of freedom within a fixed form is unique to the Indian 
artistic tradition. 
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In this context, highlighting the significance of the straight line and the circle in Indian 
arts, Alice Boner makes the following perceptive comments on the compositional 
principles underlying Indian artworks: 
A given space or surface may be divided and subdivided indefinitiely by straight 
lines without ever becoming an organic whole. But as soon as a point is placed in 
the center of a given space or surface, the amorphous extension becomes 
transformed into an organized structure. The center is a point of reference towards 
which all parts converge, and, therefore, the whole structure becomes “con-
centrated”.224   
Noting that “the substratum of these compositions is a circular field around a central 
point” which acts as the source for all emanations,225 she notes how the above structure 
creates a composition which is analogous to an organic whole:  
The existence of the center creates a hierarchy of values, in which the parts cease 
to be equivalent and assume different weights and importance…Between the 
center and the outer parts, between the interior and the exterior, there is a polarity 
that creates tension as well as organic coalescence. The center is the source and 
fountainhead of this organic whole and the position of all outer parts are 
determined with reference to the center.
226
    
Since, according to Boner, elements in Indian arts invariably tend towards full 
development and fulfillment, she notes that while a straight line has the potential for an 
infinite linear extension, curved lines gather them into contained forces: 
Every curve is part of a circle and has the tendency to close into a full circle. In 
plastic representations, such a curve collects and rounds up movements and, 
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thereby, creates an element of rest without stress. It gathers up movements as a 
pool gathers up the inflowing waters.
227
 
Noting that, in the above sense, the circle is always the fundamental determining factor of 
Indian arts, she says: 
Between the center and the circumference of the circle, there is the indissoluble 
cohesion of polarity from which nothing can escape. The movements thrown out 
by the center are collected by the circumference and reversed towards the center, 
or, an unending movement may arise and flow around the circumference.
228
 
In comparing the compositional principles of Western and Indian sculptures, she notes 
the uniquenesss of the Indian principle thus: “None of the other methods of composition, 
except for the Gothic to an extent, is concentric space organization of such primary and 
exclusive consideration”.229  
The Indian aesthetic concept signifies the tension harbored in the potentiality of an 
organism striving for expression which is confronted with the tension born of binary 
opposites in perennial conflict with each other in a mechanical system. Dasgupta 
describes the basis of Indian arts as follows: 
In India, man is regarded as part of nature. If man is a part of nature, like a flower 
in a creeper or the green foliage of the trees, the spirit of both must be so realized 
that one may not be in conflict with the other.
230
   
Doniger O‟Flaherty clarifies the above basis as follows:  
One must avoid seeing a contradiction or paradox where the Hindu merely sees an 
opposition in the Indian sense – correlative opposites that act as interchangeable 
identities in essential relationships.
231
  
                                                          
227
 Boner, “Introduction”, 45-6, modified 
228
 Ibid, 50, modified 
229
 Ibid, 9-10 
230
 Dasgupta, Fundamentals of Indian Art, 20-1, modified 
231
 Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, Śiva: The Erotic Ascetic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973): 35, original  
emphasis 
86 
 
She notes that the contrast between the erotic and the ascetic tradition in the character of 
Śiva is not the kind of “conjunction of opposites” with which it is generally confused. 
Desire (kāma) and Asceticism (tapas) are not diametrically opposed to each other like 
black and white; rather, they are like two forms of heat where tapas is the heat of 
destruction and kāma is the desire for creation.232 The Soviet Sculptor Ernst Neizvestny‟s 
following description ideally fits the process followed by the Indian artists: 
Two sculptors are carving a sphere out of stone. One of them wants to achieve the 
most perfect form of a sphere. The other wants to convey the inner tension of the 
sphere filled to the bursting point. The first will be the work of a craftsman, the 
second that of an artist.
233
    
The above idea of man as a harmonious part of nature rather than struggling with it for 
domination follows from the Vedic principle of an equivalence of the principles operating 
with a microcosm and macrocosm, symbolized in the „great saying‟ (mahāvākya) of “you 
are that” (tat twam asi), signaling that the inner principle which drives the self (atmā) is 
similar to the inner principle that drives the cosmos (Brahmana). Boner notes that Indian 
compositions may be considered as cosmic symbols where the center or the bindu 
represents the Brahman, the surrounding circle its manifestation and the space within the 
circle its field (kṣetra) of action.234 These thoughts have significant implications for all 
artworks including cinema.  
In sum, only certain brief ideas have been given above about the way embodied 
principles work in phenomenology and classical Indian theories and what happens when 
they are applied to the field of arts. While the phenomenological principles of Merleau-
Ponty are extensively being applied to artworks, particularly cinema, in the West, the 
application of classical Indian theories to art-forms including cinema is still largely 
unknown to the existing academic discourse in general and film discourse in particular. A 
redressal has been attempted in the ensuing chapters.     
____________________________ 
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           Chapter 2 
           Cinema and Embodiment 
        Merleau-Ponty‟s Theory of Existential Phenomenology 
 
               Philosophy consists in restoring a power to signify, a birth of meaning, a wild meaning, 
               an expression of an experience by an experience...the voice of no one, since it is the  
               voice of things, the waves, the forests…  
                                                                                                          ------- Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
This chapter moves from the phenomenological theories of Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of existential phenomenology, the latter implying 
that human beings‟ embodied experiences of the world form the underlying basis for the 
formation of all cognitive and signifying systems in this world. Merleau-Ponty calls this 
“an expression of experience by experience”235 which signifies that understanding of the 
world is formed on the basis of lived experiences of the world to which the human body 
had adapted over millenniums. Since these expressions remain internalized within the 
body, they are understood by all human bodies. In this sense, bodily expressions form a 
rich language informing human beings of their interactions with the material world. 
However, since this „language‟ has not yet been formalized, it has remained below the 
threshold of human „knowledge‟. Merleau-Ponty departs from Husserl and Heidegger to 
hold that the body is the center of all human experiences and hence forms the underlying 
basis for all human cognitions of the world. By seeking to reverse the Cartesian 
privileging of mind over the body, phenomenological thought in general and Merleau-
Ponty in particular demarcates a new analytical model of understanding phenomena 
which is likely to have a profound influence on the way we theorize about cinema.             
Phenomenology is a study of the world as experienced by human beings living in 
the world. The theoretical component of this development evolved in three stages. 
Husserl held that, in contrast to the Cartesian notion of a transparent transcendental 
intelligence which „understood‟ what it came in „touch‟ with on the basis of 
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internalization of the lived experiences of the world, the departure from the concept of 
Cartesian “mind” involving “transparent intelligence” to Kantian “consciousness” 
involving “categories of understanding” to Husserlian “consciousness” which includes 
“categories of lived experience” has been quite remarkable in Western thought. In place 
of Kantian à priori “categories of understanding”, Husserl notes that human 
consciousness carries à priori embodied components, called structural archetypes or 
eidos, on the basis of human beings „understand‟, like filling up the third dimension to 
form „objects‟ and „things‟ in perception where physically only two dimensions can be 
perceived. Heidegger holds that, since human beings have learnt to interact with the 
world through the „tools‟ they have manufactured for the purpose, these „tools‟ become 
exteneded parts of human interactions, making human beings tool-wielding social agents 
of the world. Merleau-Ponty literally dispenses with the notion of the human 
“consciousness” by holding it it merely the „effect‟ of the body‟s interactions with the 
world which remains stored as the body memory. In other words, he replaces “ego” 
underlying Husserl and Heidegger‟s theories to hold that the „human body”, by virtue of 
having internalized all the lived experiences of the world, is the sole cognitive instrument 
and agency of the world.  
While Part 1 discusses the above phenomenological journey, ending up with a 
summing up of its serious implications for human pursuit of “knowledge” noted by 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Part 2 discusses phenomenology‟s application to 
cinema by contemporary film theoreticians like Vivian Sobchack, Laura Marks and 
others.  
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llustration 1: The Phenomenolgical Concepts 
Subjective-Objective Experiential Mode – Human beings neither experience the world in 
objective materiality independent of them as “science” holds nor through a subjective 
imposition of “Categories of Understanding” on the world as Kant holds, but as a subjectively 
experienced world in terms of human beings‟ embodied and socio-cultural practices of life. 
Edmund Husserl 
Intentional Consciousness: Certain repetitive experiences of human experiences of the world 
are internalized in “consciousness” as archetypal forms or structures (eidos) which creates our 
normal experiences of the world in perception called “horizon of expectations”. In this sense, 
human “consciousness” is intentional in nature:  
 1.  Perceiving an “Object”: A 3-Dimensional Intentional Construction 
By applying three-dimensional structural pieces or “eidos” to sense “Particulars”, Human 
Consciousness intends to complete an “Object” in one‟s Perception.   
   2.  Perceiving “Relation between Objects”: Motivational Causality  
Intentional Consciousness generates a Relationship of Mutual Dependence between 
“Objects” in terms of Human Beings‟ Subjective Experiences of Living-in-the-World.     
Martin Heidegger 
Dasein: In the course of human beings‟ experiences of the world, they have become Tool-
Wielding Social Agents of the World. Dasein signifies being-in-the-world which represents all 
human relations with the world. Dasein is thus not only intentional but also inter-subjective in 
nature, circumscribed by human beings‟ “Totalities of Relevance” in a Socio-Cultural World.   
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
Intentionality of the Body: Merleau-Ponty replaces Intentional Consciousness with Bodily 
Intentionality which forms an “Intentional Arc” that forms the basis for Inter-Subjectivity 
among human beings. It leads to the following sense experiences:    
a) Vision and touch sensations are equivalent in referring to the same material zone of 
experiences which generates a Synesthetic Experience among Human Beings.  
b) Subjective-objective alterations in human communication are internalized by the Body 
called the Chiasm  
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                                                                    Part 1 
      The Phenomenological Journey from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty 
Since the word “phenomenology” has a confused existence in history, it has resulted in a 
plethora of meanings, like “description of appearances”, “subjectivity of consciousness”, 
“descriptive psychology”, “objective correlates of subjectivity”, “experiential aspects of 
living in the world”, etc.236 With its roots traceable to Plato and Aristotle, it is evident 
that there is an “openness and indefiniteness of the term „phenomenology‟ in its historical 
use”.237 Broadly speaking, its early phase till Merleau-Ponty may be said to deal with the 
science of consciousness which has internalized certain archetypal lived experiences of 
the world by human beings.
238
 In other words, this phase of phenomenology, from 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-1961), becomes a study of human beings‟ lived experiences of the world 
which condition their “consciousness”,239 ultimately conceived as merely being an effect 
of the body.   
          Phenomenology‟s Departure from the Objective Mode of Analysis 
In Western thought, till Kant (1724-1804), reality was generally dealt with as an 
objective factor independent of human existence. Sinari notes:  
The most basic assumption of science is that objective knowledge is the only 
valid knowledge, for it is definitive, exact, unambiguous, and mathematically 
computable…in order to know phenomenon reliably, it must be reached 
objectively, i.e. it must be posited by mind outside itself.
240
  
In his The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, for the first time in Western thought, argues  
that an understanding of the world is reached only on the basis of certain à priori 
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“categories of understanding” given in human “consciousness”.241 Thus, human beings 
experience the world in a subjective way (phenomena) by imposing “categories” imposed 
on reality, a process which forever debars them from knowing things-in-themselves 
(noumena). For Kant, the process signifies an epistemic enclosure marking the limits of 
human understanding:  
An object within consciousness…as distinguished from a thing in itself, must 
receive its character not from anything lying beyond the circle of consciousness, 
but from something within consciousness itself.
242
  
Kant questions the foundations of classical epistemology of Descartes (1596-1650), 
which has even permeated scientific thoughts of our times, that holds that “objects” exist 
“out there” independent of human consciousness of them which, however, are capable of 
being known by them objectively by applying “thoughts” and “ideas” to them by a 
transparent human intelligence called “the mind”. Kant essentially reverses this model by 
advocating what may be called a subjective-objective mode of enquiry which doesn‟t 
deny reality to be “out there”, but denies the possibility of it ever being understood in its 
absolute objective terms. Husserl, who first undertook a systematic and rigorous 
exposition of the phenomenological method in his voluminous writings starting with 
Philosophy of Arithmetic ([1891], 2003), signaled a further shift along the subjective line 
of thought by replacing Kant‟s à priori “categories of understanding” with what may be 
called “categories of archetypal experiences” that are internalized by human 
“consciousness” that determine human perception of reality.    
          Edmund Husserl‟s Phenomenology  
The following sections illustrate Husserl‟s notion of the formation of “objects” and 
“relation between objects” in human perception. 
Husserl‟s Notion of “Object” Perception: Intentionality of Consciousness  
While wrestling with the question how do “objects” get individuated in human perception 
from flux of sensations hitting them at each moment, Husserl agrees with his teacher 
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Franz Brentano (1838-1917) that it happens because human consciousness “intends” 
them to be so.
243
 The question is from where does this intentionality arise in human 
consciousness? Husserl considered that repetitive human experiences of the world are 
internalized in human consciousness as architectures of embodied experiences, called the 
“eidos”, in terms of which human beings „understand‟ the world. Thus, in contrast to 
conceiving “consciousness” as a form of transparent intelligence as Descartes had done, 
or as filled with certain à priori “categories of understanding” as Kant had thought, 
Husserl considered it to be filled with day-to-day phenomenological experiences of the 
world. Thus, even when an “object” is physically perceived in 2-dimensions, human 
consciousness „fills it up‟ with its third dimesion on the basis of the archetypal “eidos” 
internalized within consciousness. Mohanty notes the significance of this idea: 
When Husserl regards consciousness as constituting nature, he analyzes even 
“transcendentally purified” consciousness into the hyletic sensory components 
and the noetic act of meaning-giving or interpretation. In this sense, 
consciousness is not a disembodied pure spirit; rather, it is embodied, being 
located in the lived body, i.e. lieb, whose innermost core is kinesthesia. The 
structure “lived body”, “kinesthesia”, “motility”, and “sensory continuum” 
characterizes consciousness‟s world-constituting role.244   
Husserl argues that consciousness‟s intentional “anticipations” are deeper than one‟s 
normal anticipations since they have grown in tandem with human evolution in nature 
and the socio-cultural practices built around them. In this sense, eidos are “taken over 
from culture and never thought about”.245 Husserl notes that, since the intentionality of 
one‟s consciousness invariably adds the missing dimension of experience to one‟s 
perception, “our „anticipations‟ always go beyond what „meets the eye‟ (or our other 
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senses); the „object‟ goes beyond anything that we ever anticipate.”246 Thus, “objects” 
appear as ideal entities in our consciousness, limited by a “horizon of expectations” 
dictated by human beings‟ lived experiences of the world.  
While Husserl‟s notion of “object” formation is relevant for cinema, his notion of 
“space” formation in human consciousness is equally important.  Husserl and, later, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, hold “space” to be not simply a locatory space where 
objects and things are kept, as conceived by Aristotle, but an experiential space 
signifying the bodily experiences of living in a particular space. In contrast to Kant‟s 
understanding of the three-dimensional space as an abstract entity, Husserl posits a three-
dimensional lived space where the human body and the “lived space” or “place” becomes 
co-determinants for each other. Casey notes: 
Phenomenology suggests that ties between the animated body and lived space are 
as thick as the flesh that connects them…place is not just something seen – as 
visuo-centric models would imply – but something felt, sensed, undergone.247  
In this bodily sense, a “lived space” is experienced in the following two ways: it is 
relative to its surrounding landscape which demarcates a space in terms of human 
movement (Husserl uses the terms “near” and “far”), and it is relative to the scale of the 
human body as a measure of action that happens within it (Merleau-Ponty uses the terms 
“height”, “size”, and “shape”).248  
Similarly, Husserl discusses “time” in terms of experiential time, i.e. “felt time” 
experienced by a subject. Husserl dissociates this experience from the notion of scientific 
time which is uniform and measurable, based on the linearity of Newtonian concept of 
uniform and absolute time. Instead, Husserl concentrates on the intentionality that 
underlies a subject‟s consciousness of time. Since it is in relation to an “object” or an 
“action” that one experiences time, present time is not empty but is laden with subject‟s 
memories of the past and anticipations of the future in relation to the “event” that she 
encounters. Such an experience of time is never uniform; rather, it is most uneven in 
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terms of one‟s embodied experiences of living in the world. In this sense, Husserl notes 
that temporal notions of the past, present, and future should not be treated as detached 
experiences but should be considered as coalescing into an integrated whole within one‟s 
consciousness. Thus, a melody does not appear as a mere “disharmonious tangle of 
sound” to a listener; 249 instead, Husserl claims that the piece‟s “musicality” lies in the 
listener‟s integration of an ongoing “now” with “impressions” of the past and 
“anticipations” of the future.250 In other words, a musical piece invariably reflects how 
time is intended to be experienced in the listener‟s consciousness which makes it 
experientially greater than the sum of its parts.  
Husserlian Notion of “Relation between Objects”: Motivational Causality  
Husserl completes his phenomenological understanding of the world by holding that an 
“object” gets related to another “object” in terms of one‟s lived experience of the world. 
He clarifies that this linkage is not in the nature of being a necessary causality, as prevails 
between fire and smoke, but a “motivational causality” where one‟s experiences of living 
in the world makes him/her “anticipate” a certain relation of mutual dependence between 
them. Due to the commonality of human experiences, such imputations are inter-
subjective to the core, generating a “natural attitude” among human beings to anticipate 
certain interactions which are commonly experienced in the world. Christensen notes: 
The natural attitude understood as a stance or a confidence – a general trust – 
concerns the belief that each perceptual experience entails, as part of its very 
existence or identity, a particular spatio-temporal order exists in the world.
251
   
This attitude is so strong that even when a particular perception proves to be false, it 
doesn‟t shake one‟s belief in the world one has „constructed‟ with the help of eidos and 
relations of mutual dependence that one knows. Thus, even when a person mistakes a 
rope for a snake, the falsity of this perception can only be proved against the firm belief 
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that both these objects exist in the world.
252
 In Husserlian theory, it is the commonality of 
such human experience forms the basis for inter-subjectivity in the world.
253
   
Since „things‟ are known on the basis of eidos existing in one‟s consciousness in 
Husserl, does it mean, like in Kant, that things-in-themselves remain unknown to the 
perceiver in terms of their bare objectivity? Husserl holds that an intuitive power of 
grasping material entities emanates from “pure consciousness” occurring on the basis of 
an eido-filled consciousness.
254
 This intuitive process, called Husserlian epoché or 
“phenomenological reduction”, it consists in putting out of practice, i.e. „bracketing‟ 
relations arising out of one‟s empirical experiences of living in the world. Husserl holds 
that, deprived of contingent and motivational “relations”, an object‟s essential ground of 
being, i.e. its eidetic structure comes to be directly grasped by a person. Called eidetic 
seeing, Husserl notes that in this state, an inquirer‟s mind is gripped by certainty of 
knowledge, a state Husserl calls apodeitic self-evidence.
255
  
In the context of cinema, one may note that, far from representing a process of 
disembodied vision, as advocated by film theories, film perception seems to be thriving 
with audiences‟ embodied “anticipations” of “objects” and “object relations” as claimed 
by Husserl. Turvey comments: “Unlike theories of the natural universe, film theories 
concern what human beings already know and do based on their own experiences of 
living in the world”.256  
Husserl‟s phenomenology is strikingly similar to Nyāya theory of perception: Husserl‟s 
notion of human perception of “objects” and “relation between objects” are essentially 
similar to Nyāya‟s notion of “relational universals” representing the imposition of 
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functional relationships to form an “object” and the formation of a “relation between 
objects” strictly in terms of the perceiver‟ embodied and socio-cultural practices of life.    
         Martin Heidegger‟s Phenomenology 
Martin Heideggar‟s contribution lies in more firmly moving phenomenology from the 
confines of individual consciousness to that of human beings‟ socio-cultural 
consciousness. 
Human Beings as Tool-Wielding Social Agents 
Martin Heidegger gives Husserl‟s idea of “intentionality of consciousness” a new 
direction. He reasons that there must be something in the constitution of human 
“consciousness” itself which makes it manifest its intentionality towards things outside 
itself. In this respect, Heidegger introduces the important notion of “Dasein” (sein means 
„being‟ and da means „there‟) which essentially means a process of “being-in-the-world”. 
In Heidegger‟s evolutionary theory of society and culture, a human being is the 
culmination of all his lived relations in the world: „being-in-the-world includes in itself 
relation of existence to being in the whole [Sein im Ganzen]‟.257 Heideggar reasons that it 
is this very nature of relatedness of human beings to the world lie Dasein‟s intentionality. 
Dastur notes: 
There is an essential disclosedness (erschlossenheit) of being which comes from 
the fact Dasein bears in its innermost being the character of not being 
closed…Heidegger notes: “Through disclosedness, this Da-sein of the self is there 
for itself together with the Da-sein of the world”.258  
According to Heidegger, the original condition of human beings is to be “always already 
with other beings”. For him, therefore, Dasein is not simply the “consciousness” of an 
                                                          
257
 Heideggers’ marginal notes in Being and Time, Trans. J. Stambaugh (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, [1927] 1996): 10;  quoted in François Dastur, “Dasein”, in The Routledge Companion, 318- 
26, 320, original emphasis 
258
 Dastur, “Dasein”, 320; Heidegger’s quotes from Being and Time, Trans. J. Stambaugh, 34, modified, 
original emphasis 
99 
 
isolated individual but is that of a specific social agent who always intends to be equal to 
her social position in relation to all the other human beings of the world.
259
   
In the above sense, for Heidegger, a human being is a “tool-using” social agent, 
the very use of the “tool” used by a human being orienting her to the material world in a 
particular way, which also includes an anticipation of others‟ the behavior towards her. 
Thus, being a carpenter is to know how to handle hammer and nails while being-in-the-
world with the possibility of learning new technologies as and when they come. In this 
way, „evolution‟ of “tools” since primordial times reflects the evolution of humn society 
till the present times. Heidegger, thus, replaces Husserl‟s “horizon of anticipations” with 
his notion of “totalities of relevance” of human beings operating as social agents within 
the world. Svenaeus notes: 
A chair never appears in isolation; it always appears within a horizon of human 
projects where it is used in a variety of activities. The meaningfulness of the chair, 
its being as a chair, can only be understood if we focus on its place in a context of 
practices. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes such contexts as “totalities of 
relevance” – as settings in which objects assume the role of tools (zeuge) used to 
attain specific goals…all bound together by what Heidegger calls “the world”‟.260  
Clearly, this is an extremely important development in phenomenological thought: 
Heidegger‟s phenomenology doesn‟t pertain to a world of nature but to a world of 
culture. Christensen notes the significance of Dasein‟s social process: since, in order to 
be relevant, a tool-using entity invariably presupposes the existence of other tool-using 
entities in the world, it leads to the inevitable conclusion that being-a-self typically means 
being-with-the-others at the same time. In other words, subjectivity inevitably entails 
inter-subjectivity in Heideggerian thought.
261
 Cinema, as a techno-cultural tool, has a 
deep affinity with Heidegger in this respect.  
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There is a similarity between Heidegger‟s notion of “tools” and Nyāya notion of 
arte-factual “universals”, to be discussed in chapter 3. Nyāya holds that the formation of 
“objects” in human perception occurs in terms of their basis for use (pravrtti nimitta) by 
human beings in the course of their living in the world.
262
  
           Merleau-Ponty‟s Existential Phenomenology 
Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology moves away from the notion of “consciousness” in 
Husserl and Heidegger to that of “the body” alone in his thought process discussed 
below.   
Embodiment as the Basis of Cognition 
While for both Husserl and Heidegger, “the body” is subsumed by the notion of a 
transcendental consciousness in which are internalized the body‟s orientation towards the 
world, Merleau-Ponty replaces the notion of human “consciousness” as being 
independent of the body with that of “the body” producing “consciousness” as its effect 
in his theory of existential phenomenology. For Merleau-Ponty, “the body”, which 
replaces both human “consciousness” and “ego”, exercises two specific functions while 
being-in-the-world. First, it generates an “operational intentionality” where the body‟s 
primordial experiences of living in nature are internalized as bodily memory, and, 
secondly, “bodily intentionality” which adopts the body to the way the world is being 
drastically reshaped by human interventions in nature, also internalized as body memory, 
with the former producing the foundational basis for the latter to be built-up as part of 
human “consciousness”. In other words, while primordial experiences of nature constitute 
the body‟s “operational intentionality” at the most basic level of human existence, 
“bodily intentionality” adopts the body to the arte-factual world.263 According to 
Merleau-Ponty, these two intentionalities together help us to understand even thought-
processes involving abstractions and idealizations, like “He is walking”, etc.264  
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Merleau-Ponty makes the further point that since my body is “my point of view to 
the world”, the body‟s situatedness in the world is ingrained in us.265 Merlaeu-Ponty‟s 
idea of perception, laid out in his masterwork Phenomenology of Perception ([1948], 
1962), is heavily influenced by the Gestalt theory of the Berlin School which flourished 
in the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Holding that objectivity in perception is inseparable 
from subjectivity of perception, the Gestalts argue that all sense stimuli are ultimately 
perceptions of „completed‟ forms in terms of internalized human experiences of the 
world. Merleau-Ponty reorients Husserl‟s theory by holding that eidos do not occur in 
human consciousness but are internalized as bodily memory with intentionally converting 
free-flowing sense-datum into coherent “objective” wholes in the world. For Merleau-
Ponty, the bodily memory of internalized experiences appears as human “consciousness” 
with intentions to complete “objects”. In this sense, both for him and the Gestalts before 
him, perceptual fields are places where the objective and the subjective world of 
embodied consciousness „complete‟ each other. Transcending Cartesian dualism in which 
subjects are closed-off from their objects of perception, Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, 
says: “We are through and through compounded of relationships with the world”.266  
Merleau-Ponty farther holds that, during the formation of “objects” through 
subjective-objective interactions, the internalized bodily experiences form “relation 
between objects” i.e. relational wholes in perception. More importantly, the „meanings‟ 
of such relational wholes remain influenced by the bodily perspective from which they 
are being perceived. Thus, a mountain which appears „tall‟ in relation to other objects 
from a particular point of view may not appear to be so from a height. This idea has the 
following implication for cinema: different shots of the same scene taken from different 
angles are expected to generate different bodily experiences among the audiences.  Apart 
from the arbitrariness of the contingent nature of spatial relations experienced by the 
body, since the phenomenal world is also ever changing in terms of color, lighting, etc, 
Merleau-Ponty also holds that the very nature of human perception is arbitrary in the 
sense that it forever remains “unfinished” and “precarious” within the perceptual field. In 
this sense, Merleau-Ponty challenges the logic of certitude of knowledge central to 
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classical Western philosophy. Instead, Merleau-Ponty holds that “the subject-object 
correlation transpires within incompletion, non-coincidence, and penumbra”.267 In other 
words, he replaces Cartesian dualism of “I think” related to a transcendental 
consciousness with “I perceive” related to the sensations being received by the body 
which, being arbitrary, forever remains incomplete in relation to the world. Crucially, 
because of the interrelatedness of the body to other bodies, Merleau-Ponty farther holds 
that the body internalizes both the memories of being a perceiving subject as well as 
being an object of perception from other‟s point of view: “I consider my body, which is 
my point of view on the world, as one of the objects of this world”.268  
Merleau-Ponty also advances Heidegger‟s notion of human beings being tool-
wielding social agents. Since the memory of the typing skill resides in the body, one‟s 
effort at intellectually understanding the operation of its keys is bound to fail. Similarly, a 
blind man invariably experiences the world at the end of his stick which becomes an 
extension of his body.
269
 In other words, human interventions in the world eventually 
become internalized as part of the human body.
270
  
Carel sums up Merleau-Ponty‟s idea of the body being the locus of pre-reflective 
knowledge as follows:
271
 
i) Habitual Body 
Merleau-Ponty holds that bodily habituation forms an important part of our pre-
reflexive knowledge about the world. Normally, however, we aren‟t aware of it. 
Only when something breaks down and our habit is disturbed, we become aware 
of what Sartre calls “taken for granted-ness” of our body.  
            ii)   Body‟s Motor Intentionality or Motility 
In order to achieve a physical task, the body always gets oriented in a particular 
manner unconsciously. Merleau-Ponty holds that human motility is what is 
generally known as human “consciousness”: “Consciousness is being-towards-
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the-thing through the intermediary of the body…to move one‟s body is to aim at 
things through it”.272 
            iii)  Intentional Arc 
In the same vein as that of Husserl‟s “horizon of anticipations” and Heidegger‟s 
“totalities of relevance”, Merleau-Ponty uses the overarching term “intentional 
arc” to describe one‟s relationship to the world involving temporal structures, 
human situations, and moral conditions which signify existential conditions 
resulting in the belief that if something hurts me it would hurt other human beings 
as well. This idea captures Merleau-Ponty‟s thoughts on the ultimate embedded-
ness of human beings in the cultural and moral world.
273
 It is this “intentional arc” 
– one‟s existential relationship to the world – which goes „limp‟ in pathological 
cases.  
This completes the phenomenological journey from Husserl‟s notion of “transcendental 
consciousness” filled up with experiential archetypes or eidos to Heidegger‟s notion of 
human beings as “tool-wielding” social agents to Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of “the body” 
as the center of all human experiences with “consciousness” appearing as its effect in the 
world.   
  Lakoff and Johnson‟s Analysis of Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology 
It is a remarkable journey from the point of view of Western thought. Merleau-Ponty‟s 
emphasis on the body as the center of all cognitions and experiences, which is duly 
supported by some of the current findings of cognitive science, has the subversive 
potential to overthrow many of the cherished notions of Western thought. Lakoff and 
Johnson catalogue their findings in their remarkable work Philosophy in the Flesh: The 
Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.
274
 In the first three sentences of 
the book, the authors summarize their position as follows:  
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The mind is inherently embodied; 
                                                    Thought is mostly Unconscious; and 
                Abstract Concepts are largely Metaphorical 
The concept of “reason”, which represents the human capacity to think transparently, 
based on the assumption that an underlying transcendental consciousness lies within 
human beings, an article of faith in Western thought since the Greeks, becomes a matter 
of serious dispute. Summed up by Lakoff and Johnson, it leads to the following 
conclusions regarding “reason”:275 
i) Since it goes beyond saying that we need a body to experience the world, 
“human reason is embodied reason, a reason inextricably tied to our bodies 
and the peculiarities of our brains”.276 Thus, “reason” is not disembodied, but 
arises from our embodied experiences. 
ii) Reason is not universal in the sense of being a transcendental entity; rather it 
is „universal‟ in the sense of being common to human beings. 
iii) Even abstract reason is based on animal nature, arising from human embodied 
experiences of the world and its naturalization in terms of socio-cultural 
practices of the world. 
iv) Since the body is unconscious, only capable of reacting to the world in terms 
of „pain‟and „pleasure‟ which it internalizes as body memory, reason is both 
unconscious and emotionally engaged. 
v) The body being unconscious, it „understands‟ the world in terms of similar 
experiences from the past, the experience being internalized in its memory as 
“invariable sequence” of occurrences in the world. In this sense, reason is 
basically metaphorical and imaginative in nature which can only be loosly 
represented in language.  
Explaining their conclusions, Lakoff and Johnson note that, since reason is embodied 
with the body being unconscious, there is no real understanding by human beings of what 
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is happening in the world; rather it is an unconscious mechanical process where an 
„understanding‟ is reached through comparison with other embodied experiences in the 
past. Mentioning that the process is metaphorical in nature where “the essence of 
metaphor is one‟s understanding through experience of one kind of thing in terms of 
another”, Lakoff and Johnson note “the human conceptual system is metaphorically 
structured and defined”.277 The latest research in Neural Theory of Language has shown 
an inalienable connection between bodily behavior and human concepts, like “above” 
and “in”, etc. The researcher Srini Narayanan has shown that patterns of one‟s bodily 
motions underlie our understanding of metaphors, such as “France falls into a recession”, 
etc.
278
 Interestingly, Lakoff and Johnson analyze the metaphor “Argument is War” as a 
product of a combination of sentences such as „Your position is indefensible‟, „I 
demolished his argument‟, „Ok, shoot!‟, etc.279  
The following film example illustrates the way the body gets represented to us in 
cinema. In Satyajit Ray‟s Nayak (The Hero, 1966), the journalist Aditi (Sharmila Tagore) 
is interviewing the matinee idol Arindam Mukherjee (Uttam Kumar) in the dining car of 
a moving train. At a particular point in the scene, the camera technique changes from cut-
to-cut shots between their faces to a smooth panning shot linking the two. While the 
position of the two characters does not visibly change neither do the tenor of their 
dialogue delivery, the change in the camerawork represents a body „movement‟ for the 
audiences that conveys the metaphorical sense to the audiences that Aditi‟s attitude has 
changed from being a cut-throat journalist to that of being sympathetic towards him. As a 
confirmation of the audiences‟ embodied understanding of the scene, Aditi tears all her 
notes in the climactic scene, announcing that she will keep them in her mind rather than 
publish them.   
The extent of revolution that Merleau-Ponty signifies in Western thought may be 
summed up as follows: there is no Cartesian dualism where a person has a thinking 
                                                          
277
 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5-6, 
modified; OERD defines “metaphor” as “The application of a name or a descriptive term or phrase to an 
object or an action to which it is imaginatively but not literally applicable”.  
278
 Accessed “Review of Lakoff & Johnson” from the Web, June 2016 
279
 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 4 
106 
 
“mind” separate from an inert “body”; no Kantian autonomous person with absolute 
freedom to dictate what is moral; no utilitarian person with a free consciousness dictating 
economic rationality; no Husserlian person who, through phenomenological reduction, 
can get to the bare particulars of reality; no Lacanian person who is entirely constructed 
by the others since the body, to a large extent, is already constituted by the material 
world; no poststructuralist person in the sense of being a completely decentered subject 
for whom all meanings are totally arbitrary, relative, and historically contingent because 
our minds are already steeped in embodied experiences which are common to human 
beings in general; and, finally, there is no Fregean person for whom thought is excluded 
from the body as proposed by analytical philosophy because there can be no meaning 
without embodiment, truth being relative in the sense of being mediated by embodied 
understanding and imagination.
280
 Needless to say, these new parameters of thinking 
signify momentous changes in the conventional mode of Western thinking so far.         
There are some striking similarities as well as some significant differences 
between Merleau-Pontian thought and Nyāya theory of perception. The similarities are as 
follows: all experiences are embodied experiences, „understood‟ in terms of other 
experiences; consciousness arises only contingently, arguably as an effect of the body‟s 
interactions with matter; reason is embodied including abstract reason like inference, etc; 
all knowledge arises from experience, there being nothing à priori in Indian thought; all 
knowledge is metaphorical in nature, arising from an „unintelligent‟ comparison between 
experiences read as „invariable sequences‟ occurring in reality, etc. As far as differences 
are concerned, they would be discussed in greater detail as part of the Nyāya 
epistemological discourse in chapter 3. Needless to point out that these thought processes 
and the principles they formulate have profound influence in the way we experience and 
understand cinema.      
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Is Merleau-Ponty a “Theorist”? 
Before we proceed to Part 2 where Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology will be applied to 
cinema, it is necessary to address the question often raised in relation to Buddha and 
Merleau-Ponty: can they be called “theorists” at all?281  
The above question is legitimate in the sense that the basic aim of both Buddha 
and Merleau-Ponty has been to deconstruct existing theories rather than to construct new 
ones. In the above sense, their stance may be more appropriately described as 
establishing “anti-foundationalist” positions rather than starting new ones. However, in 
the present work, they are still being called “theorists” not only because any position that 
contradicts an existing position on the basis of a coherent system of thought becomes a 
„theory” in itself, but also for certain deeper considerations being explained below.  
Anti-foundationalism is guided by a critical spirit of not resting with a priviledged 
set of ideas. The argument is that foundationalism priviledges certain givens which 
ultimately signify a commitment to a metaphysics of presence.
282
 The anti-
foundationalists‟ denial of a given form goes with the denial of a form-giver as well. 
However, phenomenology holds that consciousness is not a denial of all given conditions, 
but a meaningful intending of objects because of consciousness‟s inherent intentional 
structure. Thus, while sensations are organized into “objects” and “objects” into the 
“world”, impulses and desires get converted into „goal-directed‟ activities for human 
beings.
283
 In this connection, Mohanty critiques the denial of a self or an ego by both 
Buddha and Merleau-Ponty in the following specific sense: 
To say that felt experiences are unified by an ego, a self, or a subject is to say no 
more than that these principles and categories constitute experiences as an 
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organism develops. The putative ego is a unity as a result of the modes of 
synthesis inherent in the conscious life.
284
 
The anti-foundationalist rejects the priviledged given by positing temporality as a 
universal feature of change of all worldly things which not only undermine their unity as 
“things” but also their unified “meanings”. In this sense, the anti-foundationalists 
critiques the notion of “meaning” itself: since the unity of a perceptual object is forever in 
the process of being constituted, its “meaning” as a finished product is implicated in an 
endless process of deferral.
285
  
However, this raises questions about the nature of the discontinuities themselves: 
how radical can the radical discontinuities be? Mohanty points out their limits: 
If seamless recapitulation is not possible, radical rupture is not intelligible 
either…truly, radical ruptures would lead to the metaphysical thesis that there is 
not one time but a plurality of times.
286
   
In fact, Mohanty points out that the anti-foundationalists fall back upon the same 
dogmatic view of the self as the foundationalists do: 
In order to deny ideal-objective meanings, the anti-foundationalist denies the 
possibility of undertstanding the other which means that one understands, if at all, 
only itself. One is, thus, back with the familiar Cartesian thesis or something close 
to it.
287
 
Since it appears that, in the above sense, the anti-foundationalists are as dogmatic in 
using certain ideas as the foundationalists are in using their‟s, no violence would be done 
to the spirit of both Buddha and Merleau-Ponty if they are called “theorists” within the 
explanatory context mentioned above. 
 
 
                                                          
284
 Mohanty, Theory and Practice, 28, modified 
285
 Ibid, 30-1 
286
 Ibid, 29 
287
 Ibid 
109 
 
          Part 2 
        Applying Merleau-Ponty‟s Phenomenology to Cinema 
Based on Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of existential phenomenology, a group of 
contemporary film researchers like Vivian Sobchack, Laura Marks, and others have held 
that embodied experience forms a crucial part of audience‟s meaningful engagement with 
cinema. Although Linda Williams is the pioneer of inserting “the body” in film discourse 
through her work on pornographic cinema, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the Frenzy 
of the Visible (1989),
288
 the present trend of applying Merleau-Ponty to cinema can be 
said to have truly started with Sobchack‟s largely polemical work The Address of the 
Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (1992).
289
 The contemporary researchers base 
themselves on Maurice Merleau-Ponty‟s argument that, since both animate and inanimate 
entities have grown in tandem with nature, they have been transformed into effective 
vehicles of experience and response to the world at large. Calling such correspondences 
and communications wild meaning, Merleau-Ponty holds that, at the embodied level, 
there is a fundamental intelligibility of the world for all of us.
290
 Thus, when we see 
something in nature, like a tree for instance, it makes sense to us at a deeper level of our 
being, which is only subsequently conceptualized as a „tree‟. Sobchack makes the 
important point that such originary signification of the world acts as the enabling 
structure for all secondary significations, like verbal language, etc, which normally 
constitute our on the surface „undersatnding‟ of cinema.291  
Embodiment has another important effect on viewers. Merleau-Ponty had held 
that, by virtue of realizing that they are bodily grounded, human beings also realize that 
other embodied beings are similarly grounded too. Thus, while from a viewer‟s 
perspective, others appear as objects to the viewer, the viewer simultaneously realizes 
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that, from their perspective, she appears as an object to them as well. Such experiences 
lead to Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of reversibility of perception and expression which he 
considers to be the basic plank of social communication in the world: based on the 
experiences of one‟s body acting as the ground level or degree zero of interacting with 
the world, the perceiver gets a hint of others‟ intentions by observing the way their bodies 
are poised in particular situations and respond accodingly. Film theorists have so far 
brushed aside this fundamental aspect of cinema.   
Since cinema is a mechanical or an electronic reproduction of the material surface 
of the world, Sobchack claims, on the basis of Merleau-Ponty‟s existential 
phenomenology, that there is a fundamental intelligibility of the film experience shared by 
the filmmaker, the viewer, and the film together.
292
 In this sense, cinema is a process of 
“double signification”: while, at the fundamental level, it generates a direct experience 
for the audiences at their embodied level, at the secondary level, it generates mediated 
experience through other signifying systems like film narration, etc. When a natural 
entity is perceived in a film, like the hills or the trees, they already “mean” something at 
the level of human being‟s embodied living in the world, called “operational 
intentionality” by Merleau-Ponty. On the basis of such a primordial understanding, the 
filmmaker constructs an artificial world where the “bodily intentionality” of the actors 
become a vehicle of expression for the audiences at their own embodied level. In 
Merleau-Ponty‟s words, the bodily gestures of the actors represent an expression of an 
experience by an experience where the actors‟ embodied behavior generates an embodied 
experience for the audiences.
293
 While silent cinema is a prime example of such 
embodied understanding, sound cinema tacitly depends on it to build up its narration.  
In the ensuing sections, Merleau-Ponty‟s ideas will be applied to cinema under 
the following heads: embodied sense in cinema, phenomenological construction of space 
and time in cinema, vision-touch equivalence generating a synaesthetic experience in 
cinema, and subjective-objective alterations involving a chiasmic interaction in cinema.  
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The Embodied Phenomenological Sense of a Scene 
How embodiment influences one‟s understanding of cinema is illustrated through the 
following film sequence: 
Train Sequence in Satyajit Ray‟s Pather Panchali (Song of the Little Road, 1955) 
In a phenomenologically rich sequence, we observe young Apu (Subir Banerjee) and 
Durga (Uma Dasgupta) running through „kash bon‟ (lean and tall plants with white 
flowers on their stems) in midst of pristine nature, an area which they have not seen 
before. They suddenly come across a telegraph pole. Durga presses her ears against the 
pole and hears a mechanical sound never heard before which enters her consciousness as 
a new phenomenological experience. As they trudge along, Durga falls but Apu keeps 
moving ultimately to come across a railway line. He has heard the mechanical clanking 
sound of trains passing his house but has never seen one before. As a goods train chugs 
along, Apu observes it with an awestruck expression. The whole scene is rich in 
phenomenological experiences which are totally alien to their lived experiences of rural 
life so far.  
The art critic, Geeta Kapur has noted that Ray combined Tagore‟s romantic, 
lyrical tradition with modern Western traditions and presented it to the emerging middle 
class as a progress, together with its attendant morality, as a natural development in the 
modernizing discourse, a project intimately tied to the project of modern nationhood 
vigorously pursued by India‟s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.294 Kapur implies 
that, in pursuit of presenting this modernist project in an acceptable form, Ray has 
glossed over the traumatic history of India‟s emergence into the modern period.295 As 
evidence, Kapur cites the train sequence in Pather Pnachali as Ray‟s efforts at a seamless 
integration of the signs of modernity, like the telegraph poles and the train, with the 
feudal landscape of Nischindipur village in the tradition of Tagore‟s romantic 
Shantiniketan painterly modes,
296
 generating an impression that it has organically grown 
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out of India‟s own aesthetic traditions.297 However, Vasudevan critiques this position by 
arguing that “the modernist dimension of Ray‟s work disturbs any straightforward 
organization of narrative material and spectatorial perspective”.298 Vasudevan notes the 
discontinuities and the jerks that Ray, a person steeped in the seamless mode of 
Hollywood editing, deliberately introduces into the scene: 
As if needing to work disruptive effects of sensations into filmic structures, Ray 
resorts to a rare discontinuity, a temporal gap in the abrupt cut that shows Apu 
entering the space around the telegraph pole after Durga has left it; the 
compulsion to repeat highlights the moment and the space as symbolically 
charged, as marked off from the seamless flow of previous time. When Apu asks 
Durga for an explanation of the mysterious sense impressions, she merely 
gestures him to silence, to listen.
299
 
Vasudevan further highlights Ray‟s deliberate efforts at disrupting the scene. When 
billowing cloud of smoke emerges on the horizon, Ray foregrounds the audiences‟ look 
through a swiss pan, which goes entirely against the mode of narration so far, in order to 
jerk them out of their perspective of Apu: 
Our look here is dislocated from the smooth flow of character focalized narration. 
For we briefly lose our object, and, in the process, are alerted to the 
phenomenology of the moving camera at the very moment the character becomes 
aware of the moving train…The moment of dislocation is developed into a full 
jettisoning of the spectator‟s view from the framed character.300  
In fact, rather than being an unequivocal votary of modernism, Ray, throughout his 
career, exhibits his characters‟ trepidations about the impinging modernity. Thus, apart 
from building disjunctions and fractures into the scene, Ray also captures a low angle 
perspective of Apu, in which the goods train appears like a huge mechanical contraption 
bearing down on him. This phenomenological sense interpenetrates his sense of 
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wonderment with a strong embodied sense of fear which would forever haunt Apu in his 
relationship with trains in future. Thus, whenever trains appear in the Apu Trilogy, they 
become harbingers of bad news for Apu. For example, in Aparajito (The Unvanquished, 
1957), Apu comes to his native village by train only to find his mother dead and, in Apur 
Sansar (The World of Apu, 1959) Apu receives the tragic news of his wife‟s death at the 
station. Ray presents Apu as a true representative of the Indian psyche which, though 
welcoming human interventions in nature, always receives it with a certain caution as to 
whether these „events‟ would eventually disturb the harmony of nature.  
 However, Pather Panchali calls for a deeper analysis in terms of human beings‟ 
phenomenological relations with their surroundings. The literary work on which the film 
is based was conceived by Bibhutibhusan Bandopadhyay as a chronicle of human beings‟ 
day-to-day living in a village caught in the midst of a socio-economic transformation. 
Even though Harihar (Kanu Bandyopadhyay) is losing out on his family occupation of 
priesthood due to these changes, Bibhutobhsan‟s writings do not give any impression that 
he considers these changes as anything but normal. In the Indian tradition, changes 
occurring due to human interventions in Nature are welcomed, with the wheel (cakra) 
considered as the quintessential symbol of such change, subject to the condition that it is 
in harmony with cycle represented by nature. Pather Panchali tells the story of a 
primordial phenomenological relationship of human beings living in Nature, represented 
by Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of “operational intentionality”, within which arte-factual 
interventions of man get progressively inscribed, a change which the body adopts in 
terms of Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of “bodily intentionality”. The important point to note is 
that, whether in Bibhutibhusan‟s work or in the film picturization, the larger 
phenomenological experience of Man in Nature is ever present as the underlying river-
bed against which all its „flows‟ are measured. That‟s why the day Apu sees the train, the 
same day he and his sister witness the death of the village grandma, the two events being 
treated as coincidental events in the film with life and death and change appearing as 
inalinable parts of the larger cycle of human existence in the world.   
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Norman Bates discovers Marion Crane‟s Body in Alfred Hitchcock‟s Psycho (1960) 
While Marion Crane‟s bathtub murder is one of the most celebrated phenomenological 
sequences in world cinema, it is the scene that immediately follows would be the subject 
matter of study here. In this scene, Norman Bates runs towards Marion‟s room only to 
find her murdered in the bathroom there. Hitchcock has captured this whole scene in long 
and mid shots which cuts to a close-up only when Bates holds his anguished face in both 
his hands at the end of the scene. Arguably, the „meaning‟ of this entire scene could also 
have been conveyed through a montage of shots involving Bates running down the stairs 
of his house in long shot juxtaposed with his running in the Motel corridor in mid shot 
juxtaposed with his shocked appearance in a close-up, the montage effect being enough 
to create an appropriate intellectual understanding of the scene among the audiences. 
However, Hitchcock prefers to reproduce the very physicality of this whole scene 
through long and lengthy shots, changing them only when action moves beyond a 
particular camera position. Through this process, Hitchcock aims to evoke the audiences‟ 
phenomenological experiences, which he further reinforces by showing cheap linens on 
windows of the Bates Motel prominently, thereby seeking to generate a tactile bodily 
experience among the audiences. 
A legitimate question may be raised here: if Hitchcock desires to give his 
audiences a phenomenological experience, why then does he adopt a different approach 
in presenting the murder scene? One would recall that he presents this scene in a large 
number of extremely fast cuts (76 cuts approximately). The reason is that, in the murder 
scene, his intentions are not only to deliver maximum „shock‟ and „awe‟ to the audiences, 
but also not to disclose too much information about the murderer‟s facial profile in order 
to maintain the intrigue. It is for this reason that, even after the bathtub curtains are 
pulled, Hitchcock takes the cinematic liberty of keeping his face in darkness even though 
it would been exposed under realistic circumstances.                 
Constructing Phenomenological Space and Time in Cinema 
Hunter Vaughan, who applies phenomenological concepts to films of Jean-Luc Godard 
and Alain Resnais, notes: 
115 
 
There is what I will call the phenomenological notion: meaning lies in the 
interaction between the object and the subject of the image…I say 
“phenomenological” because, in this case, meaning lies neither solely in physical 
objects nor solely in the subjective apprehension of those objects but in the 
interactive flux that binds the former to the latter, what Merleau-Ponty sought as 
“the synthesis of the subjective and objective experiences of phenomena”.301  
In the context of subjective-objective interactions‟ requirement of „completing‟ a 
perceptual event, Vaughan notes that “spatial perception is a structural phenomenon, not 
an essential natural aspect, and is understandable only to the extent it is founded in a 
particular subjectivity”.302 In other words, both space and time are phenomenological 
constructs of the mind in terms of human beings‟ lived experiences of the world.  
Credit Sequence in Godard‟s Contempt (1963) 
In film after film, Godard pointedly draws our attention not only to the fact that meaning 
is entirely constructed in cinema, but also to the fact that the subject and the object 
repeatedly change their respective positions in the viewer‟s perception. The celebrated 
credit sequence of Godard‟s Contempt (1963) provides a classic example in this regard. 
As the sequence starts unfolding, Francesca (Giorgia Moll) walks towards the camera 
while reading from a script. Godard‟s cinematographer Raoul Coutard tracks her as 
Godard read the credits in voice-over. While tracking, Coutard gradually comes to be 
within the perceptual field of the audiences when Godard quotes Bazin “cinema 
substitutes for our gaze a world in accord with our desires”. Then, as the camera with 
Coutard behind it faces the audiences, Godard concludes “Contempt is the story of this 
world”. The point of this opening sequence totally demolishes the objectivity of the 
image for the audiences. Coutard is being shown as the object through the same process 
through which he shows Francesca as the object. In subverting conventional codes of 
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suture and other seamless editing devices, Godard entirely creates space and time for the 
audiences.
303
    
Vision-Touch Equivalence in Cinema: The Synesthetic Experience 
Merleau-Ponty indicates that organs of vision and touch are equivalent since they interact 
with the same space: “I can touch what I see and I can see what I touch”.304 By noting 
that “through others‟ eyes we are ourselves fully visible”, Merleau-Ponty notes the 
deeper implications of this phenomenon: 
Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same 
world…Every movement of my eyes – even more, every movement of my body – 
has its place in the same universe that I itemize and explore with them, as, 
conversely every vision takes place somewhere in the tactile space. There is a 
double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in the 
visible; the two maps are complete and yet they do not merge into one. The two 
parts are total parts, and yet they are not super-imposable.
305
   
Calling this deeper linkage between vision and touch as “Vision”,306 Merleau-Ponty holds 
that perceptual experience is essentially synesthetic in nature:  
A wooden wheel placed on the ground is not, for sight, the same thing as a wheel 
bearing a load since sight, in natural perception, carries references to what can 
also be discovered by the other senses. Synesthesia is the norm. The sighted do 
not share tactile and auditory sensations with the blind, since sight – or the lack of 
it – changes the whole structure of experience.307  
Thus, the expression “I see a „heavy‟ wheelbarrow” becomes a valid expression for 
Merleau-Ponty as are “I see „cold‟ ice” and “I see „fragile‟ glass”. According to him, if a 
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person seeks to break down this synesthetic perception into parts in order to understand it 
analytically, s/he is essentially making the whole thing become “unstable” for the 
viewer.
308
  
Sinking of the Ship in James Cameron‟s Titanic (1997) 
When we apply Merleau-Ponty‟s synesthetic experience to the protagonists sinking in the 
icy cold waters of the Atlantic in James Cameron‟s Titanic (1997), it indicates that the 
audiences‟ experiences are much „richer‟ than what the audio-visual mode of cinema is 
bringing to them. For example, while the protagonists sink, the audiences would also be 
able to see, i.e. “touch through vision” the severity of the „cold‟ water as well as other 
touch sensations pertaining to the sea. Since, at the deepest level, the body reacts in terms 
of elements that are either „pleasurable‟ or „painful‟ for the body, the audiences would be 
experiencing an embodied sense of fear associated with sinking in the sea.  
Nyāya theory fully anticipates Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of vision-touch 
equivalence among the subjects. Since the material world one sees can also be touched by 
a person, Nyāya, like Merleau-Ponty, holds that touch is given in vision and vice-versa. 
Nyāya, however, goes beyond Merleau-Ponty in grafting proximal sensations, like smell, 
sound and taste to the vision-touch equivalence as well through revived memory 
operating around the visual nucleus of the scene which generates an experience of visual 
synesthesia among the audiences. Thus, for Nyāya, expressions, like “I see a „fragrant‟ 
flower” or “I see the „honking‟ of a car”, are also valid in this theory. This aspect of 
Nyāya will be explored in much greater detail in the next chapter.  
Explaining Haptic Visuality in terms of Vision-Touch Equivalence in Cinema 
Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of vision-touch equivalence underlies the contemporary notion of 
haptic visuality in film discourse. Advocated by Laura Marks, haptic vision is a tactile 
form of perception where “the eyes function like organs of touch”.309 The film critic 
Donato Totaro comments: 
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As Marks explains, in optical visuality, the eye perceives objects from a distance 
to isolate them as forms of space. Haptic visuality is a closer form of looking, 
which tends to “move over the surface of its object rather than plunge into 
illusionist depth, not to distinguish form so much as to discern texture”.310  
Signifying haptic visuality as an experience of the surface rather than depth, as an 
indication rather than representation, as closeness rather than separation, Marks‟ 
professed aim is to “restore a flow between the haptic and the optical that our culture is 
currently lacking”.311   
Marks has been influenced in her thinking by two currents of thought: Merleau-
Ponty‟s existential phenomenology as elaborated by Vivian Sobchack in the domain of 
cinema and Bergsonian ideas of space, time and identity elaborated in the Deleuzian 
writings on cinema. Deleuze follows Bergson to hold that “meaning” is on the outside or 
surface of things, which the perceiver‟s body „touches‟ to know. In this sense, the 
“image” of the thing and the “thing” becomes indistinguishable for the perceiver, leading 
Deleuze to hold Image = Movement, signifying, thereby, that the current „appearance‟ of 
the thing-image is the thing itself and not a sign of the thing.
312
 This is a kind of 
“Appearing” where there is “not even an eye” to discern what it is from a distance.313 
Delueze terms the infinite presence of such images in cinema as the “plane of 
immanence” whose very „touch‟ through vision generate meaning among the audiences 
as some kind of a wild meaning (to borrow a Merleau-Pontian term) and not as a 
disembodied, intellectual „understanding‟ of the images. These images are cinephilic and 
tautological in the sense that they do not represent anything but pure „movement‟ or 
„appearance‟.314 More importantly, Deleuze has devised many types of images which do 
not translate into narrative action, but generates meanings and affects simply through 
their being. Thus, the falling of a lock of hair on an actor‟s face may not advance the 
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narrative as such but may generate a lot of visceral effect among the audiences. Called 
“opsigns” or “affection-images” by Deleuze, which form a part of a huge list of images 
that he classified, these images move from the optic to the haptic, interrupting the 
narrative flow of the film where the viewer‟s gaze does not symbolically identify the 
image in order to master it but creates a tactile space of a gradually evolving experience 
through the process of „touching‟ the image.315 Unlike the Lacanian subject which can 
only represent a lack or a void, the haptic subject does have an embodied phenomenal 
center.
316
 
What is the deeper implication of haptic visuality in cinema? Marks holds that 
filmmakers use it to revive memories that are suppressed by the dominant discourse or 
the „official history‟ where vision and hearing or optic visuality, which master symbolic 
forms from a distance, are privileged over proximal senses or haptic visuality like touch 
and smell, which are literally experienced by “touching” a thing.317 Marks delves into 
Bergson to hold that, while “habitual memory” primarily depends on the audio-visual 
senses that serve pragmatic needs, “pure memory”, which occur in unhabituated forms in 
which the mind generally makes connections laterally between completely unrelated 
things, are normally revived by non-optical triggers.
318
 Bergson also refers to a third kind 
of “unsolicited” independent memory, called “involuntary” memory, like the one which 
occur in Marcel Proust‟s celebrated work The Remembrance of Things Past in which a 
person is flooded with completely unsolicited images that overwhelm his sensibilities.
319
 
These images, which may include the memory of certain traumatic events in personal or 
collective memory, are more liberating for the audiences in terms of their experiences. 
Marks cites experimental filmmakers from non-Western cultures to evoke experiences 
involving proximal senses which still remain priviledged depite inroads made by 
industrialization in these cultures in contrast to the oculo-centrism of the Western culture. 
Examples of such experiences occur in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky. Thus, Tarkovsky 
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employs perpendicular overhead tracking shots over pools of water in Stalkӆr (Stalker, 
1979) and Nostalghia (Nostalgia, 1982) which are filled with items that are associated 
with deeply affective memories of the past.
320
 Similarly, narration in Nostalgia is often 
interrupted by an apparently unrelated shot of a person sitting with a dog close to a pool 
of water, a shot which liberates overwhelming affects for reasons unknown to the 
audiences. Torato also gives the example of Abbas Kiarostami‟s film The Wind Will 
Carry Us (2001) where a series of characters, while remaining unknown visually, become 
known to the audiences through other senses, an apt case of haptic visuality. More 
importantly, in Majid Majidi‟s film Children of Paradise (1999), where Majidi uses 
extreme colors and natural beauty to make the spectator experience how a blind boy 
experiences reality through his proximal senses.
321
 Totaro quotes Abbas Kiarostami “I 
want to create the type of cinema that shows by not showing” to sum up such film 
experiences.  
Subjective-Objective Transformation: Notion of the Chiasm 
Subjective-objective alteration, which results in the frequent change of a subject‟s 
phenomenological realization that while it exists as a subject in relation to an object it 
perceives, it simultaneously also appears as an object for the perceived object, is an 
important insight of Merleau-Ponty‟s thought. He holds that since such experiences 
alternate in perception, it is never able to fully isolate a thing in its concrete objectivity; it 
is invariably a product of the subjective-objective interactions occurring within the 
perceptual field.
322
 The plane of immanence, where subjects and objects have no rigid 
boundaries in interaction, is called chiasm by Merleau-Ponty: “there is a body of the 
mind and a mind of the body and a chiasm between them”.323 According to him, this 
chiasmic plane of immanence is a structure of mediation characterized by fluid 
reversibility and circularity of the chiasmus which operates at different levels of duality. 
Rycroft notes:  
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[H]e defined a new philosophical engagement with human bodies, senses, and 
spaces that rejected, in a modernist manoeuvre, the western intellectual binaries of 
the subject and the object, the self and the other, and the mind and the body.
324
    
Arguably, Merleau-Ponty‟s theory had influenced the formation of Lacan‟s notion of the 
gaze – the power of the gaze of the other to formulate and legitimize the subject.325 Fuery 
comments: 
The subject, then, becomes a („mirror‟) image for itself, how it positions itself in 
the world and how the world („the symbolic order‟) positions it. Here we witness 
one of Lacan‟s fundamental premises: the subject‟s formation of the self via the 
image is due to an interaction of the gaze from the subject and the subject being 
positioned by the gaze of the other…it is the gaze itself that becomes both part of 
the other and an object of desire for the subject.
326
   
Noting that “The gaze I encounter…is not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the 
field of the other”,327 Lacan goes to say that subjectivity is then “much more than simply 
having the capacity to see – it is part of the legitimizing of the subject to itself and to the 
other…to be recognized by the gaze of the other is to have a sense of [my] presence”.328 
The moment when we become aware of our own gaze, the gaze of the other on us, and 
the effects of this interplay in our perception, it forms the self-reflexive moment of the 
gaze for Lacan called “anamorphosis” by him.329 
Merleau-Ponty argues that, while the chiasm signifies a process of 
„encroachment‟ between the subjective and objective modes, their individualities are 
never fully erased. Toadvine notes that this chiasmic „synopsis‟ of encroaching into each 
other‟s territory involves no sublation of the opposites as in the Hegelian form, but is 
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achieved with the sense of subjectivity remaining intact.
330
 In the above context, three 
characteristics of the chiasm as conceived by Merleau-Ponty may be summed up as 
follows:     
       i)      It „opens‟ the body to the world 
                         ii)     It involves reversibility of roles between a subject and an object  
       iii)    Despite frequent encroachments, there occurs a gap between the 
                subject and the object since whenever a particular mode of experience is 
                changed, i.e. whenever a subject becomes an object and vice versa,  
                one immediately becomes bodily aware of this change.
331
   
What is important in the above context is the fact that the body is conditioned to expect 
such alterations happening constantly. Since this expectation or anticipation is, thus, in-
built into one‟s bodily memory, it makes such frequent transitions both bodily and 
psychologically acceptable to a subject.  
Explaining Shot-Reverse Shot as a Subjective-Objective Alteration in the Viewer 
Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the subjective-objective alteration may be effectively used in 
explaining the popularity of the shot-counter shot technique in cinema.
332
 Shot-counter 
shot or shot-reverse-shot has been defined as “an editing technique widely used in 
dialogue sequences in which characters exchange looks: one character is shown looking 
(often off-screen) at another character, and in the next shot the second character is shown 
apparently looking back at the first”.333 On the surface, it is based on the idea that “since 
the characters are shown facing in opposite directions, the viewer assumes that they are 
looking at each other”.334 While analyzing the shot-counter-shot technique, Bordwell first 
discounts Pudovkin‟s idea that it mirrors the “natural” way of looking at a thing viz. the 
device “must be subject to the same conditions as those of the eyes of the observer”,335 by 
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pointing out that “the shot-reverse-shot device is unfaithful to ordinary vision because it 
not only changes the camera position to favor ¾ views” but also “when we watch a face-
to-face interaction, we are not perceptually capable of shifting our angle of view as 
drastically as is normal in shot/reverse-shot cutting”.336 Bordwell mentions that Pudovkin 
was ultimately forced to change his stance to acknowledge the presence of an “ideal” 
omnipresent observer in this mode of viewing.
337
  
Having discounted the “natural” position, Bordwell next takes up Jean-Pierre 
Oudart‟s theory of “suture”, i.e. “the filmic processes by which the spectator is 
continuously „sewn‟ into the series of shots and spaces playing out on the cinema 
screen”.338 Oudart holds that the first shot entails an off-screen space which represents “a 
pure field of absence” for the perceiver. The counter shot then reveals to the audiences 
that something occupies that off-screen space.
339
 While the first shot raises a question, the 
counter shot answers it which the audiences then stitch together to make the whole. 
Bordwell notes that Oudart‟s process works on the basis of two conditions: camera angles 
of the two shots must be oblique and not occupy the subjects‟ „optical‟ positions, and 
secondly, the same portion of space must be shown both in the visual field and in the off-
screen space.
340
 Oudart has commented that his idea works on the following basis: “the 
appearance of a lack perceived as the absent one is followed by its abolition by someone 
or something placed within the same field”.341 Noting that Oudart claims this suture 
movement helps the audiences to construct a narrative space around a semantic meaning, 
a “signifying sum”,342 Bordwell criticizes it on the ground that, in this process, the 
audiences must build everything up from the ground level each time the shots change. 
That is, the process of “stitching” has to be repeated again and again signifying that the 
audiences have „learnt‟ nothing from the previous processes.343  
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In its place, Bordwell offers a “constructivist” account where the audiences “come 
to the image already „tuned‟, prepared to test a spatial, temporal, and logical scheme 
against what the shot presents”:344  
In this sense, the “signifying sum” often precedes, as a hypothesis, the perception 
of the object…Contrary to Oudart, the viewer checks the shot against what he or 
she expected to see and adjusts hypotheses accordingly. By using conventional 
schemata to produce and test hypotheses about a string of shots, the viewer often 
knows each shot‟s salient spatial information before it appears.345      
For Bordwell, the audiences read the cues contained within the shots or the editing 
practices to expect what is being presented in the scene. In this sense, imputing a separate 
explanation for this conventional process, as done by Oudart, becomes superfluous. 
While Bordwell‟s explanation appears to be satisfactory, it still does not explain 
reasons for the popularity of what must be a very disorienting technique for the audiences 
involving, as it does, rapid shift of view points. Bordwell is aware of this problem. A 
further exploration brings him to the interesting concept of the “contingent universal” 
which signifies a process of naturalization of certain repetitive embodied and socio-
cultural practices involving human communication among viewers. Bordwell notes that, 
given certain uniformities in the environment across cultures, human beings have devised 
certain ways of dealing with similar phenomena in the society.
346
 Bordwell notes: 
“Neither wholly „natural‟ nor wholly „cultural‟, these sorts of contingent universals are 
good candidates for being at least partly responsible for the „naturalness‟ of artistic 
conventions.”347 Holding that “face-to-face personal interaction is a solid candidate for a 
cross-cultural universal”, Bordwell says that shot-reverse-shot represents one such 
“contingent universal”:348  
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As for the instantaneous change of view which is said to create the “ubiquitous” 
or “ideal” observer: this would seem to be a special case of the immediate leap in 
time or space caused by any cut, of any sort. And once spectators, presumably 
from a very young age, have acquired the skill of taking a cut to signal such a 
shift in orientation, the other cues present in shot/reverse-shot may suffice to 
motivate the distinct changes of angle.
349
     
However, Bordwell‟s above explanation still seems to be unsatisfactory in the following 
sense: despite the device‟s artificiality that assaults the audiences‟ embodied experiences, 
how has it managed to become so popular among the audiences? It is felt that a more 
viable explanation lies in Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of chiasm, where the subjective-
objective alteration is naturally expected by the body and hence psychologically 
anticipated by the viewer. Farther research needs to be done in this area to reach a 
definitive conclusion. 
Subjective-Objective Alterations in Tarkovsky‟s Zerkalo (Mirror, 1974) 
Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of chiasm would be illustrated through Andrei Tarkovsky‟s film 
Zerkalo (Mirror, 1974) which presents numerous examples of subjective-objective 
alterations in cinema.  
Tarkovsky replaces narrative logic by an alternate mode of expression in his 
films: “I am seeking a principle of montage, which would permit me to show the 
subjective logic – the thought, the dream, the memory – instead of the logic of the 
subject. Show things that aren‟t necessarily linked logically.”350 In this connection, 
Tarkovsky‟s Zerkalo (Mirror, 1974) furnishes one of the most potent examples. It is a 
semi-autographical film which dwells upon three generations of the Tarkovskys. Their 
memories are woven within a subjective structure of Tarkovsky‟s own memories and 
dreams which are set in three distinct historical periods: 1935-6, when Tarkovsky is three 
to four years old (having been born in 1932 in the village of Zavrazhye on the river 
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Volga), presented mostly through adult Alexei‟s dreams (probably heard from his mother 
or father as he must have been too young to remember); the World War II period, when 
Tarkovsky is a teenager, which primarily occur in the form of his own recollections of 
these times; and an unidentified present (most probably the 1970s), the vantage point 
from which Tarkovsky the narrator is moving freely backwards and forwards in time. 
These memories are interspersed with a newsreel footage that depicts history sweeping 
through Soviet Union during 1930s to 1950s.
351
  
This extremely complex structure of Mirror is held together by the narrative 
voice-over of Tarkovsky, which itself is multi-layered, sometimes reflecting the 
subjective viewpoint of his mother, sometimes of his own child and adulthood, and 
sometimes of the collective memory of the historical times in which he lived. 
Tarkovsky‟s voice-overs are interspersed with the voice-over recitation by his father, 
Arseny Tarkovsky, of his own poems. As is clear, these multi-layered narrations set up 
multiple subjective positions whereby subjects and objects keep interchanging their 
positions. These are totally different from classical narrations in films in which the unity 
of a single subject position is always preserved.  
The question is when does a subjective image change into an objective one and 
back again in Tarkovskys‟ films and what are the signifiers within the images that signal 
such a change? The following sequence from Tarkovsky‟s Mirror analyzes this process 
as an intermingling of memory, dream, imagination, and reality in his films. 
1. Lady Sitting on the Fence Sequence in Zerkalo (Mirror, 1974) 
In this sequence, camera tracks slowly to a young woman (Margarita Terekhova) sitting 
on a fence looking towards a lush green field which is lit by the golden glow of a setting 
sun. A voice-over starts narrating that this was “our summer place before the war” and 
continues to wonder whether the man walking up the field is his father. Clearly this is 
Tarkovsky‟s voice-over since his poet father, Arseny Tarkovsky, had left the house 
around 1935-6 never to return again to the family (he having married twice since). 
However, since Tarkovsky was too young to remember the scene – a brief cutaway 
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shows an objective view of Tarkovsky and his sister as children sleeping in a hammock - 
it is obviously the memory of his mother, the lady who is sitting on the fence. The man 
walking up towards her from the fields is a doctor (Anatoly Solonitsyn) who enquires for 
direction, flirts with her briefly, and then leaves. While he starts crossing the field, a 
powerful gust of wind catches him midway. As he looks back and meets the woman‟s 
eye, an even more powerful gust roots him to his spot. Finally the doctor leaves as we 
catch a desiring look in the woman‟s eyes indicating her loneliness.  
Noting that Tarkovsky‟s childhood dacha in this sequence becomes a 
fountainhead for memories for the narrator Andrei,
352
 Skakov notes that the unnatural 
gusts of wind act as the trigger for Tarkovsky to dramatize and transform the scene from 
its mundane daily-ness to a realm of mystery.
353
 This effect is further accentuated by a 
treadmill shot involving simultaneous zooming-in and tracking-out that literally deny the 
viewers a firm ground from where to view the scene. As the mother starts walking 
towards the house, we hear his father, Arseny Tarkovsky‟s recitation of his own poem 
„First Meetings‟ which celebrates joys of love and sexual passion.  
2. Young Tarkovsky‟s Imagination Sequence in Zerkalo (Mirror, 1974) 
As camera tracks past the mother to a window overlooking a garden having a table with 
rains falling like a solid sheet, a voice recites: 
                                          In the world everything was transfigured, even 
                                          Simple things – the basin, the jug – when 
                                          Between us stood, as if on watch, 
                                          Stratified and solid water 
Just as love transforms everyday reality in the poem, so does memory bathe everyday 
items like the basin, the vase, the pitcher, the rains, and so on. Camera cuts to a close-up 
of the mother gently wiping her tears. The poem echos the violent historical setting of the 
times: 
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                                         When fate followed behind us on the trail, 
                                         Like a madman with a razor in his hand
354
 
In this whole sequence, the viewpoint is unusual since it is built up not only of a direct 
experience (however faint it might be) of what Tarkovsky was told, of what he dreams, 
and what he imagines (unusual gusts of wind), but also the collective memory of what a 
whole generation of people in that time think and feel (summer-time dachas were a 
common occurrence in pre-war Soviet Union).
355
  
Jean-Pierre Jeancolas has pointed out that Mirror, both in its overall structure and 
in its frequent movement between past and present, dream and reality, memory and 
hallucination, voice-over narrations and subjective use of documentary footages have a 
close analogy with Alain Resnais‟s film Last Year at Marienbad (1961) in the latter‟s 
continuous panning shots which show a character in several incompatible positions as we 
have seen in young Tarkovsky‟s dream sequence above.356  
Opening Sequence in L’Anné Dernière à Marienbad (Last Year at Marienbad, 1961) 
Alain Resnais‟s Last Year at Marienbad opens with long tracking shots – signature shots 
of Resnais – that glide over the luxurious gilded frescoes of Marienbad chateau. In the 
aural field, two sound tracks are fighting for our attention, an organ and a male voice. 
They take turns in overpowering each other in a system of ebb and flow. In generating a 
calculated inconvenience, this organization of images is aimed at destabilizing any stable 
point of reference for the audiences.
357
 In the sequence where the memory of a lady, 
called A ((Delphine Seyrig), is invoked by a male character, called X (Giorgio 
Albertazzi), we are confronted with a struggle between the male and the female character 
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as to what had actually happened or hadn‟t happened between them in the past. In this 
sense, these memories are more in the nature of “memory-suggestions” than memories of 
objective facts. The entire film is apparently an effort to convince Lady A through the 
voice-over narration by X of a reality that seems to have been created in the male 
character X‟s mind. In this sequence, while we find A wandering through an open 
hallway, X speaks off-screen of her clothes and her gestures occurring in a past event. In 
this sense, A‟s wanderings in those clothes clearly appears to be a subjective mental 
image of A held by X. This formal alteration immediately shifts the immanent plane from 
a subjective to an objective frame of reference. As the scene progresses, we find A trying 
to adjust herself according to the descriptions being given by X. What these images mean 
is that A is a memory of X where she is imagined to be in the past, in which A is directly 
responding to X‟s speech set in the present. These subjective-objective alterations “fully 
break the illusion necessary for a stable denotation either between the characters or 
between the film and the spectator”.358  
In terms of Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the chiasmus, which signifies a subjective-
objective free flow that encroaches upon each other‟s territory, the radical alterations of 
the subjective-objective positions in the above sequence, which would be extremely 
disorienting under normal circumstances, become acceptable at the embodied level of the 
audiences. However, while Merleau-Ponty‟s concept of the bodily alterations explains 
how the physical process is working in the scene, the sequence begs to be understood in 
deeper psychological terms as to why the characters are appearing to the other in the way 
they do in the film; Merleau-Ponty‟s chiasm merely explains the bodily processes of the 
viewers who are able to take the disorientations and disruptions in their stride, but not 
their deeper psychological affections on the basis of which either the characters exchange 
roles within the film or the way the characters respond within the scene.  
In classical Indian thought, the notion of subjective-objective interaction goes 
back to the Vedas where it is held that a devotee is „blessed‟ by a deity only when the 
deity looks at the devotee while the devotee being aware of it even though he doesn‟t 
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meet His eyes for fear of being singed by it. This process is called the darśan in Indian 
philosophy. In Indian art-forms, this process is given concrete shape through various 
depictions of subjective-objective alterations in Indian performative arts. For example, in 
Bharata‟s theory of drama, the „stage-audience‟ barrier is broken down by making the 
audiences a part of the stage as well. While this aspect will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 4, one must point out that Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of “encroachment” or the 
circulating chiasmus within each other‟s space does not appear to have been anticipated 
by the Indian theoreticians. In the Indian case, subjects and objects neither “encroach” 
upon each other‟s space nor is there any mention of these interactions being internalized 
by the body.    
In conclusion, phenomenology‟s ambitious project is to radically question and alter the 
very way Western foundation of knowledge is built up. Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology 
shows that embodied understanding of the world is the only concrete foundation required 
for an effective understanding of the world. In this sense, embodiment acts as the 
originary language written on a “wall” with all other languages being subsequently 
inscribed on it. When phenomenological thoughts are applied to cinema, which may be 
considered as the medium par excellence of embodiment in the modern age, one may 
claim that it is the audiences‟ embodied senses which ultimately lend “meaning‟ to every 
element occurring within a film. While Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of vision-touch 
equivalence as the basis of synesthetic perception provides a satisfactory explanation of 
the phenomenon of haptic visuality in cinema, his notion of subject-object alterations or 
the chiasm, which not only conditions the viewer‟s body but also her psychological 
expectations, adequately explains the popularity of conventional film practices like the 
shot-counter shot technique as well as the Deleuzian time-images used by avant-garde 
filmmakers. In the above sense, incorporation of the body in film discourse is expected to 
throw light on a foundational aspect of film experience which has been brushed aside by 
the existing theorization of cinemae. 
                   ________________________ 
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      Chapter 3 
    Cinema and Perception 
     Nyāya Theory of Pratyakṣa 
 
        He Atita, Tumi Hṛdaye Amar, Katha Kao, Katha Kao! 
       (O Past! I Beseech You, Speak to Me, Speak in My Heart!) 
                                                                                                         -------- Rabindranath Tagore 
              Perceptual awareness has no other awareness as its causal condition par excellence 
                                                                                                    --------- Gaṅgeśa Upadhyaya 
 
Classical Indian theories are basically theories of knowledge whose most productive 
period, called the Age of the Systems, can be said to have occurred between 6
th
 BCE to 5
th
 
CE with sporadic developments continuing to occur till the present. These philosophical 
systems, appropriately termed the darśanas or „ways of seeing‟, construct distinct 
ontological and epistemological structures that make significant contributions in 
theorizing the way we experience and understand the world. While these structures have 
similarities with Western theories, they also have significant differences which indicate 
that there are some basic differences between the two systems of thought. Amartya Sen 
notes: 
There are many differences in reasoning within the West and the East, but it 
would be altogether fanciful to think of a united West confronting 
„quintessentially eastern‟ priorities. It is my claim, rather, that similar - or closely 
linked – ideas have been pursued in many different parts of the world, which can 
expand the reach of arguments in Western literature and that the global presence 
of such reasoning is often overlooked or marginalized in the dominant traditions 
of contemporary Western discourse.
359
  
Since the professed aim of both Eastern and Western systems is to understand reality, a 
study of their complementarity would be beneficial to each other.  However, it is a fact 
that the contemporary understanding of the world, including cinema, has been dominated 
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by Western theories which make film theories, together with film histories and film 
studies generally based on them, Eurocentric in nature. As far as cinema is concerned, 
non-Western theories have either been incorporated in film discourse as “national 
cinemas” interpreted in terms of post-colonial studies or as “area studies” interpreted by 
ethnographic experts.
360
 While not denying the important contributions made by Western 
thought in understanding the world, including arts and culture, from which non-Western 
cultures have borrowed heavily, it is, however, a matter of history that the West has 
significantly borrowed from non-Western theories as well, with some of them even 
forming the foundations of Western theories today. Unfortunately, these latter borrowings 
have generally remained below the threshold of common knowledge. In this work, I point 
out three such instances: Saussure‟s borrowings from Sanskrit and Buddhist linguistics to 
construct his structuralist thoughts, the influence of Ānandavardhana‟s theory of dhvani 
or suggestion and its elaboration by Abhinavagupta on the formation of Lacan‟s 
poststructuralist thought and the influence of the Yoga theory on Carl Gustav Jung‟s 
notion of the collective unconscious. It is perhaps time to break the glass ceiling formed 
by a core group of Western theories in order to reach a state where the whole world 
becomes a significant contributor to the advancement of knowledge and culture in a 
globalized world. In the context of cinema, its world-wide popularity has made the task 
even more urgent today.  
It is rather surprising that the classical Indian theory of Nyāya signals a striking 
departure from conventional Indian thought in the same way as Merleau-Ponty does from 
Western thought. Like Merleau-Ponty, Nyāya also takes “the body” to be the sole arbiter 
of the world. While both hold that all knowledge is experiential knowledge gathered by 
“the body”, their only difference lies in holding where this knowledge is finally stored: 
while both Merleau-Ponty and Nyāya are similar in holding that its primary source is “the 
body” itself, Nyāya conceives an additional entity called “the self” (ātma) where all 
mechanical interactions registered in “the body” finally get stored as “knowledge”.   
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Nyāya presents one of the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of 
perception in history. Its chief contribution to cinema lies in the following two areas: 
first, human beings have a given urge to integrate into a narrative whole all elements 
occurring within one‟s perceptual field and, secondly, perception is a product of the mode 
of appearance of the narratively integrated entity within view and its mode of 
presentation to the viewer.  
Nyāya belongs to the direct realist school in perception, an expression which 
needs a brief explanation. While Nyāya considers material existenses to be real which are 
objectively cognized (as against some of the Buddhist schools with whom it had a 
running battle for ages), they lead to subjective experiences of “objects” and “relation 
between objects” in the perceiver (an aspect which physical sciences deny). Nyāya holds 
that all “knowledge” of the above kind are represented by the standard epistemic formula 
“qualifier + qualificand + relationship = unit of perception”, where a „property‟ qualifies 
a „location‟ through a functional relationship to generate a unit of pereception in the 
perceiver. Nyāya holds that the formula gives the mode of appearance of an entity to the 
perceiver, like a “flower” or a “book”, an appearance which occurs in terms of the 
perceiver‟s experiences of life in the world. Nyāya farther holds that the mode of 
presentation of this entity, given by the sense-object trajectory operating between the 
percept and the perceiver, generates an embodied sense in the perceiver. According to 
Nyāya, final perception is a product of the mode of appearance and the mode of 
presentation of an entity to the perceiver.   
An important aspect of the Nyāya theory of perception is that the perceiver 
forever seeks to combine elements appearing within its perceptual field into an integrated 
whole which helps the organism to respond to the scene as a whole, a process essential 
for its survival. In this sense, perception is a “goal-directed” activity in the Nyāya theory 
that invariably seeks a “closure”. An urge for narrative construction of an “integrated 
whole” is, thus, in-built in human psyche, an essential aspect on which Nyāya theory of 
perception is based. Since “Indian epistemologies are through and through causal 
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theories”,361 the narratives that are built in perception are causal narratives which inter-
alia becomes a given condition of human psychology.      
After a brief presentation of contemporary scientific thoughts on perception 
relevant for cinema in the first section, Nyāya theory of perception will be elaborated in 
the following two parts:    
Part 1: Nyāya Theory of Perception 
In the second section, after historically situating the Nyāya School in the context of 
classical Indian thought, Nyāya ontology will be briefly analyzed in terms of its 
constituting elements of “the self”, “consciousness” and “the body”.      
In the third, and, by far the most important section, Nyāya epistemology will be analyzed 
in terms of the formation of the “mode of appearance” of an entity within a perceiver 
represented by the Nyāya epistemic formula, also called the Nyāya fundamental formula 
of perception, “qualifier + qualified + relationship = unit of perception”. In the process, 
Nyāya notion of “causality”, which underlies the above process, will be analyzed. In this 
connection, the formation of “invariable sequences”, “universals” and “classes” as 
important concepts which, together, acts as the “limitor” of “knowledge” for a perceiver 
will be highlighted.  
In the fourth, “mode of presentation”, involving the sense-object trajectoey operating 
between the perceiver and her view will be analyzed.  
In the fifth section, parallels will be drawn between principles of Nyāya perception and 
the compositional principles of Indian visual arts.     
Part 2: Application of Nyāya Theory of Perception to Cinema  
The sixth section will undertake a reading of visual images in order to highlight the roles 
that Nyāya perceptual tools play in generating audience perception and their associated 
emotions.   
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The seventh section will apply Nyāya theory of perception to the dominant film practices 
of montage and continuity in order to mark its superiority in explaining those “events” in 
relation to the existing film theories.   
The eighth section will examine Nyāya theory of absence, which holds that situational 
absences are directly perceived by the viewers, in the context of cinema.   
The ninth and the final section will examine Nyāya theory of vision-touch equivalence, 
termed visual synesthesia, which not only anticipates Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of 
synaesthetic perception but also exceeds it in certain respects.   
        Perception in Contemporary Science 
Contemporary western thoughts on perception of a thing or a view is explained on the 
basis of a “lower order” direct perception advocated by J. J. Gibson and a “higher order” 
representational perception constructed by higher faculties.
362
 Generally the “higher 
order” has been preferred over the “lower” resulting in the impoverishment of an in-depth 
understanding of the perceptual process, including that occurring in cinema. 
While Gibson‟s theory is based on an ecologically driven direct and immediate 
understanding of what is occurring within view, in the theory of indirect or mediated 
perception where what one perceives is converted into mental representations to be read 
by “higher order” cognitive faculties.363 Both these theories draw their sustenance from 
the German physicist Hermann von Helmholtz‟s “likelihood principle” formulated in 
1850: we perceive that which, in our normal life, are most likely to have produced the 
effective sensory stimulation we have received.
364
 In using the terms “normal life”, 
Helmholtz had reasoned that “the sensory signals had meaning only in relation to 
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associations built up by learning”.365 Helmholtzian “normal life”, meaning culture rather 
than raw nature, forms the basis for both Gibson‟s ecologically-learnt direct perception 
and the representational theory of symbolic learning. The jury is still out on these issues.    
Wrestling with the question how moving organisms adjust to changing patterns of 
light and other sensations in order to pinpoint the location and physical dimensions of an 
entity accurately, Gibson reasoned that certain information remain “invariant” for an 
organism in midst of the plethora of sensations being received by it all the time. In other 
words, in what Gibson calls an ecological approach, perception and action remain 
“tightly interlocked and mutually constraining”.366 On the question of how the Ames 
Room, which has tilted floors and walls that do not form square corners, produces the 
perceptual illusion of a „normal‟ room when viewed through a peephole, Vilayanur 
Ramachandran and Stuart Anstis advance the above line of thought by proposing that 
visual systems make the following three “assumptions” in order to stabilize the perceived 
world: “objects” remain in continuous existence, “objects” are rigid making all their parts 
move together, and a moving “object” progressively covers and uncovers portions of its 
background.
367
 Ramachandran and Anstis categorically state that all these assumptions 
operate directly at the “lower level” of perception in which no thoughts are involved:  
[Our experiments] were designed to eliminate the effects of high-level cognition; 
specifically, we flashed images at speeds too rapid to allow the brain to make 
thoughtful decisions about what it was seeing. Our results therefore suggest that 
low-level processes can, on their own, control the perception of apparent motion 
during the early stages of visual processing.
368
        
Joseph and Barabara Anderson note:  
Information, then, consists of patterns of actual relationships between objects in 
the real world. It is not something added or deduced or inferred from raw data. 
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The information contained in these patterns of light is encountered directly by the 
visual system and processed immediately and ongoingly without the necessity of 
high-level logical or linguistic constructions which only humans might be able to 
perform, for after all perception is not unique to humans – it began with the fish. 
This is what Gibson meant by “direct perception”.369   
In other words, perception becomes a process of selection of certain patterns based on 
perceptual schemata in order to „see‟. The Andersons note: “This is not to say, however, 
that we see only what we know. It is rather, in Neisser‟s words, „we can see only that 
which we know how to look for‟.”370 The Andersons farther observe that only when one 
moves from perceiving simple “objects” to other items of furniture, involving complex 
perception of “relation between objects”, like a chest of drawers, etc., it requires a leap of 
abstraction needing “higher-level” faculties.371 In the context of cinema, the Andersons 
persuasively argue that, while movies do go beyond basic-level categorization, yet it is 
this basic perceptual level of the film-viewing experience that allows intellectual and 
cultural abstractions to make sense on top of them. However, film theories generally 
priviledge higher-level processes at the cost of “low-level” perception.372 Even though 
scientific research is continuously discovering how complex perceptual processes are, yet 
the Gibsonian idea that some basic assumptions are necessary to give stability to what 
one perceives has struck deep root.
373
  
Even Hochberg and Brooks, who detail scientific discoveries that undercut 
common-sense beliefs about perception, favorably comment on Helmholtz‟s “normal 
life” criterion of his likelihood principle “That principle must surely be at least 
approximately true, or we could not survive”,374 hinting that perception is ultimately the 
result of a progressive learning of embodied and socio-cultural practices of the perceiver.   
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   Illustration 2: Concepts in Nyāya Theory of Perception 
The Self: It is a transcendental „substance‟, acting as a location for material properties 
generated by the body to accrue as “knowledge”. Since the self belongs to a different 
existential plane, its connection with the body is illusory and the “knowledge” that 
accrues is accidental; the self within itself is devoid of all consciousness and agency.  
The Body: “The body” acts on the basis of the following three factors: sense organs and 
the mind detect and classify sense data, its purpose being to maximize bodily experiences 
of maximizing „pleasue‟, minimizing „pain‟, and being „indifferent‟ towards others.    
Consciousness: There being no separate conception of “consciousness” in the Nyāya 
theory, it is apparently conceived as an effect of the body‟s interactions with the world.  
In this sense, it is an intentional consciousness which „completes‟ “objects” and “relation 
between objects” within view on the basis of “the body‟s” interactions with the world 
which finally register as “knowledge” in “the self”.  
Perception: In the perceptual process, an undetermined “particular” sensed by the 
organs triggers the memory of a “universal” representing an “object”, a “quality”, or an 
“action” which is then linked to the “particular” through a functional “relationship” that 
constitutes its “mode of appearance” to the perceiver, given by the epistemic formula 
“Qualifier + Qualified + Relationship = Unit of Perception”. The “mode of presentation” 
gives an embodied „measure‟ of the „event‟ to the perceiver. According to Nyāya, final 
perception is a product of the “mode of appearance” and “mode of presentation” of an 
entity to the perceiver resulting from the perceiver‟s embodied and socio-cultural 
practices of life.  
1. Perception of an “Object” 
 
     Ex: “Particular” + “Flower-Hood” + Functional “Relationship” → “This is a Flower” 
2. Perception of “Relation between Objects” 
 
      Ex:  “Lady”  +  “ Books”  +  “Study-hood”   →    “She is Studying” 
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  Part 1 
          Ontology and Epistemology of Nyāya Theory of Perception 
The present section will discuss the following issues: the historical position of Nyāya in 
classical Indian thought; Nyāya ontology of perception, involving the notions of “the 
self”, “consciousness” and “the body” where the latter is a part of “matter” and 
“consciousness” is an effect of “the body‟s” interactions with the material world; and 
Nyāya epistemology of perception being a product of the formation of “mode of 
appearance” and “mode of presentation” within view based on the perceiver‟s embodied 
experiences of the world and his socio-cultural practices of life.  
Historically Situating Nyāya 
The most philosophically potent section of the Vedas (c. 2000 BCE) is the Upaniṣads (c. 
1000-700 BCE) whose basic principle says that the inner drive that permeates the self 
(ātma) within each person is similar to the drive that permeatrs the universe (Brahman), 
the underlying source of all things. In other words, microcosm is equivalent to 
macrocosm expressed in what have been called the „great sayings‟ (mahāvākyas), like 
Brahman = ātma or tat twam asi („you are that‟),375 which opened a philosophical 
discourse on the subject in Indian thought.
376
 This identity between the internal order 
(ṛta, „cosmic law‟)377 of the cosmos and the internal functioning (ātma, „the self‟) of the 
sentient being is modeled on the principle of a living organism undergoing cyclical 
processes of growth, decay, and regeneration in case of the self and evolution, existence, 
and involution in case of the cosmos, an article of faith for orthodox “Hindu” theories.  
Both in its defence and in opposition to this principle, a series of Indian theories 
emerged between 6
th
/5
th
 century BCE and 5
th
 century CE, a process which continued less 
extensively till almost the present times. Called the “Age of the Systems”, it involved a 
major bifurcation of thought in Indian philosophy during the classical period between six 
                                                          
375
 Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 2 
376
 Ibid, 1 
377
 Since ṛta is generally equated with the word ritu or the ‘seasons’, the internal order of the cosmos is 
often confused with the cyclical change of seasons; however, ṛta as the cosmic order  has more to do with 
the principle of indestructibility of matter and force, with change representing a process of 
transformation of matter generally expressed in the form of the law of karma   
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orthodox “Hindu” theories owing their allegiance to the Vedas378 and six heterodox 
theories opposing the Vedas (See Illustration 3: Genealogy of Classical Indian Schools). 
The “Hindu” theories are further subdivided between the “realist” schools of Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā on the one hand and the “dualist/idealist” schools of Sāṃkhya-
Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, and Kashmir Śaivism on the other. The former group are called 
the “atomists” who hold that “matter‟ is constituted of “atoms” which, through various 
permutations and combinations, generate the material forms of the world; the other group 
are called the “substantialists” in which, while Sāṃkhya-Yoga held that existence 
consists of a dualism between “pure consciousness” (puruṣa) and “matter” (prakṛti), 
Advaita Vedānta and Kashmir Śaivism379 held that existence is a monism where “pure 
consciousness” (brahman, param śiva) constitutes the whole universe, with “the self”, 
empirical “consciousness”, and “the body” being various moments of it. The heterodox 
theories of Buddhism, Jainism, and Materialism deny the authority of the Vedas. While 
for Buddhism, the whole universe is constituted of momentarily existing phenomenal 
“ultimates”, called the dharmas, and for Materialism the universe is an epiphenomena of 
matter, Jainism seeks to synthesize in its ontology and epistemology the orthodox 
theories of being and the Buddhist theories of becoming or change. In almost an exact 
mirroring of the realism-dualism/monism divide in the orthodox theories, Buddhism is 
equally divided in four “realist” and “idealist” schools. The “Genealogy of Classical 
Indian Schools” is presented below for a better grasp.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
378
 It may be noted that not all orthodox theories abide by the Brahman = ātma doctrine; Thus, both 
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called the agama or the positive path, which is considered to be necessary for attaining control over 
“matter”. In contrast, the Vedic line advocates the negative path of shunning the material world, called 
the nigama. However, in the course of its development, Kashmir Śaivism had become close to Advaiata 
Vedānta in many ways.   
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Illustration 3: Genealogy of Classical Indian Schools  
                      Vedas                                                                                  Tantras   
(Ṛg-veda, Sam-veda, Yajur-veda, Atharva-veda)  (Śaiva, Vaishnava & Śakti Schools of Tantra-Mantra) 
                  (c. 2000 BCE)                                                                    (Older than the Vedas)  
 
        _______________________________                                                                ⁞                        
Mantras    Brahmanas   Aranyakas       Upaniṣads                                                           
                                                  (c. 1000–700 BCE)  
                                                                                                                   Kashmir Śaivism 
                                                                                                                         (c. 9th CE) 
                                                                                                             Non-Vedic Thought 
                                                                                                  Systematization of Heterodox Schools  
                                                                                                                            (c. 6th BCE)  
                                                                                                          _________________________                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                   Jainism             Buddhism       Materialism 
                                                                                                (Mahavira)           (Buddha)           (Cārvāka) 
                                                                                             (540–468 BCE)   (563–483 BCE)  (Pre-Buddha) 
                                                                                                                _________________ 
                                                                                                       Hīnayāna                      Mahāyāna 
   Systematization of Orthodox Schools                               (c. 400 BCE)                  (c. 400 BCE)                                
         _____________________________________ 
 Sāṃkhya         Vaiśeṣika      Mīmāṃsā              Vedānata 
  (Kapila)           (Kanāda)        (Jaimini)             (Badarayana)                                                                   
 (c. 7th/6th BCE)(c. 3rd BCE)   (c. 2nd BCE)            (c. 2nd BCE)     _________                        __________ 
    Yoga                Nyāya                                                      Vaibhāṣika     Yogācāra  Mādhyamika                                                                                                                                                                             
(Patañjali)       (Gautama)                                                 (Vasubandhu)(Asanga)    (Nāgārjuna)   Sautrāntika                                         
 (c. 2nd CE)        (c. 2nd CE)                                                      (c. 1st CE)     (c. 1st CE)    (c. 2nd CE)   (Vasubandhu)          
                                      Kumārila Prabhākara Advaita Vedānta                                                        (c. 5th CE) 
                                      (c. 8th CE)  (c. 8th CE)     (Śankarācārya)              Digñāga 
                       Navya-Nyāya                                 (788-820 CE)               (c. 6th CE)                  
                         (Gaṅgeśa)                                                                                                           
                        (C. 13th CE)                                    Integral Yoga             Dharmakīrti 
                                                                              (Sri Aurobindo)             (c. 7th CE) 
       Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (c. 16th CE)               (1872-1950) 
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Nyāya Ontology 
Orthodox Indian theories, called the “Hindu” theories, generally analyze existence in 
terms of the following three entities, “the self”, “consciousness”, “the body”, the latter 
being part of “matter” or the material world. These aspects, which have been elaborated 
in Annexure 1, are briefly presented below.  
In Nyāya, “the self” is an unconscious „entity‟ which is totally devoid of any kind 
of agency. Whatever happens to it is due to its „false‟ identification with matter. Due to 
such identification, an idea which is common across all classical Indian theories, “the 
body‟s” interactions with the world accrue as “knowledge” in “the self” despite the two 
existing in two different existential planes. This has been made possible through “the 
self‟s” illusory identification with “the body” which makes “the self” acquire all the 
experiences that “the body” undergoes in relation to “matter” including inheriting all its 
propensities which drives “the body” in the material world. By, thus, acquiring an 
agency, “the self” continues to act through “the body” on the world till it is able to free 
itself from “the body” by attaining true knowledge resulting in its liberation (mokṣa). In 
liberation, “the self” regains its original nature of being an unconscious, agency-less 
entity as conceived by Nyāya. In this state, it is unable to cognize anything at all, thereby 
living a „blind‟ existence for all practical purposes. This passive phase of “the self” is not 
important at all; rather, its active phase, representing its illusory identification with “the 
body”, is crucial for us. In this phase, “the self” is entirely dependent on “the body” for 
any kind of experience at all. Chatterjee notes: “the self can never have knowledge in a 
disembodied state; it is only an embodied being that can have cognition”.380 She goes on 
to add: “Not only of cognition, but the body is the locus of all experiences”381 for “the 
self”. Since in this active phase, “the self” is synonymous with “the body” for all 
practical purposes, why does Nyāya feel compelled to conceive of “the self” as a separate 
entity at all? Larson and Bhattacharya offer a significant explanation.
382
 Since the 
material processes of “the body” is ultimately an unconscious mechanical process which 
                                                          
380
 Amita Chatterjee, “Embodiment and Nyāya Philosophy”, Seminar on “The Philosophical Contributions 
of Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharya”, University of Calcutta, December 12, 2011: 1-13, 5 
381
 Ibid 
382
 Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, Eds. Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition, in 
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. IV, Gen. Ed. Karl H. Potter (Delhi: Motilal Banrasidass, 1987), 79  
145 
 
goes on endlessly till a system lasts, it has no conscious content which makes the world 
„pointless‟ after all. In order to break this „meaningless‟ cycle, “the self” has been 
conceived as a transcendental entity as an absolute measure of the activites going on in 
the world.
383
 In this sense, “the self” acts as the absolute constant of the speed of light 
which provides the only true „measure‟ in the relativity of the universe. In view of “the 
self‟s” amalgamation with “the body” in the world, the Nyāya ontological system may be 
appropriately conceived as the self-body system. The Neuroscientist Antόnio Damátio 
reaches similar conclusions when he says that every conscious event is invariably passed 
through the bodily loop before a final judgment is made by a person.
384
 In other words, 
all decisions carry somatic marks, an aspect to be elaborated subsequently.  
Arguably, Nyāya considers “consciousness” to be an effect of “the bodys‟” 
interactions with the world. Since such material activities are ultimately based on 
“matter‟s” property of discrimination (sattva), incessant motion (rajas) and determinate 
material formations (tamas) – these properties of “matter”, originally conceived by the 
Sāṃkhy school, has come to form the bedrock of all orthodox Indian theories – in Nyāya 
“consciousness” literally serves the purpose of bringing such activities within “the self‟s” 
domain. In this sense, “consciousness” appears to be intentional in the Nyāya theory.  
The Nyāya notion of “the body”, involving the sense organs and the mind, forms 
an autonomous, self-sustaining biomechanical system in the Indian theories. Schweitzer 
notes: “By including the mind in the realm of matter, mental events are granted causal 
efficacy, and are, therefore, able to directly initiate bodily actions”.385 In this way, Nyāya 
ensures that the process of mental causation follows physical conservation laws, held 
sacrosanct by both Eastern and Western theories, whose violation poses a major difficulty 
for the Cartesian mind-body system. However, despite this change, Schweitzer notes that 
the system is still unable to answer the following question: how can an unconscious 
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material process get represented in one‟s consciousness which occurs in a different 
existential plane? Schweitzer comments: 
The deep philosophical problem in case of human perception lies…in the fact that 
such perceptual structures are imbued with consciousness…It is consciousness, 
rather than content, which provides the most compelling reasons for dualism.
386
        
In effect, thus, Nyāya merely shifts the Cartesian mind-body duality to consciousness-
body or self-body duality which still begs for a satisfactory answer.  
For a detailed analysis, see Annexure 1. 
Nyāya Concept of “The Self-Body System” 
The functions of “the self”, “consciousness”, and “the body” as delineated above in the 
Nyāya theory are summed up below: 
1
st
 Stage: Generation of Sense Awareness and its Classification by “The Body”  
1.  The sense organs sense an undefined “particular”;  
2. The mind, which acts as the memory-bank in Indian theories, matches data to earlier 
experiences of „plasure‟, „pain‟, or „indifference‟ felt by “the body”;  
3. “The body” reflexively responds to the sensations in trying to maximize „pleasure‟, 
minimize „pain‟, and feel „indifference‟ towards others. 
2
nd
 Stage: “Intentional Consciousness” generates “Awareness” in “The Self” 
“Intentional consciousness”, which arises contingently as an effect of “the body‟s” 
interactions with the world, makes “the self” aware of such interactions.  
3
rd
 Stage: Generation of “Knowledge” in “the Self”          
Interactions of “the body” with matter accrue as “knowledge” in “the self” in the course 
of its illusory identification with “the body”. It converts perceptual elements into an 
integrated whole for the organism to respond to the scene as a whole.   
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             Nyāya Epistemology of Perception  
The word pratyakṣa or perception is etymologically made up of two elements prati 
meaning „to, before, or near‟ and akṣa meaning „sense organ‟ which together mean 
„present to or before the sense organ‟ and hence called a direct or immediate 
experience.
387
 Nyāyasūtra (c. 2nd CE), the original text of Nyāya by its founder Gautama, 
gives the following definition of “perception” (pratyakṣa): 
Perception is knowledge that arises from the contact of a sense with its object 
which is determinate, non-deviating, and non-verbal.
388
 
The above qualifications serve the following purpose: eliminate doubt by being 
„determinate‟ or certain (vyavasāyātmaka), eliminate false cognitions or illusions by 
being „non-deviating‟ or non-promiscuous (a-vyabhicārin), and eliminate the influence of 
verbal knowledge by being direct or „non-verbal‟ (a-vyapadeśya).389 The Neo-Nyāya 
logician Gaṅgeśa Upadhyaya (c. 13th CE) gives another definition of perception from the 
point of view of its immediacy and directness: 
  “Perceptual awareness has no other awareness as its causal condition par excellence”.390   
According to Gaṅgeśa, “causal condition par excellence” means a causal factor that has 
no mediating condition, called “operation” or vyāpāra in classical theories. In other 
words, it is not only immediate but also direct.
391
   
The above two highly condensed definitions, however, assume the fulfillment of 
certain other internal and external conditions for perception to occur. One of the basic 
internal requirements is that the “sense-organs” must be in touch with the object, the 
“mind” must be in touch with the “sense organs”, and “the self” must be in touch with the 
“mind” for perception to take place. What the above conditions imply is that the 
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perceiver must pay attention for perception to occur. Externally, three kinds of defects 
need elimination for an effective perception to occur: envioronmental defects, like haze, 
bad lighting, distance, etc; pathological defects, like myopia, etc; and cognitive defects, 
like a retarded capacity to know, etc.
392
 Potter notes that among the full collection of 
factors (kāraṇa-sāmagrī) that provides sufficient condition for perception to occur as an 
effect,
393
 while some may appear to be more prominent than the others, the presence of 
all “accessory” causes are ultimately for perception to occur.394 
While the above definitions describe the nature of perception and the „ideal‟ conditions 
under which it may occur, they do not describe either the perceptual structure of what is 
being perceived and how i.e. the content of perceptual knowledge or the perceptual 
process as a result of which perception occurs within the perceiver. These aspects are 
described below.   
          Perceptual Knowledge 
Nyāya perception is a product of two experiential modes viz. the “mode of appearance”, 
which constructs an “event” in perception, and the “mode of presentation”, which gives a 
„measure‟ of that “event” to the perceiver. These processes are briefly described below.  
“Mode of Appearance” in Perception 
The commonsense knowledge that not everything combines with everything else in the 
world may be represented as “A + B + Relation” where A and B only in a particular 
“mode of appearance” combine with each other. In the above sense, the role of “relation” 
becomes crucial: it signifies that only a particular functional “relationship” between A 
and B would make them combine in reality. Applying this insight to perception, Nyāya 
holds that while a plethora of sensations from the world keep being received by a person, 
not all of them combine to form perception. Only elements which appear in particular 
“modes of appearance” to the perceiver would combine through a particular functional 
relationship to generate perception within the perceiver. Noting that it is a common 
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human characteristic, Ganeri mentions: “We do not, in general, think of objects in general 
terms, but only in so far as the objects are presented to us in certain „ways‟, „modes‟, or 
„guises‟.”395  
Nyāya elaborates the perceptual process as follows: when an undetermined 
“particular” is sensed by the sense-organs, it triggers the memory of an “object”, a 
“quality”, or an “action” in the mind of the perceiver, which “the self”, acting through 
“the body”, proceeds to combine with the “particular” in terms of a functional 
“relationship” to form an “invariable sequence” in perception that results in the 
appearance of an “object”, etc, to the perceiver. Such triggered memories are called 
“universals” (sāmānya) in Nyāya theory, an aspect which would be discussed in greater 
detail in a subsequent section. The important point is that these “universals” do not 
represent memories of “objects” in general, but only in their particular “modes of 
appearance”. Thus, while a “flower” may appear in the “mode of appearance” of being a 
symbol of love to a suitor or a decorative piece to a lady, it may appear in the form of a 
plant-specimen to a scientist. In other words, the process of the imposition of the “flower-
property” on the “particular” would differ depending on whether it is being perceivied as 
a decorative piece or as a plant-specie, the functional relationship that combines the 
“qualifier” with the “particular” being different in the two cases. Thus, even though all of 
them perceive the same “object” viz. “This is a flower”, their individual understanding of 
the perceived “object” would be different in different cases. Nyāya captures this crucial 
insight in the following formula for perception: 
           Qualifier + Qualificand + Relationship = Unit of Perception 
Matilal defines such an epistemic process as a property-location event: “A cognitive 
event is usually said to locate a property in a locus, the form being „x has p‟ or „p is in x” 
occurring in the Nyāya formula “qualifier + qualificand + relation”.396 The above 
formula, called the fundamental principle of knowledge in Nyāya, is significant since it 
not only represents the structure of perception viz. qualifier-qualified-relationship, but 
also the internal process, in which the qualifier acts as a property of the qualificand 
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related through a functional relationship which forms a particular “mode of appearance” 
for the perceiver. Mohanty notes that, even though Nyāya is a robust realist, it moves 
away from the notion that things are directly perceived as they occur in reality to a 
position where things occur in a particular mode of appearance alone.
397
 In the above 
sense, Mohanty comments: “Analysis of cognition is not an analysis of the object in the 
ontological mode, but rather of the content in an epistemological mode”.398 The above 
idea leads to the “two-component theory” of knowledge by the Neo-Naiyāyika, 
Gadadhara Bhattacharya (c. 17
th
/18
th
 CE):
399
  
      Meaning of a Perceptual Unit = Referent + Mode of Appearance 
There is a marked difference between the Nyāya theory of perception and Western 
thoughts on the subject. It is now widely held in the West that any kind of thinking, 
including thinking arising from perception, is impossible without using language. 
However, according to Neo-Nyāya or Navya-Nyāya (c. 13th CE) theory, a logical 
extension of Nyāya, a word only refers to a „neutral‟ concept of an object or a thing in its 
generalized form, but not to its specific “mode of appearance” which may only be 
deciphered by the receiver from the context in which the word is being used.
400
 Thus, the 
world “flower” does not indicate whether it is being perceived in the “mode” of being a 
thing of beauty or as a plant specimen. Nyāya holds that since, there is no way of 
expressing such “modes of appearances” in conventional language, perception can not be 
exactly reproduced in common language.
401
 For the exact representation of perception, 
Nyāya develops a technical language which need not detain us here.   
 It is quite clear that the “mode of appearance” (paryāya) of a thing to a perceiver 
is a matter of her embodied experiences of the world and her socio-cultural practices of 
life. Habituation to certain experiences in life leads to the formation of an “invariable 
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sequence” in her perception. Thus, the triggered impression of a “flower” would not arise 
in a person who has never seen or heard about “flowers”.   
 Mohanty holds that “Indian epistemologies are through and through causal 
theories”.402 The formation of an „invariable sequence” between an undefined 
“particular” which triggers the memory of an “object” in a particular “mode of 
appearance” also represents a “causal” process. The question is what form of “causality” 
works in the Nyāya perceptual process? Classical Indian theories generally advocate two 
forms of “causality”, one which brings about real transformation among the elements 
while the other only „generates‟ an apparent transformation in the eyes of the perceiver. 
Leaving aside the huge debate that had ensued between these two positions in classical 
Indian thought, in case of perception, all theories appear to agree that it is only a case of 
an apparent transformation where the perceiver narratively integrates a whole from the 
elements occurring within view. Devoid of real transformation, it represents the operation 
of a “powerless causality” which the Buddhists prescribe in all cases while the other 
Indian schools follow primarily in case of perception alone.        
The Notion of “Powerless Causality” in Nyāya Theory of Perception 
For the Buddhists, the world is constituted of momentarily existing phenomenal 
“ultimates” or the dharmas which exhaust all their potentiality in coming into being 
alone.
403
 Having no residual “power” left in them, an “ultimate” disappears immediately. 
In the absence of a real power to cause anything, the Buddhists explain “causality” as a 
coincidental coexistence of “ultimates” occurring in a series that give the appearance of 
stable objects and things on the surface. Since the Buddhists conceive the “ultimates” to 
be experiential entities which appear in five different forms, a certain series of them 
either alone or in combination gives the impression of streams of consciousness in terms 
of their experiential contents. In the above sense, Buddhist “causality” represents the 
formation of an “invariable sequence” constituted of a „before‟ and an „after‟ between 
different series of “ultimates” which produce in perception the false impression of being 
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physically related. For the Buddhists, a causal process at the most basic level signifies 
the momentary existence of an “ultimate” that does not obstruct the emergence of another 
“ultimate” expressed in the formula “if x is, y happens”. Hume has been influenced by 
this idea of coexistence of things forming an integrated whole in perception:  
Hume pointed out that, however many times we may observe that one event is 
followed by another, we can never observe any power or necessity that would 
make the effect follow from a cause. In the end, we have only two events, one of 
which is repeatedly observed to follow from another. Hume‟s stance is the basis 
for most latter thinking on causation, including contemporary probabilistic 
theories, according to which, we say that there is an extremely high probability 
that the second event will follow the first.
404
 
However, despite being the basis for the formation of “invariable sequences” within 
perception, the Buddhist theory does not mean a „free-for-all‟. It holds that the space 
momentarily occupied by x would be „conditioned‟ in a manner that only y would emerge 
there. The Buddhists explain their karma theory of “dependent origination” (pratīya 
samutpāda), involving a 12-fold link underlying „existence‟ and „change‟ in the 
phenomenal world, on the same basis.   
Nyāya adopts this notion of “powerless causality” from the Buddhists and applies 
it in its theory of perception. Mohanty notes:  
The relation of “causality” – stripped of the notion of “power” – was analyzed 
into (a) a substance, a quality, or an action, and (b) the relation of “invariable 
temporal precedence” (niyatapūrvavartitva).405 
Nyāya holds that “perceptual knowledge” is entirely constructed on the basis of two 
entities appearing in specific “modes of appearance” that form an “invariable sequence” 
in perception which produces the “object”, etc, as an integrated whole for the perceiver. 
In this process, the causal power only apparently links the objects in perception in terms 
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of the perceiver‟s embodied and socio-cultural practices of life without any real 
transformation occurring there.
406
 In this sense, classical Indian theories are distinguished 
in analyzing an “event” from the perceiver‟s point of view in contrast to the more 
common Western mode of the speaker‟s point of view.407 
In the following sections, the specific nature and implications that a “mode of 
appearance” has as a “universal” and as its sub-category of “class” in case of perception 
would be explained. 
The Concept of the “Universal” in Nyāya Theory of Perception 
The concept of the “universal” (sāmānya, „general‟) is a seminal Nyāya contribution to 
the understanding of the perceptual process. It basically represents the “mode of 
appearance” of a perceptual element, e.g., an “object”, “quality” or “action” which gets 
triggered by the sense-data interacting with an undetermined “particular” in the 
surrounding vicinity. Bhattacharya notes that an ideal way of understanding the Nyāya 
concept of the “universal” is to assume that a property or a set of properties is shared in 
common by all who belong to a general term. In other words, a common property 
becomes the ground for the application of a general term to a group of entities or 
individuals.
408
 Thus, a lady with books in front may generate the cognition “She is 
studying” as a common term linking her with the books, provided the cues occurring in 
the scene trigger the underlying “universals” of the lady being a “student”, the books 
being “study-material” and their functional relationship being “studying”, all the 
“universals” being based on the perceivers‟ embodied and habitual experiences of socio-
cultural life. The formation of these images in memory is rather „loose‟ being triggered 
by even an indistinct cue acting as a “sign” for a particular “object” for the perceiver.  
In contrast to „simple perception‟ (savikalpa jñāna, viśiṣṭa jñāna) where the 
memory of an “object” qualifies a “particular” through a functional “relationship” in 
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perception, in case of „complex perception‟ or „perception of a higher order‟ (viśiṣṭa-
vaiśiṣṭya jñāna), one object acts as the qualifier i.e. property of the other object in terms 
of a functional relationship to forge an integrated whole which acts as the “universal” for 
the perceiver. Matilal clarifies that, in this process, such diverse physical materials as fire, 
smoke, water, a cup or a pot act both as “objects” and as “properties” when they are 
locatable in such loci as a mountain, ground, lake, a kitchen, and a plate.
409
 He holds that 
the apparent oddity of treating “objects” as “properties” can be resolved if one conceives 
that anything that has a location can also act as a property. Both perceptual formations 
follow the same epistemic formula of “qualifier + qualificand + relationship”. Thus, 
while “cup-ness” as a qualifier of a “particular” constitutes the object “cup”, it, therafter, 
may act as a “property” of the table in the cognition the “Table with a cup”.410   
For Nyāya, each such functional unit is perceived as a single “object” signifying a 
„concept‟ represented by a „word‟ – commonly known as „thought‟ - the “object” in 
perception, therby, becoming a nameable entity. Ganeri notes: “So, if „Cyclops‟ is a 
singular term, then Cyclops is an „object‟” for the perceiver.411 Crucially, in the above 
sense, „object-hood‟ becomes the minimum unit of perception in the Nyāya theory 
represented in its principle of realism as follows: whatever is is knowable and nameable 
(astitva jñeyatva abhidheyatva).
412
 In the above sense, the Nyāya theory consists of a 
cognizable world of names involving not only “objects”, but “qualities” and “actions” as 
well, i.e. “states of affairs” in general and a non-cognizable world of sensations which, 
even though felt, remains un-cognized in one‟s perception. Since Nyāya accepts the 
production of new knowledge in the world – it accepts arte-factual objects produced 
through human interventions in nature,
413
 like the “wheel” (cakra), etc, makes Nyāya 
theory of perception evolutionary in nature, involving a continuous sliding up from the 
un-cognized zone to the cognized zone and falling away due to disuse occasioned by 
changes in human history. Thus, when a flower-vase qualifies a table, what is important 
                                                          
409
 Matilal, The Character of Logic in India, Eds. Jonardon Ganeri and Heeramon Tiwari (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998): 145 
410
 Ibid 
411
 Jonardon Ganeri, The Age of Lost Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450 – 1700 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011): 169 
412
 Potter, “Relations”, in Encyclopedia, Vol. II, 47-68, 48 
413
 Matilal, Perception, 382 
155 
 
in the Nyāya theory of perception is not the flower-vase‟s physical „contact‟ (saṃyoga) 
with the table, but its subjective contact with the table as a „decorative‟ piece perceived 
by the viewer in terms of her socio-cultural experiences of life.
 414
  
The Buddhists criticize Nyāya perception on the following ground: how can an 
“object” be perceived directly i.e. in its totality when all that a person ever sees is only 
one side of it? Citing the example of a tree, the Buddhists hold that, since a person can 
see only one side of a tree, perceiving the whole tree represents a case of inference by the 
perceiver, which is non-veridical in nature. Orthodox Indian theories, including Nyāya, 
offer an interesting solution to this problem. In contrast to Western thought and current 
scientific thinking that sensations come from the world outside to meet human sense 
organs, in orthodox Indian theories, the sense organs go out of human beings to meet the 
“objects”. As these senses come back to the perceiver after „enveloping‟ the “object”, the 
perceiver, by experiencing the transformations or modifications (vṛttis) that the 
sensations have undergone in the process, not only experiences the “object” in its totality 
but also experiences it directly because the sensations are “owned” by the perceiver.415 It 
is interesting to note that this notion acts as one of the foundations of Ānandavardhana‟s 
theory of dhvani where the readers or the audiences experience an artwork on the basis of 
what comes back to them in the form of an echo (dhvani) or a reverberation 
(pratidhvani).
416
 This direct experience of the whole is only subsequently analytically 
subdivided into parts through “a process of constant and progressive extraction, 
comparison, analysis and abstraction” undertaken by the perceiver on the basis of her 
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embodied and socio-cultural practices of life, the analytical process being called the 
apoddhara method by the Grammarian Bhartṛhari.417 
In this context, Nyāya holds that, by virtue of an extraordinary mode of 
perception, called sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti („perception of universals‟),418 an 
individual perceives both the “particular” and the “universal” at the same time which are 
combined by her self-body system to form an integrated whole in terms of her lived 
experiences of life. In this process, the “particular” lends the “universal” a distinct 
individuality. The notion of the “individuator” (viśeṣa) which not only holds a special 
position in the Nyāya theory, more specifically in its Vaiśeṣika dispensation, but also 
gains its name from there, because it „saves‟ Nyāya realism from getting into difficulties. 
Thus, while a „quality‟, like, say, a white color, remains repeatable across “objects”, in 
each such instantiation, a particular characterisitic of the white color surfaces which is not 
found in other cases. Contrasting this notion with the Western notion which holds that a 
„quality‟ is essentially a repeatable property, Potter notes: 
In Nyāya, a particular white substance has a particular white guṇa which is 
different from the white guṇas of other white substances…Although this view of 
a „quality‟ having a particular characteristic in a particular thing is found in 
Western thought, it is not common there.
419
  
In the above sense, according to the Nyāya theory, even though the perceiver still sees a 
generalized “universal”, it remains uniquely individual in human perception.   
The “universal” discussed so far may either represent a rather loose, non-
essential, occurrence of a qualifier in a qualificand or a location or represent a qualifier 
which essentially occurs within a qualificand. The latter is more appropriately called a 
“class” which occurs as a specific category of the “universal”. Thus, while a “universal” 
representing a relation between a man and the cap he is wearing would be verbalized as 
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the “Man with a cap”, the relationship between a man and his „big‟ nose would form a 
“class”, generating the cognition “Man with the big nose”. Hiriyanna distinguishes 
between a “universal” (sāmānya) and a “class” (jāti, „genus‟, „specie‟) as follows:  
It is necessary to caution against taking sāmānya as the equivalent of “genus”. It 
stands for merely a feature or a property common to two or more things and not 
like the genus or a “class” of things exhibiting such a feature.420  
In the examples cited above, “class” (jāti, „genus‟, „specie‟) would be perceived 
only in terms of essential qualities of being a „man‟ or a „nose‟, etc, while the „cap‟ 
would form a “universal” constituted of non-essential properites.421 On the basis of the 
flexibility or „looseness‟ provided by the “universals”, Navya-Nyāya propounds the 
principle: everything may be combined with every thing else by some relation or the 
other.
422
 Potter notes that, as far as “universals” are concerned, such relations may be 
formed between natural and artificial kinds with the Vaiśeṣika commentator Śrīdhara (c. 
950 - 1000 CE) “specially denying that „universals‟ only characterize „natural‟ kinds: as 
long as people conventionally treat two otherwise different items under the same rubric, 
that in itself is sufficient to warrant our recognizing a „universal‟ to be present”.423  In this 
sense, Nyāya theory of “universals” and “classes” is an evolutionary one. 
It should also be noted that, even though the lady is sitting in front of books, it is 
not necessary that she is actually studying books, a position which would be illustrated 
through visual examples in Part 2. It is only due to the coincidental coexistence of 
elements within a scene that an “invariable sequence” is formed between them for the 
perceiver. Moreover, the “normative values” constructed by the perceiver in relation to an 
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“event” in terms of his embodied and socio-cultural practices of life would also influence 
the perceiver‟s understanding of a scene. Thus, in a society where formal education does 
not exisit, the question of an understanding based on “studying” would not arise.  
Since the Nyāya epistemic formula “qualifier + qualificand + relationship = unit 
of perception” also applies to the verbal languages as well, it would be interesting to 
compare and contrast it with Saussure‟s formula of the “signifier + signified = sign”:    
            1.         Signifier         +          Signified                   =                      Sign            (Saussure) 
               (Audio/Visual Cue)  (Representing a Concept)        (An “Object” for the Receiver)                    
            2.         Qualifier + Qualificand   +          Relationship          =       “Object”   (Nyāya) 
                       (Signifier)    (Location)      (Functional Relationship)  (Mode of Appearance) 
                                                             (Between Signifier & Location) (For the Perceiver) 
Despite Saussure being influenced by Sanskrit and Buddhist linguistics, he transforms the 
perceiver‟s point of view occurring in classical Indian theories to the Western speaker‟s 
point of view by eliminating the factor “functional relationship” from his formula. It may 
be recalled that it is on the basis of the “functional relationship” that the perceiver 
integrates the scene in the Nyāya theory in terms of his own experiences of the world. 
Thus, in the Nyāya theory, one cannot simply say “x causes y” where „x‟ and „y‟ stand 
for two general terms, but only when „x‟ and „y‟ appear under particular “modes of 
appearance” to the perceiver:424 
           “X as F, causes Y as G” 
“Universals” acting as “Limitors” of Meaning in Nyāya Theory of Perception 
The Nyāya “modes of appearance” also act as the “limitor” (avacchedaka, „the slicer‟) of 
meaning for the viewer. Mohanty notes: “To say that fire burns is to regard fire as being 
limited by it‟s “fire-ness” (vahnitvāvacchinnavahni) as being the cause of burning and 
not fire as limited by its „color-ness‟.”425     
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The notion of a particular “mode of appearance” acting as a “limitor” of “meaning” is 
widely used in Indian arts. Matilal notes:  
According to Nyāya, “objecthood” has a two-way determination: it is determined, 
on the one hand, by the object itself and, on the other, by the unique way the 
viewer cognizes it. Generally, the two “objecthoods” are different with the second 
being determined by the Nyāya notion of the “delimitor” (avacchedaka).426   
The following examples are from Indian sculptures:  
                                            
                                                       Figure 1:  Makara (Crocodile) 
                                    (c. 2
nd
 BCE, Sandstone, Bharhut, Madya Pradesh, India) 
What immediately strikes the viewer‟s eye is the most unusual and unrealistic coiled 
form of the crocodile. Clearly, the artist has wanted to convey through this “mode of 
appearance” the lethal nature of the animal as a “coiled menace” to the perceiver. This 
unusual “mode of appearance” of the crocodile acts as the “limitor” of the meaning for 
the perceiver.  
The following sculptures provide some farther examples: 
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                         Fig 2: Pārvatī                       Fig 3: Chamunda                 Fig 4:  Chamunda 
                       c. 12
th
 CE, Basalt                     c. 10
th
 CE, Basalt                  (in relief, c. 10
th
 CE) 
(South Mohammadpur, Bangladesh)     (Bihar, India)                         (Bihar, India) 
While both are goddesses, Pārvatī is the goddess of love and good tidings and Chamunda 
is the goddess of bad tidings, disease and death. In the “mode of appearance” of being 
Pārvatī, the qualifiers are her highly polished texture, her youthful appearance, flowers, 
etc, which act as the “qualifiers” or the “signifiers” of good times; in contrast, for 
Chamunda, the “qualifiers” are her rough texture, aged appearance, the virus of disease in 
her stomach, skull in her headgear, etc, which act as the signifiers of bad times, disease 
and death.  
These Indian sculptures remind us of the French Sculptor Auguste Rodin‟s (1840-
1917) celebrated figure, “The Thinker” (1888). Through its “mode of appearance” 
involving the coarse texture and the physical form, the artist wants to convey the tortured 
soul of Alighieri Dante during his writing of the Divine Comedy (1308-20), contrasted 
with the highly polished texture of “The Kiss” representing a couple in the “mode of 
appearance” of a blissful ecstasy:  
161 
 
                                                
                          Fig 5:  The Thinker                                                        Fig 6: The Kiss 
                               1888, Bronze                                                                 1889, Marble 
Matilal emphasizes the decisive role that the “mode of appearance” plays in qualifying a 
scene which acts as the “limitor” in restricting the “meaning” of the scene for the 
perceiver:  
We need a prior grasping of the qualifiers or characteristics, but we need not have 
a prior acquaintance with the subject or the dharmin („what holds‟). For we can 
become acquainted with it at the same time we “construct the judgment”… Nyāya 
says that a prior awareness of the qualifiers is all that is logically needed for us to 
formulate a “qualificative” judgment.427   
Matilal argues that seeing something from a distance we may speculate whether it is a 
„man‟, a „post‟, or a „tree‟ only because we are already acquainted with the above 
qualifiers.
428
 This is the “maypole” theory of judgment,429 an aspect which is fully 
demonstrable in the case of cinema as will be shown in Part 2 of the present chapter. 
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Formation of “Nominal” or “Bogus Universals” in Perception 
On the question of “universals”, the Naiyāyika, Udayana (c. 11th CE) makes a crucial 
distinction between a “real universal” (sāmānya) and a “nominal universal” (upādhi).430 
Etymologically the word upādhi means the following: upa means „proximity‟ (sāmīpya, 
„close‟) and dhi means „attribution‟ (āropya, „imposition‟).431 Gangopadhyay notes: “The 
word upādhi means an object or a property which imparts or attributes its own 
characteristic or quality to an object proximate to it”.432 Thus, while, the former 
represents the actual occurrence of a feature in a thing, the “nominal universal” represents 
a qualifying feature that does not occur objectively in a thing, but is only subjectively 
experienced by the perceiver as occurring there. For example, a crystal lying close to a 
red flower would appear to be red to a perceiver, a property which is not objectively 
present in the crystal. Since “nominal universals” represent “conditional or subjectively 
imposed properties”,433 they are also called “bogus universals”. Such subjective 
functionalities are generally called “relation-particulars” (svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa) 
that are “uniquely contrived for the occasion not ontologically distinguishable from the 
terms they connect”.434 In the above sense, “nominal or bogus universals” are basically 
heuristic devices used for understanding scenes or situations in terms of the perceiver‟s 
embodied and socio-cultural experiences of life.  
The Naiyāyika, Uddyotkara (c. 500 CE) holds that, logically, only a „basis for 
use‟ (nimitta) is required for applying “nominal universals” to a particular case. A special 
form of a “bogus universal” is an „accidental appendage‟ (upalakṣaṇa), like a crow sitting 
on top of a house, would form a “bogus universal” for a perceiver “The house with the 
crow”!435 “Nominal or bogus universals” are crucial ingredients of film perception, an 
aspect which will be discussed in part 2 of this chapter. 
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“Mode of Presentation” in Perception 
The “mode of presentation” of a percept in a particular “mode of appearance” serves the 
primary function of locating the percept in a particular spatio-temporal context which 
gives a „measure‟ to the perceiver based on her embodied and socio-cultural practices of 
life. Thus, in cinema, the “mode of appearance” may give the „dominance‟ of a person in 
relation to another within a scene, the low angle “mode of presentation” of a character 
gives a „measure‟ of his „dominance‟ over others within the scene to the perceiver.      
 The basic factor that constitutes the “mode of presentation” is the sense-object 
connection (sannikarṣa-bhāsya, „contact through a medium‟) between the referent and 
the perceiver:  
Object + Sense-Object Trajectory (Connector) → Perceptual Cognition436 
The sense-object trajectory (sannikarṣa-bhāsya-samsarga)437 generates a particular body 
perspective of the scene for the viewer in terms of his lived experiences of life. 
Commenting on a particular verse in the Atharva Veda (c. 2000 BCE), Tagore celebrates 
the body‟s viewpoint of the world in a phenomenological vein: 
Our capacity to stand erect has given our body its freedom of posture, making it 
easy to turn on all sides and realize ourselves at the centre of all things. As one 
freedom leads to another, Man‟s eyesight also found a wider scope. From the 
higher vantage point of our physical watch-tower, we have gained our view – not 
merely information about location of things but their inter-relation and their 
unity.
438
 
Tagore‟s insight leads to the conclusion that a view does not merely give information 
about a percept, like a “pot”, but it also generates an embodied sense of the “pot” in 
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relation to us. In generating such a sense in us, the construction of space and time in 
relation to our particular point of view plays a decisive role.  
“Embodied Sense”: Construction of Space and Time of a Scene in Perception  
Potter analyzes the construction of space and time in the Nyāya theory: 
Philosophical scholars sometimes divide theories of space and time into two main 
divisions: absolute and relational. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is relational, 
though it might, at first glance, seem otherwise. Space and time are not viewed 
either as receptacles in which objects move over a continua of fixed points 
constituting extension. Rather, they are inferred, or, for some Naiyāyikas, even 
perceived as the necessary relating principle among physical things such as being 
above and below, before and after, farther and nearer, etc.
439
   
In clarifying the concept of relative space (dik) and time (kāla), Nyāya says both become 
perceptible only as a qualifier of the percept within view. Thus, space qualifies a 
particular table as “The table is here”. In this sense, perception of space represents 
“certain space relations” which occur between objects, like “far” and “near”, etc.440 
Similarly, time (kāla) is also perceived only when it qualifies a perceptual event, like “I 
see the table now”.441  
However, since Nyāya also speaks of the indivisibility of space and time in the 
same breath, it leads to some confusion as to whether it holds space and time as absolute 
or relative. Potter clarifies that while the Nyāya‟s core concept of space and time remains 
relative, its mention of an absolute space and time is necessitated by the Nyāya 
requirement that any two entities anywhere in the universe are capable of being related in 
some sense or the other. If there were more than one space and time, then A in one space 
and time could not be connected to B in another space and time. A conceptual space-time 
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continuum in the form of an absolute space and time is, therefore, required to subsume 
the relative spaces and times.
442
  
The particular location of the percept within view generates a „measure‟ of the 
percept in the viewer which either appears as „benign‟ or as a „threat‟ in terms of the 
viewer‟s body based on her experiences of living in the world. According to classical 
Indian theories, embodied senses are entirely a product of three basic instinctual 
processes: the survival instinct of the organism, the sexual instinct based on a desire for 
continuity and propagation of the organism, and the acquisitive instinct in order to make 
the surroundings condusive for survival and propagation of the organism.
443
 These 
instinctual drives find expression in the form of maximization of „pleasure‟, avoidance of 
„pain‟, and „indifference‟ towards others in relation to embodied experiences of the 
world. Based on the repeatation of similar experiences over a long stretch of time, these 
bodily experiences are „rationalized‟ in terms of certain „dos‟ and „donts‟ prescribed by 
the society which establishes a direct causal connection between an embodied „intention‟ 
and the „means‟ for its fulfillment. Thus, if X causes bodily pleasure and Y controls X, 
then, Y is held as a means for „causing‟ pleasure. “The body” mechanically gets used to 
such experiences in terms of forming “invariable sequences” in its bodily memory 
leading to the formation of integrated wholes within one‟s view. Since such integrations 
enable an organism to uniquely respond to a situation confronting it, it becomes an 
essential part of its survival strategy. In this sense, narrative integration of elements 
within view is a given in the psyche of an organism.    
Lakoff and Johnson note the importance of embodied senses in human beings‟ 
interactions with the world:  
There is no fully autonomous faculty of reason separate from and independent of 
bodily capacities such as perception and movement. The evidence supports, 
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instead, an evolutionary view in which reason uses and grows out of bodily 
capacities.
444
  
The „measure‟ given by a “mode of presentation” significantly influences the contextual 
meaning of a scene involving the percept, an aspect which would be demonstrated in part 
2 of this chapter.  
An Integrated Whole is a New Product  in Nyāya Theory of Perception 
In the Nyāya theory, the percept, born as a product of its “mode of appearance” and its 
“mode of presentation” to the perceiver, is a cognitive whole which represents properties 
independent of its parts. Matilal notes:  
The continued existence of the Nyāya whole is destroyed when it loses even its 
minutest parts with a new whole being created in its place…One, therefore, 
destroys the old shirt simply by taking out a thread from it…In other words, parts 
must stay in certain relations for the Naiyāyika whole to continue to exist.445       
Thus, the perception “Lady is studying” generates meaning as a related whole through the 
functional relationship of „studying‟, rather than a mere summation of the meanings of its 
parts, e.g., the lady, books, etc. in which the meaning of „studying‟ do not automatically 
inhere. In view of the fact that a particular functional relationship relates two elements 
appearing in specific “modes of appearance” to the viewer, an aspect which is not 
available to the constituting elements seen separately, perceptual wholes are greater than 
their parts. More importantly, the same elements A and B may even combine differently 
to produce different integrated wholes for the same perceiver. For example, while a 
particular combination of threads may produce a particular cloth, another combination 
between them would produce another cloth. Thus, the “inherence-cause” 
(samavāyikāraṇa) represented by A and B remains „detachable‟ from their “non-
inherence-cause” (asamavāyikāraṇa) representing their various combinations within 
view.
446
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More importantly, a percept, which manifests the same “mode of appearance” but 
presented through different “modes of presentation”, would form different integrated 
wholes for the perceiver having different „meanings‟ for her. Matilal notes that the above 
Nyāya concept of “non-substantial causality” where the „meaning‟ of a scene changes 
with its “mode of presentation”, has no parallels whether in the East or in the West.447 
Nyāya holds that even a minor alteration in the elements constituting a whole would lead 
to the formation of a new whole for the viewer generating new “knowledge” in him. In 
the above sense, the age-old puzzle of the Ship of Theseus has a strikingly different 
resolution in the Nyāya theory: when even a single plank of the ship is changed, it 
becomes a new ship for Nyāya!448 The above concept is particularly applicable to cinema 
where different shots of the same scene generate different “knowledge” among the 
audiences. Above conclusions may be summed up in terms of the following formula for 
perception: 
                             Perceptual Knowledge = Mode of Appearance + Mode of Presentation 
This aspect will be illustrated with visual images in Part 2 of this chapter.  
Before concluding this section, it may be useful to distinguish the Nyāya notion of 
“knowledge” with that of Western thought. In Nyāya, “knowledge” (jñāna) is not natural 
to “the self”, but appears as its accidental quality or property on the fulfillment of certain 
causal conditions operating within the world. This concept of “knowledge” as contingent 
and transitory in the Nyāya theory is distinct from the Western understanding of 
“knowledge” as a „timeless‟ proposition. Potter notes: 
The reason is that, since qualities are transitory, “knowledge” as jñāna would 
arise and disappear as qualities in the knowing self leaving its traces in the mind. 
Thus, we shall have to speak of a “knowledge” which is transitory and hence to be 
distinguished from a lasting “knowledge” in the Western sense. In the above 
sense, jñāna is best translated as “judgment” signifying not a timeless proposition, 
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but the actual process of judging an act at the time of its performance by the 
knower.
449
  
The Western notion of “knowledge” is perhaps better translated as pramā or “true 
knowledge” in terms of Indian philosophy. 
This raises a question about the “truth-value” of human knowledge of the world.  
Classical Indian theories differentiate between different levels of knowledge. Thus, jñāna 
is „unverifed knowledge‟, e.g., “There is a ghost in the house”; pramā is „verified 
knowledge‟, e.g., “There is evidence that there is ghost in the house”; and satya is „true 
knowledge‟, e.g., “The very idea of a ghost being false, there is no ghost in the house”. 
The question of verification of knowledge assumes significance in Indian theories with 
different schools subscribing to different modes of such verification: 
i) Truth consists in its practical value                 - Nyāya, Buddhism 
(Pragmatic Theory) 
ii) Truth as following the correct procedure for gathering knowledge  
(Correspondence Theory)                               - Nyāya  
iii)  Truth as harmony                                          - Saṁvāda Group of Theories 
 (Coherence Theory) 
iv) Truth as uncontradicted knowledge              - Vedānta Group of Theories 
(Consilience Theory) 
Since even false knowledge may satisfy the first three criteria, like the early belief that 
the sun went round the earth had continued to satisfy human needs for a long time, the 
Vedānt theories hold that, in the ultimate sense, uncontradicted knowledge provides the 
real test of truth. However, since no body can be sure of having attained that state, there 
is a sense of incompleteness, like a „work in progress‟ belief, in the Indian theories where 
„knowledge‟ is taken as „true‟ till it is proved otherwise.450   
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        Formation of „Higher‟ Thoughts in the Nyāya Theory 
The importance of the formation of “invariable sequences” in perception in terms of the 
perceiver‟s embodied and socio-cultural practices of life, however, goes much beyond 
“perceptual knowledge” alone; it also forms an essential basis for the production of all 
abstract „higher‟ thoughts in the Nyāya theory. Since film audiences understanding of a 
scene or a sequence not only involves direct perception but also higher thought, the 
process would be briefly discussed below.   
According to classical Indian thought, in all there are “six ways of knowing” 
reality: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), word (śabda), comparison 
(upamāna), postulation (arthāpatti), and absence (anupalabhdhi).451 In this range, while 
perception represents an immediate and direct way of knowing, the rest are mediate and 
indirect processes which also, however, depend on the formation of “invariable 
sequences” for the enquirer.452 Processes of inference, comparison, postulation, and 
absence are being demonstrated below as examples.  
The observation that “the sun rises from the east every day” is an inductive inference 
based on the “invariable sequence” that the sun rises from the east everyday.  
The celebrated Aristotelian syllogism representing deductive inference is as follows: 
                       Man is mortal,  
                       Socrates is man,  
                       (Hence) Socrates is mortal  
Nyāya would explain it in terms of „invariable sequences” as follows: by eliminating the 
common ground between the two “invariable sequences” involving “man is mortal” and 
“Socrates is man”, one deductively gains the “knowledge” of a third “invariable 
sequence” that “Socrates is mortal”. However, there is an important difference: while the 
Aristotelian deduction is ultimately a formal device where “Man is immortal, Socrates is 
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man, (Hence) Socrates is immortal” remains equally valid, Nyāya, being an arch realist, 
would not accept Man‟s immortality as a valid proposition.   
The Nyāya model of inference, accepted by all classical Indian theories, is as follows: 
                       There is fire on the hill 
                       Because there is smoke  
                       Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, like in the kitchen, unlike in the lake 
                       This smoke is like that 
                       (Hence) There is fire on the hill 
It is a deductive-inductive inference, commonly known as „inference for others‟ 
(„inference for self‟ involves only the first three steps), whose very basis is perceptual 
viz. „wherever there is smoke…‟ endorsed by habitual experiences of life. if the 
Aristotelian syllogism is put in the Nyāya model, it would appear as follows:  
                                   There is mortality in the world   
                                   Because there is man 
                                   Wherever there is man, there is mortality, like in human societies 
                                   Socrates is a man 
                                   (Hence) Socrates is mortal 
In Nyāya theory of comparison, taught aspects of learning is given prominence. 
Thus, when a person identifies an animal in real life on the basis of a description he has 
learnt earlier, it represents the same process of the formation of an “invariable sequence” 
as the basis of her knowledge.   
Postulation or hypothesis, on which abductive inference is based, primarily 
employs the process of elimination to reach a conclusion. Thus, the observation “X is 
gaining weight while fasting during the day” leads to the hypothesis that “X must be 
eating during the night” based on the occurrence of an “invariable sequence” between 
one‟s weight and eating.  
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While all other Indian theories hold that a situational absence (anupalabhdhi) 
may generate “knowledge” negatively, Nyāya is alone in holding that situational 
absences (abhāva) are directly perceived by the viewers where the absence of an element 
habitually perceived in a place leads to the formation of an “invariable senquence” 
between the location and the directly perceived absence of the item which generates 
knowledge in the perceiver.
453
 This aspect will be demonstrated in the section dealing 
with “Perceiving Absence”, illustrated with suitable examples from cinema, in Part 2 of 
this chapter. 
           The Jaina Contribution to the Nyāya Theory of Perception 
It is now time to say the final word about the formation of perception in a viewer in 
classical Indian theories. Building on previous insights and adding some of its own, the 
Jaina thinker Siddhasena Divākara (c. 450-500 CE) gives the following comprehensive 
definition of perception:  
The proper method of exposition of entities is based on substance (dravya), space 
(kṣetra), time (kāla), and state of existence (bhāva) on the one hand and mode of 
appearance (paryāya), aspect (aṃśa, deśa), relation (saṃyoga), and distinction 
(bheda) on the other.
454
    
Based on the Nyāya theory, the Jainas also hold that even a minor change in any one of 
the above elements would involve the formation of a new cognitive whole for the 
perceiver, expressed in terms of the following two principles: “Every expression signifies 
a differentiation through conditioning factors”,455 and “Every expression functions with a 
restriction”.456 Extending Nyāya thought, the Jainas also develop the idea of emphasis 
(arpaṇa), which involves paying attention to certain sections of a scene depending on the 
intention of the perceiver and the narrative cues provided within a scene.
457
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The Jaina theory seeks to synthesize the Buddhist theory of continuous flux with 
the Hindu theory of continuity by holding that, even while things undergo continuous 
change in their “modes of appearance” for a perceiver, their core remains unchanged.    
Chaplin‟s Marching Sequence in Modern Times (1936) 
In Charlie Chaplin‟s Modern Times (1936), when Chaplin picks up a red flag that has 
accidentally fallen off a truck and starts walking holding it in his hand, quite unknown to 
him, he is seen as leading a procession of agitating workers marching behind him. Based 
on their appropriate “body orientation” within the scene, they combine to form an 
“invariable sequence” between the “agitators” and their “leader” functionally linked the 
imposition of the relational universal of “agitator-hood” between them in terms of the 
audiences‟ habitual experiences of socio-cultural life. It results in the cognition “Chaplin 
is leading marching workers” for the audiences. However, since the functionality of the 
scene only arises accidentally, being unknown to both Chaplin and the workers, the scene 
becomes comedic for the audiences.  
Susan Alexander‟s Attempted Suicide in Orson Welles‟s Citizen Kane (1941) 
In the scene of Susan Alexander‟s (Dorothy Comingore) attempted suicide, she is seen 
breathing heavily lying on the bed with her face covered in darkness while, in the 
foreground, a bottle marked „Poison‟ and an empty tumbler with a spoon stand 
prominently on her bedside table. The audiences construct a visual whole of the scene 
resulting in the cognition “She has taken poison”. In a subsequent development, the door 
is flung open as Kane (Orson Welles) and another person rush in. Based on his body 
language, Kane would be perceived as qualified by a poisoned Susan resulting in the 
cognition “Kane is worried about her”.  
Jaina theory of “emphasis” (arpaṇa) holds that, based on narrative cues, the 
audiences are unlikely to notice the presence of a decorative flower plant by the side of 
the door flung open by Kane. In this sense, a literary principle given by Mīṁāṃsā (c. 3rd   
BCE) is useful: only those elements flock together in perception which have mutual 
expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), contiguity (sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyatā) for each other.    
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Perception and Compositional Principles in Indian Art 
While there is no scope for a fuller discussion here, the following is a brief indicator of 
how some of the processes operating in perception influence the compositional principles 
of Indian arts.   
Indian aesthetes hold that processes of perception in real life and in the arts are 
similar, their only difference being a change in the attitude that the perceiver experiences 
in the two cases: while in the former a „practical‟ attitude is adopted, in case of arts, a 
„fictional‟ attitude prevails, the latter aspect having been fully theorized by Bhaṭṭa 
Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta to be elaborated in the next chapter. In holding that “art is 
imitation”, the Nyāya aesthete, Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 9th CE) says: “It is similar to one when, 
seeing the life-like picture of a particular horse or a particular person, we formulate the 
judgment „It is that horse or that person‟ (citra-turaga-nyāya, lit., „painting-horse-
like)”.458 Nyāya‟s idea finds support in Carroll: “Picture recognition is not a skill 
acquired over and above object recognition. Whatever features or cues we come to 
employ in object recognition, we also mobilize to recognize what pictures depict.”459 
Even though the conclusions reached by Śrī Śaṅkuka and Carroll appear to be similar, the 
nature of “idealizations” in Western and Indian arts are essentially different: while 
Carroll represents the Western tradition where art “idealizes” by breaking surface reality 
in order to incorporate inner dynamics of a situation beyond human perception, Indian 
arts exceed reality in terms of “idealizations”, where a “particular” trggers the memory of 
an ideal “object” which when connected with the former in terms of a functional 
relationship, generates a “universal” in perception in terms of human beings‟ embodied 
and socio-cultural living in the world. This process exercises a determining influence on 
the compositional principles in Indian arts. In Indian commercial cinema, the 
construction of characters, involving heroes, villains, mothers, friends, etc, are based on 
their models “idealized” in terms of embodied and socio-cultural practices of life in the 
Indian tradition.     
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Analyzing photographic images, Christopher Pinney, the art historian of early 
photography in India, contrasts Bourdieu‟s analysis of ordinary people‟s response to 
photographs in the French village of Lesquire with the Indian response in the village of 
Bhatisuda: 
In the French village of Lesquire, the density of their local knowledge makes 
photography almost wholly redundant: “We have seen each other too many times 
already! Always the same faces all day. We know each other down to the last 
detail!” and, hence, concluding “…it‟s not worth it!” In Bhatisuda, conversely, 
photography never seems to merely duplicate the everyday world, but is, rather, 
prized for its capacity to make traces of persons endure, and to construct the 
world in a more perfect way than is possible to achieve in the hectic flow of 
everyday life.
460
 
Marks of “idealization” reflecting the “normative values” of an “event” constructed by a 
perceiver in terms of her worldly experiences may be found in the early practice of 
„filling out‟ of photographs taken of Indian subjects by painting the photographs based on 
“idealizations” that a particular subject should have as representing a „model‟ in the 
Indian tradition. Pinney notes Judith Mara Gutman‟s path-breaking study of early Indian 
photography, Through Indian Eyes, in this matter:  
While European photographs also used paint, both to retouch negatives as well as 
to enhance color on the final print, for Indian photographs dating from 1860s, 
paint is much more than a supplement to the photographic image; rather the 
overlay of paint completely replaces the photographic image in such a way that 
the original is “obscured”.461   
Not only in the above respect but also in some others, Western critics feel perplexed 
while encountering Indian arts. Thus, Pinney quotes Guttman as complaining of her 
difficulty in negotiating Indian photographs: 
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…with no “invitation” into the picture, my eyes did not know how or where to 
enter. So they leaped in and were surrounded by one group of women. Even, 
inside the picture, my eyes could not move around… There were no “leads” as 
you find in Western imagery.
462
  
Alice Boner offers significant insights into the compositional principles of Indian arts. 
She refers to a very distinctive Indian compositional practice of constructing images in 
two broad forms of “quiescence” and “movement”. The notion of “compositional 
quiescence” has its roots in the Indian theory of darśan, where “ideally” the eyes of the 
deity should fall on the devotee with the latter being aware of it signify that the deity has 
accepted the offering (prāsāda) and showered blessings on the devotee in return. This 
image presents a picture of perfect „containment‟ exercised in terms of the subject and the 
object within the scene. In contrast “movement” compositions are those where “looks” 
move outwards from the compositional frame. Noting that Indian compositions signify 
concentric circles representing force-fields which overlap when the stresses are 
converging inwards as in “quiescent images” and diverge as in “movement images”,463 
Boner notes the following distinctive features of Indian arts: 
The life of every composition depends not only on the counterplay of movement 
and quiescence, but also on the opposition of big and small form-elements, of 
rounded and straight movements, of sizable plains and aggregates of multiple 
smaller forms.
464
 
Boner says that, in terms of cosmic symbols, Indian compositions represent the central 
bindu or the hub of the composition as the Brahman, the surrounding circle as the 
potentiality of manifestation (garbha), and the space within the circle as the manifested 
field (kṣetra) with the circle always the fundamental determining factor.465  
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 The notion of “eyeline match” in cinema would represent “quiescent images” in 
Indian arts. Arguably, the “shot-counter shot” technique in cinema where the outward 
„look‟ of a character is matched with the person being „looked at‟ in the next shot would 
also be considered as a “quiescent image” in the Indian arts. All the rest, where images 
are not contained within the frames, would present “movement images” in the Indian 
tradition. While it is customary in the Western tradition to provide a „lead‟ to the viewer 
to enter a “quiescent” scene, in the Indian arts, such scenes being modeled on the 
principle of darśan, is foreseen as disturbing the “event”. Thus, Guttman finds no „leads‟ 
to enter the scene in the example cited by her.  
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                                            Part 2 
Reading Visual Images 
Let‟s apply Nyāya theory of perception to understand the following visual:  
        
                                    Image 1: Madhuri and Books – Normal Angle View 
                                        “Perceptual Knowledge” arising from the Scene 
It has been established that perceptual knowledge is the product of the “mode of 
appearance” and the “mode of presentation” of a percept. The above scene has been 
analyzed on this basis.  
“Mode of Appearance” within the Scene  
1.  “Mode of Appearance” of “Objects” perceived as “Universals” in Perception  
Objective features relating to Madhuri, like her age, her general appearance, her 
countenance, etc, act as „signs‟ which qualify her to be perceived as a „student‟, resulting 
in the following cognition:  
“She is a student”  
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Similarly, when „signs‟ available within the scene, like old look, frayed sides, etc, qualify 
books appearing on Madhuri‟s table, it leads to the following cognition:  
“Books are study-material” 
2.  “Mode of Appearance” of “Relation between Objects” perceived as a “Universal” 
When books appearing as „study material‟ qualify Madhuri appearing as a „student‟, they 
form an “invariable sequence” for the perceiver who proceeds to combine them on the 
basis of the functional relationship of „studying‟ imposed on them in terms of the 
perceiver‟s socio-cultural experiences of life. When these factors are put in the epistemic 
formula of perception “qualifier + qualificand + relationship = unit of perception”, it 
leads to the formation of the following “universal” in perception: 
        “Madhuri is studying” 
A point to note is that the perceptual process does not stop with the integration of the 
chief qualifying elements alone; rather, the process goes on with other elements getting 
progressively integrated as subsidiary qualifiers for the scene till, ideally, all the elements 
within a scene are exhausted. Thus, the pen-stand and the flower-vase would further 
qualify Madhuri‟s „study‟. In case certain elements fall beyond the purview of the 
audiences‟ mental attention or narrative concerns, they are likely to remain unintegrated 
within the scene.  
“Mode of Presentation” of the Scene 
3. Sense-Object Trajectory generating an “Embodied Sense” in Perception 
The “mode of presentation” being a normal angle viewpoint here, the sense-object 
trajectory presents books at a „normal‟ height to Madhuri, evoking an embodied  sense in 
the viewer in terms of the her own embodied experiences of life. This embodied sense 
generates the cognition that the situation is „benign‟ for Madhuri among the audiences:    
“Books are under control of Madhuri” 
     Perceptual Knowledge = Mode of Appearance + Mode of Presentation 
                                       = Madhuri is studying + Books are under control of Madhuri 
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At the final stage, it produces the following “perceptual knowledge” in the viewer: 
“Madhuri is in control of her studies” 
“Emotion” generated by the Scene 
Since books form a „normal‟ relation with Madhuri, the viewer assumes that the 
experience is „pleasurable‟ to her in terms of the viewer‟s own experiences of life. 
Consequently, the viewer associates an emotion of „happiness‟ with her:     
“Madhuri is happy” 
 
Let‟s now analyze the same scene from a low angle camera viewpoint:  
 
          Image 2: Madhuri and Books – Low Angle View 
 “Mode of Appearance” of “Objects” within a Scene 
1. “Mode of Appearance” of “Objects” perceived as “Universals” 
Since the „signs‟ remain the same, the “objects” constitute the same “universals”:  
                                                     “Madhuri is a student” 
                                                  “Books are study-material” 
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2. “Mode of Appearance” of “Relation between Objects” perceived as a “Universal”   
Despite being a low angle viewpoint signifying a different cognitive whole for the 
audiences, Madhuri and books still produce an “invariable sequence” for the viewer:  
“Madhuri is studying” 
 “Mode of Presentation” of the Scene to the Viewer 
3. The Sense-Object Trajectory evoking an Embodied Sense in the Viewer  
In this low angle viewpoint, the sense-object trajectory makes the books appear „taller‟ in 
relation to Madhuri.
 
In terms of the viewer‟s own embodied experiences of life, it poses a 
„threat‟ to Madhuri which results in their cognition:   
“Books are posing a threat to Madhuri” 
    Perceptual Knowledge = Mode of Appearance + Mode of Presentation 
                                           = Madhuri is studying + Books are posing a threat to Madhuri 
At the final stage, it produces the following “Perceptual Knowledge” in the viewer: 
“Madhuri is overloaded with her studies” 
“Emotion” generated by the Scene 
Madhuri being perceived as „overloaded‟ with her studies, the following cognition 
anxiety‟ with Madhuri resulting in the perception:  
        “Madhuri is worried” 
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Let‟s examine the scene involving Madhuri and books from a High Angle Viewpoint: 
     
  Image 3: Madhuri and Books – Top Angle View 
From this high angle viewpoint, Madhuri does not seem to have anything to do with the 
books at all!  
The question is which one of the above three viewpoints, all of which have the 
same content, represent truth? Since Nyāya is an arch realist school, it does not hold any 
particular viewpoint to be privileged in relation to others as long as the pramāṅa, i.e. the 
correct procedure for the arising of perception, like appropriate lighting, adequate 
distance, etc, have been followed. Since, in these cases, all such conditions have been 
satisfied, Nyāya would take all of them to be „true‟ till they are found to be erroneous in 
the practical field. The literary critic Mammaṭa (c. 11th CE) offers nine extra-textual 
factors on th basis of which „meaning‟ is deciphered by the audiences: 
Aesthetic suggestion…produces in sensitive readers the idea of something 
different by means of nine specific factors (vaiśiṣṭya): the speaker, the addressee, 
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the tone of voice, the syntagm of the sentence, the expressed sense, the presence 
of a third person, the context, the time, and the place.
466
 
Ultimately, Nyāya judges the success of particular „meanings‟ in terms of the practical 
results they achieve in the field. Mohanty notes: 
The only reason some contents are regarded as real is that they have not yet been 
contradicted. Replacing “truth” by “uncontradictedness”, one can, at best, say 
“uncontradicted as far as experience up to this time goes”. The idea of real 
existence or non-existence is here not of much worth. X is said to exist in case it 
is an object of a pramāṇa or veridical cognition…In that case, the cause should be 
defined simply as the invariable antecedent, entity or non-entity.
467
  
In the empiricial world, therefore, there is no guarantee of an “event‟s” truth except in 
terms of its „successful‟ functioning within a given situation. 
“Normative Values” influence the “Knowledge” of a Scene 
It is important to note how “normative values”, which arise from the viewer‟s embodied 
and socio-cultural experiences of life, exercise a determining influence on perception. 
Thus, even though Freud‟s table contains more books than those of Madhuri, yet the 
perceptual „meaning‟ generated among the perceivers here remains different. 
Let‟s examine the following image: 
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                Image 4: Freud in his Study 
The physically daunting huge stack of books on Freud‟s table, much larger than what 
Madhuri‟s table contains, does not generate an embodied sense of „threat‟ for Freud in 
the viewer because of the “normative values” he holds in relation to Freud. Under the 
circumstances, the viewer would cognize the situation as under control of Freud.  
Similarly, the following scene would hardly be cognized as “Tagore is under threat” even 
though the books stacked on his study table are much more than on Madhuri‟s table: 
 
          
        Image 5: Tagore in his Study 
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          Applying Nyāya Theory of Perception to Cinema 
In explaining the film process of linking the previous shot to the latter one in perception, 
Nyāya‟s theory of “connective-recollective cognition” (pratisandhāna) comes to the fore 
which Matilal defines as: “Pratisandhāna means an awareness that arises with regard to a 
different thing being linked with an awareness of a previous object.”468 On the basis of 
this principle, Nyāya would like to hold that both continuity and montage practices of 
cinema are instances of direct perception and not mediated thought in its theory.    
Explaining Continuity & Montage Practices in Cinema 
According to Nyāya, “continuity” and “montage” practices in cinema would be explained 
as follows. 
Continuity in Cinema 
Film continuity is much easily explained in terms of this Nyāya concept. Two 
consecutive shots of a person walking, one existing now and the immediately preceeding 
one revived from memory, are linked in the audiences‟ perception through the process of 
“connective-recollective cognition (pratisandhāna)” to form an integrated whole. In such 
a scenario, the succeeding view qualifies the previous one on the basis of the viewer‟s 
subjective imposition of the functional relationship of “walking” between them on the 
basis of the viewer‟s embodied and habitual experiences of life. It leads to the perceptual 
knowledge “He is walking” among the audiences.   
Montage Cinema 
Montage theory, propagated by early Soviet filmmakers, who believed that the process 
involves an intellectual synthesizing of discontinuous actions in the minds of the 
audiences. In the celebrated Kuleshov Experiments, when the shot of Ivan Mozzukhin‟s 
expressionless i.e. „neutral‟ face is juxtaposed with the shot of a “bowl of soup”, it 
generates the meaning “He is hungry” among the audiences. Kuleshov reasoned that 
since the meaning of “hunger” neither occurs in the expressionless face of the actor nor in 
the bowl of soup, it must have arisen in the form of an intellectual “idea” in the minds of 
the audiences as a „third‟ meaning arising from synthesizing the shots. Kuleshov further 
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found that when the same shot of Mozzukhin‟s „neutral‟ face is juxtaposed with the shot 
of “a child playing with balloons”, it resulted in the cognition “He is happy” among the 
audiences. This reinforced Kuleshov‟s view that, since “happiness” neither occurs in the 
face of the actor nor in the child playing with balloons, it must have arisen as a 
synthesizing “third idea” among the audiences.   
Nyāya would, however, differ with the above explanation. It would like to 
analyze these scenes in terms of direct perception alone. When the shot of the “bowl of 
soup” is being presented, the audiences immediately recall Mozzukhin‟s „neutral‟ face in 
the preceeding shot. In terms of the audiences‟ habitual experiences of life, Mozzukhin‟s 
neutral face would have the “mode of appearance” of being „hungry‟ and the “bowl of 
soup” would appear as „food‟, the two being linked by the audiences on the basis of the 
functional relationship of „hunger‟ to form an “invariable sequence” for them. That is, in 
this process, the “bowl of soup” would qualify Mozzukhin‟s “neutral face” through the 
functional relationship of „hunger‟ in terms of the epistemic formula „qualifier + 
qualified + relationship‟ to generate the cognition “He is hungry” among the audiences. 
Since the emotion of „happiness‟ is habitually associated with a “child playing with 
balloons” in terms of the audiences‟ habitual experiences of day-to-day life, the scene 
would qualify Mozzukhin‟s neutral face to lead to the cogntition “He is happy” among 
the audiences.  
Strength of Nyāya Theory vis-à-vis Kuleshov‟s Theory: Two Examples 
The strength of the Nyāya theory of direct perception vis-à-vis Kuleshov‟s theory of 
intellectual synthesis may be further demonstrated from the following two examples.  
First, in the example of Mozzukhin‟s “neutral face” and “bowl of soup”, the 
following question may be raised: why don‟t the audiences read Mozzukhin as a Chef 
admiring his dish or a Hotel Owner feeling proud of the dish being served to the guests, 
both of which are likely to result in the cognition “He is proud” among the audiences? 
Nyāya‟s emphasis on perception being caused by embodied and socio-cultural practices 
of life would easily answer by saying that „hungry‟ faces in front of „food‟ plates are 
more common than that of a proud chef or of a hotel owner admiring his dish. The scene 
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also lacks appropriate „signifiers‟ which would qualify Mozzukhin as belonging to the 
“class” of the Chefs or as the Hotel Owner for the audiences. In contrast, Kuleshov would 
be hard put to explain why the “third idea” cannot be that of Mozzukhin being the Chef 
or the Hotel Owner unless he falls back upon the viewers‟ common experiences of life 
which occurs no where in his theory.   
Second example is based on Kuleshov‟s “Sensitivity Test”. In this test, even when 
Mozzukhin expresses emotions that are contrary to the juxtaposed visual, like expressing 
grief on seeing the child playing with balloons, the audiences still cognized him as being 
“happy”.469 This experiment is rather unsatisfactorily explained by Kuleshov as signaling 
the perseverance of the mentally intuited “third idea” that links the shots for the 
audiences. However, Nyāya offers a much better explanation of the above scene. 
According to the Nyāya theory of perception, qualifiers are the real meaning-generators 
of a scene. Matilal notes: 
Nyāya says that a prior awareness of the qualifiers is all that is logically needed to 
formulate a “qualificative” judgment…The knowledge of the location or place 
signified by “there” may simply co-arise with the judgment...470  
In the present case, the “child playing with balloons” becomes the qualifier of 
Mozzukhin‟s “neutral face”. Since “happiness” is habitually associated with a child 
playing with balloons, it becomes the meaning-generator of the juxtaposed shots in the 
Nyāya theory resulting in the cognition “He is happy” even when Mozzukhin‟s own 
expression remains contrary to it!  
Eisenstein‟s Critic of Kuleshov Experiments 
Significantly, Eisenstein critiques Kuleshov Experiments as being instances of “linkage 
montage” in which shots are perceptually integrated rather than intellectually synthesized 
by the audiences which supports the Nyāya view.471 Eisenstein holds that only in his 
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concept of “collision montage”, an intellectual process of dialectical montage occurs 
among the audiences.
472
 Thus, in the sequence of “Kerensky climbing steps” in 
Eisenstein‟s October (1928), Kerensky is seen as repeatedly climbing the same flight of 
steps even though his designation keeps rising in each such case. In no way, can these 
shots be perceptually integrated by imposing a functional relationship between them in 
terms of the audiences‟ habitual experiences of life. Instead, they would be required to 
exercise their intellect, i.e. „higher thoughts‟ in terms of inference, hypothesis, etc, in 
order to resolve the disparities occurring within the scene. Eisenstein notes: “The 
incongruity between these two shots produces a purely intellectual resolution at the 
expense of this individual. Intellectual Dynamization.”473 The intellectual montage, 
representing the dialectical process of thesis and antithesis producing a synthesis at a 
higher level of integration, remains entirely beyond the purview of direct perception of 
the audiences.  
In Mrinal Sen‟s Padatik (The Guerrilla Fighter/The Rank and File, 1973), an ad-
film on a particular brand of baby food is being shown to corporate clients by the 
producer Shilpi Mitra (Simi Garewal). The film intercuts between shots of a healthy baby 
and a voice-over that keeps eulogizing the baby food‟s nutritional values. When the show 
ends, a young executive requests for one more viewing during which he imagines 
skeleton figures of under-nourished children while the voice-over still goes on 
recommending baby food for them! In no way can these shots be related by imposing a 
functional relationship between them; they need to be synthesized in terms of the „idea‟ 
that the bourgeois society is an exploitative society.  
      Perceiving Absence in Nyāya and its Application to Cinema 
Going against the view of other classical Indian theories that anupalabdhi or „knowledge 
through non-cognition‟ is an intellectual process, Nyāya argues that “situational 
absences” (abhāva) are directly perceived rather than inferred by the audiences. Thus, a 
flower vase, which is regularly present on a table, generates perceptual „meaning‟ for a 
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viewer through its situational absence on a particular day. Nyāya views such negations in 
a positive sense: “x does not exist” is not to be understood as denying the occurrence of 
„x‟, but rather as affirming something positive described as “absence of x”.474 Matilal 
notes:  
For Nyāya, the absence of a property is treated as another property. “The pot is 
not blue” is rephrased as “The pot has the absence of blue color.475 
The significant point is that when “absence of x” is perceived as a whole, it does not 
mean the absence of an entity in general, but a specific absence. Thus, for Nyāya, the 
“table” and the “absence of flower-vase” form an “invariable sequence” in the viewer‟s 
perception. In this sense, situational absences are inalienably integrated with their 
locations in the Nyāya theory representing additional intentional information for the 
viewer.  
Explained in terms of the epistemic formula “qualifier + qualified + relationship”, 
the “the flower-vase” qualifies the location of “the table” through the functional 
relationship of its “absence from the table”. However, since an “absence” as such cannot 
be functionally related to a table, Nyāya conceives of a relationship called the “self-
linking relation” (svarūpa saṁbandha) which defines absences as being identical with 
either one or both its relata.
476
 Clearly, Nyāya has constructed a heuristic device here in 
order to explain human beings‟ common experiences of life.477  
Examples of Perceiving Absence in Cinema  
This notion finds useful application in cinema. It is a general practice of the filmmakers 
to deliberately keep a certain „space‟ empty within a particular frame in order to draw the 
audience‟s attention to this absence in the location, thereby, making the absence 
suggestive of deeper meanings for the audiences.  
In Satyajit Ray‟s Charulata (The Lonely Wife, 1964), an empty room is shown 
with the camera pointing towards the door. Charulata subsequently enters through the 
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door. The very emptiness of the frame in which Charu enters signifies the overwhelming 
loneliness of her life, caused by her husband‟s total absorption in his own work.  
In Arjun Gourisaria and Moinak Biswas‟s Sthaniyo Sangbad (Spring in the 
Colony, 2010), a bulldozer demolishes a slum silently watched by the slum-dwellers. In 
this scene, the sound track is deliberately kept silent. This felt absence of the bulldozer‟s 
sound is experienced by the audiences as qualifying the location representing the slum-
dwellers‟ silent protest against the demolition.  
In Michelangelo Antonioni‟s L‟Eclisse (Eclipse, 1962), a series of 52 „empty‟ 
shots of busy city corners at the end of the film generate “invariable sequences” between 
busy city corners and their present absences for the audiences to generate a sense of felt 
absence among them signifying the ephemeral transience of all forms of relationships in 
the modern day city life.   
                     Nyāya Notion of Visual Synesthesia and its Application to Cinema 
The notion of visual synesthesia in the Nyāya theory deserves special mention not only 
because it anticipates Merleau-Ponty‟s theory of vision-touch equivalence but also 
exceeds it in certain respects. It also forms the main basis for Bharata to construct his 
theory of the evoction of an affective state among the audiences in the course of 
witnessing a play.  
The roots of Nyāya‟s idea go back to the Vedic notion of vision-touch 
equivalence. It has generally been held since the Vedas that the vision of a thing is also a 
form of touching that thing. Vedic scholar, Jan Gonda, notes: “That a look was 
consciously regarded as a form of contact appears from the combination of „looking‟ and 
„touching‟. Casting one‟s eyes upon a person and touching him were related activities.”478 
Stella Kramrisch notes: 
Seeing, according to Indian notions, is a going forth of the sight towards the 
object. Sight touches it and acquires its form. Touch is the ultimate connection by 
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which the visible yields to being grasped. While the eye touches the object, the 
vitality that pulsates in it is communicated…479 
In the above sense, there is a „hierarchization‟ of the sense organs in Hindu 
theories where vision and touch occupy special position.
480
 While holding that the direct 
perception of „qualifiers‟ lend meaning to a scene, Nyāya, being a realist, also holds that, 
„qualificands‟ or „substances‟ are also directly perceived. Hiriyanna notes: 
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considers that substances are also directly cognized. But not 
all the senses are capable of doing this. In regard to external substances, it is only 
the organs of sight and touch that can do so; and in regard to the internal, it is the 
manas. In other words, while all the organs can sense, some can perceive also. 
The position is substantiated with references to experiences such as “I am now 
touching what I saw”.481   
Hiriyanna further clarifies: “What the two senses apprehend are clearly different, yet an 
identity is perceived by them explained as referring to the underlying substances being 
experienced alike in the two moments”.482 Underlying the above process is the 
assumption that sense-atoms shoot out from the body to envelop external reality, e.g., 
“object”, thereby generating its form (ākṛti) within the particular sensation, by perceiving 
which in the mind‟s „eye‟, the self-body system comes to know what it is.483 The orthodox 
theories further differentiate sense-organs by holding that while vision and touch are 
distant senses, hearing, smell, and taste are proximal senses, i.e. they cannot sense 
beyond a limited distance. While it is clear that vision is a distant sense-organ, touch is so 
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considered only because touch-sensations are considerd to be given in the architecture of 
vision when it sweeps over a surface making it touch the surface.  
While it is generally accepted by both Hindu and Buddhist theories that each 
organ has its own specific domain of experience, the Hindu theorists are forced to make 
an exception in case of vision-touch equivalence. Thus, against the Buddhist “restriction 
theory” (vyavastha), which holds that “the domain of objects for each sense-faculty is 
exclusive and separate”, the Hindu theories advocate “mixture theory” (saṃplava) in case 
of vision and touch sensations by holding that “the same object may be known or 
established through different processes”.484 Matilal notes that the question whether vision 
and touch experience the same thing,
485
 was raised by Molyneax to Locke: if a blind 
person, who has learnt to differentiate two things by touch alone, suddenly regains his 
sight, would he be able to identify the two by vision alone now?
486
 In the light of the 
above, Nyāya would like to reply that, since seeing is also touching, the person would 
indeed be able to differentiate the two through vision alone. In fact, the Nyāya treatise, 
Nyāyasūtra, elevates it as a principle: “Because the same artha („thing‟ or „object‟) is 
grasped by seeing and touching”.  
However, the same situation does not prevail in case of the other senses. Nyāya 
holds that, while vision and touch grasp the same material body as their sources, the other 
senses, like hearing, smelling, and tasting, can only grasp the relevant sensations, but not 
the sources from which they are emanating.
487
 Matilal says:  
Nyāya would say, for example, that we smell the fragrance of the flower but not 
the flower itself and we taste the sweetness of sugar but not the sugar lump 
itself.
488
  
Thus, whether the sensations are coming from synthetic or natural sources are beyond the 
grasp of these sense-organs.  
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However, Nyāya does include the sensations of sound, smell, and taste in the 
experiencing of an “event” through a process which is unique to its theory. Nyāya holds 
that experiencing something through vision and touch may automatically revive 
memories of hearing, smell, and taste as well in the perceiver through a process called 
“perception through revived memory” (jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti).489 Nyāya holds it to be 
an extraordinary mode of perception because these sensations are not physically sensed 
by the sense organs but are generated in the viewer‟s mind.490 Thus, when a rose is seen 
from a great distance, its smell is likely to be lost on the way. However, mind would still 
revive it for the perceiver in terms of the “impressions” of a rose experienced in terms of 
the viewer‟s embodied experiences in the past. According to Matilal, these revived 
memories qualify the visual nucleus in terms of the epistemic formula “qualifier + 
qualified + relationship = unit of perception”, generating an experience of these 
sensations alongside the one produced by vision and touch. In this sense, in the Nyāya 
theory, perception is much „fuller‟ than what vision-touch equivalence can produce in the 
viewer.
491
 Matilal notes that this theory generates the following perceptual experiences 
for the viewer: 
The above principle of Nyāya is extended to explain various facts about 
perceptual situation. It is contended by Nyāya that even such reports as “I see 
sweet honey”, “I see cold ice” or “I see fragrant flowers” would be correct as long 
as the „nucleus‟ of the object-complex is visually presented.492  
Sometimes, the mind can even make a „mistake‟ by generating false associations under 
certain compelling circumstances. Thus, Macbeth sees a dagger and Lady Macbeth sees 
blood where there are none. 
By incorporating other sensations in perception through the process of 
“perception through revived memory”, Nyāya goes much beyond Merleau-Ponty‟s theory 
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of vision-touch equivalence. Since vision still forms the nucleus around which not only 
touch but other sensations also cluster, the Nyāya process may appropriately be called 
visual synesthesia.   
Examples of Visual Synesthesia in Cinema 
The difference between experiences generated by Nyāya visual synesthesia and Merleau-
Ponty‟s synesthetic experience may be illustrated through the same film example used in 
Merleau-Ponty‟s case: James Cameron‟s Titanic (1997). When the protagonists are 
sinking in the sea, Nyāya would like to say that the audiences would not only experience 
touch sensations, but also other sense qualities like sound, smell, as well as taste, in case 
the audiences have personal experience of theses sensations in relation to sea or have 
learnt about them from authentic sources to generate an imagination which would be 
revived by mind for the audiences. In case the senses of smell and taste (sound is already 
included in cinema) are „painful‟ for the body, they would generate a sense of embodied 
pain for the audiences. In this sense, according to Nyāya, the audiences‟ experiences 
would be even fuller than what Merleau-Ponty visualizes.   
Similarly in Ritwik Ghatak‟s Titas Ekti Nadir Naam („A River Named Titus‟, 
1973), a boy wades into the river up to his waist while the camera also stands in waist-
deep water to watch him. As weeds float by the camera lens, the audiences not only 
experience the touch sensations of the cool river water, but also taste the river water as 
well as smell the weed floating by through their memory. Nyāya theory of cinematic 
experience flies in the face of existing film theories based on the notion of disembodied 
vision alone.  
In conclusion, one may sum up the advantages that Nyāya theory of perception offers in 
relation to contemporary theories of perception as follows: 
i) One gets a more detailed analysis of the process through which perception works. 
It, thus, makes us understand the complementary roles that “mode of appearance” 
and “mode of presentation” play in perception: while the “mode of appearance” 
give us the “event”, “mode of presentation” gives us a „measure‟ of the “event”. 
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ii) It makes clear the respective roles that embodiment and socio-cultural practices of 
the viewer play in perception. 
iii) It makes clear that an integrated whole of elements within view is formed in 
perception so that a unified response can be given to the scene as a whole, 
essential for the survival of an organism.  
iv) Since it forms an integrated whole in perception, perception is a “goal-directed” 
activity which forever seeks a narrative closure in completing the process of 
integration. Narrative constructions are, thus, an in-built component in the human 
psyche as part of its survival instinct.   
Existing film theories had narrowed the role of perception to disembodied vision as the 
role model of Western theories since renaissance. Nyāya significantly reverses this trend 
by holding that the audiences do not witness a scene in isolation; rather, they carry with 
them a load of experiential factors relating to their body, history, and culture which 
determine what they ultimately see on the screen. Nyāya thoughts on the structure and 
process of perception, involving “modes of appearances”, “invariable sequences”, 
“universals”, and “classes” as constituting “object-hoods” for the perceiver and “modes 
of presentation” and “sense-object trajectories” as giving an embodied „measure‟ of the 
“event” to the perceiver, becomes a treasure trove for analysts operating in the field. 
Nyāya seems to be far ahead of contemporary theories of perception. More importantly, 
its emphasis on the audiences‟ embodied and socio-cultural experiences of life helps it to 
bring back ordinary audiences to the center of academic discussion, a position from 
where they have been most unfortunately banished by the existing film discourse.   
           ________________________ 
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Chapter 4 
Cinema and Identification 
Bharata‟s Theory of Rasa 
 
The drama I have devised is a re-presentation of actions and conducts of people 
depicted in different situations, rich in various emotions.  
                                                                                                                            ----------- Bharata 
 
In the following two chapters, I enter the domain of Indian aesthetic theories which deal 
with the following basic question “knowing that it is a fiction, how do the audiences still 
experience emotions?” These questions are essentially related to the issue of 
identification of the audiences with an artwork which culminates in Bharata‟s (c. early 1st 
millennium CE) theory of rasa or aesthetic pleasure enunciated in his celebrated work on 
the theory of drama, Nāṭyaśāstra („Treatise on Drama‟), and the brilliant commentary 
Abhinavabhārati thereon by the Kashmir Śaiva philosopher-aesthete Abhinavagupta (c. 
10
th
 CE). This chapter examines Bharata‟s thoughts on the levels of audience 
identification with an artwork and the evocation of a corresponding affective state among 
them which enable the audiences to both consciously and bodily relive scenes constructed 
by the artwork. Together these two aspects constitute one of the most distinctive Indian 
contributions to the theory of art.   
On the question why people identify with situations which are fictional in nature, 
Bharata notes that, since the situations depicted are “a re-presentation of actions and 
conducts of people, depicted through different situations, rich in various emotions”,493 
they lead to the audiences‟ identification with scenes at various levels of their occurrence. 
This idea has led the philosopher-aesthetes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (c. 9th CE) to theorize that the 
fictional nature of artworks generalizes audience emotions by virtue of which they do not 
suffer emotions as they do in real life. On the question why, then, the audiences seek to 
engage with artworks at all even after knowing all are fictions, Abhinava had come up 
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with the brilliant idea that the audiences engage with artworks because they identify with 
the fictional nature of the play even before they have stepped into the auditorium, an 
identification which starts acting as the core for all other identifications in relation to the 
artworks hereafter. What this core level of identification with the fictional mode does is to 
make the audiences “willingly” interact with artworks that engage their attention. This 
idea provides one of the most effective solutions to the most perplexing problem in the 
domain of arts: “why do the audiences enjoy tragedies?”  
Once the core level of identification is formed among the audiences, they undergo 
various other levels of identification in relation to the artwork. Thus, while engaging with 
the artwork, they initially pass through a „mild‟ form of identification as they start 
„paying attention‟ to the play, which primarily involves the evocation of a corresponding 
affective state i.e. a “psycho-somatic state” among the audiences that helps their 
„unconscious‟ bodies being brought at par with their consciousness enabling them to 
relive a scene in terms of both their bodies and souls together. The above process leads to 
the formation of more intense forms of identification like „sympathetic‟ identifications 
with the generic form of the artwork in terms of its narrative and action modes, which 
may finally culminate, at the highest level of intensification, with an „empathic‟ 
identification with the focus of the play, a state in which the audiences not only feel 
sympathetic towards the main protagonists and their actions, but exchange places with 
them. The formation of different levels of identification together with their corresponding 
affective states produces different levels of aesthetic pleasure among the audiences in the 
course of their interactions with the artworks, called the rasas, broadly classified by 
Bharata as constituting of three basic types, e.g., aesthetic relish, aesthetic saturation, 
and aesthetic immersion or ecstasy. One of Bharata‟s brilliant insights consists in linking 
these aesthetic experiences with different narrative structures of the play, an aspect which 
would be analyzed in greater detail later.  
In this connection, the word rasa, which forms the summum bonum of Bharata‟s 
theory, needs farther explanation. The word derives from the root “rasa” (lit., „juice‟) 
leading to its various interpretation in the aesthetic field as “relish”, “taste”, “mood”, etc, 
basically signifying that experience of emotions in the field of arts is qualitiatively 
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different from emotions experienced in practical life. In contrast to practical emotions, 
rasa means “generalized resultant emotion”494 shared by all spectators in relation to an 
artwork which stands on the basic idea that, in principle, all human beings share similar 
embodied experiences and socio-cultural practices within a particular culture, or 
sometimes in case of certain basic emotions, across cultures.
495
 Bharata holds that rasa 
represents the tasting of an aesthetic emotion by the audiences from „outside‟, rather than 
personally „suffering‟ it, a process which makes all aesthetic experiences pleasurable for 
the audiences including tragedies.  
Different aspects of Bharata‟s theory and Abhinava‟s brilliant elucidations thereof will be 
discussed as follows:  
In the first section, contemporary notions of audience identification in Western thought 
will be discussed;  
In Part 1, a discussion on relationship between the levels of audience identification and 
artworks will take place, including the significant contributions made in this regard by the 
two philosopher-aesthetes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta; in this regard, the 
following levels of audience identification will be analyzed: identification with the 
fictional mode of the play, „mild‟ identification with the play when the audiences start 
paying „attention‟ to it including the evocation of a corresponding affective state among 
them, sympathetic identification with the narrative mode of the play, sympathetic 
identification with the action mode of the play, and empathic identification with the focus 
of the play; a discussion of what will be the Indian response to POV identification in 
cinema will also be undertaken;   
Part 2 will deal with the relationship between narrative structure and aesthetic experience. 
In this connection, Bharata‟s theory of “extended action”, involving three five-step 
narrative structures consisting of the mental state of the protagonists (avasthāa), the 
nature of the unfolding action (arthaprakṛtis) and the joining together of these various 
parts as limbs of a living organism (sandhis) will be discussed; Bharata‟s farther 
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subdivisions of sandhis into sandhyaṅgas representing the templates of situation-models 
and lakṣaṇas representing elements that lend grace and beauty to an artistic rendering 
will be highlighted;  
In the next section, the nature of the resulting aesthetic experiences among the audiences, 
broadly classified as aesthetic relish, aesthetic saturation, and aesthetic immersion or 
ecstasy, will be discussed;  
In the sixth section, Abhinava‟s listing of the obstacles to proper aesthetic appreciation of 
the play when reality intrudes into the fictional mode of the play will be elaborated; in 
this connection, Vivian Sobchack‟s discussion of “fictional” and “documentary” attitudes 
will be analyzed;   
In the seventh and concluding section, Bharata‟s idea of subjective-objective alteration 
will be discussed in relation to dance drama and cinema with special reference to 
Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the chiasm.    
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lustration 4: Concepts in Bharata‟s Theory of Aesthetic Experience (Rasa) 
Identification → At the most level in classical Indian theories, identification is said to 
occur with the process of integration of various elements within view into a cognitive 
whole which enables the human organism to give a unified response to a situation 
essential for the survival of the organism.  
In the field of arts, the process leads to the following levels of identification between the 
audiences and an artwork: 
1. Basic Identification with the Fictional Mode of the Artwork 
2. Identification with the Perceptual-Cognitive Mode of the Artwork with the 
simultaneous evocation of a corresponding Affective State among the audiences 
3. Sympathetic Identification with the Narrative Mode of the Artwork 
4. Sympathetic Identification with the Action Mode of the Artwork 
5. Empathic Identification with the Basic Focus of the Artwork 
6. Indian Response to POV Identification in Cinema   
Affective State → Various Levels of Identification evoke their corresponding Affective 
States in the perceiver which helps align the perceiver‟s Body with her Consciousness. 
This process enables the audiences to relive a scene created by an artwork.  
Rasa → The “generalization” of aesthetic experiences that the audiences undergo in 
relation to an artwork is called Rasa or Aesthetic Pleasure. The basic three forms of 
Rasa  have been broadly classified as under: 
1. Aesthetic Relish (Bhoga) → It is an aesthetic state where the audiences‟ 
consciousness is in a mode of expansion signifying a state of enquiry  
2. Aesthetic Saturation (Rasavat) → It is an aesthetic state where the audiences‟ 
consciousness is in a mode of repose and inner blossoming signifying a 
successful completion of the mode of enquiry  
3. Aesthetic Immersion (Samāveśa) → It is an aesthetic state where the audiences 
consciousness is in a state of immersion, overwhelmed by archetypal emotions 
being released from within the audiences‟ own subconscious   
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            Western Notions of Audience Identification in Cinema 
The notion of “identification” is a vexed issue which has not yet run its full course in 
Western thought. Following is a brief discussion of the issue in three segments: 
contemporary theories of identification in the West, identification in film theories and 
changes occurring in the notion of identification due to findings in cognitive and 
neurosciences.   
Since “identification” is invariably associated with “identity” of the entity which 
is identifying, this brief discussion may profitably start with the notion of “the self” in 
Western thought. Western tradition has found it difficult to reconcile the fact that while 
the “identity” of “the self” is predicated on constancy, change remains in-built in the 
biological system. In this connection, two trends are visible: “identity” as an unalterable 
inner core and “identity” as an external construction.  
The traditional notion of “the self” as a unique inner core has been under threat 
from two sides in contemporary times, psychology and sociology. As far as psychology is 
concerned, Freud‟s theory of identification holds that a child assimilates, i.e. “introjects” 
external persons or objects within his psyche. Lacan reworked Freud‟s thesis in terms of 
Saussurian linguistics to hold that “identity” is not a organic unity but has an alienated 
aspect within it on the analogy that linguistic “meaning” is not internal to individual 
expressions but arises externally from a selection of words and their arrangement within a 
linguistic structure. Lacan explains the understanding of a child‟s own “self” through the 
metaphor of the “mirror image” where the child, looking at its own reflection, 
experiences unity within the image which it lacks in its own body resulting in his 
identification with his own image. Lacan holds that it parallels the process where the 
caregivers literally „construct‟ the child from outside which the child misrecognizes as its 
own. In this sense, Lacan describes the child‟s “identification” with his own 
representation as an instance of primary narcissistic identification which henceforth 
would underlie all his future identifications with the world.
496
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In contemporary sociological thought, William James and George Herbert Mead 
held “the self” to be an “identity” that has two aspects: the “I” as the knower which is 
creative and yet unknowable within itself and the “Me” which forms its outer core 
determined by the social phase. “Identification” here becomes a process of naming, of 
placing oneself within socially constructed categories where language holds a central 
position. Michel Foucault, combining Saussurian position with the sociological finding, 
holds that individual positions of identity and agency are formed through discourse which 
shape the way human beings come to know the world.
497
           
These two aspects of “identity” viz. identity as an unalterable core where 
somebody can call an “I” as really belonging to him and identity as constructed where 
nothing can be called one‟s own are sought to be reconciled by some contemporary 
thinkers who shift the emphasis from the “identity” of a person as an underlying core to 
“identity” as a steady pattern observed within the persons‟ experiences and actions.498 In 
this connection, Paul Ricoeur argues that we make sense of our own and others‟ 
biographies the same way we understand stories: by following a plot involving the 
protagonists featured within it. In narrative terms, then, the “identity” of a person 
becomes the identity of a character existing within a play. Ricœur‟s view of narrative 
identity is largely based on Aristotle‟s Poetics in which characters are shaped by their 
actions and circumstances. What makes the characters recognizable to the audiences is 
the similarity of the ordered series of events occurring within a play with their own 
lives.
499
  
The above aspects frame the “Identity” discourse in film theories. In classical film 
theory, the montage theorists of early Soviet cinema hold “identity” to be entirely 
constructed by an exploitative bourgeois society which the filmmakers wanted to replace 
with a construction undertaken by the masses themselves. In this connection, the 
filmmakers advocate montage cinema as a solution where juxtaposition of discontinuous 
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shots breaks the spell of conventional film narrative to produce a new understanding of 
reality among the audiences.  
In contrast, André Bazin‟s theory of realism proclaimed a transcendental form of 
identification between nature and human beings which operate at a deeper level of their 
existence than perceived at the surface level of reality. He, therefore, argued in favor of a 
mode of filmmaking that presents „undistorted‟ reality to the audiences. In this sense, 
both these theories sought to distance the audiences from their conventional modes of 
identification with cinema with new forms of engagement with cinema.  
During the „60s and „70s, the incorporation of Lacan‟s thoughts in contemporary 
film theory, led to the idea that, for any communication to take place between a subject 
and others, some form of identification is necessary between them.
500
 Since Lacan‟s idea 
is also based on the notion that “I” is only graspable through the other, the very process 
of understanding any communication by the audiences in cinema becomes a socially 
mediated process through the other.
501
 On this basis, contemporary film theory came to 
hold that while the “socially structured regimes of meaning known as the Symbolic 
domain” constitute forms of communication that results in the audiences‟ “primary 
identification” with cinema, their “secondary identification” occurs with the very process 
of filmmaking itself that constructs such domains for them.
502
 Althusser subsumes this 
Lacanian position in his theory of interpellation where social institutions conditioned 
human psyche to make them subjects subservient to the bourgeois purposes. Bordwell 
notes that, since the Lacanian and Althusserian processes of identification literally 
comprehend all aspects of reality, it tends to lose its focus, eventually becoming useless 
as an effective tool for analyzing cinema.
503
 
Cognitive film theory, arising in mid „80s, advocated an intellectually alert 
audience in place of a socially conditioned „passive‟ audience as conceived by 
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contemporary film theory. In this theory, the audiences identified with the intellectual 
process itself that unraveled enigmas posed by the films. Plantinga notes: 
The fundamental tenet of a cognitive approach is that the spectator‟s affective 
experience is dependent on cognition, on mental activity cued not only by film 
form but also by story content. In viewing films, cognition would include 
inferences, hypotheses, and evaluative judgments.
504
  
The theory, while being intellectually „strong‟, lacks an effective explanation of the depth 
psychological aspects generated by cinema.
505
   
These, in brief, are the notions of “identity” of the audiences as conceived by various film 
theories, all of which, incidentally, cater to the constructivist idea in some form or the 
other.  At a deeper level, all these ideas are based on the notion of a disembodied vision 
representing an idea of human intelligence detached from the body and which gets 
imprisoned by the social structures. The film theories generally used this notion of 
disembodied vision as the basic instrument of understanding films which totally negated 
the audiences‟ embodied experiences and the socio-cultural practices built around 
them.
506
 In this context, Brecht‟s idea of the “alienated spectator” came to be adopted as 
the ideal form of audience response to cinema. This “estranged” or “distanced” response 
(verfremdung), resulting from a mental distantiation of the audiences from the story-line 
of the play which would have the effect of instituting an unbiased observer in place of a 
spectator identified with the narrative of the play. This process, which was expected to 
enable the audiences to grasp the underlying reality, became the criterion of informed 
film criticism since the „60s.507 However, Bordwell argues that this notion of 
“identification” is still rather vague: “The theorist must still clarify what identification is 
and why we need the concept in order to explain the effects of cinema.”508   
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In recent times, the conventional notions of audience “identification” and their 
associated emotions, which had taken a beating in the hands of film theorists and avant-
garde filmmakers and dramatists, have resurfaced thanks to revelations taking place in 
cognitive and neurosciences. These findings are that emotions have a key role to play in 
the formation of “thoughts” in human life.509 In the present scenario, following forms of 
audience identification are under discussion: states of a-central and central imagining 
involving „sympathetic‟ and „empathic‟ identifications, and the type of identification that 
operates in a POV shot in cinema. A brief outline of these arguments is presented here.  
The film theoretician Murray Smith explains the art critic Richard Wollheim‟s 
ideas as follows: in a-central imagining, a person imagines the best course of action in 
relation to a scene standing outside the scene and thinking “from no-one‟s standpoint” as 
to what is the best course of action for the protagonists operating in the scene in contrast 
to the notion of central imagining where a person “standing inside the scene” responds 
entirely by adopting a character‟s point of view.510 Smith is, however, skeptical about the 
latter which “seem to imply a kind of total replication of a character‟s experience” among 
the audiences.
511
 Instead, Smith argues in favor of the production of a sympathetic state 
among the film audiences as a result of the following thress processes: “recognition (the 
identification and assignment of traits to characters), alignment (the revelation of the 
actions and psychological states of characters), and allegiance (the evaluation of 
characters, especially morally but in other ways as well – according to notions of taste, 
etc)”.512  
In contrast, Alex Neill argues in favor of empathic states which he differentiates 
from sympathetic states as follows:  
“With sympathetic response, in feeling for another, one‟s response need not 
reflect what the other is feeling…In contrast, in responding empathically to 
another, I come to share his feelings, to feel with him; if he is in an emotional 
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state, to empathize with him is to experience the emotion(s) that he 
experiences.”513  
While noting that empathic responses have been „short shrifted‟ in contemporary 
debate,
514
 he notes that the trend is reversing: 
The idea that historical and social scientific explanation involves verstehen, 
“seeing things from another‟s point of view”, has a distinguished and influential 
history…And more recently, a growing number of philosophers and psychologists 
have been arguing that empathy is crucial to our “everyday” ability to understand, 
explain and predict the behavior of those around us: that our “folk psychological” 
attribution of mental states to others depends on empathic understanding.
515
        
Since feeling from another person‟s point of view not only depends on the viewer‟s belief 
of what the real situation is but also an active identification with it, Neill holds: 
“Empathizing with others also makes available to us possibilities for our own emotional 
education and development.”516   
Smith and Gregory Currie have engaged in a debate on what has been called a 
POV state. While Smith argues that the primary function of a POV shot is to inculcate 
sympathetic identification between the looking character and the spectator, he, however, 
concedes that, because of the multifaceted alignment that a POV shot can bring about 
between the spectator and the character, it may promote an „empathic‟ identification 
involving “central imagining” or “imagining standing inside the scene” by the audiences, 
an argument which Currie further advances.
517
 The debate has, however, remained 
inconclusive so far. 
         
 
                                                          
513
 Alex Neill, “Empathy and (Film) Fiction”, in Post-Theory, 175-94, 175-76, modified, original emphasis 
514
 Ibid, 176 
515
 Ibid, 178, modified 
516
 Ibid, 191-92 
517
 Smith, “Imagining from the Inside”, 417 
208 
 
         Part 1 
          Levels of Audience Identification in Bharata‟s Theory 
The present section would discuss classical Indian theories of “the self” and the various 
levels of “identification” that it generates in relation to artworks. Before embarking on 
the specific levels of identification that Bharata considers in relation to an artwork, a 
general discussion on what is understood by the concept of “identification” in the 
classical Indian theories would be useful here. 
The notion of “the self” in the orthodox theories has already been elaborately 
discussed in chapter 3 under the section “Nyāya Ontology” as well as in Annexure 1. 
Suffice it to say that, as far as Nyāya theory is concerned on which, I argue, Bharata‟s 
aesthetic theory is based, it conceives the notion of “the self” (ātma) as a unique locus in 
the whole universe where “knowledge” and its associated emotions generated by “the 
body” in the course of its interactions with the material world accrue. However, since 
“the self” occurs in a different existential plane than “matter”, it cannot interact either 
with “the body” or “matter” constituting the world. As a solution to this problem of 
„category mistake‟ suffered by Descartes in his theory of mind-body duality, Nyāya as 
well as other orthodox “Hindu” theories hold that “the self” undergoes an illusory 
identification i.e. mis-identifcation with “the body”, resulting in “the self” arrogating to 
itself all the properties, drives, tendencies and experiences acquired by “the body” in the 
course of its interactions with the material world. These aspects accrue as “knowledge” in 
“the self” resulting in its manifestation of an „agency‟ which acts on the world sole 
through “the body”. Crucially, since Nyāya, together with its aligned schools, like 
Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, hold that the true nature of “the self” is devoid of all 
consciousness and agency, the “knowledge” that accrues within it is literally constructed 
by “the body”. In this sense, it is a “bottoms-up” theory where the “identification” 
exhibited by “the self” is synonymous with “the body‟s” “identification” with the world. 
Since another human being also undergoes similar experiences, understanding the bodily 
interactions with the world forms the basis for intersubjectivity in the Nyāya and its allied 
schools. Due to the prominence accorded to embodied experiences in this group of 
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theories, a total construction of the subject by the other, which requires the notion of a 
disembodied intelligence as its basis, remains an alien concept here. 
As far as “Hindu” theories opposed to Nyāya group of theories are concerned, the 
monists among them, e.g., Advaita Veānta and Kashmir Śaivism, hold that “pure 
consciousness” constitutes the whole universe which periodically undergoes phases of 
involution and evolution with temporary stability achieved in-between those formations. 
During the relatively „stable‟ evolutionary phase of “pure consciousness”, entities such as 
“the self”, “empirical consciousness”, “ego” and “the body” appear as its various 
„moments‟. Since all entities belong to the same source in these monistic theories, the 
problem of „category mistake‟ does not arise. However, the “identification” that “the 
self” exhibits during its phase of illusory identification with the world represents a „fall‟ 
from the pristine state of “pre consciousness” signifying a “top-down” theory of 
“knowledge” here.   
On the heterodox side, the most revolutionary theory is presented by the 
Buddhists who deny the existence of “the self” altogether. Noting that in any particular 
moment of our experience, we experience only some form of sensation, Buddha 
challenges the notion that these experiences have an unchanging core reality known as 
“the self”.518 Instead, the Buddha holds that these sensations are generated by the 
momentarily existing phenomenological “ultimates”, called the dharmas, constituting 
five types of experiential series (vithi) involving the sense-experiences of form 
representing all five sense-organs (rūpa), feelings (vedanā), concepts (samjñā, saññā), 
traces (saṃskāras, saṅkhāra), and consciousness (cetana, viññāna). When „bunched 
together‟, forms an aggregate called the skandhas (also khandhas, lit., „the trunk of a 
tree‟)519 that give the appearance of an abiding “self” is nothing but an  an ever changing, 
fluid self, more famously known as streams of consciousness.
520
 However, when the five 
dharmas are not bunched together, they generate the impressions of isolated “things” and 
“objects”. 
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One may sum up the thead that underlies all the above notions of “the self”, 
whether „abiding‟, as in the orthodox theories, or „fluid‟, as in Buddhism, which lead to 
the fundamental form of identification thus: they all identify or, more appropriately, mis-
identify with the material world, a process in which “the body” plays a prominent role. In 
this sense, the “identification” that the human organism, which may be more 
appropriately called the self-body system in terms of the above thinking, is associated 
with following three processes at the most basic level its „existence‟: the urge for survival 
internalized as the survival instinct, the continuity of the organism through procreation 
internalized as the sexual instinct, and securing favorable conditions in the immediate 
surroundings conducive to the above processes internalized as the acquisitive instinct. 
While the first two signify embodied processes, the third one „spills over‟ into the socio-
cultural sphere where an amount of „control‟ is needed to be exercised over reality in 
order to secure favorable conditions for the survival and continuity of the organism. In 
this sense, alongside our desire for survival and propagation, the instinct of exercising 
“ownership” (svatva) and “power” (śakti) over sections of reality, also appear to be in-
built in our psyche.
521
   
At the perceptual level, the working out of above instincts requires that the 
elements occurring within one‟s field of vision be converted into a cognitive “whole” to 
ensure unity of response of the viewer, essential for its survival.
522
 Thus, classsical Indian 
theories hold that an individual‟s basic identification is with this basic “knowledge-
process” that secures its survivial and propagation. While the primary identification is, 
thus, always with the processes of narrative integration of a scene rather than with 
individuals, the organism may, however, develop secondary identifications with 
individuals when they are seen to perform such tasks repeatedly. It is only in this sense 
that “heroes” are created whether in real life or in artworks in the Indian theories. In this 
sense, Indian theories depart from Paul Ricoeur‟s notion that “identification” occurs with 
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characters representing a center for linking of experiences and actions in a narrative 
constructed by an individual “self” rather than with the “knowledge-process” as such.  
The following levels of “audience identification” would be discussed in the 
ensuing sections: identification with the fictional mode of an artwork; a „mild‟ 
identification with the perceptual-cognitive mode of the „play‟ based on the audiences‟ 
mental attention and the beginning of the evocation of a corresponding affective state 
among them; their sympathetic identification with the narrative and action modes of the 
„play‟; and their empathic identification with the general focus of an artwork if the work 
is capable of elevating them to that rarefied level. This section will finally end with 
comments on how classical Indian theories would have dealt with POV identification in 
cinema.  
1. Identification with the Fictional Mode: Generalization of Audience 
Experience 
This is a seminal Indian contribution to the theory of arts, which, arguably, solves the 
problem of the “paradox of junk fiction” or “why do the audiences enjoy tragedies?”    
In trying to solve the above paradox, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (c. 9th CE) thought that 
artworks generate bhāvanā („the state which is caused‟), among the audiences which 
makes them „align‟ with the ideas represented in an artwork on the analogy that Vedic 
injunctions generate bhāvanās among its devotees viz. i) “Someone desires me to do this” 
and so ii) “I must do this”.523 However, while the Vedas ultimately promise eternal 
happiness which makes a person follow its injunctions, it was not clear to Nāyaka why 
the audiences would frequent tragedies which not only cannot promise any such thing but 
also may evoke painful sentiments in them?  
While wrestling with this question, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka makes one of the greatest 
breakthroughs in Indian aesthetic theory. He argues that the very fictionality of the 
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artworks generalizes the audiences‟ experiences (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, „universalization‟) 
which are not personally “owned” by them any more, i.e. which are different from the 
emotions experienced by them in their real life. When a person experiences something in 
such a generalized state, it amounts to experiencing something without personally 
„suffering‟ it. In the context of his theory of rasa, Bharata uses the expression “chewing” 
(carvaṇā, „tasting‟, „relishing‟) which holds that the audiences “taste” the experiences as 
if from „outside‟ without being personally involved in them. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka holds that his 
idea of generalization (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa) provides a solid foundation for Bharata‟s rasa 
theory which provides the key to the understanding why the audiences enjoy all artworks, 
including tragedies. In other words, in such a state, all aesthetic experiences become 
pleasurable to the audiences. On the question whose emotions do the audiences 
experience in such a generalized state, the literary theorist Viśvanātha (c. 14th CE) 
enigmatically replies that they are “another person‟s, yet not quite another person‟s; 
mine, but not quite mine”.524 In other words, they appear as “ownerless” emotions in the 
audiences‟ experience.525  
Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka‟s great idea, however, still leaves the following question 
unanswered: even after knowing that an artwork is a fictional work, why do human 
beings still frequent them? In other wirds, why do human beings at all feel motivated in 
engaging with artworks? Mohanty notes that motivation underlying classical Indian 
theory of action has been conceived as under: 526 
           Knowledge   →    Desire   →     Will to Do   →   Motor Effort   →   Action 
                                 (Jñāna)             (Cikirṣā)           (Pravṛtti)               (Ceṣtā)              (Kārya) 
                                                          
524
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While the motivational process kicks off with the arising of cognitive knowledge in the viewer, it 
subsequently leads to desire, etc, resulting in visible action in the final stage. The question is what 
is the motivation or desire acting within human beings which make them engage with artworks?   
Abhinavagupta offers an innovative solution to the problem faced by his 
predecessor. He extends Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka‟s idea of generalization a step farther by holding 
that the motivation operating within the audiences of artworks is their identification with 
the fictional mode of the artwork even before they have started engaging with an artwork. 
In other words, this prior “willingness” creates the basic desire among the audiences to 
engage with a particular artwork which brings them to the auditoriums to witness the 
play.    
While Abhinava was, thus, able to present a creative solution to the “paradox of 
junk fiction”, it, however, raised the following question of logic: if the audiences know 
an artwork to be a work of fiction, why are they still profoundly influenced by it? It is 
clearly a violation of the law of contradiction in the sense that “A believes p and doesn‟t 
believe p at the same time”. While Carlyle noted this contradiction by holding that the 
audiences undertake a “willing suspension of disbelief” in experiencing an artwork and 
the Indian tradition held that knowledge generated by an artwork was “knowledge 
produced out of one‟s own desire at a time when a contradictory knowledge is present in 
the person‟s mind”,527 it still did not solve the problem. The Neo-Nyāya or Navya-Nyāya 
(c. 13
th
 CE) offered a possible solution to the above problem: “a property p and its 
absence not-p cannot be asserted of the same object at the same time in the same 
sense”.528 Thus, a tree may be conjoined to a bird as well as not being conjoined to it at 
the same time though not in the same sense, provided spatial segments of the tree are 
appropriately delimited, e.g., while its upper branch was conjoined to the bird, the rest 
had remained free from it.
529
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528
 Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, Ed. Jonardon Ganeri (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1971): 36   
529
 Ibid                         
214 
 
The above explanation, however, raised a fresh logical question: how can one‟s 
belief that it is a work of fiction and his response as if it is real can simultaneously co-
exist in the same person at the same time? Again Navya-Nyāya offers a possible solution 
based on an article of belief held by the orthodox Indian Schools that a temporal unit of 
experience consists of three moments (pal): 
i)      Moment of Origination where awareness arises (sṛṣṭi, „evolution‟, „creation‟), 
ii)     Moment of Existence where awareness leaves its trace in memory (sthiṭi, 
        „existence‟, „maintainance‟),  
iii)    Moment of Destruction where awareness ceases to exist (saṁhāra or proloy,  
        „involution‟, „destruction‟). 
Navya-Nyāya argues that, in the above sense, even while a new awareness is arising in a 
person in its moment of origination, a memory-trace left by the previous awareness in its 
moment of existence remains resident in the individual‟s consciousness.530 Navya-Nyāya 
holds that there is no logical conflict in holding that the new arising and the trace left by 
the past may be contradictory in nature.  
 According to Abhinava, the importance of audiences‟ willing identification with 
the fictional mode lies in the fact that it acts as the substratum for all subsequent 
identifications between an artwork and its audiences.   
2. Identification with the Perceptual-Cognitive Mode of an Artwork  
In Nyāya theory of perception, whenever a person starts integrating elements within her 
perceptual field into a cognitive whole, it is assumed that she is paying mental attention to 
it. Called an “engaged situation at the time of cognition”, it represents a process which 
does not remain an „empty‟ perception but one where a person both perceives and 
cognizes, a process which has a striking similarity with contemporary integration theories 
of attention.
531
 It represents a preliminary stage of identification for the audiences.   
                                                          
530
 Buddhist theory of momentariness only prescribes two moments viz. the moment of origination and 
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Hitchcock‟s following description of a hypothetical scene may be taken as a 
classic example of a „mild‟ identification with a perceptual-cognitive mode aroused by 
the perceiver‟s mental attention:   
A curious person goes into somebody else‟s room and begins to search through 
the drawers. Now, you show the person who lives in that room coming up the 
stairs. Then, you go back to the person who is searching, and the public feels like 
warning him “Be careful, watch out. Someone is coming up the stairs.” Therefore, 
even if the snooper is not a likable character, the audience will still feel anxiety 
for him.
532
 
Hitchcock holds that, even when the audiences are not effectively identified with the 
scene, they would still feel the urge to warn the interloper “Hey, watch out! Somebody is 
coming up the steps!” It confirms the traditional Indian thought that, as long as the 
audiences are not mentally switched off from a scene, their consciousness would continue 
to act within a scene.  
Evocation of an Affective State in Bharata‟s Theory 
One of the lasting contributions of Bharata has been to demarcate a basic unit of 
performance which evokes an affective state (sthāyī bhāva, lit., sthāyī means „abiding‟ 
and bhāva means „state‟) among the audiences corresponding to their level of 
identification with a scene or an artwork. Since the audiences‟ bodies remain 
„unconscious‟ even as they identify with the scene in their consciousness, it creates a 
problem as the two are likely to go in two different directions. Bharata‟s seminal 
discovery of the evocation of a corresponding affective state among the audiences solves 
this problem by bringing their bodies and consciousness at par which enables the 
audiences to relive a scene by employing both.
533
 Before proceeding further, it is, 
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however, necessary to explain what an “affective state” means in terms of contemporary 
research.
534
  
In contemporary research, an affective state is considered to be a “psycho-somatic 
state” which helps human beings experience feelings and emotions.535 It has three 
operational dimensions, e.g., valence, which evaluates subjective experiences along a 
positive to negative trajectory; arousal, which activates a „sympathetic nervous system‟, 
a psycho-somatic state within the organism in relation to such experiences; and 
motivation, which generates an impulse to respond in a particular way to the situation or 
scene.
536
 Clearly, in the scenario where the audiences identify with a scene, while valence 
represents a cognitive understanding of the scene and arousal represents the evocation of 
a corresponding affective state among them, motivation occurs as the product generating 
the desire to act in a particular way in the given situation. Strikingly, these thoughts 
exactly mirror Bharata‟s thoughts on the subject explained below.  
In Bharata‟s well-known formula, the crucial unit of enactment consists of the 
“determinant + consequent + transient” in which the audiences witness a “dramatic 
situation” called the “determinant” (vibhāva) having psychological implications for the 
protagonists which produces an appropriate response among them termed the 
“consequents” (anubhāva) as well as some fleeting responses called the “transients” 
(vyabhicāribhāva) either among the protagonists themselves or among some of the side 
characters, the latter having the effect of conveying the „measure‟ of the scene to the 
audiences. Since, on the basis of the Nyāya theory, human beings have an inherent urge 
to combine elements occurring within view into a narrative whole, the audiences 
integrate the scene into a causally-linked cognitive whole, a process with which they 
identify. Witnessing this chain of “goal-directed activity”, a psycho-somatic state (sthāyī 
bhāva) is evoked among them where their bodies aquire the same state of readiness as 
those of the protagonists within the scene.
537
 When the audiences in this state of affect 
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witness the farther unfolding of the scene, emotions in the form of “aesthetic pleasure” 
(rasa) is produced among them.   
 Bharata‟s two-stage formula of unit of enactment which evokes an affective state 
among the audiences leading to the production of rasa or aesthetic pleasure among them 
in the next may be represented as follows: 
                   1
st
 Stage 
                   The Audiences Witness a “Goal-directed Activity” in a Play →  
                       Determinant + Consequents + Transients    →      Evocation of an “Abiding State” 
                        (Vibhāva)        (Anubhāva) (Vyabhicāribhāva)  (Sthāyī bhāva among the Audiences)                            
                     2
nd
 Stage   
                        The Audiences now in an “Abiding State” Witness the unfolding Play →  
                        Determinant + Consequents +    Transients   →   Production of “Aesthetic Pleasure” 
           (Vibhāva)       (Anubhāva)   (Vyabhicāribhāva)      (Rasa among the Audiences)                        
The above explanation significantly departs from the traditional explanation of “abiding 
state” (sthāyī bhāva) in Bharata‟s theory. It has generally been held that by sthāyī bhāva, 
Bharata generally meant “dominant emotion”. However, since Bharata holds that 
“aesthetic pleasure” (rasa) is produced among the audiences only in the next stage, what 
kind of “dominant emotion” arises among them in the first stage? Clearly, since it is not 
yet rasa, it is not an “aesthetic emotion”. Then, what kind of an “emotion” is this? In 
view of the contradiction, I argue that Bharata‟s “abiding state” (sthāyī bhāva) represents 
the evocation of a “sympathetic nervous system” involving a psycho-somatic affective 
state among the audiences. With this idea, Bharata brilliantly fills the gap between the 
„unconscious‟ body and consciousness of the audiences, a gap which has not been 
satisfactorily dealt with before. With the introduction of an affective state in his schema, 
Bharata is able to bring the audiences‟ body and consciousness at the same level enabling 
them to respond in unison to a scene.            
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 with their identification with the fictional mode in general 
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There is further support for this idea. Etymologically, bhāva comes from the root bhū 
which means “to be” or “caused” which have been used in two different ways: “cause to 
be” like creating and “to pervade” like a perfume does. Clearly bhāva‟s meaning as 
“emotion” has been derived from the latter use. However, it means much more. While the 
verve of the word is bhāvayati which means “something exists due to a cause”, its noun 
bhāvanā means “state which is caused”.538 Gupt holds that, in the above sense, bhāva 
generates many meanings: “state of being, becoming, type of feeling and thinking, 
sentiment, purport or intention”.539 In fact, bhāva is a state which not only produces 
“emotion” as is generally contended, but also “thought” and a “state in-between”, like 
indifference, indolence, laziness, sleep, etc, which form an important part of Bharata‟s 
category of transient states or vyabhicāribhāvas (to be explained shortly) in the chapter. 
In case sthāyī bhāva is only interpreted as “dominant emotion”, Bharata‟s transient 
categories are likely to create enormous confusion for an interpreter as it does for Marie 
Higgins: 
This list includes many things that we in the West would not consider to be 
emotions at all, such as sleep, epilepsy, death, and deliberation. These may, 
however, occur as side effects or consequences of an emotional state, and that is 
enough for Bharata to classify them as vyabhicāribhāvas.540  
In order to make sense of the categories Bharata is using, bhāva clearly needs to be 
interpreted as an affective state alongside its other meanings. A final argument in this 
regard is provided by the Indian art critic Mukund Lath as follows: 
We can speak of “narrative bhāvas” which represent specifiable “states” in the 
realm of action rather than emotion. Bharata‟s sthāyī bhāvas are subservient to 
actions that seek their own dramatic value in a narrative. For example, “suspense” 
generates a sthāyī bhāva which is specifiable in terms of the narrative requirement 
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of creating surprise, tempo, and the like rather than specific emotions which 
remain secondary, ambiguous, or even vague. Similarly, moral dilemmas 
(dharma-saṇkatas) generate a kind of sthāyī bhāva which, while being rich in 
feelings, are not specifiable in terms of emotions.
541
  
I do not think any farther arguments are necessary in this regard.     
Anticipating Eisenstein‟s Formula of Dramatic Performance  
It is interesting to note that Bharata‟s formula of enactment has a remarkable affinity with 
Eisenstein‟s formula for constructing a dramatic scene in cinema. In analyzing what an 
Image represents in totality, Eisenstein says that it consists of the following two 
components: an “image” (obraz) which represents the “psychological content of the 
scene and the interaction of the characters” within it, and a “depiction” (izobrazhenie) 
which represents “people‟s normal, accepted behavior” within the scene in response to 
the situation.
542
 Eisenstein‟s formula of performance may be represented as follows:  
              Image = Inner Psychology of a Dramatic Situation that has an Effect on Characters 
                                                       + Character‟s „Normal Behavior‟ in Response to the Situation 
Since the „Inner Psychology of a Dramatic Situation‟ is nothing but „Determinant‟ in 
Bharata‟s formula and „Character‟s Normal Behavior in Response to the Situation‟ is 
identical with Bharata‟s „Consequents‟, Bharata‟s formula is similar to Eisenstein‟s 
except in the following two areas: the notion of transients (vyabhicāribhāvas) and the 
evocation of an affective state among the audiences (sthāyīn). While the concept of the 
“affective state” has been amply elaborated above, the need for “transients” require some 
farther clarifications being offered below. 
 By the “transients”, Bharata means states which occur on the sides of the main 
state being experienced by the protagonists in response to the determining scene. Marie 
Higgins clarifies its need as follows:  
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Vyabhicāribhāvas are represented only in passing, but they strenghthen and 
provide shadings for the main action and the durable emotions they represent…In 
Hamlet, for instance, Hamlet‟s fear of ghost, his wistful recollection of Yorick, 
his sarcastic attitude in speaking to the King, his wrathful outbursts towards his 
mother are among temporary emotional states that hamlet undergoes and that 
contribute to the avenging anger as the prevailing emotional tone of the play.
543
  
While Higgins emphasizes the role of emotions in the “transient state”, it even includes 
states, like indolence, lazinenss, etc, which occur in-between „thought‟ and „emotion‟ has 
already been noted.  
 However, it is felt that the true significance of vyabhicāribhāvas has been missed 
in the above interpretations. I argue that, in Bharata‟s theory, the side characters may 
even be totally unrelated to the development of the scene, their main purpose being to 
give a „measure‟ of the event to the audiences from a „neutral‟ point of view. The 
importance of the concept lies in the fact that if the audiences are forever kept within the 
confines of the main development, they may not only miss the „intensity‟ of the event but 
may also miss its ramifications in other areas judged by a neutral person.  
For example, at one point in Clint Eastwood‟s Sully (2016), the true story of an 
airliner hit by birds landing safely on the river Hudson by the pilot “Sully‟ Sullenberger, 
the director cuts to three unrelated characters, involving a car driver, a person on the 
terrace with a cup of coffee in his hand and a company executive looking through the 
glass panes of his office, who see the plane flying at an alarmingly low altitude in 
between New York highrises. Even though the persons are rank outsiders, they give a 
neutral „measure‟ of the „intensity‟ of the event happening so close to the 9/11 event in 
America. In the absence of their perspective, the ominous similarity of this event with the 
past event would have been missed by the audiences. More importantly, it is with the 
help of vyabhicāribhāvas or promiscuous activities „unrelated‟ to the story that a 
playwright could control the „measure‟ or „intensity‟ of the main event either by 
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enhancing or diminishing it. While such transient characters are obviously present in 
Eisensteins‟ films, they have not been theorized as such by him.      
Anticipating Mirror Neurons: Evocation of an Affective State among Observers   
The evocation of an affective state among the audiences when they witness a causally 
connected “goal-directed activity” in a scene has scientific support now. In early 1990s, 
Giacomo Rizzolatti, Shaun Gallaghar, and others found that when great apes observe 
“goal-directed activity”, i.e. acts that are not aimless or mere movements but 
“purposeful” in nature, similar neurons (that‟s why they are called “mirror neurons”) start 
firing in them as well which puts them in the same affective state as the performers 
themselves. Such an automatic initiation of motor activities within the body reverses the 
hitherto understood formula of perception from “perception → cognition → motor 
activity” to “cognition → perception → motor activity” in which what the human beings 
perceive produces understanding in them directly rather than through a higher faculty 
making meaning for them.
544
 Scientists claim that it is ultimately on the basis of this 
evoked state that an observer understands what a performer is doing: “without a mirror 
mechanism we would still have our sensory representation, a „pictorial‟ depiction of the 
behavior of others, but we would not know what they were really doing”.545 Scientists, in 
fact, claim that it forms the basis for inter-subjectivity among human beings.  
Scientists have since extended their theory to the domain of hearing
546
 
representing “goal-directed” activities through audios as well as videos to produce the 
same effect on the observers.
547
 However, Rizzolatti sounds a warning: “[S]haring 
someone‟s emotive state at viscera-motor level and feeling empathy for that person are 
two very different things. For example, if we see someone in pain, we are not 
automatically induced to feel compassion for him…compassion depends on many factors 
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other than recognition of pain.”548 Naturally, further scientific research is needed in the 
matter.   
3. Sympathetic Identification with the Narrative Mode 
Abhinava holds that the most basic level of audiences‟ identification with an artwork viz. 
their identification with the fictional mode of the work even before they have started 
engaging with the work and with the perceptual-cognitive mode of the work as they start 
„paying attention‟ to it together with the evocation of corresponding affective state among 
them, would only be intensified to sympathetic or empathic levels only when they have 
“sensitivity” (sahṛdayatva, „similarity of heart‟) towards the work. This happens when 
the audiences have constantly polished their skill of understanding arts and are willing to 
engage with it. Abhinava notes when the audiences‟ hearts are in „sympathetic‟ 
identification (sahṛdaya, hṛdaya saṁvāda) with the work:549  
The realization (bhāva) of the [artistic] object consisting of determinants, etc, 
which finds sympathy in audience‟s heart, is the origin of rasa. The body is 
pervaded by it as dry wood by fire.
550
   
In this context, Abhinava‟s celebrated definition of a sensitive reader is as follows: 
The word sahṛdaya [literally meaning „having their hearts with it‟] denotes 
persons who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of 
their hearts have been polished by the constant study and practice of poetry, and 
who respond to it sympathetically in their hearts.
551
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Both Bharata and Abhinava point out that not everybody has the capacity to “identify” 
with art. Sahṛdayas are sensitive, cultured, and learned in the way of the world as well as 
of the arts on the basis of which they are able to perceive “the natural appropriateness of 
what is being represented” in an artwork.552  
Intensification of the audiences‟ identification occurs in the form of identifying 
with the generic mode of the play. Herman and others mention: “Genres reflect one of the 
fundamental realities of human cognition and communication: we understand and refer to 
phenomena by comparing them to existing categories, and, if necessary, by modifying the 
categories or creating new ones”.553 In the Indian aesthetic theories, the narrative 
integration of scenes generates the following eight dominant aesthetic emotions among 
the audiences: the erotic (śrṅgāra), the comic (hāsya), the pathetic (karuṇa), the furious 
(raudra), the heroic (vīra), the terrible (bhayānaka), and the marvelous (adbhuta), to 
which Abhinava has added a ninth viz. the mode of quiescence or peace (śānta). 
Subsequently some other generic modes have been added to the list. While all aesthetic 
experiences are „pleasurable‟ for the audiences, the nature of rasa, however, differs from 
genre to genre. Abhinava notes: 
All the rasas consist in beatitude. But some of them, on account of the objects by 
which they are colored, are not free from a certain touch of bitterness; this 
happens, for example, in the heroic rasa which consists of, and is animated by, a 
firm endurance of misfortunes.
554
  
While Abhinanva‟s comments indicate the audiences‟ differing response to them, an 
interesting example occurs when the audiences respond differently to a similar scene 
being portrayed in two different genres. Thus, while in the comedy Modern Times (1936), 
Chaplin is strapped to a chair and is being force-fed through a machine at the dictates of 
his capitalist boss, the machine suddenly starts malfunctioning, hitting Chaplin all over 
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his face, spilling hot soup over him, etc. Clearly, he is in extreme physical pain and yet 
the audiences laugh their hearts out over the scene. In contrast, in Brian Helgeland‟s 
crime thriller Payback (1999), when Porter‟s (Mel Gibson) feet is being hammered by a 
Mafia thug while being strapped to a chair, the audiences wince each time the hammer 
comes down on his feet! The answer lies in the fact that the audiences‟ initial 
identification with the genres of comedy and thriller determine their subsequent 
responses to the two scenes.   
Generic forms of narratives are inalienably associated with “narrative universals” 
which represent similarity of features of story or discourse that recur across cultures.
555
 
Since these cultures were unrelated in ancient times, the recurrence of the “narrative 
universals” point towards something more substantial in terms of human experience than 
mere elements of chance.
556
 Vladimir Propp
557
 and Gérard Genette
558
 have identified 
narrative codes of traditional stories which have been further analyzed by Patrick Colm 
Hogan in recent times.
559
 In the context of genres, Derrida makes the following important 
points: genres are determined by the audiences in terms of reading codes and generic 
marks in the texts and that generic boundaries are established in the very act of 
participation by the audiences.
560
 It is interesting to note that Hogan has been deeply 
influenced by the Indian notion of “narrative universals”, acknowledged by him in his 
book The Mind and its Stories (2003) in more than one place. Bharata‟s contribution in 
this regard would be farther discussed in the section dealing with his notion of “extended 
action” in a drama.  
4. Sympathetic Identification with the Action Mode 
Audience identification with an artwork does not remain confined to the narrative codes 
of a play alone, but immediately spills down to the “action modes” operating within 
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them. An „action mode” may be defined as the distinguishing feature of certain action 
types which, though involving planned behavior within the narrative context, generally 
include some unplanned events or happenings that generate unexpected behavior within 
the narrative, resulting in the production of enigma and suspense among the audiences.
561
 
A narrative is generally co-extensive with an action mode representing the following 
three states of an unfolding action: i) an initial state where the story world rests before 
action is initiated, ii) an end state where the story world reaches at the end of the action, 
and iii) the state in which the story world would have been had action not been 
intiated.
562
 In the above sense, both the Narrative and Action Modes mutually reinforce 
each other: “actions could not be mentally projected at all in the absence of narrative-
based norms of actions”.563 However, defining or distinguishing discrete acts within 
narrative modes, which may or may not advance the narrative and yet have a profound 
influence on the audiences, has always posed a problem for the theoreticians.
564
 Virginia 
Woolf notes some such actions: 
Recall, then, some event that has left a distinct impression on you – how, at the 
corner of the street, perhaps you passed two people talking. A tree shook; an 
electric light danced; the tone of the talk was comic, but also tragic; a whole 
vision, an entire conception, seemed contained in that moment.
565
  
An action in the above sense represents an “image” which Ezra Pound describes as: “An 
image is that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of 
time”.566 Such actions fall within Bharata‟s classification of sandhyaṅgas or the “span-
elements” of an “action” and lakṣaṇas or the signifying moments of “actions”. These 
aspects would be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.  
An appropriate example of an action mode is given by Hitchcock. His concluding 
comments on his example in the section “Identification with the Perceptual-Cognitive 
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Mode” acts as an ideal illustration of how the audiences identify with the action mode of 
a scene. In referring to his film Rear Window (1954), Hitchcock notes: 
Of course, when the character is attractive, as, for instance, Grace Kelly in Rear 
Window, the public‟s emotion is greatly intensified.567           
Hitchcock‟s reference is to the scene where Lisa (Grace Kelly) snoops inside Lars 
Thorwald‟s (Raymond Burr) apartment seeking evidence of Lars having killed his wife. 
In the meantime, unknown to her, Thorwald is seen coming up the stairs, eventually to 
find her there. Since Jefferies (James Stewart) is watching this whole scene through his 
binocular through his rear window, he is extremely anxious, along with the audiences, 
about Lisa‟s safety. This extremely dangerous situation is ultimately averted when he 
informs the police who arrive quickly on the scene. This scene signifies what happens 
when the audiences are not only sympathetically identified with the narrative elements of 
the scene but also with its action mode through which the narrative expresses itself in the 
scene.    
The generic action-modes with which the audiences identify may be called 
“action universals”. While each narrative mode generates its own form of action, Indian 
aesthetes have classified three broad categories of action-universals that underlie all of 
them: i) a mode of enquiry where a state of search is initiated by the protagonists in 
resolving an enigma posed by the narrative which results in the audiences‟ consciousness 
remaining in a mode of expansion (vistāra) throughout the scene, ii) a mode of rest, 
where an enigma having been resolved permits a scene to be „closed‟, resulting in the 
audiences‟ consciousness reaching a state of rest blossoming internally (vikāsa), and, 
finally iii) a mode of immersion where the  audiences‟ consciousness raches a state of 
melting (drūti) being overwhelmed by emotions unleashed by the triggering of archetypal 
experiences from within the audiences‟ subconscious.  
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5. Empathic Identification with the Basic Focus of an Artwork 
While contemporary Western thought on this issue by Alex Neill has already been 
mentioned, Indian theory differs in the way empathy is evoked among human beings. The 
ultimate ideal of Indian philosophy is to reach a state of empathic identification 
(saṁvedana, lit., „identical experience‟) signifying a complete shift from one‟s egoistic 
self representing „selfish action” to one of “self-less action” (niṣkāma karma, „action 
without any selfish desire‟) in the service of others (lokasaṃgraha, „for the people‟). In 
the Indian tradition, it represents a state of liberation for an individual (jīvan-mūkti, 
„liberated in this life‟). Abhinava has equated aesthetic experience in general and 
aesthetic state of immersion in particular with the experience of a liberated “self” 
(Brahma-svada) on the ground that, in both cases, the audiences forget themselves. 
Mohanty notes: 
The enjoyment of rasa is said to unfold through various stages: other objects 
disappear from consciousness until rasa alone is left…Aesthetic enjoyment then 
becomes somewhat like the contemplation of the Brahman [the Ultimate].
568
        
As to why Abhinava equates audience experience of artworks with states of liberation 
experienced by seekers may be gleaned from Abhinava‟s explanation of the audiences‟ 
response to the dear-hunting scene in Kālidāsa‟s celebrated Abhijñanaśākuntalam. The 
scene has been analyzed by Gupt as follows:   
Abhinava says that on seeing a deer being chased by King Duṣyanta [ready to be 
felled by his arrow at any moment], the spectator knows that even though the deer 
appears to be afraid within the scene, there is “no earthly reality” (viśeṣa rūpa 
abhāvaḥ) to which this fear can be related as the “chaser is unreal and the chase is 
not happening in real space and time‟. Therefore, says Abhinava, the spectator is 
neither afraid himself, nor does he think that the actor [playing the role of the 
deer] is afraid nor does he think the other actor [playing the role of King 
Duṣyanta] is a friend or a foe.569   
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In such a state of „make-belief‟, concrete personal reactions are set aside. Gupt analyzes 
Abhinava further: 
The dramatically represented emotion, e.g., the fear which looms large before the 
spectator‟s eyes, goes straight into his heart as bhayānaka rasa or the rasa of fear. 
At this moment, “the self of the spectator is neither assertive nor subdued”. That 
is to say, dramatic emotion is impersonal and hence felt in a special way.
570
   
Since rasa represents a universalized state (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa),571 a process which helps 
the audiences to move away from their egoistic self, it invariably represents a state of 
restfulness (viśrānti) for the audiences, akin to the realization of the Ultimate by 
individual seekers, their only difference being that while the former state is temporary, 
the latter is a permanent one.
572
 Mohanty notes, since the experience of rasa invariably 
leads a person to a state of mental tranquility, Abhinava holds śānta rasa or the rasa of 
peace to be the highest form of rasa in artworks.
573
  
6. POV Identification in Cinema: The Indian Response 
Smith mentions the following interesting example
 
of a POV experience in cinema: 
Close to the beginning of Phillip Noyce‟s Dead Calm (1989), a character climbs 
on board a deserted boat drifting on a clam sea…the calm is broken by a loud 
noise; our protagonist John Ingram (Sam Neill) turns his head to see a large, 
heavy pulley swinging directly towards him…rendered for us through a POV 
shot…My reaction to this shot on a first, unprepared viewing, was visceral 
flinching…574  
The same thing must have happened to the audiences in the first show of Lumière 
Actualités in Paris in 1995 when they had run helter-skelter on seeing a train coming 
towards them in his short Train Arriving at the Station. Similar reaction has been noticed 
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among the audiences when 3-D was first introduced in films. Carroll describes such 
reflexive reactions as the “startle response”: 
If we are studying horror films, it strikes me as incontrovertible that filmmakers 
often play upon what psychologists call the “startle response”, an innate human 
tendency to “jump” at loud noises and to recoil at fast movements. This tendency 
is, as they say, impenetrable to belief; that is, our beliefs won‟t change the 
response. It is hardwared and involuntary.
575
 
Arguably, classical Indian theories, especially Nyāya, would not agree with Carroll that 
the “startle effect” is impervious to belief. According to Nyāya, it represents a bio-
mechanical response of the body in the face of danger signals being sent by the senses 
and classified by the mind. However, Nyāya would argue that, the ability of the effect to 
„startle‟ the audiences would progressively diminish as the knowledge that it is ultimately 
fictional in nature gains ground. In other words, progressively, the audiences would get 
used to such effects resulting in their fictional cover remaining intact even during such 
effects. This conditioning would help the audiences enjoy such effects as fiction in future. 
However, since POV may involve as yet unchartered aspects of audience experience, as 
held by Currie and Smith, a fuller discussion on the subject would call for more details in 
the matter.
576
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        Part 2 
           Narrative Structure and the Production of Aesthetic Pleasure 
Bharata‟s theory forges a significant relationship between the narrative structure of a play 
and the aesthetic experience it produces among the audiences.   
Bharata‟s Theory of Extended Action 
Bharata extends his formula of unit of enactment to a five-step structure of extended 
action, which usually involves a “story” (kāhini), and its “plot” line (itivṛtta „so it 
happened‟) also endorsed earlier by Aristotle as follows: since “beauty depends on 
magnitude and order” having a beginning, middle, and an end in a story is much 
appreciated as an act of beauty by the audiences.
577
  
Dramatizing a Story: Bharata‟s Notion of The Plot (Itivṛtta)  
That a full-scale drama having five acts exerts maximum impact on the audiences appears 
to have been universally accepted both in the East and the West. While Aristotle called it 
“plotting” in the context of Greek drama, it is called “itivṛtta” („so it happened‟) in 
Bharata‟s theory of drama. Margaret Kane notes the significance of “plot” in his theory: 
Even though Bharata deals with all facets of dramatics ranging from the structure 
of the stage to the use of hand gestures, one of his most significant and interesting 
contributions to dramaturgy is the eleaborate theory of plot structure that he 
details in the ninth book of the Nāṭyaśāstra. The plot of dramas, according to 
Bharata and subsequent Indian dramatists, consists of many individual members 
that together give substance and shape to a unified drama.
578
 
Bharata‟s brilliance lies in describing the plot of a drama in three interrelated categories 
having five members each, called the pañcakatraya:
579
 the first group analyzes the five 
mental states of the protagonists (avasthās) in the five stages of the play when they are 
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stiving to attain their goal; the second group analyzes the nature of the actions 
(arthaprkṛtis) which the protagonists adoptin the five stages of the play to reach their 
goal; and the last group analyzes the intricate lacing of scenes and sequences that 
function like joints (sandhis) which connect the five acts of the paly into a united 
whole.
580
 Formulated on the analogy of a living organism, Indian dramas are conceived 
as first being embedded, then sprouting and growing, and finally bearing fruit within a 
play.
581
  
Bharata‟s first five-fold plot structure, analyzed from the point of view of the 
protagonists‟ mental states (avasthās), is as under:582  
                   Beginning        →       Effort        →        Hopeful of Achievement    
                 (Prārambha)             (Prayatna)                    (Prāptisaṃbhava)                                     
                                              →       Certainty of Achievement       →        Fulfillment 
                                                                     (Niyatāpti)                             (Phalaprāpti)    
Each of the above mental states (avasthās) may be seen as a mirror replica of being the 
product of the level of identification that the audiences are experiencing in relation to a 
particular scene or a sequence and their corresponding evocation of affective states 
among them. Bharata has repeatedly said that, while forms of drama may change, the 
above five mental states are mandatory for the production of rasa among them.
583
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The other two forms of Bharata‟s five-fold plot structure are briefly described below:584 
                          Sources of Action                                       Points of Joining Actions  
                             (Arthaprakṛti)                                                      (Sandhi) 
        1.  The Seed (bīja)                                      1. The Mouth (mukha) 
        2. The Flow of Action (bindu)                   2. Unseen Development (pratimukha)  
        3. Sub-Plot (Patākā)                                   3. Revitalization in the Womb (garbha) 
        4. Side-Plot (prakarī)                                 4. Disappointment (vimarśa) 
        5. Working towards Fulfillment (kārya)    5. Fulfillment (nirvahaṇa) 
As far as the nature of the action (arthaprakṛti) is concerned, movements are 
conceived both horizontally in terms of the main plot and vertically in terms of the sub-
plots, which advances the plot directly by helping the protagonists, and the side-plots, 
which help them only incidentally. Lane quotes from Dhanañjaya‟s Daśarūpaka: 
The secondary plot has a purpose that belongs to another (i.e. the principal hero), 
through which one‟s own purpose is incidentally furthered. When it is protracted, 
it is called an episode (patākā), and when it has a shorter duration, it is an incident 
(prakarī).585 
Lane notes that it would be wrong to view the arthaprakṛtis as a list of actions „from the 
beginning to the end of a play‟.586 Rather they delineate the crucial sources of main 
actions (prakṛtis) occurring within the play. Thus, we have the germ (bīja) or the original 
source of action, drop (bindu) or how the action „spreads‟ or develops, subsidiary action 
(patāka) or how secondary matter helps the main action directly, incidental action 
(prakarī) which helps it indirectly and denouement (kārya) towards which all action 
remains directed.
587
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 It is only with Bharata‟s third five-fold structure, the Joints or Sandhis that we 
start entering into the domain of the scenes and sequences constituting the play. Sandhi 
performs the task of „binding‟ and intricate „interlacing‟ (bandha, „stitching together‟) of 
various scenes and sequences occurring within the broad five-fold structure.
588
 Sandhis 
are further sub-divided into the sub-section called the Sandhyaṅgas, 64 in number, which 
are not completed episodes but represent “span-elements” which merely identify the 
model-situation occurring at a particular juncture in the play. In this sense, noting that 
“Each Sanskrit drama represents an aggregate of model-situations”,589 Byrski mkes the 
following perceptive comments:  
Nāṭyaśāstra breaks up the major action-spans of the Sandhi phase to a series of 
“span-elements” called the Sandhyaṅgas which establishes the characteristic of 
Indian drama as a series of situation-models.
590
  
These “span-elements” or sandhyaṅgas merely act as the templates for the actions in 
progress during a particular moment in the play. In this connection, Byrski farther notes 
that the sandhyaṅgas are basically indicative of two types of situation-models: one which 
identifies the psychological condition of the characters and another technical 
representation of situations within the play.
591
 A random sampling of sandhyaṅgas helps 
illustrate the templates in use in Bharata‟s theory: suggestion (upakṣepa) which hints at 
the central problem, allurement (vilobhana) which makes the problem attractive for the 
audiences, decision (yukti) which indicates the decision made in the matter, arrangement 
(vidhāna) which infuses conflict in the situation, dissension (bheda) which introduces 
difference of opinion among the protagonists, and so on.
592
 In the above sense, 
sandhyaṅgas represent the smallest pieces of plot construction with no specific lengths 
prescribed to them. Lane notes: “They are not actual events or happenings, but rather are 
individual and specific moments of dialogue, or brief expressions of emotions, which 
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collectively form the nature of each individual sandhi”.593  Sandhyaṅgas constitute subtle 
moments in the narrative which exercise a profound influence on the audiences. Nabokov 
comments on the construction of such moments in Lolita: 
These are the nerves of the novel, the secret points, the subliminal co-ordinates by 
means of which the book is plotted – although I clearly realize that these and 
other scenes will be skimmed over or not even noticed, or never even 
reached…594   
Lane notes: “The similarity between Nabokov‟s conception of the nerves of his novel and 
the sandhyaṅgas is more than curious.”595  
 Bharata also classifies 36 Lakṣaṇas or “indicators” which act as the lineaments of 
nature (sāmudrika lakṣaṇa), like the sportive look of a person, etc. These “indicators” act 
like ornaments (bhusana), e.g., a lock of hair falling on the forehead; compressions 
(akshara-saṅghata), e.g., smart dialogues; beauty (śobha), e.g., compositional harmony, 
etc. The lakṣaṇas „glorify‟ the dramatic execution of a scene by imparting grace and 
beauty to it. In this sense, they do not belong to any particular juncture of the play, but 
may be freely spread throughout the play.
596
 Using Ezra Pound‟s description, the 
lakṣaṇas represent “images” which signify “intellectual and emotional complexes in an 
instant of time”.597      
When we turn our attention to Western thought, we find that, in a classic analysis of five-
act tragedies, Gustav Freytag (1816-1895), in his study titled Die Technik des Dramas 
(1863), said that it ultimately represents three points of a triangle starting with the play‟s 
introduction (A), its climax (B), and the catastrophe (C): 
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                                                                        B 
 
                                 
 A                                C 
                                                          Freytag‟s Triangle 
In the above triangle, at “A”, characters, settings, and the initial state of affairs are 
introduced, “AB” covers „rising action‟ of the protagonists to reach their goal in the face 
of obstacles, and “BC” covers the „falling action‟ representing the protagonists‟ declining 
fortunes ending in catastrophe in case of tragedy which Freytag had theorized.
598
 Later 
theorists have variously redistributed the Freytag points in terms of introduction, 
development, complication, climax, and resolution.
599
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Bharata‟s categorization of avasthās, arthaprakṛtis and sandhis, with the latter‟s 
sub-division into sandhyaṅgas and lakṣaṇas provides one of the most detailed and 
painstaking analyses of the dramatic structure. Arguably, Bordwell‟s structure of 
Hollywood „canonical‟ films‟,600 which follows Freytag‟s Triangle, represents a broad 
generalization of Bharata‟s notion of arthaprakṛtis in certain respects: 
                                                       Introduction of Settings & Characters 
                                                       Explanation of a State of Affairs 
                                                       Complicating Action  
                                                       Ensuing Events  
                                                       Outcome/Ending 
Since the primary focus of this chapter is on the aesthetic aspects of Bharata‟s theory, a 
more detailed exposition of Bharata‟s above three extremely sophisticated structures 
would not be undertaken here.   
         Nature of Aesthetic Experience (Rasa) in Bharata‟s Theory 
In Bharata‟s theory, aesthetic experiences representing rasa have been classified as 
belonging to the following three broad categories: “aesthetic relish” (bhoga, „sensuous 
enjoyment‟), “aesthetic saturation” (viśrānti, rasavat, „rasa-like‟), and “aesthetic 
immersion” (samāveśa, āveśa, „ecstasy‟), the latter, according to the latter aesthetes like 
Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, signify the highest form of rasa in art.  
Aesthetic Relish (Bhoga)  
In Indian tradition, bhoga or prasāda represents an offering to God by the devotees 
which is inspected and accepted by the deity by casting His/Her glance (dṛṣṭi, „vision‟)601 
on the devotee with the latter being aware of it. The process basically represents an 
activity of sensuous consumption through vision.
602
 Since in the Indian theories, vision is 
not only equivalent to touch sensations, but also, according to the Nyāya theory, evokes 
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other sensations through memory on the basis of an in an extraordinary process of 
perception, the process of darśan ultimately represents an all comprehensive process in 
the Indian theories. According to the Indian theorists, however, this mode of enquiry is 
not uni-directional in nature but involves the reciprocal awareness of the deity‟s look by 
the devotees with the proviso that the devotee‟s glance should not meet the deity‟s 
directly lest the devotee be singed by it. Only when the deity‟s glance and the devoteee‟s 
awareness occur simultaneously, the process of darśan is said to be complete. In this 
way, the deity not only inspects the devotee but also his offering, a process which may be 
fraught with „doubts‟ on His/Her part, even a „crisis‟ where He/She may be on the verge 
of rejecting it.
603
 On his part, the devotee may even have „doubts‟ as to whether his 
offering has been accepted by the deity at all. The important point is that, while this 
process of enquiry may be filled with „anxiety‟, it still generates an experience of 
“delectation” in the enquirer progressively reaching towards the goal.604 Once a 
satisfactory conclusion is reached, it generates a sense of rest and repose in the enquirer 
which produces a different form of pleasure within him. Finally, an altogether different 
and more intense kind of pleasure is generated when certain archetypal experiences are 
triggered from within the enquirer by application of appropriate cues from outside which 
release emotions suppressed within one‟s subconscious that overwhelm the enquirer‟s 
sensibilities completely. The Indian theory of aesthetic experience is basically modeled 
on these three types of experiences.   
Regarding sensuous experiences and its attendant pleasures (bhoga), which are 
associated with modes of enquiry that keep the enquirer in a state of animated suspense 
having the effect of expanding their consciousness (vistāra), classical Indian theories 
follow two well-defined paths. The Vedic process represents the „preventive path‟ 
(nigama) which argues that, since sensuous pleasure is extremely powerful and mutually 
reinforcing, one must learn to shun them from the beginning; in contrast, the Tantrik 
process represents the „affirmative path‟ (agama) which advocates that sensuous 
pleasures can only be controlled by experiencing them. This has created a dichotomy in 
Indian thought with Advaiata Vedānta and Kashmir Śaivism falling on the two sides of it. 
                                                          
603
 Gerow, “Notes”, 8 
604
 Ibid 
238 
 
However, since one of the ultimate aims of an artwork is to generate sensuous pleasure, 
the Indian dichotomy shifts to a conflict between “high” art, which produces refined 
enjoyment (vinodana) of sensuous pleasure, and “low” art, which doles out sensuous 
pleasure (bhoga) for its own sake alone. It raised the following question: is the 
contradiction between “high” and “low” art basic to Indian art or is it arbitrary? Lath 
comments: 
It is not surprising that the list of kalās [„arts‟] from the Kāmasūtra includes such 
“high” arts as literature, theatre, music, and painting along with such „low‟ arts as 
cooking, perfumery and the like. I say this in order to emphasize the fact that 
there is a continuum between bhoga and the more elevated appeal of the higher 
arts.
605
  
Lath notes that as far as Indian art theories are concerned, they hold that „higher arts‟, 
representing higher forms of knowledge, can only be approached by negotiating the 
„lower arts‟ which act as the basis for yielding such knowledge.606  
Film Examples of Aesthetic Relish (Bhoga) 
Since Detective films or Suspense movies use intense forms of modes of enquiry to 
unravel enigmas posed by narratives, they may be appropriately used here to illustrate 
aesthetic relish or bhoga.  
The suspense genre provides a special form sensuous pleasure: “Suspense 
engages our emotions through anxious uncertainty”.607 In Hitchcock‟s Psycho (1960), the 
private investigator Abrogast (Martin Balsam) is slowly climbing the steps of Norman 
Bates‟ house to meet „the mother‟. In the background of the audiences‟ knowledge, they 
would be expecting the worst for Abrogast. It is to Hitchcock‟s credit that despite such 
anticipation, the final act of his murder still comes as a shock. The important point to 
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note, however, is that the scene proves “delectable” for the audiences even though they 
constantly face a “crisis” generated by uncertainty and fear of what might happen to him.   
In Quentin Tarantino‟s Inglorious Basterds (1978), SS Colonel Hans „The Jew 
Hunter‟ Landa (Christoph Waltz) plays a cat-and-mouse game with the French dairy 
farmer Perrier LaPadite (Denis Manochet) to make him reveal where the Jewish Dreyfus 
family is hiding. Framed against the audience‟s background knowledge of their hiding 
place, it provides a mesmerizing sequence of enquiry and the impending “crisis” they 
face in the possible revelation of the place by LaPadite. This results in a delectable state 
of sustained suspense for the audiences.  
Aesthetic Saturation (Rasavat)  
In classical Indian thought, particularly in the school of psychology represented by 
Kashmir Śaivism (c. 9th CE), bindu („the point‟) represents a state of consciousness, 
which “when saturated with a particular knowledge, gathers into an undifferentiated 
point-like state”.608 When a mode of enquiry reaches a satisfactory solution, it leads to a 
state of “saturation” where the audiences‟ consciousness tends to “rest” and “repose” 
(viśrānti) representing a state of inner “blossoming” or “radiance” (vikāsa).609 While 
viśrānti originally means an epistemic rest signifying the “last meaning” (rodhana),610 in 
an aesthetic sense, it signifies the arising of “the fullest delight from the complete 
awareness of an object”.611 This is a state where the subject and the object are no more 
“adrift like two logs in an ocean”, but form two equal parts of a dynamic whole.612 In this 
state, the subject rests in its own knowledge, thereby, ending “all dependence on the 
outside world”.613 Dehejia notes: 
Abhinavagupta argues that the cognitive process, which moves out towards 
knowledge and enjoyment of objects, is not complete until it is reversed and 
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brought to rest in the knowing subject. This signifies that all objective knowledge 
culminates in a deepening awareness of the subject and subjectivity. This 
culminating moment of resting in the subject is technically called viśrānti.614 
Film Examples of Aesthetic Saturation (Rasavat) 
In the last scene in Ritwik Ghatak‟s Meghe Dhaka Tara (The Cloud-Capped Star, 1960), 
Shankar (Anil Chatterjee) watches a young lady returning from her office. As the strap of 
her slipper is torn, she picks up the slipper in her hand, gives a wan smile to Shankar and 
moves on. It reminds Shankar and the audiences of a similar scene where the main 
character Nita‟s (Supriya Choudhury) slipper was similarly torn which symbolically 
represented the endless sacrifices that she was making for establishing her refugee 
family. Since Nita not only loses her lover to her younger sister but also dies of TB 
subsequently, the audiences „rest‟ in the knowledge that the present lady is also destined 
to suffer a similar fate. This very realization leads the audiences‟ consciousness to a 
mode of rest and repose (viśrānti) in midst of a generalized sense of pathos (karuṇa-rasa) 
experienced by them. 
In the last sequence in Andrei Tarkovsky‟s Andrei Roublev (1966), the Painter 
Roublev (Anatoly Solonitsyn) watches in wonder Boriska‟s (Nikolai Burlyayev) casting 
of the bell which ends in success. He asks himself, how can a boy, who has never ever 
been taught the necessary skill, cast such an enormous bell in his first attempt? Roublev 
takes it as a miracle and regains his faith in God. He starts painting again where 
restoration of his faith is reflected in the color sequences of Roublev‟s painting captured 
by Tarkovsky. The final shot of horses grazing peacefully on the banks of a river 
represents the audience‟s mind, which, exhausted by a continuing cycle of violence and 
counter violence in the film, finds “peace” at last and reposes (viśrānti) there.  
Aesthetic Immersion or Ecstasy (Samāveśa, Āveśa)  
In this state, the audiences‟ consciousness is overwhelmed with the triggering of 
emotions suppressed within them by appropriate cues employed by an artwork which 
generates an experience of “melting” (drūti) within them.  
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In modern parlance, “immersion refers to any state of absorption in some action, 
condition, or interest”.615 Holding that the „getting carried away‟ phenomena is instigated 
by mimentic, illusionistic devices, Plato had criticqued it on the ground that anything 
inaccessible to analytical thought was epistemically void and hence dangerous.
616
 While 
noting that “the psychological and representational features of the state of imaginative 
immersion are still very poorly understood”, Herman and Others note: 
Plato‟s view of immersion as an illusionist device that fools the senses and the 
mind seems to be misguided. In fact, Walton maintains that, in the course of the 
immersion process, the spectator always remains conscious of the fact that he or 
she is in a “game of make-belief”, retaining an awareness of the distinction 
between the imagined situation induced by mimetic primers and her real-world 
surroundings.
617
  
In the above context, it would be interesting to see how classical Indian theories explain 
the phenomenon.  
Abhinava has used the terms samāveśa or āveśa interchangeably to describe the 
process of immersion “to imply immersion of limited and restricted subjectivity into the 
unlimited universal self”.618 Yoga theory (c. 2nd CE) offers the first available explanation 
of this process. Since certain types of activities or images, along with their associated 
emotions, keep recurring in human experience, they ultimately get detached from the 
original events and merge into generalized forms of experience which remain submerged 
in the human subconscious. These forms represent pure forms of potentiality which 
cannot be recalled through normal memory. Accroding to classical Indian theories, 
conscious acts leave traces in memory in two ways, as „impressions” (saṁskāras) of 
specific events and as “dispositions” involving mental attitudes that accompany such acts. 
In case of archetypal images, repetitive experiences, together with their accompanying 
mental attitudes, get merged into pure potentiality, the two together forming what are 
                                                          
615
 Herman & Others, “Immersion”, 237-39, 238 
616
 Ibid 
617
 Ibid 
618
 Manju Deshpande, “Samāveśa”, in Indian Aesthetics and Poetics, Ed. V. N. Jha (Delhi: Sri Satguru 
Publications, 2003): 115–24, 115, modified   
242 
 
called the vāsanās (lit., „abodes‟, which, however, in the derivative Indian languages has 
the meaning „desires‟). When confronted with certain images, vāsanās are revived 
flooding human beings with emotions, along with the dispositional tendencies that 
underlie such events, which make the receivers respond in a certain way to the events 
concerned. This process leads to the experiencing of a state of immersion involving a 
sense of „drowning‟ among the receivers, the reasons for which, however, remain 
unknown to them. More importantly, since such archetypal images may be triggered even 
by a minute cue, which may or may not have anything to do with the film or the story as 
such, like a lock of hair falling on a face mentioned earlier, or the snatches of a musical 
tune, etc, the audiences experience emotions much beyond the capacity of the images 
being represented on screen. 
In this context, the Yoga theory holds that, since the generalized form of these 
potentialities or vāsanās, involving “emotions” and “dispositions”, occur in terms of 
human beings‟ embodied and socio-cultural practices of life, they cut across boundaries 
set by individual experiences to become the common legacy of human beings. It is well-
known that the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung (1875 - 1961), who was originally 
a disciple of Freud till he changed his line of thought, was deeply influenced by this 
Yogic thought in formulating his theory of the collective unconscious, which involved the 
experiencing of certain archetypal forms not only common within cultures but also across 
cultures, like the mother image, etc, which generated overwhelming responses from 
human beings.
619
  
Since, in the state of aesthetic immersion or ecstasy (vigalita-parimita-
pramārtṛtva), the audiences experience their “own” emotions, a question arises as to 
whether they suffer these emotions? Despite these emotions being their “own”, the 
repeatation of the events generating them get lumped together to form a generalized form 
which prevents the audience from suffering them as their personal emotions. Voicing 
Bharata, Abhinava holds that the audiences “taste” such emotions while standing 
„outside‟ them. Hogan holds that Abhinava‟s idea is duly supported by modern 
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researches in cognitive science.
620
 It shows that the memory of a person has two 
components, one representational and one emotive. Over the years, its representational 
part tends to get lost to memory, while its emotive part has a tendency of remaining 
intact.
621
 Detached from the event these emotions were originally associated with, the 
emotive part assumes a generalized form. Witnessing certain scenes in cinema triggers 
such generalized affective memories which had earlier bled into the audience 
consciousness, remaining there in the subconscious form. Hogan clarifies the specific 
nature of such generalized and submerged emotions:  
The emotive part is not an abstract recollection of one having had an emotion…it 
is, rather, a re-experiencing of that emotion. In other words, it is not remembering 
that one was sad or happy or frightened at a given time and place, but actually 
feeling again, in some degree, that same sadness or happiness or fright…The 
experience of rasa is precisely the experience of these feelings.
622
 
Hogan concludes that artworks have the ability to trigger such activations involving “a 
pang of sadness” or “a moment of tenderness” in a patterned manner resulting in “a more 
pronounced and continuous experience” for the audiences.623  
These triggered moments represent autonomous states of rasa which are 
independent of the preceding or anticipated developments of the narrative in an artwork 
or a film. In this sense, rasa, representing a state of immersion of the audiences, is a sui 
generis experience which is qualitatively different from all other aesthetic experiences 
generated by an artwork, signifying an aesthetic leap for the audiences. Dehejia notes: 
Knowledge of ultimate reality is a step-ladder process which proceeds step-by-
step, from joy to greater joy, but that the penultimate step requires a leap 
produced by the thrill and unbounded joy of the expansion of consciousness.
624
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This has been called the rasa-dhvani stage by Ᾱnandavardhana (c. 8th CE) which, 
according to him as well as Abhinavagupta, represents the highest form of art.
625
  
Film Examples of Aesthetic Immersion (Samāveśa) 
In Ritwik Ghatak‟s Meghe Dhaka Tara (The Cloud-Capped Star, 1960), Nita (Supriya 
Choudhury) discovers her sister‟s treachery in trying to take away her lover who is no 
longer prepared to wait for Nita who is making endless sacrifices in trying to establish 
her refugee family. As Nita watches them chatting animatedly, she asks her brother, 
Shankar (Anil Chatterjee) to sing with her the Tagore song, „Je rate more duar guli 
bhanglo jhore‟ („the night storm broke all my doors‟). Ghatak takes the shots not only 
from very close below her chin but also from all odd angles during the song, with one 
particular shot projecting an unusually elongated profile of her face resembling the 
mother image in the form of a Goddess to the audiences. While these shots generate a 
haptic, i.e. synaesthetic experience among the audiences, their representation of the 
archetypal mother image making untold sacrifices for her children trigger the revival of 
“ownerless” pathos (karuṇa-rasa) lying submerged within the audiences which 
overwhelms their sentiments generating an experience of immersion in them.   
In Ritwik Ghatak‟s Subarnarekha (The Golden Line, 1962), Sita (Madhavi 
Mukherjee), who had eloped with her lover Abhiram (Satindra Bhattacharya) on being 
denied marriage by her elder brother Iswar (Abhi Bhattacharya) on caste considerations, 
is forced to take to prostitution on her lover‟s sudden death. This is going to be her first 
day with a customer. Iswar, who loved her sister dearly is grief-stricken and comes to 
Calcutta in search of solace. After drinks and merriment in a Night Club, his friend 
Haraprasad (Bijon Bhattacharya) advises him to visit a prostitute who, coincidentally, 
happens to be his sister. Though, in his drunken stupor, he fails to recognize Sita, she 
recognizes him. In a tragic act, she chops off her head with a kitchen slicer with blood 
sprinkling all over the walls and on Iswar‟s dress. As reality gradually dawns on Iswar, 
he raises the slicer over his head, makes a desperate cry of anguish, and falls weeping on 
the ground. Here Ghatak not only enforces a jerky, expressionistic camerawork but also 
frequently alternates between the subjective and objective perspectives. It triggers the 
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revival of generalized, “ownerless” emotion of the odious type (bībhatsā-rasa) lying 
submerged within the audiences which overwhelms their sensibilities.   
            Intrusion of Reality in Fiction: Obstacles to Aesthetic Realization 
Before discussing what happens when reality intrudes into the fictional world, one would 
like to clarify what happens when it does not intrude. 
Abhinava notes that in a well-enacted play, where the author has constructed an 
effective fictional world, a single unified experience (ekaghanatā) is generated among all 
spectators based on the triggering of similar desires and emotions residing within them.
626
  
Noting that, in the above sense, the audience‟s consciousness undergoes an expansion in 
a public place or an auditorium, Abhinava says: 
In public celebrations, it returns to a state of expansion since all components are 
reflected in each other. The radiance of one‟s consciousness (which tends to pour 
out of oneself) is reflected in the consciousness of all bystanders, as if in so many 
mirrors, and, inflamed by these, it abandons its individual contraction.
627
 
It leads to the production of a specific state experienced by all members of the audiences. 
Abhinava perceptively comments on the audiences‟ special state of being while 
experiencing an artwork:   
One‟s own self is neither completely immersed (vigalita) nor in a state of 
emergence (ullikhita), the same thing happening with other selves as well. As a 
result, the generality involved is not limited (parimita), but extended (vitata), as 
happens in the case of pervasion (vyāpti) between smoke and fire or that between 
trembling and fear.
628
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 Abhinva‟s idea is similar to Kant‟s notion of “a common connection” between 
disinterested viewers.
629
 In the above context, Abhinava notes the importance of the 
audiences‟ necessary skill and attitude (sahṛdayatva) to identify with the play: 
For this very reason, in meetings of many people, fullness of joy occurs when 
every bystander is identified with the spectacle…On the other hand, even if only 
one of the bystanders does not concentrate on the spectacle and does not share the 
form of consciousness in which other spectators are immersed, this consciousness 
is disturbed, as if at the touch of an uneven surface.
630
 
            The question is what happens when reality intrudes in a fictional play?  
Vivian Sobchack discusses a scenario where reality intrudes in fictional cinema. In Jean 
Renoir‟s La Règle du Jeu (Rules of the Game, 1939), the hunting sequence was real. 
Scores of rabbits and birds were massacred for the scene. How do the audiences react to 
it? There has been two deaths in the film, the rabbit‟s „meaningless‟ death is supposed to 
bracket the first transatlantic pilot André Jurieu‟s (Roland Toutain) equally „meaningless‟ 
death with one character even commenting how he „rolled over like a rabbit‟ when he 
died. In fact, the second death, belonging to a great hero like Jurieu is supposed to be 
even more tragic since it occurs due to his sincere love for Christine, wife of his host 
Robert de la Chesnaye. Since true sentiments do not form part of the “rules of the game”, 
Jurieu‟s death should have appeared as more shocking to the audiences than that of the 
rabbit‟s death. In reality, however, the audiences all over the world have been haunted by 
the meaningless massacre of the little rabbits, particularly the one which folds its paws on 
its chest as it rolls over and dies. Why is it so? Clearly, it is because of the fact that the 
audiences know that, as against Jurieu‟s fictional death, the rabbit‟s death is real which 
breaks their fictional cover. In this connection, Sobchack quotes filmmaker Haskell 
Wexler as follows: 
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I find people‟s reaction to “real” death and “movie” death fascinating. For 
example, in Jean-Luc Godard‟s Weekend (1967), perhaps twenty people are 
dramatically killed.  But there is one scene in which the throat of a pig is cut. I 
have seen the film several times, and each time that scene appears, the audience 
gasps. They know that they are seeing an animal die. They know that, unlike the 
actors, when the Director says “cut”, the pig will not get up and walk away.631       
Same thing happens to the audiences when a real ox is slaughtered in Eisenstein‟s Strike 
(1924).  
            Vivian Sobchack makes two points here.
632
 First, there is a difference between the 
“documentary attitude” and the “fictional attitude” and the audiences know the difference 
between the two. For example, when Forrest Gump (Tom Hanks) is shown as shaking 
hands with successive American Presidents, like Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 
respectively, despite its seamless editing, the audiences aren‟t fooled. The point is how do 
the audiences know what is real and what is fictional? Here Sobchack makes her second 
point. She says that when the audiences encounter real trees, real rivers, etc, in a fictional 
film, they are willing to put them “out of play”. In other words, for the audiences, their 
existence remains generalized. Sobchack notes: 
[I]n fictional experience…they would be engaged as what philosophers call 
typical particulars – a form of generalization in which a single entity is taken as 
exemplary of an entire class. Thus, although they retain a diffuse existential 
“echo”, trees and rabbits and grasshoppers in fictional consciousness are not taken 
up by us in their individual and specific particularity.
633
 
Sobchack notes that this is, however, not the case when some real incident intrudes in a 
film which: “...foregrounds their specific existential status for us and restructures the kind 
and quality of our investment in them”.634 She concludes by saying that ultimately two 
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factors always remain present as an undertone in the audience experience of a fictional 
film: their phenomenological sense of embodiment and their extra-textual knowledge of 
real events in the world outside in terms of their own embodied and socio-cultural 
experiences of living in the world.
635
  
Abhinava‟s List of „Obstacles‟ to Aesthetic Experience 
In the above connection, Abhinava lists the following obstacles (vighṇas) to the 
generation of appropriate aesthetic experience among the audiences when reality intrudes 
into the fictional world of an artwork:  
i) Lack of verisimilitude 
According to Abhinava, since “consent of the heart” in relation to a play is a 
necessary condition among audiences, a lack of conviction among them would 
vitiate their appreciation of the play. Lack of verisimilitude is one of the 
important factors in this regard. In this context, Aristotle‟s advice is that 
actions must be plausible, rather than being improbable.   
ii) Immersion in one‟s personal thoughts 
If one is too heavily weighed down with his own practical problems i.e. if one 
cannot relinquish her egoistic self, then she would to fail to appreciate art.  
iii) Absorption in one‟s own sense of pleasure 
One is distracted in the theatre by the awareness that one may lose one‟s sense 
of pleasure in real life. It is absolutely necessary that a psychic distance 
between the viewer and his practical life is built up. To put her into such a 
state, conventions of theatrical illusion like the ambience of the cinema hall, 
etc., are used.  
iv) Defective means of perception 
Abhinava notes: “if the means of perception are absent, perception itself will 
also be naturally absent”.636 Clarity about what is being perceived is an 
essential condition for identification of audiences.  
 
 
                                                          
635
 Sobchack, “The Charge of the Real”, 271  
636
 Gnoli, Aesthetic Experience, 82 
249 
 
v) Lack of clarity in the play 
Abhinava notes: “The presence of words alone, by means of which the reader 
infers the narrated acts, is not enough to make the reader identify himself with 
the subject and characters of the play”.637 Susan Langer says that the actors 
must develop actions to the point of self-sufficiency so that speeches become 
dispensable.  
vi) Lack of an abiding mental state 
Wallace Dace notes: “If a person‟s consciousness rests on something of a 
secondary order, something transitory, then an obstacle to rasa is encountered 
because [his] perception would find no rest in itself and would run 
[elsewhere]. Only the permanent mental states can be the object of tasting.”638  
vii) Doubt about what is being conveyed through the play 
Doubts cannot be eliminated among audiences unless consequents are 
attached to appropriate determinants. Abhinava notes:  
Tears may be aroused indifferently by a great delight, or a pain in the eye. 
A tiger may arouse either anger or fear [on stage]. The combination of 
these elements, however, has an unmistakable significance. For example, 
when the determinant consists of the death of a friend, the consequents of 
wailing and tears and the transitory mental states are of anxiety and 
depression, then the dominant mental state which results cannot be other 
than sorrow…[The act of tasting this dominant mental state in the theatre] 
is perfect rasa.‟639  
Thus, whenever the fictional façade of a „play‟ is broken (āvaraṇa-bhaṅga), it ruptures 
the generalized state of the audiences‟ experiences resulting in every member of the 
audience getting affected by the act!
640
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            Subjective-Objective Alteration in Bharata‟s Theory 
The notion of subjective-objective alteration in the theories of Indian arts, the concept of 
darśan, which has a strong affinity with Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the chiasm elaborated 
in chapter 2, plays a decisive role.  
In the context of worshipping a deity, it is commonly said that the deity or a sage 
(sādhu) “gives darśan” while the devotee “takes darśan”. Diana Eck notes: 
What does this mean? The very expression is arresting, for “seeing” in this 
religious sense, is not an act which is initiated by the worshipper. Rather, the deity 
presents itself to be seen through its image, or, the sādhu makes himself available 
to be seen. One might say that this is a “sacred perception” given to the devotee, 
just as Arjuna was given special vision to see Kṛṣṇa‟s universal figure 
(viswarūpa) as described in the Bhagavad Gītā.641        
Devotees seeing the image, however, represent only one part of the process; the more 
important part lies in the deity seeing the devotee as well.
642
 When a crowd cranes its 
neck to catch a glimpse of the deity, it wishes not only to “see” the deity, but also to be 
“seen” by the deity.643 Later, various Indian systems or schools of philosophy came to be 
called Darśans signifying different “points of view”, instead of a single-eyed process of 
revealing the truth.
644
   
It has already been noted that Bharata‟s seminal contribution to the field of arts 
lies in postulating the processes of identification occurring between the audiences and an 
artwork and the corresponding evocation of affective states among them which enable 
their bodies and souls to relive a scene. This process makes the audiences an inalienable 
part of the play which breaks down the subjective-objective duality between the stage and 
the audiences. In the above sense, the significance of the term “rasa” means both 
“tasting” and being “tasted”.645 Heckel notes: 
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This means that while rasa is the taste of performance, it is realized completely 
only when tasted, that is to say, when a relationship is established between what is 
staged and the spectators.
646
 
The above process has significant application to the field of performing arts.   
Applying Bharata‟s Theory of Subjective-Objective Alteration to Dance Drama 
What does the above notion of subject-object transformation bring to the field of arts? 
Analyzing the mode of “seeing” or “gaze” in an artwork, Uttara Coorlawala mentions 
that, according to Laura Mulvey, there are three mechanisms of gaze in cinema: gaze of 
the camera which “choreographs” our perceptions, gaze of the male characters within the 
film which determines our relation to the content, and gaze of the spectator which 
combines the two. Mulvey contends that, ultimately, all three forms combine to serve the 
male gaze in cinema.
647
 Citing an example from Odissi dance, Coorlawala, however, says 
that the gaze doesn‟t operate in the same way in the Indian arts. In a dance presentation of 
poet Jayadev‟s masterpiece Geet Govinda, which celebrates love between Radha and 
Kṛṣṇa that evokes an erotic sentiment (śṛṅgāra-rasa) among the audiences, the following 
alternating gazes of Radha and Kṛṣṇa are personified in the same dance maestro Kelu 
Charan Mohapatra.  
When Radha plays the role of an erotic object for Kṛṣṇa, she subverts the mores 
of a conventional society in the sense that she is married to another person; and when she, 
as a subject, looks at herself as an erotic object object.  
Mohapatra then plays out the following alternating gazes between Radha and 
Kṛṣṇa: when Kṛṣṇa is absorbed in decorating Radha‟s breasts with sandalwood on being 
invited by her to do so; when he ends the work by gently applying two dots (tikka) on 
Radha‟s two nipples visibly admiring his work; when Radha, who is an object of desire 
for the male so far, regains subjectivity by expressing her pleasure as she slowly closes 
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her eyelids in ecstasy; 
648
 and, finally, when, in a subtle shift of gaze, Radha now joins in 
the activity of decorating her own body alongside Kṛṣṇa as she also watches him continue 
with his work. Thus, Radha‟s position, which started as an adorned erotic object, 
gradually shifts to the male position of the constructing subject.  
In the final act, a modest Radha, who, as the wife of another person, applies 
sindoor (red turmeric powder signifying the married status of a woman) on her forehead, 
draws a veil around her, and walks away to her husband.
649
   
In this context, Coorlawala differentiates scopophilic, i.e. voyeuristic pleasure of 
the male gaze from the concept of “seeing” in darśan which is a model of subjective-
objective transformation in India: 
A mutually complicit merging of subject-object positions is a necessary requisite 
of darśan. A transformative darśan necessarily involves reciprocal „seeing‟…An 
observer who aligns with the dominating male gaze which claims possession, or 
which criticizes and separates [from the ongoing act], is unlikely to experience 
transformation.
650
 
She finally concludes: “Thus, subjective-objective interaction or darśan, together with 
aesthetic equivalent of the performer being the mirror or darpaṇa, involves a reversal of 
the power structures of voyeurism itself”.651     
Applying Bharata‟s Theory of Subjective-Objective Alteration to Cinema 
The opening sequence in Alain Resnais‟s Hiroshima Mon Amour („Hiroshima, My 
Love‟, 1959) is a classic case of subjective-objective alteration in cinema. The sequence 
has three intercutting segments: the present day story of an affair between the French 
actress „Nevers‟ (Emmanuelle Riva) and the Japanese architect „Hiroshima‟ (Eiji Okada), 
both of whom are married; Never‟s self-narrated past involves her love affair with a 
German soldier during the Occupation, his subsequent death, her incarceration by her 
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family and society; and the new scale of destruction wrought on Hiroshima by the Atom 
Bomb.  
The voice-over flashback of Nevers makes the film image to be a shared mental 
image between Nevers and Hiroshima, between her own past and the present with 
Hiroshima‟s frequent interruptions “you have seen nothing about Hiroshima” brings the 
film back to an objective present. Clearly, therefore, an overlapping of different systems 
of reference exists in the film with the images sliding along multiple points of a 
subjective-objective scale.  
A documentary-like footage of a hospital is then introduced where people even 
look directly into the moving camera. Even though these are supposed to be documentary 
images, yet they are presented as mental images pertaining to Never‟s memory. All these 
factors force the immanent field to constantly shift between various planes of reference: 
the objective present, Nevers looking at the objective plane subjectively, Never‟s own act 
of looking at herself as an object interjected with Never‟s past memory, and Hiroshima‟s 
subjective interruptions of Never‟s account.652  
While the notion of subjective-objective alteration in classical Indian theories 
appears to be to Merleau-Ponty‟s concept of chiasm, yet Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the 
internalization of the chiasmas within the body seems to be missing in the Indian 
theories. As already pointed out, the Merlau-Pontian notion helps to explain haptic 
visuality, the shot-counter shot technique as well as the more complex Deleuzian time-
images of Resnais, Godard, or Tarkovsky, phenomena important for modern cinema.  
In conclusion, the classical Indian concepts of the various stages of “identification” 
together with their evocation of corresponding “affective states” among the audiences 
provides a comprehensive basis for understanding the nature of aesthetic experiences 
generated by arts. In this connection, the “generalization” (sādharanīkaraṇa) of audience 
experiences, arising from the knowledge and willing identification with the fictional mode 
of an artwork, is a seminal concept which effectively solves the “paradox of junk fiction” 
in art theory. In fact, Bharata‟s theory presents a two-fold theory of generalization of 
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audience experience, once when they identify with the fictional mode of an artwork 
which generalizes their aesthetic experiences prospectively and once when certain 
archetypal images are revived from within the audiences‟ subconscious which generalizes 
their experiences retrospectively. Bharata‟s formula of enactment, which captures the 
process of evocation of states of identification, affect, and aesthetic pleasure or rasa 
among the audiences, together with his classification of the aesthetic experiences into 
sensuous experiences, a sense of saturation and a sense of immersion are some of his 
memorable contributions to the field of arts. The support lent to his views by Eisenstein 
and the discovery of “mirror neurons” make them highly relevant in contemporary times. 
In all these respects, Bharata and his commentators leave us with a legacy whose 
implications would keep unraveling for a long time to come.  
_______________________ 
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Chapter 5 
Cinema and Suggestion 
Ᾱnandavardhana‟s Theory of Dhvani 
 
 Dhani is art and rasa-dhvani is the highest form of art 
                                                                                                   ----- Ānandavardhana 
Rājānaka Ᾱnandavardhana‟s (c. 8th CE) theory of dhvani, contained in his magnum opus 
Dhvanyāloka („Light on Suggestion‟), with Abhinavagupta‟s (c. 10th CE) celebrated 
commentary Locana („The Eye‟) thereon, break new grounds in the theorization of arts in 
India. Taking Nyāya theory of perception (pratyakṣa) and Bharata‟s theory of drama 
(rasasūtra) as its basis, Ᾱnandavardhana‟s theory brings about a revolutionary change in 
the understanding of arts by introducing the concept of “suggestion” (dhvani) which is an 
indirect mode of communicating that which cannot be directly communicated by human 
beings in real life. In this sense, I argue that Ᾱnandavardhana especially chooses dhvani 
to manifest human expressions that are repressed by the society, traumatic experiences 
generate existential conditions among human beings that prevent them from relating to 
their surroundings, or archetypal experiences that remain submerged within human 
subconscious and yet keep influencing their human actions on the surface. By 
manifesting them, dhvani helps restore „full‟ subjectivity to the affected individuals. 
Since nothing more significant has happened in the field of classical Indian art theories 
thereafter, the theory of suggestion may be said to bring about some kind of a „closure‟ to 
classical Indian thoughts on the subject.  
For Ānanda and Abhinava, suggestion signifies an independent power of 
signification in communication, especially in the field of arts. Starting with the literature, 
Ānanda demonstrates that suggestion (vyañjanā) is a fourth power of signification over 
and above the conventional powers of “denotation” (abhidhā, „primary‟), “indication” 
(lakṣaṇa, „secondary‟), and “intention” (tātparya, „authorial intention‟) in Indian 
linguistic theories. While vyañjanā means „manifesting‟ suggestion, dhvani, which 
literally means „sound‟ as well as „echo‟, ultimately comes to assume in Ānanda‟s hands  
meanings suppressed by the literal meaning of an expression in the field of arts. As 
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Ānanda‟s theory develops, dhvani ultimately comes to assume deeper roles in the field of 
arts: of transgressing socio-cultural norms that censure human behavior, of dealing with 
l‟condition humaine where individuals, after having undergone a traumatic experience 
are in search of a new “meaning” in their lives and of connecting with the archetypal 
experiences and images stored deep within human psyche. Considering arts in the above 
roles signals an important shift from the conventional mode of textual analysis of 
artworks to the mode of their reception by the audiences in Indian theories of art.  
The following points will be discussed in this chapter:  
The first section will discuss Western thoughts on suggestion in artworks;  
Part 1, which delas with dhvani as suggestion in Indian theories of art, will start by 
analyzing the nature of dhvani as an independent power of signification that has a socio-
cultural dimension crucial for human understanding of the world, an aspect which eludes 
conventional modes of expression;  
The third section discusses the notion “What is art?” in classical Indian thought and the 
theories that were built around this issue. Starting with the conventional theories of guṇa-
rīti-auchitya (quality-style-appropriateness) theories and their larger subsumption within 
the two larger modes of expression, realism and formalism, acknowledged since 
Bharata‟s time, Ānanda‟s idea that “art” represents the gap that opens up between an 
expression and the expressed where suggestions dwell will be elaborated;    
The fourth section will farther elaborate the above issue by indicating how dhvani alters 
the conventional theories of Indian “art” from elements which enhance the meaning of an 
artistic expression in terms of guṇa-rīti-auchitya to elements which subvert the literal 
meaning of an expression in order to bring out their underlying suggested meaningsis; in 
this connection, the idea that artistic suggestions arise by comparing reality constructed 
by artistic imagination and reality as lived by the audiences will underlie a discussion of 
the three artistic modes viz. “realism” or vastudhvani, “Formalism” or alaṅkāradhvani 
and the “direct mode” or rasadhvani will be highlighted;   
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In Part 2, which deals with the dhvani modes of expression as means of retoring full 
subjectivity to human beings, the respective roles played by the three dhvani modes of 
expression viz. vastudhvani („suggestion through realistic mode‟), alankāradvhani 
(„suggestion through formal mode‟) and rasadhvani („suggestion through direct mode‟) 
as instruments of manifesting social repressions, existential conditions and triggering 
“lost” archetypal forms, together with their associated emotions and accompanying 
mental dispositions will be elaborated by citing examples from cinema;   
The sixth and final section will discuss dhvani‟s influence on Lacan‟s thoughts on 
language acting as a rupturing device and its relation to the emergence of post-structural 
thought in the West. 
          Suggestion in Western Thought 
Ingalls notes that there is nothing in Western classical (Greek and Latin) tradition that 
corresponds to the concepts of either rasa or dhvani which have, since Ānanda and 
Abhinava‟s time, become central to Indian theories of art. He says that, except for 
Longinus and his work, On the Sublime, all classical western rhetoricians chose the path 
that Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin had chosen in the Indian context: painstakingly listing 
instances of suggestions that are directly conveyed by recognized and conventional 
“tropes” and “figures of speech” in artworks. Only Longinus had the uncanny skill of 
recognizing passages of literature that excite the reader, or, as Ingalls put it, that drive 
him to ecstasy.
653
 Noting that ancient Western artisits lacked the grand vision in which 
Ānanda and Abhinava conceived their theory of suggestion, Ingalls wistfully mentions: 
“If only Longinus had had followers, they might have worked out a critique of literature 
not unlike that of Ᾱnanda and Abhinava”.654    
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In contemporary Western literature, Edgar Allan Poe is considered to be the first 
person to have specifically used the word “suggestiveness” in his writings.655 In his 
article “Philosophy of Composition”, Poe says: “Poetry should have some amount of 
suggestiveness – some undercurrent, however indefinite, of meaning…which imparts to a 
work of art so much of that richness.”656 Poe sometimes uses the word “mystic” for the 
purpose meaning thereby “that class of composition in which there lies beneath the 
transparent upper current of meaning an under or suggestive one”.657 Talking about 
Tennyson‟s poetry, Poe says that it manifests “a suggestive indefiniteness of meaning 
with a view to bring about a definitiveness of vague and, therefore, of spiritual effect”.658 
Regarding Tennyson‟s poetry, Poe goes on to note: 
Imbue it with any determinate tone, and you, at once, deprive it of its ethereal, its 
ideal, its‟ intrinsic and essential character. You dispel its luxury of dream. You 
dispel the atmosphere of the mystic upon which it floats. You exhaust it of its 
breath of fairy. It now becomes a tangible and easily appreciable idea – a thing of 
the earth, earthy.
659
  
The emotional mood in Poe‟s own tales is captured first through horror and then the 
terror that his protagonists feel when facing sure death. In such a state where all hope is 
lost, a person is able to look death in the eye in a disengaged manner which opens up 
aspects of death that has so far remain hidden from him. In Poe‟s “A Descent into the 
Maelström”, as the helpless fisherman is swept in by a huge whirlpool which keeps 
drawing him towards the interior of the abyss, he arrives at a stage of selfless reflection 
on the abyss. Poe notes: “With nothing to gain, no reason to exert, no plan to formulate, 
no expectation to make, the sailor can do something he has never done before; he can 
look at the abyss with detachment”.660 On Poes‟ other celebrated short stories, like “The 
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Pit and the Pendulum”, “William Wilson”, or “The Fall of the House of Usher”, the art 
crtic Jaishree Odin draws a significant parallel between the states of Poes‟ characters and 
rasa: she comments that, in case of Poe, characters are mesmerized by the suggestiveness 
of death which transforms sentiments of terror into a generalized form similar to the 
generalization of sentiments experienced by the audiences in the rasa theory.
661
 What 
Odin implies is that persons undergo an experience of immersion in these states through 
the triggering of impressions of terror that lie submerged in a generalized form in the 
human subconscious. 
H. P. Grice‟s “Implicature” theory of the 1950s is arguably a contemporary theory 
of suggestion. However, it entirely lacks the philosophical dimensions that Ānanda and 
Abhinava brought to their theory and the social purposes that they made dhvani to serve 
for human beings.
662
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Illustration 5: Concepts in Ānandavardhana‟s Theory of Suggestion (Dhvani) 
Suggestion → Ānandavardhana‟s Theory of Dhvani seeks to express through suggestive 
means human expressions that remain „unspoken‟ due to various socio-cultural reasons.  
Socio-Cultural Conditions that Curtail Human Expression and the Role of Dhvani 
Human Condition of Social Repression: 
Normal Expression is blocked due to socio-cultural repression of human beings. These 
meanings are indirectly suggested by suggestive narratives generated by dhvani theory.    
Existential Crisis produced by Trauma: 
Human Beings cannot meaningfully relate to their surroundings due to trauma suffered by 
them. By artificially creating these experiences, dhvani theory seeks to make the audience 
these experiences which result in a deeper understanding of reality among them    
Human Condition of „Lost‟ Connection with Archetypal Experiences:  
Certain repetitive human experiences, together with emotions and mental dispositions  
associated with them, get detached from concrete events and remain submerged within 
human subconscious as pure forms of potentiality. These experiences, when revived by 
the dhvani modes, release overwhelming sentiments which immerse the audiences.    
Suggestive Dhvani Modes of Expressions that Restore Human Subjectivity 
Suggestion in the Realistic Mode (Vastudhvani) 
It Suggests by Comparing an artist‟s creation of reality, i.e. “state of affairs” (Vāstu) with 
reality as lived by the audiences in terms of the following criteria: Generic Form or Class 
(Jāti), Generic Characteristics of the Class (Guṇa), Typical Class Activity (Kriyā) and 
Special Property of a particular Member of the Class (Viśeṣa).    
Suggestion in the Formal Mode (Alaṅkāradhvani) 
It Suggests by Comparing through formal means an artist‟s creation of reality with reality 
as lived by the Audiences in following areas which forces them to go beyond a surface 
understanding: Simile (Upamā), Hyperbole (Atisayokti), Pun (Sleśa), and Irony (Atisleśa).   
Suggestion in the Direct Mode (Rasadhvani) 
It Suggests by Directly Evoking Archetypal Forms, which lie submerged within human 
subconscious in a generalized form, that overwhelm audiences‟ consciousness.  
263 
 
          Part 1             
        Suggestion in Indian Thought and its Role in „Arts‟        
This section would discuss how Ānanda and Abhinava reconceptualize the role of dhvani 
or suggestion in the field of Indian arts, earmarking in the process a more fundamental 
purpose for the arts.    
Suggestion as an Independent Power of Signification 
Noting that “dhvani is another meaning” (dhvanirnāma arthāntaram)663, Ᾱnanda explains 
that it manifests a suggested sense which takes precedence over the literal sense.
664
 While 
dhvani literally means “sound”, “voice” or “echo”, it represents “reverberation” as well 
as “resonance”, all of which signify a process representing “that which comes back” from 
an expression to a receiver.
665
 In keeping with the Sanskrit tradition, Abhinava explains 
the triadic signification of dhvani as “the suggestion, the suggested, and the process of 
suggestion”, which, together, generate greater comprehensibility about a situation among 
the audiences.
666
  
With the help of his celebrated example “A village on the Ganges” (gaṅgāyāṃ 
ghoṣaḥ), Ānanda demonstrates dhvani‟s power of suggestion as a means of expression 
that exceeds conventional powers of linguistic expression. Since a village cannot be 
located on a river, the “primary sense” involving the denotative power (abhidhā) is 
blocked requiring the “secondary sense” (lakṣana) to be invoked in the matter: “A village 
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on the bank of the Ganges” (gaṅgātaṭaḥghoṣaḥ). In the above context, since the author 
has deliberately used a poetic expression, his “authorial intention” (tātparya) is to bestow 
a sense of “coolness” and “serenity” on the village by evoking its association with the 
river in a more direct manner.
667
 While accepting the useful roles that the above three 
powers play in communication, Ᾱnanda holds that, in the case of the arts, however, they 
are not enough to comprehend the full extent of the experiences undergone by the 
receiver. Thus, for example, he notes that the river Ganges also suggests a sense of 
“purity” and “piety” to the devout Hindus for whom Ganges happens to be a holy river, 
an idea which is not captured by the conventional powers of a language.  
What Ānanda seeks to emphasize is the fact that the meaning of an expression is 
also suggestive depending on the socio-cultural context of its use. Thus, all expressions 
involving the Ganges do not convey “holiness” to the pious Hindus. Ingalls notes: “The 
word gaṅgā possesses suggestiveness of purity [and piety] only under certain conditions, 
not, for example, in the sentence „There are many fish in the Ganges‟ (gaṅgāyāṃ bahavo 
matsyā jīvanti).”668 In other words, suggestion arises only under certain specific 
conditions related to human beings‟ embodied and socio-cultural experiences of life. An 
interesting example in this regard is the English expression “Newcastle-upon-Tyne” 
which, arguably, has a history, but does not have a socio-cultural dimension for the 
British people as “Village on the Ganges” does for the Hindus.  
Lacan, whose admiration for Ānanda‟s dhvani theory has been noted in the last 
section of this paper, points out the importance of the socio-cultural context of an 
expression by mentioning the following example from Indian mythology:    
When Devas [gods], Maṇusa [men], and Asuras [devils] were ending their 
novitiate with Prajāpati, the God of Thunder…they addressed to him this prayer 
“Speak to us”. “Da” said Prajāpati and the Devas answered “Thou have said to us: 
Damyata, master yourself” …“Da” said Prajāpati and the Men answered “Thou 
have said to us: Datta, give”… “Da” said Prajāpati and the Asuras answered 
“Thou have said to us: Dayadhyam, be merciful” …That, continues the text, is 
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what the divine voice caused to be heard in the thunder: submission, gift, grace. 
Da, Da, Da. Prajāpati replied to all of them: “You have heard me”.669 
The above example strikingly illustrates the socio-cultural dimension of the reader‟s 
understanding of an expression. Ānanda‟s theory of suggestion seeks to unearth the 
socio-cultural contexts which lie under the surface of human expressions. In this sense, 
for Ānanda and Abhinava, dhvani becomes a meta-language in the field of arts. Pandit 
notes:  
Dhvani meaning is that which lies beyond spoken words. It is the meaning that is 
constituted by silences in midst of speech…Through dhvani, the poetic language 
reaches its condition of silence. It functions like a meta-language, generating 
many meanings by deploying collective and individual memory, latent 
impressions, and mental associations.
670
   
By bringing out that which remains suppressed within human beings, dhvani restores full 
subjectivity to human beings. According to Ānanda, the suggestive aspect of an artwork 
constitutes the basic sense of what is called “beauty” in the arts. He says: “suggestiveness 
is nowhere found without the suggested meaning being a source of beauty whereas 
secondary [literal] meaning…needn‟t necessarily have a beautiful meaning”.671 Abhinava 
clarifies that, by the experession “beautiful”, Ānanda means that which holds the 
audiences‟ attention which is generally the dhvani or the suggestive aspect of an artwork. 
In the absence of the receivers‟ attention dwelling on the suggestive means of an artwork, 
it would have a tendency to turn back and rest on the literal sense once again “like a 
common man who catches a glimpse of the divine only to lose it in the next moment.”672  
Though dhvani is initially used in explaining the aims and methods of poetry, it is 
ultimately applied to all forms of art. Hiriyanna notes: 
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This is indicated by Ānandavardhana‟s own references to other arts, like music, 
for purposes of illustration. It is clear from the nature of dhvani itself; for the 
means of suggestion need not be confined to linguistic forms, but may extend to 
the media employed in arts other than poetry.
673
  
           In the next section, what is meant by “art” in Indian theories would be discussed. 
           The Notion of “Art” in Indian Tradition 
After Bharata‟s premise that “art” is that which generates aesthetic pleasure or rasa 
among the audiences, a more detailed understanding of “What is art?” starts emerging 
from the comments made by the literary theorist Bhāmaha (c. 7th CE), who forms the first 
of a significant group of literary art critics to emerge in classical India, a process which 
continued unabated almost till the 17
th
 century CE. Bhāmaha held that art is śabdārthau 
kāvyam or art is “a combination of the expression and the expressed”.674 This pretty 
innocuous definition, however, suggests a deeper meaning: while śabda represents 
„word‟ signifying „meaning‟, artha is a “stronger word than its translation „meaning‟ 
conveys, for it implies an aim, an intention and a will” of the person using it.675 In this 
sense, artha creates a space between an expression and what it expresses in the Sanskrit 
language. In contrast to the natural sciences (śāstras), which seek to close the gap in 
order to have a tighter grip on reality, art eventually comes to be represented by the very 
gap it is able to create between the two in an artwork. The essence of this artistic process 
is evocatively captured by the literary theorist Kuntaka (c. 1000 CE): there is a “mutual 
rivalry” (parasparaspardhā) between the expression and the expressed in the arts.676 In 
this sense, the more pregnant a gap is, the more significant an artwork is assumed to be.  
 It automatically leads to the next question: what are the elements of an artistic 
expression that creates a suggestive gap between the expression and what it purports to 
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describe? The earlier critics successively held that the suggestive elements consist of 
“figures of speech” (alaṅkāras, „ornaments‟) in the field of literature - 140 of them 
having been identified till the last count – which lent a particular „quality‟ (guṇa) to the 
expressions, like the use of the word „robust‟ in a heroic tale, etc or a particular „style‟ 
(rīti) which evokes specific sentiments among the readers, like the lyrical poetry; and, 
finally, a judicious combination between the two schools to keep the suggestive elements 
within bounds of „appropriateness‟ (aucitya) in order to generate maximum effect among 
the audiences, „everything in good measure‟ being the principle of guṇa-rīti-auchitya 
school. The figures of speech and their styles are considered to create a gap between an 
expression and the expressed which connotes more than what their literal sense 
conveyed. In this way, they acted to enhance the meanings conveyed by an expression 
which, according to them, constituted “art”.  
Since Bharata had advocated two broad modes of expression in his theory of 
drama viz. realism (lokadharmī) and formalism (nāṭyadharmī),677 the literary theorists 
subsequently calling them the modes of “natural utterance” (svabhāvokti) and “oblique 
utterance” (vakrokti), the question naturally arose as to how the so far identified 
ingredients of art, e.g., figures of speech, style, etc, would fare in them. Considering that 
“art” represents a process of creating a pregnant gap between an expression and the 
expressed, a raging controversy ensued as to whether realism or “natural expression” 
(svabhāvokti) can at all be called an artistic expression, especially since it was supposed 
to close the very gap between its description of reality and reality itself. Since this debate 
throws light on an analogous debate between montage and realism in film theory, a brief 
recounting would be useful here.  
The proponents of formalism (vakrokti) had asked the question: can the following 
reportage (vārtā) of a realistic situation like “the sun has set, the moon is up, birds go to 
their nests” ever become part of an artistic expression?”678 The advocates of formalism 
held that, since an “indirect expression” involving formalism (vakrokti) necessarily 
creates space between its mode of expression and what it purports to express, it becomes 
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a natural heir to the epithet “art”. However, problems with the above line of thought 
surfaced immediately. Many oblique expressions, like “hit the nail on the head”, etc, or 
the example given by Ānanda, e.g., “A village on the Ganges”, have long become part of 
realistic day-to-day expressions.
679
 In fact, all languages have in their kitty a large 
number of such expressions which originally belonged to the formalistic repertoire but 
have since been naturalized to become a part of normal or realistic expression, used 
freely in artworks. Moreover, the literary theorist Mammaṭa (c. 11th CE,) showed that, 
depending on the differing contexts of the socio-cultural situations, the reportage “the sun 
has set” would suggest at least nine different meanings to the hearers!680 Matilal also 
notes that Kālidāsa, the doyen of Sanskrit authors, has himself used realism in midst of 
formal expressions on many occasions: 
[T]he point is that the cart driver‟s plain or vulgar language can be invested with 
beauty or obliqueness by setting it in an appropriate context. For example, in the 
Vishkambhaka in Abhijñānaśākuntalam, the fisherman‟s as well as the 
policeman‟s plain and rough and ready speech become part of an excellent 
drishyakāvya [audio-visual scene].681 
The Indian theorists ultimately came to the realization that, since the process of 
naturalization of expressions has gone on for centuries, a „pure‟ mode of expression in 
the arts does not exist anymore. This idea resulted in the acceptance of both realism and 
formalism as two legitimate forms of artistic expressions in Indian theories of art. 
“Art” as Comparison: Insight from Dhvani Theory 
            By Ānanda‟s time, the limitation of the guṇa-rīti-auchitya school had become all too 
apparent. While these schools did create a suggestive „gap‟ between an expression and 
the expressed through an appropriate combination of words and styles, the elements thus 
selected merely acted to „enhance‟ the literal sense of an expression; unearthing meanings 
lying hidden underneath an artistic expression, either by a partial or a full subvertion of 
its literal sense, was simply beyond the power of these schools. This was a severe 
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limitation in analyzing the true import of artistic expressions used by such Sanskrit 
authors as Kālidasa, Baṇa, etc, or the philosophical drives underlying the epics like 
Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. A new understanding of “what is art” was necessary to 
explore the depths reached by the above works.   
The break-through came in realizing that the gap that “art” creates between an 
expression and the expressed is not due to the quality, style, or the appropriateness of a 
given expression, but between the „reality‟ constructed by the artistic imagination and the 
reality lived by the audiences in terms of their embodied and socio-cultural practices of 
life. Through this process, the artist, by virtue of her powerful imagination, generates a 
deeper understanding of reality, generally missed by the audiences in the course of their 
hum-drum life. In other words, the „gap‟ in this new understanding of “art” arises out of 
the comparative mode between the artist‟s creation and reality. This suggestive gap is 
dhvani in Ānanda and Abhinava‟s theory of “art”.  
             Ānanda‟s Classification of Dhvani Modes of Expression 
Ānanda classifies dhvani modes of suggestion as follows: 
1. Dhvani or Dominant Suggestion where suggestion dominates the literal sense of 
an expression.  It has three forms: 
i)          Dominant Suggestion in the Realistic Mode (Vastudhvani)  
ii) Dominant Suggestion in the Formal Mode (Alaṅkāradhvani) 
iii) Direct Evocation of Rasa through Suggestion (Rasadhvani)  
2. Guṇībhūtavyañga or Subordinated Suggestion where literal sense dominates the 
suggestion 
3. Citrakāvya or Unintended Suggestion where suggestion occurs only incidentally 
in an artwork 
Even though notions of “subordinate suggestion” and “unintended suggestion” occur in 
Ānanda‟s theory, only “dominant suggestion” would be elaborated here for reasons of 
brevity.  
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Vastudhvani („Suggestion in the Realistic Mode‟) and its Application in 
Arts   
Vastudhvani (vastu, „thing‟) signifies a “realistic” mode of presenting facts, situations, 
characters, prohibitions, permissions, etc, through an accumulation (samuccaya) of 
significant details called the “factuals” (vāstava) in Indian aesthetic theories.682 These 
accumulations by the artist - ideally comprising of a genera or class (jāti), general 
characteristics of the class (guṇa), typical acts performed by the class (kriyā) and special 
properties of a particular member of the class (dravya, viśeṣa) – helps her to construct a 
reality much richer in insight and details into reality than what the audiences are able to 
grasp from the world in terms of their embodied and socio-cultural experiences of living 
there.
683
  
The very first sequence in Satyajit Ray‟s Paras Pathar (The Philosopher‟s Stone, 
1957) may be analyzed in terms of the four characteristics mentioned above as the bench 
mark of realistic suggestion viz. class, typical characteristics, typical act, and a special act 
which further reveals the nature of a character. Paresh Chandra Dutta (Tulsi Chakraborty) 
is a bank clerk who is waiting for the lift at the end of office. As his colleague joins in the 
wait, Dutta informs him that he has received a lay-off notice recently. As the lift comes 
up and they are about to enter, senior officers arrive on the scene for whom they 
immediately make space. Dutta‟s colleague even hurriedly removes his umbrella from the 
lift cage as if that would have stopped the lift from moving. As the lift gate is being 
closed, a junior officer appears on the scene and the gate opens again. The lift finally 
leaves with this full contingent, leaving Dutta and his colleague behind. In this scene, 
Ray accumulates significant details of the class (jāti) to which Dutta and his firend 
belong, the general characteristics (guṇa) of this class as revealed through their normal 
banter, typical acts performed by this class (kriyā), like giving way when the managerial 
class arrives and the special property of certain members of this class (viśeṣa), like the 
hanging of their umbrellas in the lift cage. Together these details suggest a class 
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difference prevailing in the society which turns Dutta and his friend into a mere cog-in-
the-wheel in the system.  
Alaṅkāradhvani („Suggestion in the Formal Mode‟) and its Application 
in Arts 
Alaṅkāradhvani or Formalism (vakrokti) suggests by comparing between the artistic 
imagination of a phenomenon and the audiences‟ experiences of reality, the point of 
„formalism‟ being that the artistic creation of an “event” essentially remains 
„incomparable‟ to the audiences habitual experiences of life. In this sense, when 
compared, they form a montage of discontinuities which forces the audiences to break the 
boundaries of realistic understanding of phenomenon in order to make sense of the 
artist‟s presentation. In this processs, the Indian theorists hold that formalism employs the 
following four comparative modes to suggest „new‟ meanings to the audiences: simile 
(upamā), hyperbole (atiśayokti), pun (śleṣa) and irony (atiśleṣa). Thus, simile (upamā) 
suggests by comparing two substantially different things. For example, when Robert 
Burns compares love with red rose to say that “My Luve‟s is like a red, red rose” or 
Daṇḍin compares a lady‟s face with the moon to utter “The moon of her face, slightly 
flushed with drinks, rivals the moon ruddy above the eastern hills”, they are essentially 
using simile to compare two essentially incomparable things. In this process, the artist is 
not trying to say that the items are identical, but to make the audiences compare some of 
the elements occurring in one with the other in order to suggest new things to the 
audiences.
684
 Hyperbole (atiśayokti) suggests by exaggerating forms of comparison. 
Sandburg‟s following example “They built a skyscraper so tall they they had to put 
hinges on the two top stories so as to let the moon pass”685 essentially suggests height of 
the new construction to the audiences through this exaggerated comparison. Pun (śleṣa) 
suggests through a derogatory comparison between two things or situations. Thus, a 
Court Jester produces pun (śleṣa) by comparing two essentially in-comparables things 
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derogatorily, thereby generating meaningful suggestions for the audiences. Irony 
(atiśleṣa) is considered to be an extreme form of pun (śleṣa) in Indian theories.686   
In Ritwik Ghatak‟s Meghe Dhaka Tara (The Cloud-Capped Star, 1960), Nita 
(Supriya Choudhury) comes to her lover Sanat‟s (Niranjan Ray) room only to realize that 
her younger sister Gita (Gita Ghatak) is present in the next room. Feeling betrayed, she 
walks out of the room. As she comes down the staircase clutching her throat, camera 
captures her anguished face from low angle. Ghatak‟s picturisation of the scene is 
extremely evocative. A shot, taken from a low angle just below her chin as she comes 
down the stairs clutching her throat and looking straight ahead, essentially evokes a 
comparison between her face with that of a devi or a goddess. Audiences hear repeated 
whiplash on the soundtrack signifying Neeta‟s extreme anguish at her betrayal.  
Eisenstein on Comparative Mode in Cinema: Complementarity of Realism and 
Formalism  
Eisenstein holds that cinema is essentially a representational medium which primarily 
generates meaning by comparison for the audiences:  
I should call cinema the art of comparisons because it shows not facts but 
conventional (photographic) representations…For the exposition of even the 
simplest phenomena, cinema needs comparison (by means of consecutive, 
separate presentations) between the elements which constitute it: montage is 
fundamental to cinema, deeply grounded in the conventions of cinema and the 
corresponding characteristics of perception.
687
  
More interestingly, however, Eisenstein holds that both realistic and montage modes of 
expression are complimentary in cinematic representations. While montage generates 
„new‟ meaning by juxtaposing two or more discontinuous pieces, Eisenstein clarifies that 
the process is dependent on the fact that the two pieces must be represented realistically. 
It is only when the audiences are able to gather their meanings in terms of their 
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experiences of life, would they be able to construct a „new‟ meaning from their 
juxtaposition. Eisenstein notes: 
Whereas in theatre an effect is achieved primarily through the physiological 
perception of an actually occurring fact (e.g., a murder), in cinema, it is made up 
of the juxtaposition and accumulation in the audiences‟ psyche of associations 
that the film‟s purpose requires, associations that are aroused by the separate 
elements of the stated fact, associations that produce, albeit tangentially, a similar 
(and often stronger) effect only when taken as a whole.
688
   
What Eisenstein is essentially saying is that the idea of an action in cinema is generated 
by the accumulation of distinct pieces of the act represented in realistic terms which 
suggest to the audiences the total act through the montage process.  
This is exactly similar to the idea occurring in the Indian theories that realism in 
arts operates through an accumulation of significant details which help the artist to 
construct phenomena on the basis of her own imagination. Similarly, the Soviet 
filmmakers‟ notion of montage represents a form of formalism which is akin to the Indian 
concept of formalism or vakrokti in many respects. Thus, while the juxtaposition of 
„discontinuous‟ pieces of reality creates a „new‟ meaning among the audiences, in the 
Indian theories, the very „incompatibility‟ between the artist‟s construction and reality 
creates a „disconitnuity‟ in montage terms for the audiences to make sense from them.  
In a striking anticipation of Eisenstein‟s thoughts on cinema, Abhinava notes that 
realistic modes of expression act “like a wall” on which formalistic expressions are 
inscribed, thereby pointing out, like Eisenstein, that the two modes are necessarily co-
extensive in the field of arts.    
Rasadhvani („Suggestion through Direct Evocation of Rasa‟) and its 
Application in Arts 
As far as the mode representing „direct evocation of rasa‟ (rasadhvani) is concerned, it is 
a significant innovation on the part of Indian aesthetes which remains largely unknown to 
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the West. While early Indian thoughts on arts were restricted to the realistic and 
formalistic modes of expression alone, the arrival on the scene of the School of Kashmir 
Śaivism (c. 6th CE), to which, arguably, Ānanda, and certainly Abhinava belongs, 
brought considerable psychological depth to Indian thoughts on arts. The process of 
direct evocation signifies the evocation of a state of immersion among the audiences 
where certain archetypal experiences, which remain submerged within them, are directly 
revived by means of appropriate clues used by an artist. When the emotions associated 
with such experiences together with the mental disposition that the experience had 
originally created in the receiver are revived, they tend to overwhelm the audiences‟ 
sensibilities completely. In the sense, the process has been called a „direct evocation of 
rasa‟ is because these experiences are directly triggered by an audio or visual notes or 
images which may not have anything to do with the narrative as such. Thus, for instance, 
the view of the sea, a single musical note, a lock of hair falling on a forehead, etc, may be 
enough to revive archetypal experiences submerged within the audiences irrespective of 
the meaning that this image may have in the narrative context of a film. While noting that 
both realism and formalism are capable of throwing up such suggestive pieces, the inner 
mechanism of this process, together with examples from cinema, will be discussed in 
greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.     
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           Part 2 
             Dhvani as Means of Restoring „Full‟ Subjectivity 
In the following sections, specific uses of dhvani as an instrument of restoring „full‟ 
subjectivity to human beings, a role envisaged by Ānanda for the arts, would be 
discussed.  
It has already been indicated that Ānanda reserves a much larger and deeper role 
for dhvani modes of expression in his theory of “arts” than has been done so far by the 
previous critics. This new role is to subvert literal sense of expressions on the surface to 
reach senses which are suppressed within them. Ānanda pitches dhvani exactly at this 
juncture where it acts as an effective instrument of socio-cultural transgression in order to 
give voice to the voiceless, thereby restoring “full” word to them. In this connection, 
even though all dhvani modes are capable of subverting social practices or conditions that 
truncate human subjectivity, Ānanda holds that some of them are more effective in 
certain areas than others. Their specific areas of application are being discussed below.  
Vastudhvani and Narrative Construction: Negotiating Socio-Cultural 
Repression  
Ānanda considers vastudhvani to be more effective in combating cases of sexual 
repressions. Pandit notes its efficacy: 
Abhinava and Ānanda‟s selection of examples revolves around the subject of 
prohibition, transgression, and other such contextual conditions as motivations for 
denial, negation, and foreclosure.
689
    
The very first example of dhvani that Ānanda mentions is as follows: 
                                             Go your rounds freely, gentle monk 
                           The little dog is gone; 
                           Just today a fearsome lion had emerged from the thickets of Godā 
                           And killed him
690
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The above is a Prakrit free verse (muktaka) which has generally been interpreted as 
follows: a young girl, in the habit of meeting her paramour in the thickets of the river 
Godāvari, has been disturbed recently by a monk frequenting the thicket in search of 
flowers. Under the garb of a „friendly‟ permission, she is actually suggesting to the monk 
not to go there anymore! It is a suggestion which fully subverts (atyantatiraskṛta) the 
literal sense of the expression.  
The question is how does one know not to take her expression at its face value? 
Noting that nothing in the poem tells us that the speaker is a woman, that her place of 
rendezvous is the thicket, and that the main point of her advice is to keep the mendicant 
away, Pollock says: 
Evidently, unless the poem is embedded in a more complete context…that 
supplements the sign system in use, there can be no access to the implication, let 
alone its significance, that is the dhvani.
691
 
Pollock notes the following characteristics of narrative construction in classical India:  
The linguistic theory of suggestion that the above example illustrates…does 
nothing to help us grasp what we really need to grasp in order to understand this 
verse. We should note at once, too, that the absence of its semantic core is no 
peculiarity of this verse, but is actually fundamental to vastudhvani poetry (and, 
in a more general sense, to much of Sanskrit poetry)…692  
In other words, the semantic core of the narrative constructed by the artist necessarily 
remains loose for the audiences to make meaning from them by filling out details in the 
light of their habitual experiences of life, a practice on this basis of which Indian epics 
and other social texts have „grown‟ in India.  
In the above connection, Pollock notes that we construct the basic premise of the 
above poem from the fact that “the gender relations that constitute the social world of 
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Prakṛit poetry demand that it is always the woman, never the man who organizes 
adultery”.693 For grasping the essential meaning of the verse, the construction of an 
appropriate narrative becomes incumbent on the readers. Thus, Mahimbhaṭṭa (c. 11th CE,  
Nyāya scholar), constructs the narrative as follows: “A certain woman, hungry for the 
sweet pleasure of undisturbed lovemaking, has made a rendezvous with some lucky 
fellow in a deserted forest spot alive with bees attracted by the sweet-smelling 
flowers”.694 In contrast, Hemacandra Suri (c. 11th CE, Jaina scholar), constructs a 
narrative in following terms: “A certain loose woman is always leaving her house, under 
the pretext of fetching water from the river, in order to meet her lover in a thicket on the 
bank of Godāvarī river”.695 While Lacan admires the idea of the lion in it viz. “The 
absence of the lion may thus have as much effect as his spring would have were he 
present, for the lion only springs once, says the proverb appreciated by Freud”,696 
Mahimabhaṭṭa finds it extremely “inappropriate” (anucita) that a majestic animal like the 
lion would kill a dog: “I have given this a lot of thought and still cannot figure out the 
poet‟s intention”; in despair, he changes the lion to a “fierce bear”‟!697  
Ānanda‟s second example of vastudhvani in Dhanyāloka is even more interesting: 
                              My mother-in-law sleeps here and I there, 
                              Look well, traveler, when it is light; 
                              For, by mistake, you should not fall into my bed, 
                              When it is night.
698
  
In contrast to the earlier verse where the speaker is suggesting a prohibition under the 
garb of a friendly permission, here exactly the opposite happens: the young wife is 
suggesting permission under the garb of a stern prohibition! In order to make the 
narrative more „meaningful‟, the literary theorist, Rudraṭa (c. 7th CE), freely adds a father-
in-law, a domestic help, and an absent husband to the verse: 
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      That‟s where my aged mother sleeps, 
                                          And there sleeps daddy, the oldest man you‟ve met; 
                                          Here sleeps the domestic help worn out by her chores during the day, 
                                          And here sleep I, who must be guilty to deserve, 
                                          These days of absence of my lord.
699
 
Rudraṭa concludes: “With these words, the youthful wife conveyed to the traveler his 
opportunity”!700  
Vastudhvani and Narrative Construction in Bollywood Cinema 
Since India has always swayed between erotic and ascetic ideals, with the austere schools 
like Buddhism, Advata Vedānta, etc, recommending shunning the sensuous as being a 
hindrance to higher contemplation, other schools, like Kashmir Śaivism, advocate that the 
erotic experience is essential for gaining control over worldly affairs. In midst of such a 
controversy, the contemplation of an erotic female form has always posed a challenge in 
India.
701
 The Bollywood film industry has developed strategies to counter social 
objections by suggestive means that has come to form an essential part of its very 
filmmaking process. Through this process, it creates an „idealized moral universe‟ that 
upholds the austere „official‟ line and then subverts it through narrative suggestions that 
escape the grasp of moral censures of the society just like authors of prakṛit free verses 
do in Ānanda‟s theory.702 Since erotic song and dances often represent such moments of 
subversion, Kasbekar notes: 
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The paradigmatic moments of song and dance mark a shift of registers that places 
them well within the realm of fantasy, and frees and distances these moments of 
spectacle from the syntagmatic narrative.
703
      
In other words, Bollywood strategically separates the „moral universe‟ from the 
„voyeuristic universe‟ with such erotic displays often representing performances within 
performances in which the film spectators are merely “looking at looking”, i.e. they are 
perforce required to „look‟ at the film diegetically without being personally involved in it. 
This process essentially subscribes to the idea that, in such cases, the film spectators are 
“forced” to look at something they don‟t morally approve: “any erotic voyeurism on the 
part of the film spectator is disavowed by the deliberate mediation of a diegetic 
spectator”.704 By remaining sympathetically identified with protagonists who are morally 
upright, the audiences are also able to absolve themselves from any vicarious intentions 
on their part. In this sense, even when vamps or cabaret dancers directly wink at the 
audiences, as happens in some Bollywood films, they are supposed to be winking at the 
diegetic spectator but not the real person occupying the seat!  
In Romesh Sharma‟s New Delhi Times (1986), Vikas Pande (Shashi Kapoor), the 
upright editor of the newspaper, who is investigating a case of political corruption and 
murder, meets an underground informant Anwar in a sleazy restaurant where a cabaret is 
in progress. The very positioning of Pande, Anwar, and the cabaret dancer in the film is 
significant. While a pipe smoking, neatly dressed Pande sits in a manner where his back 
is turned to the dancer, Anwar, in a dress typical of the lower strata, faces the dancer. 
While the audiences‟ identification with Pande absolves them from any voyeuristic intent 
on their part, they are, however, „looking at looking‟ of Anwar as he lasciviously laps up 
the dancer through his male gaze as well as when they partake of the dancer‟s erotic body 
as the camera cuts close to her. Arguably, Ānanda and Abhinava would have entirely 
approved of the suggestive strategy that Bollywood adopts today! Like the Prakrit verses, 
the Bollywood film narrations are often loose, meandering, and even downright illogical 
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at times which serves very well the purpose of foregrounding of female eroticism through 
suggestive means to the audiences.   
Alaṅkāradhvani: Negotiating Trauma   
In Dhvanyāloka, Ānanda assigns alaṅkāradhvani the role of engaging with the existential 
crisis faced by human beings as he starts dealing with Indian epics like Rāmāyaṇa and 
Mahābhārata and Sanskrit classics of Kālidāsa, Bāna, Sudraka and others. While an act is 
considered „meaningful‟ only when it engages in a „goal-directed‟ or „purposeful‟ 
activity, the question is what happens when a person has lost sense of such „goals‟ in his 
life? In such a state, the person finds his surrounding to be “meaningless” and hence fails 
to engage with it. In view of such a traumatic experience, Hamlet dithers in taking action 
against his mother and uncle, as happens to Arjuna, the mythical fighter from the Indian 
epic Mahābhārata, who lays down his arms in order not to fight the very same people he 
has revered and cherished all his life.   
Trauma, from the Greek root traumat meaning „wound‟, started being theorized in 
modern times since the clinical experiments of Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, 
Sigmund Freud, and Josef Bauer who understood it as a case of extreme psychic distress, 
earlier called “hysteria” in the medical annals.705 It affects individuals in a manner that 
detaches them from their personal memories, leading to a state of extreme helplessness in 
believing that no action is possible which subdue their instinctual responses to danger as 
well as normal activities of life. It is generally believed that for the individual to come 
back to normal life, a traumatic re-enactment or traumatic recall is necessary, the 
process being to construct a story around the trauma which would mean something to the 
individual rather than a story neutrally told to him.
706
 This process is expected to 
transform his traumatic memory into a narrative memory having a therapeutic value for 
the individual concerned. An important finding is that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), as trauma is medically called, is: “The product not of trauma in itself, but of 
trauma and culture acting together. PTSD is, thus, the product of a particular cultural 
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situation, and not an inherent disease.”707 The trauma of partition inflicted on the 
filmmaker Ritwik Ghatak may be well understood along these lines. The condition of 
trauma has raised another important question: is it a personal phenomenon which 
universally occurs among all human beings as Freud has claimed or is it caused by 
cataclysmic events uniquely happening to individuals located in particular history and 
culture? Critics today favor the latter.
708
 
A cinematic example of a „traumatic‟ state occurs in Deleuze‟s notion of “time-
image” in contrast to “movement-image”, the latter being characterized by “coherence of 
filmic space and temporal causality” in which characters have a clear direction of moving 
forward as against the “time-image” where the characters neither have any clear-cut goal 
nor of any action that can lead to such a goal.
709
 In such cases, bereft of causality, while 
the characters subjectively experience time passing, they do not experience any kind of 
causal movement as such. In this connection, Deleuze‟s distinction between action-image 
as movement-image and crystal-image as time-image is interesting. Thus, talking about 
spaces in Tarkovsky‟s films, Deleuze notes: 
There are crystallized spaces, when the landscape becomes hallucinatory…What 
characterizes these spaces is that they cannot be explained in a simple spatial way. 
They imply non-localizable relations. These are direct presentations of time. We 
no longer have an indirect image of time which derives from movement, but a 
direct time-image from which movement derives…we have a chronic non-
chronological time which produces movements necessarily “abnormal”, 
essentially “false”.710      
Tarkovsky‟s characters generally roam in such crystalline spaces in which Cartesian co-
ordinates of space and time have been lost. Having been deprived of a measurable sense 
of space from which a measurable sense of time can emerge, these characters dwell only 
in a generalized sense of time that Deleuze evocatively calls “chronic non-chronological 
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time”.711 This generates an experience for the audiences that do not depend on space but 
on time alone, echoing Hamlet‟s existential lament “time is out of joint”. 
In the Wash Sequence in Andrei Tarkovasky‟s Zerkalo (Mirror, 1974), the first 
identifiable dream sequence in the film occurs in black & white. A small child gets up 
from bed and utters „papa‟ as an owl hoots and a mysterious sound is heard. As he stands 
in the doorway of an adjoining room, an uncanny scene confronts him. His father is 
helping his mother wash her hair in a basin. However, as the mother straightens up in 
slow motion and makes flapping gestures with her arms almost like a ritual dance, the 
camera zooms out to reveal another room in a flat where neither the father nor the 
washbasin is there. As water streams keep rolling down its walls and plasters keep falling 
from its ceiling, the flooded floor remains lit by a gas stove.  
Skakov notes that the uniqueness of this sequence lies in its “doubling of the 
double”: the mother looks into the camera like a mirror, then the camera by-passes her to 
reveal an actual mirror; we, however, see the mother‟s reflection in the mirror as an old 
woman (played by Tarkovsky‟s real mother, Maria Ivanovna).712 Even though there is no 
actual action-movement here since we still notice the same streams of water flowing 
down the walls and the same glow from the stove, there is a temporal progression in 
Tarkovsky‟s imagination where the young mother is meeting her old self. We then see 
the aged mother touching her own reflection on the mirror‟s surface. This dream episode 
sequencing a flash forward imagination ends with the shot of a hand placed against the 
fire.
713
 In this sequence, the immanent plane slides from child Tarkovsky‟s memory to 
adult Tarkovsky‟s imagination, its trigger being the abnormality of space being signaled 
by the transition from a room in their summer house to a room in their Moscow flat. The 
hallucinatory aspect of this new space transports the scene to a poetic domain where 
experience of present time when compared with an imaginary space constructed by the 
filmmaker doubles up with the character‟s memory of the past generates a new sense of 
experience among the audiences. In Tarkovsky‟s words, one feels “time pressure” in 
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these images without experiencing any “movement pressure” in the scene, their 
comparison yielding new experiences and insights about reality among the audiences.  
Rasadhvani: Negotiating Archetypal Experiences  
Rasadhvani is an autonomous state independent of the other two suggestive modes with 
the proviso that they may, as so often happens, trigger the rasadhvani stage. In essence, it 
signifies the arousal of an affective state from deep within the audience‟s own sub-
conscious where they remain stored. This state represents the triggering of certain 
archetypal forms and their associated emotions and affects which, due to their endless 
repetition in human experience, have lost their connection to specific events and have 
merged to generate pure forms of potentiality in the human sub-conscious. Once 
triggered, these archetypal experiences produce states of overpowering sentiments among 
the audiences. Since these experiences may be revived independently of the 
developments occurring in the narrative, Ᾱnanda and Abhinava hold that rasadhvani may 
be achieved equally through either the modes of realism and formalism.   
Noting that mythologies are the site for such archetypal forms, Ritwik Ghatak 
makes the following important connection between archetypal images and cinema:  
Take, for instance, the question of the archetype. Even before man became 
human, the social collective unconscious, the storehouse of collective memory 
beyond consciousness, had formed itself. It is the source of all our deepest 
feelings. And some fundamental symbols (archetypes) determine our reaction to 
various things. Most of our spontaneous reactions have their roots there. And the 
archetypes always find their way into images in the form of symbols.
714
     
Noting that one such image is the naked image of the Mother which is even present in the 
deep caves of the Pyrenes, he mentions its overarching influence in the Bengali culture: 
“This mother archetype has penetrated our society in its every pore. All the songs of 
Agamani and Bijaya from Bengal, the deeper aspects of our folktales, bear witness to 
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this.”715 Ghatak recommends that the ultimate basis for judging films should lie in a 
film‟s ability to connect with these archetypal images and their associated emotions in a 
particular society.
716
 In other words, for him, an image should not only give information 
or portray this or that individual, but connote much more by linking up with the collective 
unconscious of the society at large. In this connection, he had been deeply influenced by 
the theory of Carl Gustave Jung,
717
 whose theory of the collective unconscious is based 
on the Yoga theory mentioned in chapter 4.
718
  
Ghatak mentions certain examples from cinema in order to illustrate his point of 
view. Thus, the character of the Tramp in Chaplin‟s films, the character of Indir Thakrun 
(Chunibala Devi) in Satyajit Ray‟s Pather Panchali (Song of the Little Road, 1955), or 
the character of the Priest (Francesco Rabal) in Luis Buñuel‟s Nazarin (1959) represent 
archetypal forms capable of stirring the audiences profoundly from within themselves.
719
 
The oft-repeated image of a man (Andrei Gorchakov played by Oleg Yankovsky) with a 
dog sitting in a water-soaked space in Nostalghia (Nostalgia, 1983) is an archetypal 
image representing certain experiences residing deep down within the audiences‟ 
subconscious which they have „forgotten‟ which connects with the audiences‟ inner 
beings.            
         Dhvani and Lacan‟s Post-Structural Thought 
Ᾱnanda‟s theory of dhvani or suggestion has certain striking similarities with post-
structural thoughts in the West. Freud, and especially Lacan‟s notion of language is 
motivated by the unconscious having a subversive role in rupturing the structural 
„closure‟ of an expression:   
Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence, something stumbles. 
Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the 
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unconscious…What occurs, what is produced in this gap, is presented as the 
discovery. It is in this way that the Freudian exploration first encounters what 
occurs in the unconscious.
720
 
Lacan replaces the Cartesian thought “I think therefore I am” with the enigmatic 
expression “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think”.721 In going 
beyond thinking “the unconscious merely acts [as] the seat of instincts”,722 he says that 
poetic expressions “signify something quite other that what it says”. In this sense, artistic 
expressions „disguise the thought‟ of the subject much more effectively that the Freudian 
processes of slip of tongue, etc.
723
 By holding that artistic expressions have great power 
to circumvent social censure,
724
 Lacan recommends a renewed technique of 
interpretation of the symbolic effects in a carefully calculated fashion as means of 
restoring “full word” to the subjects,725 described by Freud as “I must come to the place 
where that was”.726 In this venture, Lacan acknowledges his debt to Ānanda‟s theory of 
dhvani and “the teaching of Abhinavagupta (tenth century)” thus:727  
In this regard, we could take note of what the Hindu tradition teaches about 
dhvani, in the sense that this tradition stresses the property of speech by which it 
communicates what it does not actually say. Hindu tradition illustrates this by a 
tale whose ingenuousness, which appears to be the usual thing in these examples, 
shows itself humorous enough to induce us to penetrate the truth that it 
conceals.
728
  
In the above sense, Indian theories appear to have played critical roles in the formation 
both Structuralist and Poststructuralist thoughts in the West during the „60s and the „70s. 
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Illustration 6: Principles of Knowledge in Classical Indian Theories – At a Glance 
Nyāya Theory of Perception (Pratyakṣa) 
In the Nyāya Theory, a Unit of Perception is represented by the following Equations 
each of which throw a different light on various aspects of the Perceptual Process:  
Meaning   =     Referent     +     Mode of Appearance 
Embodied Sense   =    Referent    +     Mode of Presentation 
The Nyāya Perceptual Formula, stretched to its full, assumes the following Form: 
Meaning  =    Referent  +  Mode of Appearance +  Mode of Presentation 
The above valuations lead to the Fundamental Formula of Nyāya: 
Qualifier + Qualificand + Relationship = Unit of Perception 
Bharata‟s Theory of Aesthetic Experience (Rasa) 
A.  Levels of Audience Identification with an Artwork: 
Sympathic Identification occurs at the Fictional, Perceptual-Cognitive, Narrative and 
Action Modes of a Play and Empathic Identification with the Focus of the Play 
B.  Evocation of a Corresponding Affective State among the Audiences: 
The witnessing of a Purposeful Activity in the Play evokes a corresponding Affective State 
among the Audiences which brings their Body at par with their Consciousness, enabling 
them to Experience a Scene as a Cognitive Whole 
C. Bharata‟s Two-Stage Formula of Unit of Enactment within a Play:  
1
st
 Stage: Audiences in a particular Mode of Identification witness a “Goal-directed 
Activity” in a Play → 
   Determinant + Consequent + Transient → Evoking an  Affective State among Audiences 
2
nd
 Stage: Audiences in a Mode of Identification and Affect witness the Play → 
        Determinant + Consequent + Transient → Production of Rasa among Audiences 
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D.  Production of Aesthetic Experience (Rasa) among the Audiences: 
     Aesthetic Relish  =   Enigmas occurring within Narratives constructed by Artworks 
           (Bhoga)               generate a Mode of Enquiry among the Audiences Consciousness 
                                       which, together with its corresponding Affective State evoked 
                                       within them, produces an Experience of Sensuous Plesure among 
                                       them  
Aesthetic Saturation =  Once a Narrative Enigma is resolved, it generates a Mode of Rest 
         (Rasavat)              in the Audiences‟ Consciousness which, together with its evoked 
                                      Affective State, produces an Expereince of Repose among them       
Aesthetic Immersion = Artisitc Cues used within an Artwork revive Archetypal 
       (Samāveśa)            Experiences, together with Emotions and Mental Dispositions 
                                      associated with those Experiences, long held suppressed in the 
                                      Audience  Subconscious, which release Overwhelming 
                                      Sentiments that generates a Mode of Immersion among Audiences 
Ānandavardhana‟s Theory of Suggestion (Dhvani) 
Suggestion in Realistic Mode  Suggestion in Formal Mode Suggestion in Direct Mode 
          (Vāstudhvani)                          (Alaṅkāradhvani)                    (Rasadhvani) 
Realistic Comparison between    Formal Comparison between       Reviving Archetypal  
Artistic Imagination of Reality    Artistic Imagination of Reality    Experiences, together   
and Reality as Lived by the          and Reality as Lived by the         with Emotions and   
Audiences in terms of the            Audiences in terms creating a     Mental Dispositions  
following Factors:                        montage of „discontinuity‟          associated with such  
Genera (Jāti), Property (Guṇa),   within the following Factors:      Experiences, from   
Property (Guṇa),                          Simile (Upamā),                          within the Audiences‟ 
Action (Kārya) and                      Hyperbole (Atiśayokti)                Subconscious  
Special Property (Viśeṣa)            Pun (Śleṣa) and  
                                                     Irony (Atiśleṣa) 
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In conclusion, it may be mentioned that, Ānanda and Abhinava identify a much larger 
role for the “arts” than what Indian tradition had prescribed so far, the primary function 
of art now being to restore “full word” to individuals whose subjectivity has been 
truncated due to various socio-cultural reasons, primarily involving social repression, 
trauma, and lost connection with certain archetypal experiences. In this connection, the 
notion of dhvani or suggestive means which bring out meanings and experiences lying 
under the surface is a revolutionary thought that is far ahead of its time whether in the 
East or in the West. In this sense, for Ānanda, who classifies the dhvani modes of 
expression as basically three, each of the dhvani modes acts as the most potent instrument 
of socio-cultural subversion in the following areas: vastudhvani („dominant suggestion in 
the realistic mode‟) in unearthing socio-cultural oppression, alaṅkāradhvani („dominant 
suggestion in the expressive mode‟) in bringing individuals face-to-face with social 
trauma suffered by them and the existential condition it breeds in them and rasadhvani 
(„direct suggestion in an affective mode‟) in reviving archetypal experiences suppressed 
within human subconscious which overwhelm them with the emotions and dispositions 
associated with such experiences. In this sense, Ānanda and Abhinava‟s ideas 
reconstitute the notion of “art” in Indian theories: “art” represents the initiation of a 
comparative mode among the audiences between reality as constructed by artistic 
imagination and reality as lived by the audiences which generates suggestions that 
triggers a much deeper understanding of the existential conditions suffered by human 
beings in the world.   
Above Indian authors succeed in showing that artworks engage human beings at a 
much deeper level of their being than visualized so far, an idea which has won them 
psychoanalyst admirers like Lacan and others. In this first ever full-scale application of 
the dhvani theory to cinema, the new directions chalked out by Ānanda and Abhinava 
provide new tools in the hands of analysts to understand cinema at a much deeper level 
than have been attempted so far.    
__________________________ 
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     Chapter 6 
      Cinema and Alternate Methodology 
        A Case for “Piecemeal” Theorizing and “Local” Solutions 
 
                 In film studies, as in its literary counterpart, “method” has been largely synonymous  
                 to what is known as the „interpretative school”.  
                          -------- David Bordwell 
Does the preceding discussion help deepen our understanding of cinema? While this 
thesis does not aim at producing an alternate theory of cinema, it constructs “piecemeal 
theories” to provide a platform for theorizing experiences which occurs at the most basic 
level of engaging with cinema. In this sense, these theories help expand our current 
understanding of the cinematic process. This research does not intend to replace the 
understanding reached through hundred years of film discourse, but to enrich it in places 
where it lacks clarity. The new “methodology” being advocated here points out certain 
inconsistencies, absences, and lacks in the existing discourse which help us to reach a 
more meaningful understanding of cinema.   
This expanded understanding has been achieved by looking at cinema from two 
alternate viewpoints – phenomenology and classical Indian theories – none of which have 
been part of any serious film discussion till recently. Even when undertaken, they have 
either been done sporadically, as in the case of classical Indian theories, or have remained 
confined to a select group of experts, as in the case of phenomenology. And yet these 
theories unfailingly point out certain “wild meanings” occurring under the surface which 
significantly influence our rational and ideological understanding of cinema. Merleau-
Pontian Phenomenology and Classical Indian Theory of Nyāya are able to identify these 
“wild meanings” because they generally follow an embodied path to understand the 
world. In contrast, the world has so far been understood in an “objective” scientific 
manner which debars any kind of subjectivity to enter into its calculations. Even the 
Kantian theory, which departed from such “objective” understanding of the world,  used 
“subjectivity” in terms of certain à priori body-neutral “categories of understanding”, like 
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the categories of three-dimensional space, linear time, etc, modeled on the Newtonian 
worldview, which are generally body-neutral in their import. In this context, both 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and Nyāya theory seek to understand reality in terms of 
human beings‟ lived experiences of the world, the experiences being based on human 
beings‟ embodied experiences of the world and the socio-cultural practices built around 
them. In this sense, this process is neither fully “objective”, as in science, nor fully 
“subjective”, as in Kant, but is a “subjective-objective” process where the body‟s lived 
experiences of reality constitutes one‟s understanding of the world existing “out there”. 
These meanings, which Merleau-Ponty most aptly calls “wild meanings”, have sadly 
been ignored by contemporary film theories, resulting in a perceptible impoverishment of 
their theoretical process.    
Since this is an effort which brings diverse thoughts under one roof, it represents, 
in terms of the film theorist Noël Carroll, a “piecemeal” and “bottoms up” process that 
provide “local” solutions to some “local” problems.729 Reacting against the notion of a 
“totalizing” and “top down” grand theory, Carroll notes: 
It attempts to answer all our questions concerning filmic phenomena in terms of a 
unified theoretical vocabulary with a set of limited laws (primarily concerned 
with subject positioning) that are applied virtually like axioms. In contrast, I favor 
theorizing that is “piecemeal” and “bottom up”. That is where contemporary film 
theory presents itself as the The Theory of Film, I prefer to propose film theories 
– e.g., a theory of suspense, a theory of camera movement, a theory of Art 
Cinema, etc. – with no presumption that these small-scale theories will add up to 
one big picture some day.
730
       
This is exactly what this research seeks to achieve with the help of a single agenda: after 
the high intellectualization of the existing film theories, which had generally left ordinary 
audiences and their normal experiences of cinema out of their reckoning, all the issues 
being raised and discussed here would have the effect of bringing them to the center of 
academic discussion for a more meaningful, down-to-earth understanding of cinema.    
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This chapter would recapitulate the “piece-meal” findings of alternate methodology in the 
following sections.  
First, a brief discussion of the gaps in the existing film discourse, detailed in chapter 1, 
will be undertaken.  
Secondly, phenomenology‟s potential contribution to cinema in perceiving an embodied 
and socio-culturally conditioned cognition of “objects” and “relation between objects”, 
detailed in chapter 2, will be briefly mentioned. In this connection, Merleau-Ponty‟s 
notions of synaesthetic perception involving vision-touch equivalence and chiasm 
involving subjective-objective alterations will be highlighted.   
Thirdly, while recapitulating Nyāya theory of perception, detailed in chapter 3, 
perception of “objects” and “relation between objects” will be highlighted together with 
the roles that “intentional consciousness”, “modes of appearance” and “modes of 
presentation” play in them. In this connection, the constitution of “invariable sequences”, 
“universals” and “classes” in perception in Nyāya will be indicated.  
Fourthly, it will be pointed out how Bharata‟s theory of drama, detailed in chapter 4, 
introduces the twin concept of the audiences‟ identification with an artwork and the 
evocation of a corresponding affective state among them which help the audiences to 
respond to a scene as a unified whole in terms of both their consciousness and their body. 
This whole process, which leads to the production of various aesthetic experiences 
among the audiences, called the rasas, which has rich application in cinema, will be 
indicated.  
Fifthly, and finally, while recapitulating Ānadavardhana‟s theory of dhvani or suggestion, 
detailed in chapter 5, the role of suggestion as a metalanguage in artworks, which acts as 
the means of voicing untold human experiences, suppressed due to the occurrence of 
various socio-cultural conditions, which acts as means of restoring “full” subjectivity to 
human beings, will be briefly discussed.  
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           Gaps in the Existing Methodology for Understanding Cinema 
The existing film discourse leaves certain discernible gaps in the understanding of cinema 
by discounting audiences‟ ordinary experiences of life which they not only carry to the 
film, but, more importantly, on the basis of which they understand the film.   
The basic factor on which existing film discourse is based is disembodied vision, 
the roots of which go back to Cartesian dualism, where mind is not only equated with a 
transparent intelligence independent of the body capable of understanding phenomena, 
but also represents the “I” of the ego which understands. In contrast, the body in the 
Cartesian theory is an unconscious and passive extension of matter which is expected to 
yield to an understanding by the mind as well as mechanically responding to its‟ 
commands. However, since the mind and the body belong to two distinct categories of 
existence, the question arises as to how they interact with each other? The point at issue 
is this: how the mind reaches a conscious understanding of what the body is throwing up 
as unconscious data?
731
 Despite no satisfactory solution to this problem, mind-body 
dualism has continued to permeate Western thought including even some hard-core 
disciplines of science today.  
With the Cartesian notion of a transparent intelligence, which hovers as an 
unacknowledged omni-presence in the human system, which „understands‟ phenomena, 
the existing film theories did not feel the need for an embodied understanding of the 
world at all. Under the circumstances, those aspects of cinema which are more directly 
connected with the body, like film sensations, called the “cinema of attractions” by 
Eisenstein, remained beyond the immediate concern of the film theories. This neglect 
happens despite film sensations being the prime factor which attracts audiences all over 
the world.             
The third factor involves the acceptance of the narrative mode as the be all and 
end all of understanding cinema. After a promising start made by classical film theory to 
concentrate on the formal features of cinema, both contemporary and cognitive film 
theories adopt the narrative mode as the only basis for theorizing cinema which acted to 
                                                          
731
 Schweizer, “Mind/Consciousness Dualism”, 337, 330 
295 
 
the complete detriment of the embodied aspects human experiences and the soico-cultural 
practices built around them.  
In sum, the above factors have led to an erroneous assumption being made about 
how the audiences make sense of what they see on screen. In the existing film discourse, 
it either involves the ideological interpellation of the audiences who are made to 
understand what the bourgeoisie wants them to understand or the operation of a 
disembodied intellect which makes the audiences understand cinema in the same way as 
the buyers evaluate their choices in a market place.     
            What does “Alternate Methodology” Offer? 
The alternate methodology, primarily constructed on the basis of Merleau-Ponty‟s theory 
of existential phenomenology and the Nyāya theory of perception, represents a particular 
subjective-objective mode of experiencing the world which is unique whether in the West 
or the East. The „alternate‟ viewpoint that these theories offer is born of the audiences‟ 
embodied and their habitual experiences of socio-cultural life. I argue, when these 
insights are applied to the two aesthetic theories involving Bharata‟s theory of aesthetic 
pleasure or rasa and Ānandavardhana‟s theory of aesthetic suggestion or dhvani, they 
generate a much deeper understanding of cinema that help restore „ordinary‟ audiences to 
the high table occupied by film discourse in the present time.    
Phenomenological Experience in Cinema                                   
In order to attain accurate, formally reproducible results, the West had shunned all forms 
of subjectivism from its theories for the most part of its history. Kant‟s idea that human 
beings understand reality in terms of certain à priori “categories of understanding” given 
in them first seriously questioned this premise. The phenomenological contribution since 
the 19
th
 century has further intensified this process by examining the objective world not 
as it is subjectively understood by Kant‟s otherwise „neutral‟ “categories”, but as it is 
subjectively experienced by human beings in the course of their lived experiences of the 
world.  
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Husserl holds that the formation of stable “objects” in the viewer‟s perception 
from sense data received in a flux is based on the intentional imposition of certain 
archetypal structural forms occurring in human consciousness as a legacy of human 
being‟s lived experiences of the world. In this sense, even though Husserl ultimately 
came to accept what he called “pure consciousness”, a notion which, though appearing to 
be similar to the Cartesian notion of intelligence, was, however, different in not being 
detached from the body. It did not operate transparently as the Cartesian intelligence, but 
interacted with the world in terms of the internalization of certain archetypal structures 
arising from human beings‟ lived experiences of the world.  
Heidegger enormously expands human beings‟ embodied „touch‟ sensations of 
the world inherent in Husserl‟s theory by considering human beings as tool-wielding 
animals of the world. Thus, while a teacher touches a blackboard with his chalk, a 
carpenter touches wood with his hammer, both their consciousness and their bodies being 
oriented appropriately towards their tools and, through them, to the socio-cultural world. 
Heidegger implies that human existence in the world is inter-subjective to the core. 
Through this process, Heidegger incorporates technology in the phenomenological 
theory, an addition which is of crucial importance in the modern world, including cinema.  
While, for both Husserl and Heidegger, there is still the existence of a 
“consciousness” which is a throw-back on the Cartesian mind, it, however, stands imbued 
with “intentions” generated by the body. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty replaces it with the 
notion of a “consciousness” which arises only as an effect of the body‟s interactions with 
the world:  
In perception, we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves thinking 
about it; we are given over to the object [which] merges into the body which [the 
body] is better informed about them than we are about the world.
732
   
Since the body has grown in tandem with nature, the latter has fundamentally oriented 
human body in a particular way, called the “operational intentionality”. Thus, for 
instance, the body knows how to orient itself in its interactions with a river or a tree. On 
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this foundational layer of “operational intentionality”, the body has grown a further layer 
of “bodily intentionality” due to its acclimatization to the artefactual world. Thus, the 
body knows how to curl its fingers in trying to hold a cup. Thus, simply by noticing the 
bodily orientation of others within view, human beings can become aware of their 
„intentions‟ in the world. In this sense, the “intentionality” of the body as a whole forms 
the basis of intersubjectivity in the Merleau-Pontian world.    
Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of bodily intentionality leads to his twin concepts of 
vision-touch ecquivalence that generates synesthetic experience in the body, and chiasm 
that produces a process of subject-object alteration anticipated by the body based on the 
way it has lived and internalized the world. As far as synaesthetic experience is 
concerned, Merleau-Ponty holds that, since vision and touch experience the same surface, 
touch sensibilities are already given in the vision of an individual. This is why 
expressions like “I see cold ice” or “I see a heavy metal ball” become legitimate for 
Merleau-Ponty. Cinema, being an audio-visual medium, is loaded with such synesthetic 
experiences which convincingly explain the experience of haptic visuality in cinema, an 
experience which arises from a close contact of vision sweeping over the surface of 
reality.   
Merleau-Ponty‟s notion of the chiasm points to the fact that, during an interaction 
between two bodies, a role reversal of being a subject and an object alternately is always 
anticipated by the two bodies based on the internationalization of such repeat processes 
within their bodies since millennia. The easy acceptability of shot-reverse shot practices 
by the film audiences can be effectively explained on the basis of such subjective-
objective encroachments anticipated by the body. The twin notions of synesthesia and 
chiasm are likely to have a profound influence on future understanding of cinema.  
          Classical Indian Theories 
Its application in Nyāya theory of perception, Bharata‟s theory of aesthetic pleasure or 
rasa and Ānandavardhana‟s theory of suggestion or dhvani are summed up below.  
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Nyāya Theory of Perception and Cinema 
While Nyāya theory is similar to Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in emphasizing 
embodied and habitual experiences of life as the basis of all cognitions, it, however, 
differs from Ponty in the process it adopts in establishing this idea.    
Like Merleau-Ponty, Nyāya also effectively discards the notion of a 
“consciousness” independent of the body for all practical purposes. Instead, Nyāya holds 
that “consciousness” arises as an effect representing the body‟s interactions with the 
world. In this sense, Nyāya “consciousness” is symbolic of the body‟s “intentionality” 
towards the world. It farther holds that the body „acts‟ in response to three instinctual 
processes internalized within the body, e.g., the survival instinct, the instinct for 
continuity through propagation or the sexual instinct and the acquisitive instinct with a 
desire to secure the surroundings for survival and propagation of the organism. As part of 
its survival strategy, the body converts elements occurring within its perceptual field into 
an integrated whole in order to ensure a unified response to a situation confronting it. In 
this sense, according to Nyāya, narrative construction is ingrained in the human psyche, 
a process which essentially requires that an element of „ownership‟ and „power‟ be 
exercised by the organism over its surroundings in order to ensure optimum conditions 
for its survival and growth. It represents a “knowledge-process” for the organism with 
which it identifies at the most basic level of its existence. This primary identification at 
the embodied level leads to secondary identifications at the socio-cultural level. Thus, 
while fire burns flesh is an embodied experience, fire cooks food is a socio-cultural 
practice built around the first expereince. While classical Indian theories, including 
Nyāya, advocate that basic “identifications” occur with the “knowledge-processes”, they 
lead to secondary identifications with human beings or characters who remain associated 
with such processes.  
According to Nyāya, the perceptual process of constructing an integrated whole 
within view is represented by the fundamental formula: “qualifier + qualified + 
relationship = unit of perception” where a location is qualified by a property through a 
functional relationship to form a whole within perception. The resulting percept or 
percepts appear in particular “modes of appearance” to the perceiver. Thus, while a 
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flower may occur in the “mode of appearance” of being a plant-specie to a botanist, it 
may appear as a decorative piece to a commoner. Similarly, a lady with books in front 
may “appear” as a student and the books as her study-material to be linked into an 
integrated whole within perception through the functional relationship of “studying” to 
generate the cognition “She is studying”. Nyāya explains the perceptual process involves 
the forming of an “invariable sequence” within view between the lady and books 
resulting in the arising of “universals”, like “student-hood” for the qualificand or 
location, “study-material-hood” for the qualifier or the property and “study-hood” for the 
functional relationship to constitute the cognitive whole for the viewer. Nyāya concludes 
that the particular “mode of presentation” of the percept conveys a certain embodied 
sense to the viewer, the final perception being a product of the “mode of appearance” and 
“mode of presentation” for the perceiver. The formation of such “subjective” 
relationships between elements existing “objectively” within view advocated by Nyāya, a 
process generally accepted by all classical Indian theories with minor qualifications, 
represents a process understood entirely from the perceiver‟s point of view as against the 
speaker‟s point of view represented by the Western tradition. The above considerations 
lead to some of the most incisive modes of analyzing perception in cinema.  
Bharata‟s Theory of Aesthetic Pleasure (Rasa)           
While the statement “The lady has deep sentiments for him” can be „intellectually‟ 
understood by the readers, they would, however, not be able to experience the exact 
nature of the sentiments she is having for the person. The primary aim of Bharata‟s (c. 
early 1
st
 millennium CE) aesthetic theory is to enable the audiences to relive a scene in 
terms of the characters‟ experiences. In this sense, Bharata holds that when the audiences 
form an integrated whole within view, what they are basically doing is to integrate the 
elements occurring in the scene in terms of a causal-chain, a “knowledge-process” with 
which they identify as a “goal-directed activity” occurring within their view. This 
identification immediately leads to the evocation of a corresponding psycho-somatic state 
i.e. an affective state among the audiences which enable them to relive the scene by 
virtue of bringing their “conscious” understanding of the scene and the “unconscious” 
response of their bodies at par, the whole process occurring in terms of the audiences‟ 
embodied and socio-cultural practices of life.  
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In a classic analysis, the philosopher-aesthetes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (c. 9th CE) and 
Abhinavagupta (c. 10
th
 CE) add a preliminary level of identification by holding that the 
audiences willingly identify with the fictional mode of a play even before they have 
entered the auditorium which generalizes their experiences of the play as a whole. The 
process of generalization of audience experiences has the effect of removing them from 
their practical concerns, resulting in aesthetic experiences invariably appearing as 
„pleasurable‟ to them, including tragedies. It is a theory which provides a satisfactory 
solution to the vexed question of the “paradox of junc fiction” which had plagued 
aesthetic theories ever since their inception. The above levels of basic identification 
eventually lead to their more intensified forms of sympathetic identifications with the 
narrative mode of the play and its action modes employed by the work and, in cases of 
certain master works, an empathic identification with the focus of the play.    
These identificatory levels, together with the evocation of their corresponding 
affective states, generate different aesthetic experiences or rasas among the audiences 
which have been broadly classified as aesthetic relish (bhoga), in which the audiences‟ 
consciousness remains in a “mode of enquiry” in pursuit of a solution to an enigma 
presented by the play, aesthetic saturation (rasavat), in which the audiences 
consciousness attains a “state of rest” on the resolution of the enigma, and aesthetic 
immersion or ecstasy (samāveśa or āveśa), in which certain archetypal experiences are 
triggered from within the audiences‟ subconscious to overwhelm their sensibilities and 
experiences.  
Ānandavardhana‟s Theory of Suggestion (Dhvani)  
Ānandavardhana‟s (c. 8th CE) theory of suggestion (dhvani), with Abhinavagupta‟s 
comments thereon, acts as a meta-language generated by artworks which give voice to 
the voiceless among human beings whose normal power of communication has been 
truncated due to reasons of socio-cultural repression, existential conditions produced by a 
trauma or repetitive experiences producing certain archetypal experiences within human 
beings which remain submerged within them in a generalized form of pure potentiality. 
Since the above loss of human „voices‟ has the effect of curtailing human subjectivity, 
Ānanda and Abhinava seek to restore “full word” to them by employing art as dhvani or 
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suggestive means to make human beings come face-to-face with their „lost‟ experiences. 
The process of dhvani advocated by Ānanda and Abhinava employ a mode of 
comparision between the artistic creation of a reality and its practical counterpart which 
has the effect of bringing to the surface by suggestive means portions of human 
experiences suppressed within them.    
Ānanda classifies dhvani modes to be three, with vastudhvani, which generates 
„suggestion through the realistic mode‟, being more effective in tackling cases of sexual 
repression imposed on individuals by the society, like those occurring in Bollywood 
cinema due to censureship; alaṅkāradhvani, which generates „suggestion through formal 
mode‟, being ideal in tackling existential crisis produced by traumatic experiences 
suffered by individuals visualized in Deleuze‟s time-images, like those manifest in the 
works of modern filmmakers like Tarkovasky, Resnais, Godard, etc; and, finally, 
rasadhvani, which involves „suggestion through direct mode‟, is more effective in 
reviving archetypal experiences lying submerged in human subconscious, like those 
mentioned by Ritwik Ghatak in his analysis of certain film images.     
In conclusion, it is pertinent to point out that the existing film discourse remains 
essentially limited due its neglects either in full or in parts the operation of perception in 
terms of embodiment and socio-cultural practices of human beings, their identificatory 
and affective states, different types of aesthetic experiences and the restoration by 
suggestive means of their „voices‟ lost due to various reasons. In the absence of any 
systematic understanding of these fundamental processes on the basis of which the 
audiences engage with an artwork at the most basic level of their interaction with an 
artwork, these experiences remain as untapped “wild meanings” under the surface which, 
however, continue to exercise a profound influence on the audiences‟ understanding of a 
film scene or reality as such. Substantial gains are to be made if insights generated by 
such “alternate methodology”, involving “piecemeal theories” and their “local solutions” 
are adopted in understanding how ordinary audiences actually experience cinema, rather 
than how they should experience cinema as propagated by the existing film theories.  
                    ___________________________ 
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         Conclusion 
Philosophy, according to Bertrand Russell, represents a “no man‟s land” between 
different disciplines. By virtue of this very property, it is able to offer more analytic tools 
culled from many sources which provides for a more meaningful and inclusive 
interpretation of the world. It has been shown in this research that the philosophical 
thoughts underlying Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in the West and Nyāya theory of 
perception in classical India represent a crucial shift from a disembodied understanding 
of the world to its embodied understanding whose application to aesthetic theories bring 
about a new interpretation of the way artworks function for the audiences, including what 
happens in cinema. Since the basic findings of my research have already been summed 
up in chapter 6, this concluding section can be more appropriately utilized for discussing 
the shift in meaning that my research brings to the following determining concepts with 
the help of which we understand the world: “the self”, “consciousness”, “the body”, 
“causality”, “rationality”, “meaning” and “truth”.  
My research throughout has sought to highlight the basic difference between the 
explanations being offered in the existing film discourse and the ones being offered in my 
research as a clash between a disembodied objective view of the world where “the body” 
has no meaningful role to play and an embodied subjective-objective mode of analysis 
where “the body” plays a determining role in human understanding of the world. The 
question exactly how does the two dispensations viz. the disembodied and the embodied 
differ, especially when they are applied to cinema? In this connection, barring only the 
notion of “the body” which acts as the very foundation for this entire research, the 
differing explanations that the above two paradigms of thought offer to phenomena 
would be highlighted in the ensuing sections.    
In orthodox Hindu theories, “the self” is understood as a non-performing witness 
of events occurring in the empirical world, a process of which it essentially forms no part. 
However, by virtue of its illusory identification with “matter” icuding “the body”, “the 
self” aquires “the body‟s” experiences and drives which acts as “the self‟s” material 
“ego”, which not only acts as a base (āadhār) for knowledge of the material processes to 
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accrue within it but also to make it interact with the world through “the body”. The true 
nature of “the self” is revealed only when it achieves liberation (mokṣa) from its material 
bondage. It raises a question: since the egoistic activities of “the self” are synonymous 
with the activities of “the body”, why conceive “the self” as a separate entity at all, 
particularly since, according to Nyāya, its liberated state represents a consciousness-less, 
agency-less existence, literally a „blind‟ state which is of no practical use to us? I argue 
that, in terms of human experiences, the liberated state of “the self” is conceived as a 
state of no-thing-ness (to borrow a Heideggerian concept) in the Indian theories primarily 
to act as a basic yardstic for marking change in the world. Thus, for example, while the 
„atomist‟ group of orthodox Hindu theories, represented by Nyāya and others, considers 
the liberated state of “the self” as representing “nothing” in human experiences, the 
„substantialist‟ group of orthodox Hindu theories, represented by Advaita Vedānta and 
others, describes the true state of “pure consciousness”, which constitutes the universe, as 
with the epithet “it exists, it is true, it is bliss” (sadcchidānanda) which essentially means 
that “the self‟s” liberated state is a tensionless existence signifying no experiences 
whatsoever. In contrast, the non-Hindu, heterodox theory of Buddhism holds the universe 
to be constituted of unrelated momentarily existing “ultimates”, called the dharmas, 
which denies the existence of “the self” as a cohesive permanent entity, leads to the 
conclusion that human experiences are apparent rather than real. In sum, we see that, in 
all dispensations of classical Indian theories, “the self” represents a state of “no thing-
ness” or “no body” which acts as the basic minimum denominator for judging embodied 
events occurring in the world, just like the unalterable speed of light is considered as the 
final yardstick for judging changes occurring in the world.  
 “The self” gains knowledge of the world by using the via media of 
“consciousness” which translates all unconscious bodily experiences of the world in 
conscious terms. What is this “consciousness”? In contrast to “consciousness” being 
conceived as a form of transparent “intelligence”, called “the mind”, by Descartes, or as 
the repository of à priori “categories of understanding” occurring in Kant, in the theory 
of Merleau-Ponty as well as in Nyāya, its separate existence apart from the body has been 
denied; instead it occurs in both these theories as an effect of “the body‟s” interactions 
with the world. This embodied “consciousness” is synonymous with the responses that 
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“the bodies” have internalized in relation to the material world. This change in outlook 
brings about a massive change in the process of theorizing the world: in place of a 
conscious and „intelligent” understanding of the world, we now have an embodied 
understanding that does not involve “intelligence” in the conventional way we understand 
the term. The question is what difference does it make to our understanding of cinema? 
The basic difference occurs as follows: the embodied experiences provide to the 
audiences a basic understanding of the material processes portrayed in the films, called 
“wild meanings” by Merleau-Ponty, which acts as the basis for the production of   
cognitive understandings among the audiences, including the production of „higher‟ 
thoughts, like inference, etc, on the basis of which the audiences understand what is 
going on in the films.  
It immediately brings us to the next determining concept of the world, “reason”. 
In Western thought, “reason” has been conventionally understood as a principle or a 
cluster of principles which exist within human beings prior to their experiencing of the 
world. It is claimed that by applying this principle to reality, truth can be established 
independent of “the body”. The seed of this idea goes back to the Platonic dialogues 
where Socrates says “follow the argument where it leads” or “the unexamined life is not 
worth living”.733 Socrates‟s commitment to critical enquiry is raised a level higher by 
Aristotle who holds that, alongside the nutritive, locomotor and sensory faculties of he 
body, man is endowed with a “rational” faculty which makes human beings zoon 
politicus or a “rational animal”. Noting that it forms the highest faculty, Aristotle says 
that man‟s supreme happiness lies in doing theoria or theories which involves applying 
purely theoretical powers of reasoning to the world at large.
734
 The Greek notion of 
“rationalism” has since been associated mostly with the 17th century philosophers like 
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, called the “Continental Rationalists”. Thus, for 
Descartes, we start from the first principles known directly by reason viz. cogito ergo 
sum or “I think therefore I am” where “thinking” represents the power of “the mind” 
endowed with transparent “intelligence” inherent within Man. From this basic premise, 
Descartes progressively deduces all other forms of knowledge. Calling knowledge 
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acquired through trasnsparent “intelligence” as “intuition”, Descartes holds that it is 
trustworthy because it is not based either on perception or memory or introspection, all of 
the latter being knowledge gathered through the deceptive senses. While it inaugurates 
the “Age of Reason” in Western thought, Kant shifts its orientation by considering that 
the power of human beings to „understand‟ does not belong to the power of transparent 
“intelligence” as such, but the existence of à priori “categories of understanding” 
occurring within them. In this sense, the Kantian notion of “reason” does not arise from 
the transparency of “intelligence”, as Descartes had conceived, but is a structured 
consciousness given within human beings ab initio.   
Ranged against this theory of “Rationalism” is the theory of “Empiricism”, which, 
coming from the Greek concept empeiria („experience‟), holds that all human knowledge 
ultimately derives from sensory experience. Championed by the English empiricists, 
Locke and Hume, this theory may be said, in certain senses, to be the forerunner of the 
embodied thinking of today. Despite this empiricist challenge, “rationality” continued to 
hold sway as the essential characteristic of human beings in Western thought even today.  
As far as classical Indian theories are concerned, it has already been mentioned 
that there is nothing à priori in them, all understandings being à posteriori, i.e. they arise 
from experiences undergone by human beings in this world. While the theories of 
Merleau-Ponty or Nyāya continue to be virulently embodied, there does exist the notion 
of “pure consciousness” in the “substantialist” theories, like Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Advaita 
Vedānta or Kashmir Śaivism, which, on the face of it, gives the appearance of being 
similar to the notion of transparent “intelligence” of Descartes in Western thought. 
However, there is a significant difference between the two. Thus, while, in Descartes, 
“the mind” „understands‟ phenomena transparently on the basis of a given “intelligence”, 
in the Indian theories, “pure consciousness” generates „understanding‟ of phenomena 
through its modifications (vṛtti) undergone in constituting the phenomena. In this sense, 
knowledge ideally means experiencing a difference between its “pure” state, which 
remains as the basic common denominator within “the self”, and its modifications in 
constituting the worldy phenomena. The point to note is that knowledge is entirely 
experientially formed even in this group of theories.   
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What difference does an embodied understanding of the world signify for the 
concept of “reason”? The changes that “embodied reason” brings about are revolutionary 
in nature: it not only overthrows centuries of wisdom in Western thought but also 
substantially challenges popular understanding of classical Indian thought. In this new 
avatar, “reason”, being bodily generated, is not only unconscious but also emotionally 
motivated in the ultimate bodily terms of experience something as „pleasure‟, „pain‟, or 
„indifference‟. In this sense, “reason” is not „universal‟, but „evolutionary‟ in the sense 
that it changes in terms of the changing bodily experiences of Nature and the artefactual 
world. “Reason”, thus, differs from geography to geography and culture to culture which 
immediately leads to the conclusion that there can be no universal basis for morality. 
Whatever commonality is perceived in the “reasoning” process is due to the commonality 
of our bodily structures. Clearly, these changes call for an urgent reworking of the way 
we understand the world, including cinema.     
This brings us to the role of “causality” in the embodied theories. “Causality” is 
one of the fundamental principles which is invoked for understanding the world, equally 
acknowledged in the West and the East, with Hume calling it “the cement of the 
universe”.735 In most general terms, “causation” may be described as “the relation that 
connects events and objects of this world in significant relationships”.736 Conventionally, 
it means that an “agent” causes a “change” in some object or state of affairs to produce a 
new object or a new state of affair. However, even this very simple idea is fraught with 
controversies. Hume and J. S. Mill had held that “causation” represents only the process 
of a regular association occurring between certain events which cannot be analyzed any 
farther without becoming circular. This notion of “causality” as a state of “constant 
conjuction” has been disputed by other theories which hold that, since the effect would 
not have happened in the absence of a particular cause, the “cause becomes a sine qua 
non for the effect”.737 In this context, the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy denotes 
this vexed problem as follows: 
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The attempt to “analyze” causation seems to have reached an impasse; the 
proposals on hand seem so widely divergent that one wonders whether they are all 
analyses of the same concept. But each of them seems to address some important 
aspect of the variegated notion we term as “cause” and, it may be doubted, 
whether there is a unitary concept of causation that can be captured in an 
enlightended philosophical analysis.
738
 
As far as classical Indian theories are concerned, its ideas are equally divided in 
the context of “causation”. The main two forms of “causation” conceived by the classical 
Indian theories are briefly as follows. The first theory conceives “causation” as producing 
a real effect, including the production of a delayed effect due to the belated maturing of a 
cause, the most commonly cited example being milk turning into curd as held by the 
Sāṃkhya theory. The other theory, primarily held by the Buddhists,  conceives 
“causation” to be a mere coincidental co-existence of entites, which, when frequently 
repeated in human experience, leads to the notion of an “invariable sequence” occurring 
between the entities organized in the form of immediately before and after in the 
perceiver‟s mind which, however, produces no real effect in the practical field, the most 
commonly cited example being the case of a transparent crystal appearing as „red‟ in the 
presence of a red flower. The important point is that while the coincidental coexistence of 
entities does not preclude the production of a „practical result‟ in the real world, it has an 
effect in perception which may or may not be practically fruitful in each instant case. 
Various Indian theories try to amalgate different aspects of these two positions in their 
causal theories.  
Nyāya, generally, subscribes to the “co-existence” theory of Buddhist “causality” 
with the proviso that, for Nyāya, coincidental coexistences produce real effects in the 
world. Thus, while for the Buddhists, the existence of “objects” is a mere appearance 
being conceptual in nature and hence non-veridical in real life, for the Naiyāyikas, the 
“objects” exist in reality. The Naiyāyikas further hold that, even those entities which are  
merely forming an “invariable sequence” in perception, produces a new product for the 
perceiver which has a real effect on him or her, i.e. it has practical efficacy in the 
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perceiver‟s world in terms of the viewer‟s embodied experiences of the world and his 
socio-cultural practices of life. This is an instance of a „powerless causality‟ which 
produces a practical result for the perceiver. Thus, a lady seen with books in front is 
perceived as “She is studying” on the basis of the formation of an “invariable sequence” 
between them in terms of the perceiver‟s embodied and socio-cultural practices of life, 
even though the lady may not have anything to do with the books as such.      
This brings us to the uncanny similarity between what is understood by 
“meaning” in the theories of perception advocated by Merleau-Ponty and Nyāya, both the 
theories significantly differing from what is conventionally understood by the term 
“perception” in common parlance viz. a passive reception of sensations which are 
transparently interpreted by “the mind” in terms of a given “intelligence”, as Descartes 
had held, or on the basis of à priori “categories of understanding”, as Kant had held, or as 
an experiential understanding of the process as in case of empiricism. Merleau-Ponty 
critics both: “Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, 
otherwise we would not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that we need to 
be ignorant of what we are looking for or, equally again, we should not be searching”.739 
Shunning what Foucault terms the “empirico-transcendental doublet of modern thought” 
involving mind/body, thought/language, self/matter, inside/outside dichotomies, Merleau-
Ponty leads us to the notion that “there is no meaning which is not embodied, nor any 
matter that is not meaningful”.740 Since for Merleau-Ponty the perceiving body is also the 
„thinking‟ body, the individual is not simply a body, but also a body-subject system.741 
Perception, thus, means conceiving the perceiving body-subject in a situation rather than 
as being a „neutral‟ spectator who somehow stands beyond the situation. In overturning 
the common understanding that we first passively see something and then intellectually 
                                                          
739
 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1962): 28 
740
 N. Crossley, The Politics of Subjectivity: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty (Aldershot, England: 
Avebury Series in Philosophy, 1994): 14, quoted in Jack Reynolds, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)”, 
in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Accessed  July 17, 2016  
741
 Reynolds, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)”, Internet Access in July 2016 
310 
 
interpret it, Merleau-Ponty notes that perception itself is a process of “creative 
receptivity”.742 Reynolds explains the concept as follows: 
As hard as we may try, we cannot see the broken shards of a bear bottle as simply 
the sum of its shape, color, etc. The whole background of what the bottle is used 
for, what consuming the liquids contained therein means for different people, 
what it means for being “broken”, etc, comes with, and not behind, our perception 
of that bottle. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is not a type of thought in a 
classical, reflective sense, but, equally clearly, it is not a third person process…743   
Thus, depending on what one sees as the background, a thing would appear to be either a 
duck or a rabbit, or as a vase or as two faces confronting each other in the famous 
examples given by Jastrow/Wittgenstein.
744
 In this sense, one never perceives an 
objective world in its concrete materiality, but a “subjective” world in terms of the 
perceiver‟s lived experiences of the world.  
When we come to the notion of “meaning”, „habituality‟ plays an interesting role 
in Merleau-Pontian theory of perception. He notes that „understanding‟ as a phenomenon 
in bodily terms means that there are two existences of the body-subject: a general 
existence and an existence in response to a particular phenomenon which calls for a 
certain response from the body. Thus, while how to hold a plough emanates from the 
former, what to do with the plough in a given situation results from the latter. Terming 
these processes as “inhabit”, Merleau-Ponty notes that both of them act in tandem to 
guide the body-subject what to do in a given situation. Moya notes the importance of this 
concept:  
Merleau-Ponty explains that habitual behavior arises on the basis of a set of 
situations and responses that, despite not being identical, constitute a community 
of meaning…This is explained by the fact that the body-subject integrates certain 
                                                          
742
 Reynolds, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)”, Internet Access in July 2016 
743
 Ibid 
744
 Ibid 
311 
 
elements of general motility that permits her to grasp what is essential to the 
phenomenon…745    
It is striking that Nyāya‟s self-body system is an almost exact analog of Merleau-
Ponty‟s body-subject system. More interestingly, one cannot miss the uncanny similarity 
between Merleau-Ponty‟s notions of “habituality” and “inhabit” and the Nyāya notion of 
the “universal” signifying an integrated whole in perception habitually experienced by 
the perceiver in real life. In this sense, while the understanding “She is studying” signifies 
the concept of the “inhabit” for Merleau-Ponty, it represents the notion of the “universal” 
in the Nyāya theory, both ultimately arising from embodied experiences of the world and 
their naturalization in terms of socio-cultural practices of life.  
Paul Mus‟ comments on Alice Boner‟s analysis of composition in Hindu 
sculptures clarify the process of “meaning” formation influenced by the Nyāya theory of 
perception: 
The golden rule is that no element should be allotted any circumstantiated, 
specific meaning, except in reference to the complete, delimited and well-
balanced total. It amounts to saying that within the relief-field, the various form-
elements should stand in such correlation together that the specific of any one of 
them, while undoubtedly related to its lexical definition, should also be the 
outcome of whatever addition, alteration, suppression or correction the others 
project into it. This comes very close to what the Brahmanical treatise, 
Bṛhaddevatā calls “reciprocal origination” (anyo‟ nyayonitvam), lit., “being the 
matrix (yoni, „womb‟) of one another”.746       
The above notion automatically leads to the formation of “objecthood” in the Nyāya 
theory of perception in which an “object” signifies that which serves a human function. It 
has already been noted that if “Cyclops” serves a human purpose, it is perceived as an 
“object” irrespective of how many parts it may have. In the same sense, whether a flying 
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entity would be perceived as a “bird” or as a “falcon” would depend on the purpose it 
serves for the perceiver.  
Finally, we come to the notion of “truth” in these theories. Even though 
frequently used, it is a vexed idea which originally relates to the notion of “universal 
truth”. In Western thought, skepticism about such a grand “truth” has been 
institutionalized in the poststructural theory resulting in “the function of terms like „true‟ 
and „false‟” being confined to local issues and discussions.747 It is one of Hayden White‟s 
significant insights that when “truth” is assimilated in thought, it undergoes a certain 
structural patterning which makes the product necessarily both factual and fictional in 
nature.
748
 Since Merleau-Ponty does not accept the existence of a transparent intelligence 
as a given among human beings, there is no transcendental measure of “truth” in his 
theory. All that is there is the body-subject system which “adapts” in response to an 
invitation from the world, building up on experiences already internalized in the system in 
the past. The cognitive scientists Gallaghar and Zahavi note: “The environment calls 
forth a specific body-style so that the body works with the environment and is included in 
it. The posture that the body adopts in a situation is its way of responding to the 
environment.”749 Under the circumstances, the criterion of “truth” in Merleau-Ponty 
remains the practicality of local solutions achieved in terms of particular bodily responses 
occurring in particular situations.  
Since classical Indian theories are essentially experiential in nature, they do not 
subscribe to the existence of a transcendental notion of “universal truth” in the empirical 
world. True that the Vedic notion of Brahman = ātma is conceived as the ultimate truth 
that transcends all local “truths”, the important point to note is, however, that all classical 
Indian theories are primarily concerned with human beings‟ experiences in the material 
world which consist of myriad forms of “contingent truths”, with the Vedic notion merely 
acting as a guiding principle for such an “event” rather than being a useful tool. The non-
Vedic theories, like Buddhism, Jainism and Materialism even categorically reject the 
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Vedic notion altogether. Under the circumstances, for classical Indian theories including 
Nyāya “the only reason some contents are regarded as real is that they have not yet been 
contradicted”.750 In this sense, the only workable criterion of “truth” accepted by all 
classical theories is when a thing practically works in a given situation. The Buddhists 
cite an interesting example to support this idea of “truth”: when two persons run in two 
different directions on seeing a luster emanating from them thinking it to be a pearl, while 
one of them finds a real pearl, the other merely finds a conch-shell! Nyāya, being an arch 
realist, holds that even illusions, like mistaking a rope for a snake, and hallucinations, 
like Macbeth seeing a dagger and Lady Macbeth seeing blood in an empty space, are real 
since the parts with which they are constructed in one‟s imagination have a real effect on 
the perceiver.    
In this context, Bimal Krishna Matilal suggests that the conclusions reached by 
analysts should be taken as so many assertions which are valid within their own 
particular analytical frameworks rather than being held as expressions of “universal 
truth”.751 He says that even the statement “My finger touches the button”, which is 
conventionally accepted as true in all possible frameworks, is, however, not true in the 
physical sciences involving “atoms”752 and in Buddhist thought involving the 
momentarily existent “ultimates” or dharmas!  
In conclusion, one would like to emphasize the fact that a shift in the real significance of 
the determining concepts of the world produces a difference in our understanding of the 
cinematic process as a whole. Research undertaken in this thesis has opened up multiple 
possibilities for producing a more insightful film discourse. Since these responses do not, 
at this moment, unite into a homogenous doctrine, they should be taken as so many 
“assertions” of reality involving “contingent truths”, as Matilal mentions, or “piece-meal 
theories” having “local solutions”, as Bordwell and Carroll hold, rather than as statements 
of “universal truth” forming a grand theory. The loss of such a „grand‟ understanding of 
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worldly phenomena, including cinema, would be more than off-set by the insights gained 
from “piecemeal” theories culled from different cultures. Crucially, as has been 
demonstrated throughout this research, this process has the added benefit of bringing 
back „ordinary‟ audiences to the fold of film discourse, a position from where they were 
most unjustly displaced during last hundred years of film theorizing.  
______________________ 
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Annexure 1 
Nyāya Ontology 
Nyāya ontology involves three fundamental players, “the self”, “consciousness”, and “the 
body” as constituting the human organism which experience “matter” i.e. undergoes 
material interactions with the world. More specifically, in this schema, while “the body”, 
formed of “matter”, experiences the worldly phenomena, “the self”, which is conceived 
as transcendental to this plane, is made “aware” of these interactions by the intermediary 
of “consciousness”. While the resulting awareness pertains to a material “thing”, it 
accrues as “knowledge” in “the self” in a structured form where a property qualifies a 
location through a functional relationship in the formula qualifier + qualificand + 
relationship”, known as the fundamental principle of knowledge in the Nyāya theory. The 
following sections describe the individual parts played by each othese players in the 
Nyāya theory. 
“The Self”  
In Nyāya, “the self” may be defined as an „unconscious‟ “substance” (ādhāratva, „that 
which contains‟) which merely provides a non-material location for properties of the 
material world to accrue as “qualities” in “the self”.753 Since “the self” inhabits a 
different existential plane than “matter” in the Nyāya theory, it ultimately remains 
untarnished by the material qualities, the true nature of the Nyāya “self” in its „liberated‟ 
state (mokṣa) being a non-conscious state devoid of all forms of „awareness‟, 
„knowledge‟, „feelings‟, etc, and as such devoid of any form of agency whatsoever. In 
this sense, the true state of “the self” represents a state of “no-thing-ness” (a 
Heideggerian term) which, though appearing unique to the Nyāya theory, is, however, a 
general feature of all classical Indian theories as has been argued in the “Conclusion” of 
this work. In this sense, the „liberated‟ state of “the self” acts as the basic common 
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denominator equivalent to a „measure‟ for judging material events happening in the 
world.  
Since the liberated state of “the self” is a consciousness-less, agency-less state 
which is „blind‟ for all practical purposes in the material world, it shows that Nyāya 
emphasis is on “the self‟s” interactions with the material world, rather than on its 
liberation from the mundane world. However, since “the self” occupies a different 
existential plane than “matter”, the question of “category mistake” crops up that debars 
any real interaction occurring between two existential planes. Nyāya avoids this problem 
by holding that “the self” undergoes a state of illusory identification with “matter”, an 
aspect which would be explained later.   
It is important to point out a significant difference between what is understood by 
the terms “knowledge” and “awareness” in the Nyāya theory. While, for Nyāya, 
“knowledge” is a structured process, “awareness” is an unstructured experience primarily 
resulting from “the body‟s” unstructured, mechanical responses to the world. It has 
already been indicated that Nyāya uniquely holds “knowledge” to be the result of a 
structured form of perception occurring in terms of the formula “qualifier + qualificand + 
relationship”. In the above sense, “knowledge” in the Nyāya theory neither arises due to 
the presence of a transparent intelligence occurring in man, as Descartes had held, or on 
the existence of à priori “categories of understanding” occurring as a given in human 
consciousness, as held by Kant, but on à posteriori knowledge gathered through various 
experiences that “the body” had undergone in the past and their internationalization 
within “the self-body system”.  
It may be noted here that while the true state of “the self” is a state devoid of all 
consciousness and agency, it, however, acquires all material proclivities and drives 
occurring within “matter” through “the self‟s” illusory identification with “matter”. In 
order to work out these tendencies, “the self” aquires a material “body” through which it 
acts on the world. The association of the constructed “body” with “the self” makes it a 
self-body system till “the self” achieves liberation from its bondage to “matter”.754       
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“Consciousness” 
It is significant that Nyāya does not have an equivalent word for “consciousness” in its 
theory. Mohanty notes: 
For Nyāya, there is no consciousness as such; there is, of course, a universal 
“consciousness” which is instantiated in every cognitive state or occurrence. Each 
such state – perceiving, inferring, remembering, and so on – is either called a 
buddhi, a jñāna, or an upalabdhi – which arises when appropriate causal 
conditions are met.
755
 
Arguably, like Merleau-Ponty, for Nyāya, “consciousness” manifests as an effect of “the 
body‟s” lived experiences of the world. In this sense, all the interactions and responses 
that “the body” is privy to during its interactions with the world arises as states of 
awareness, knowledge, feelings, etc, in “the self”. Conceived in this manner, Nyāya 
“consciousness” becomes intentional in nature (artha-pravaṇa, „purposeful‟, „goal-
directed‟) which arises only contingently to make “the self” aware of the sense 
experiences arising from the material world. In this sense, Nyāya “consciousness” occurs 
only as “consciousness of something” (savisayakatva, „together with a thing‟), there 
being no concept of “pure consciousness” in this theory. In other words, “consciousness” 
has no independent and separate existence in this theory apart from the effects that “the 
body” manifests in the course of its lived experiences of the world. This notion of 
intentional consciousness, firmed up by 6
th
 century CE in the Nyāya theory, strikingly 
anticipates the phenomenological notion of intentional consciousness conceived by Franz 
Brentano and Edmund Husserl in the West during 19
th
 century CE.  
The argument that Nyāya “consciousness” may be perceived merely as a heuristic 
device is reinforced by the fact that it is conceived as transparent and formless (nirākāra), 
lacking any structure within it, its job merely being to act as a transparent principle of 
illumination (prakaśa) for “the self” to become aware of the interactions going on in the 
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material world. More importantly, while intentional consciousness throws a transparent 
light on reality, “the self” becomes aware of it externally on the basis of merely the 
external shapes and forms (ākṛti) of reality, whose real significance is „understood‟ only 
in terms of the memory that “the body” has acquired in terms of its past experiences.    
In contrast, the “substantialist” orthodox theories conceive “consciousness” to be 
“pure consciousness” which, unlike contingent and intentional “consciousness” of the 
Nyāya theory, has an independent existence apart from its contents. The monist theories 
of Advaita Vedānta and Kashmir Śaivisim eventually reduce all existents to one, holding 
that “pure consciousness” constitutes the whole universe. In these theories, “pure 
consciousness” occurs in two states, the unmanifest involutionary stage where it remains 
in a passive form and the manifest devolutionary state where it manifest the universe, the 
states of “the self”, “empirical consciousness” and “the body” constituting but three 
„moments‟ within it. In this ense, all three ontological constituents occur in the same 
existential plane. In this stage, “the self” comes to know of the interactions going on in 
the world internally by comparing the original state of “pure consciousness” with the 
modifications (vṛttis) that it undergoes in its constitutive role. “The self”, ultimately being 
a part of the constituting element of the universe, is conceived as representing the 
existential truth, which, in its unmanifest originary form of unmanifest “pure 
consciousness”, represents a state of tensionlessness signifying pure bliss (sad-cid-
ānada). The unmanifest involutionary phase of “pure consciousness” represents „higher 
truth‟ (pāramārthika-satya) while its devolutionary phase represents „lower truth‟ 
(vyavahārika-satya).756  
On the heterodox side, Buddhism conceives the universe as solely consisting of 
momentarily existing phenomenal “ultimates”, called the dharmas, which appear in five 
specific forms of consciousness consisting of form (rūpa), feelings (vedanā), concepts 
(samjñā), traces (saṁskāras), and consciousness (cetanā),757 the latter often thought to be 
forming an underlying core of all the above states. The Buddhists further hold that the 
rūpa-dharmas constitute an “atom” of sensuous experience, „which is not a “substance-
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atom” (dravya-paramānu), but rather represents the smallest gestalt (samghāta-
paramānu) occurring in that are of four kinds: visual, olfactory, taste and touch‟.758 The 
inclusion of sensory elements in Buddhist thought constituting the world makes it a 
phenomenological theory through and through. Since the dharmas decay in a moment, 
the Buddhists deny any form of continuity in the universe. The Buddhists, thus, believe in 
radical discontinuity which makes them deny the conventional notion of “causality” as 
the exercising of “power” by an entity on other entities that transforms them; instead, the 
Buddhists explain “causality” as a coincidental coexistence of two entities, constituted of 
two series of aggregated “ultimates”, that gives the appearance of one being caused by 
the other. In denying the Hindu notion of “the self”, which continues forever through 
reincarnations till it achieves liberation, the Buddhists hold that the bunching together of 
five series of dharmas give the false impression of a unity appearing as “the self”. In 
reality, however, each member of these „bunched‟ series represents various streams of 
consciousness of momentarily existing dharmas in a state of continuous flux.     
“Matter” 
In the Nyāya theory, “matter” consists of indivisible “atoms” which differ according to 
the five basic elements of fire, water, etc. Mutual interactions between these “atoms” 
form various aggregations, leading to some of them forming combinations that have 
properties separate from those of the aggregating “atoms” or forms. In this manner, 
Nyāya builds up the empirical world. Arguably, however, once such material formations 
come into existence, Nyāya follows the Sāṃkhya (c. 7th/6th BCE) conception of “matter” 
which, being the most innovative among all the orthodox theories, acted as a model for 
theorizing “matter” during the classical period. Larson and Bhattacharya mention that the 
genius of the Sāṃkhya lie in its success in formulating a tight set of conceptualizations 
that knit together a great variety of speculative loose ends which rendered human 
experiences of the world intelligible, in the process, exercising an enormous influence on 
different aspects of Indian intellectual life.
759
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Sāṃkhya model of “matter” is distinguished for the following innovations: the 
notion of conceiving an equivalence between the objective existence of the world and its 
subjective experiencing by human beings and the formation of a “material ego” 
(ahaṁkāra) within “matter” in this regard. Both these aspects profoundly influenced 
Nyāya understanding of the world in general and its theory of perception in particular.   
Sāṃkhya Conception of “Matter”  
Larson and Bhattacharya note that, in contrast to the Nyāya process of atomic 
combinations to  generate higher-order forms representing “bottoms-up” materialism, 
Sāṃkhya materialism followed a process of material formation where the notion of a 
subtle material energy (prakṛti), originally in an exceedingly translucent (sattva) form, 
becomes increasingly reified as its own inherent capacities of dynamic motion (rajas) and 
material formulations (tamas) start manifesting within “matter” representing a process of 
“top-down” process of material formation.760 Noting that the Sāṃkhya presents a unique 
concept of “matter”, Larson and Bhattacharya have analyzed it perceptively: 
In the Sāṃkhya conceptualization of the inner essence of primordial materiality, it 
makes use of a formulation that is unique in the history of Indian philosophy (and 
unique for that matter in the general history of philosophy), namely, the triguṇa 
process which may be translated as the “tripartite constituent process”.761                       
Sāṃkhya‟s unique conception becomes farther manifest in holding that objective 
descriptions of above triadic properties are exactly equivalent to the way they are 
subjectively experienced by human beings. Since this constitutes the most innovative part 
of Indian thought about “matter”, the process is explained in greater detail below.  
For a clearer grasp, one needs to understand the role that material evolutes (tattvas) play 
in the Sāṃkhya theory of material devolution. Mohanty has listed the functional order of 
their „devolution‟ as follows: 
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               1.          Pure Consciousness or puruṣa 
                2.          Originary Nature or mūlāprakṛti consisting of three material qualities, sattva, 
                            rajas and tamas 
                  3.          Intellect or buddhi, also called mahat 
                4.          Egoity or ahaṁkāra 
               5.          Mind or manas 
               6–10     Five Sense Organs or jñānendriyas involving hearing, touching, seeing, tasting 
                            and smelling  
              11–15    Five Motor Organs or karmendriyas involing speaking, grasping, moving, 
                            excreting and procreating   
              16–20    Five Subtle Elements or tanmātras involving sound, touch, form, taste and  
                            smell 
              21–25    Five Gross Elements or bhutas involving space, wind, fire, water, and earth762 
In the above schema, Sāṃkhya holds that puruṣa acts as a mere witness (sākṣi) to merely 
record the changes occurring in prakṛti or the material domain. Among the material 
evolutes, “intellect” (buddhi) represents the property of natural discrimination (sattva), 
signifying a pre-reflective “willing-ness” to undertake certain kinds of activities which, 
though unconscious and mechanical, are still capable of creating new courses and 
pathways within the material domain.
763
 The next evolute is “egoity” (ahaṁkāra) which 
represents a center of “self-awareness” (abhimāna) within “matter”, which gives life to 
the property of natural discrimination within “matter”, without which nothing would 
happen within this domain. Not to be confused with the psychoanalytical “ego” of human 
beings, it may be more appropriately called the “empirical ego” or the “material ego” 
which „blindly‟ acts within “matter”. Since the “empirical ego” needs memory to be able 
to act, the third evolute of prakṛti is the “mind” (manas) which, acting as the storehouse 
of memories, represents a process of mechanical “conceptualization” (saṃkalpas) that 
enables „identification‟ of “objects” and “things” by the “empirical ego” within 
“matter”.764  Together, these three evolutes, often called the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), 
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create a “two-fold willing-ness” (taijasād ubhayam) within “matter” which act as the 
enabling condition for it to act within this domain viz. the power of “sensing”, consisting 
of the five internal sense-organs (buddhi-indriyas or jñānendriyas), and the power of 
“acting”, consisting of the five motor-organs (karma-indriayas).765 Finally, five subtle 
elements (sound, touch, form, taste, and smell) emerge as objects of sensing followed by 
five gross elements (space, wind, fire, water, and earth) as their sense-content.
766
  
Subjective-Objective Equivalence and the Formation of Material Ego in Sāṃkhya 
Theory of “Matter” 
Analyzing the subjective-objective equivalence of this process, Larson and Bhattacharya 
note that a description of the first three material evolutes in objective terms occur as 
follows: 
From an objective perspective, Sāṃkhya describes the tripartite process as a 
continuing flow of primal material energy that is capable of natural 
discrimination and ordering (the sattva „moment‟), spontaneous activity (the 
rajas „moment‟), and determinate accumulations resulting in the objectification of 
matter (the tamas „moment‟).767 
            Their subjective description occurs as follows:   
From a subjective perspective, Sāṃkhya describes the tripartite process as pre-
reflective desiring and reflective discrimination (the sattva „moment‟), 
spontaneous motion in the fulfillment of that desire (the rajas „moment‟), and a 
continuing awareness of an opaque enveloping world (the tamas „moment‟). In 
other words, the flow of experience actively seeks material gratification resulting 
in processes of „satisfaction‟ or „pleasure‟ and „frustration‟ or „pain‟…Sāṃkhya 
recognizes that the subjectivity of material experiences is the exact obverse of the 
objectivity of matter.
768
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According to this remarkable theory, there is, then, no polar difference between the 
subjective and the objective domains, between mind and matter, or between thought and 
extension, subjective experiences merely being another way of describing the objective 
world.
769
 Larson and Bhattacharya emphasize the importance of this equivalence: 
The subjective processes that are „pleasurable‟ or „frustrating‟ are non-different 
from the objective primal processes of matter that are purposeful and coherent. 
The tripartite process of guṇa of matter is, in other words, a sort of philosophical 
Klein bottle or Möbius Strip in which the usual distinctions of 
subjective/objective, mind/body, thought/matter simply do not apply.
770
     
Larson and Bhattacharya note that Sāṃkhya description of “matter” is a remarkable case 
of reductive materialism where, being unconscious and mechanical, neither the most 
„pleasurable‟ subjective experiences differ in kind from the most „painful‟ experiences, 
nor do they essentially differ from the „indifferent‟ stones and trees of the objective 
world. In this sense, the empirical subject is really a substance for Sāṃkhya.771 These 
material „pleasures‟ and „pains‟ accrue to the “material ego” making it a prisoner of the 
proclivities of “matter”, a process which has generally been conceived as the phase of the 
illusory identification of “the self” with “matter” during which all material properties 
accrue within “matter” making it an „agent‟ for all practical purposes. These material 
proclivities are called the karma with the doctrine of karma holding that any activity 
occurring within “matter” leaves an “impression” (saṃskāra) in it that influences all its 
future performances in relation to it. Thus, when „pleasurable‟ activities are experienced 
by the “empirical ego”, it has a tendency to repeat the experience which reorients 
“matter” in a manner that makes even “the self” its prisoner. Being an Indian counterpart 
of the Pavlovian process of the conditioned reflex,
772
 the Indian karma doctrine holds that 
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such a process can only be reversed when “the self” consciously follows a reverse 
process, similar to the Pavlovian theory of reverse conditioning.
773
        
In view of the fact that reductive materialism appears capable of explaining both 
objective and subjective experiences of the material world satisfactorily, why does the 
Sāṃkhya, as well as Nyāya, need to conceive “the self” at all as an entity which lies 
beyond the material domain? Larson and Bhattacharya offer the following reason: since 
the tripartite material process tantamounts to being nothing more than an endless 
mechanical process, the states of “awareness”, “knowledge” and “feelings” of „pleasure‟,  
„pain‟ and „indifference‟ ultimately have no conscious content. In such a scenario, one is 
apt to arrive at the remarkable paradox that an apparently uniform, rational world is 
pointless after all!
774
   
Larson and Bhattacharya are making an important point here which helps us to 
differentiate Nyāya‟s emphasis on the body vis-à-vis Merlau-Pontian notion of the body. 
While the Merleau-Pontian process is a mechanical process where bodily cognitions have 
no conscious content, the Nyāya theory keeps the door open to a process beyond the body 
by imputing a “self” beyond the material domain. In Nyāya as well as other orthodox 
Hindu theories, “the self” acts as a „neutral‟ “no thing” yardstick to function as a 
„measure‟ of the formation of “things” in the world. In this sense, even while “the self” is 
conceived merely as a “witness” (sākṣin) in Nyāya, whose true nature neither manifests 
“knowledge” as its essential characteristic nor does it actively participate in any worldly 
affairs, functions as a „measure‟ that influences human beings‟ „understanding‟ of 
worldly phenomena and their behavior towards these events in the same manner as the 
illusory perception of a rope as a snake influences the behavior of a perceiver. Moreover, 
by holding up liberation of “the self” as the ultimate aim of human life, classical Indian 
theories, including Nyāya, seek to introduce an urge among human beings to move away 
from an engagement with meaningless, mechanical cycles of “matter”.  
___________________ 
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Annexure 2 
Interview 
     Dr. Moinak Biswas, Dept. of Film Studies, Jadavpur University, Kolkata 
26 November, 2013, 2 – 4 pm 
 
GM: Thank you Dr. Biswas for granting this interview. It concerns my PhD work at the 
University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, the working title being „Cinema and Wild Meaning: 
Phenomenology, Classical Indian Theories, and Embodiment in Cinema‟. I will present you 
with some of my findings and request you to react on them. My first point concerns Cartesian 
metaphysics where mind prevails over the body as the centre of all experiences and 
knowledge. Our film theory generally follows this trend of highlighting intellectual thought 
processes at the cost of an embodied reading. Do you think this impoverishes our knowledge 
of cinema? 
MB: What I‟m not sure about is how theoretical reflection can incorporate what you call 
embodied experience or embodied knowledge. Because the moment you call something 
embodied against something that is cognitive and mental, you have already accepted that 
there is a mind-body division. There is no escape from this because these are categories that 
we don‟t create on our own. Categories have to be agreed upon, categories have to emerge 
from collective experiments and investigations. It makes me slightly uncomfortable with this 
idea of embodied knowledge. This is, of course, due to my lack of exposure to this literature. I 
must tell you at the outset that I‟m not really familiar with this literature and that I‟ve come 
across this kind of writing only sporadically. What I know of cinema or the kind of discussion 
that I engage in is mostly of the other kind, of what you may call mind over body. But what 
little I‟ve come across, I‟ve not found, and you have to correct me if I‟m wrong, a proper 
theoretical elaboration of this category. The moment you elaborate something as a category or 
as a concept, you cannot keep on saying that this is something that can be known only 
intuitively, that it can only be known in the body. The moment you articulate it analytically or 
put it in words, you are kind of denying the bodily aspect of it and moving onto its cognitive 
side. This is a self-defeating exercise – how can you theoretically elaborate on embodied 
326 
 
knowledge? It is something that I‟m not sure about in film criticism, I‟ve not seen anybody do 
it. I‟m only a little familiar with Vivian Sobchack‟s work, for example, who has tried in 
recent times to consistently bring phenomenology back into focus. But phenomenology isn‟t 
necessarily entirely about embodiment. The kind of phenomenology that one has heard about, 
for example, even in Merleau-Ponty, the little bit that I‟m familiar with – it is from him that 
the theory of gaze comes, the Lacanian theory of the gaze owes its origin somewhat to 
Merleau-Ponty‟s work. Or, let‟s say, the kind of phenomenological elaboration that this very 
influential Hegelian, Alexandre Kojève in the 1930s did to make Hegel popular among the 
Parisian intellectuals including Lacan. They were all attending Kojève‟s lectures on 
phenomenology of the mind for six years between 1933 and 1939 which, very profoundly, 
renewed an interest in the area. If you look at that kind of writing - I‟ve read those lectures in 
a book - it‟s primarily what you might call a mode of ratiocination or cogitation. It is not 
entirely, or not even in a major way, devoted to embodied knowledge as such. So when you 
say embodied, my response would be in a form of question: how do you theoretically 
elaborate it? If you say something like the rasa theory, as I see it from your findings, it‟s a 
kind of theoretical elaboration. But I‟ll let you go to the rasa theory first. 
GM: Actually, you are absolutely right because phenomenology, really speaking, is a kind of 
transcendental mental affair in Husserl‟s theory which Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty later 
bring within the domain of the body. 
MB: Let‟s turn the focus back to the body. The moment you analytically articulate something 
– that‟s what your work is as a theoretical researcher – how would you actually say that 
theoretical elaboration is possible on the basis of embodied knowledge? Because the moment 
categories and concepts come into play, how do you avoid a kind of abstraction from 
everyday embodied experience and knowledge? Theory, by definition, involves abstraction. 
GM: You are possibly right that the objective criterion of bodily reading is still apparently 
lacking.  
MB: Let‟s make it something more specific so that we have something more concrete to hold 
onto. Give me an example of this embodied knowledge as a category, because a theoretical 
category or a concept or whatever is useful is actually a utilitarian thing. If a concept doesn‟t 
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explain things properly, if it is not useful, then it doesn‟t serve any purpose. How is it more 
useful than other things i.e. comparatively more useful so that you chose this concept rather 
than the other, chose symbolic knowledge rather than something else. Could you give me an 
example where its explanatory power is better than some other explanatory model in films?  
GM: Emotions are, of course, a major thing. One may argue that only after one has mentally 
understood a situation, then only emotions get generated. But, the new theory of 
Neuroscience holds that it is really the bodily response that is generating those emotions. For 
instance, all the emotions of fear usually happen through that. Antόnio Damátio, the HoD of 
Neuroscience, UCLA, holds that even when we are dealing with the most theoretical of 
thoughts, the body sends its signals through the body loop, which he calls the „somatic 
markers‟, to the mind. So whenever we are interacting, we are actually doing so both on the 
basis of the mind and the body. According to him pure thought is a myth. 
MB: Ok, that can be one sort of discussion. But I was asking you a simple question. Let‟s say 
we have to explain a film or a sequence or a group of films critically – because that‟s what 
criticism‟s job is – to an audience – group of students, readers, my colleagues – where bodily 
experience serves my critical purpose more than the other option.  
GM: When I‟m confronting an object from different angles, my bodily response changes the 
meaning of the thing. One of the classical Indian theories gives the formula of „qualifier-
qualified-relationship‟ where, on the basis of what the viewer sees, meaning is generated in 
her. Let‟s say when a person is seen as sitting in front of a lot of books, she is being qualified 
by the books to generate the meaning „she is studying‟. The same scene seen from a different 
angle may change the meaning completely. So they say that all these viewpoints are very 
visual, very physical viewpoints. What it further says is that only on the basis of this 
perception, higher thoughts are generated.  
MB: Something that is physically perceived is also processed. It is related to other things that 
are physically perceived. Everything initially starts from sensations. In case of cinema, it has 
to be like that at the basic level. But you are telling me that when I perceive something and 
relate it to something else, it is only through that relationship that meaning emerges. But why 
is this relationship to be considered as an embodied knowledge? I‟ve an idea of the books, 
328 
 
I‟ve an idea of the person who is an avid reader, somebody who has an intellectual life, let‟s 
say. So a person who is just sitting on a chair and a person who is sitting on a chair 
surrounded by books would mean two different things because I‟ve an idea what it means to 
be surrounded by books. So where is embodied knowledge here? 
GM: What this theory is saying is that the relationship that is being formed between books 
and the person arises out of immediate or direct perception. It is not based on intellectual 
thought. 
MB: That happens with most of the perceptions. But nobody stops there. They are processed. 
You just move onto the next plane. Associations, processing, meaning-making pass into 
apperception as Kant says where a set of other things get connected to the specific perception 
I‟m talking about. When you, as an analyst of films, are trying to tell us something about the 
film, what sort of advantage do you gain by using one set of explanation vis-à-vis another; it 
is all a question of usefulness. What is the usefulness of the category of embodied 
knowledge? You give me a specific sequence or a film where this would be more useful than 
just a rational analysis of things. 
GM: Sure. I‟ve already mentioned in my notes, the haptic experience, the bodily experience 
in cinema. Let‟s say In Ritwik Ghatak‟s Meghe Dhaka Tara („Cloud-Capped Star‟, 1960) 
where Nita finds out that her sister is betraying her, she asks her brother to sing a Rabindra 
Sangeet with her. There Ritwik uses all sorts of camera angles to portray this scene. We may 
rationally try to explain that, like ok, here is montage, here is something else, etc. Because of 
his genius, we may even be justified in using all those explanatory modules. But what the 
phenomenologists would say or probably Nyāya would say is that it is the very embodied 
nature of the whole scene that makes it a more synesthetic kind of experience than an 
intellectual one. One bodily interacts with the scene. 
MB: Nobody has any quarrel with that. Nobody is suggesting – and I don‟t think anybody in 
his or her right mind would suggest – that you can explain a film entirely through rational 
means of disentangling each and every element from a scene. This is a question of some sort 
of integration and organicity. I see it as a problem of that. Because when things come together 
and they enter into some sort of a proper relationship with each other, like the scene you have 
329 
 
just mentioned. In „je rate more duar guli bhanglo jhore‟, when the camera angles, lighting, 
the body movements, the characters, the actors, the music - all the elements that you can think 
of – enter into some sort of meaningful coherent relationship, then explaining that bit by bit 
by disentangling every little element and assigning it a meaning separately is actually a very 
tedious and meaningless exercise. Beyond a point, I don‟t think anybody would seriously 
suggest that this is the only way of explaining a film. In this sense, your idea of direct 
perception of an emotional scene is not under any dispute. Initially, it is direct perception of 
something, sense of suffering or pain, abandonment, betrayal, call that what you like. But my 
question is this. The moment you are explaining it as a critic or as an analyst to your 
audience, how can you just keep saying that it is an embodied knowledge. In such a case, I‟ve 
to just stop right there, I can‟t say anything else. If I say that it is a total and unified rasa – 
rasa is always a combination of four or five rasas as Nāṭyaśāstra says - which is an example 
of total embodiment. Now rasa cannot be analyzed and served to you on a platter. If I say this 
to my audience, then I‟ve to stop right there. My question is: what utility does the category of 
embodied knowledge serve? I‟m not asking a rhetorical question you know. I want to know 
what purpose it serves because if I try to write about that scene in Meghe Dhaka Tara, and 
many of us have tried to write on that scene, I cannot just say that it is an embodiment of rasa 
and stop there. This is some sort of traditional criticism, literature departments always seem to 
do that. At one point, even film criticism was like that. One would just say that there is an 
experience that comes through the scene, there is an affect that happens, which cannot be put 
into words. It is another dimension altogether. Like in Bengali we say „anyo matra‟, „bhinno 
matra‟ [„a separate dimension‟], etc. While I understand that it belongs to a different 
dimension, my unfortunate task as a critic is to elaborate on that scene: communicate, 
analyze, and even evaluate. Right? I‟ll admit that „embodied experience‟ is a valid term, there 
is no quarrel with that. Let‟s say, we are watching Sanat and Nita in such a scene. After 
having said that it is an embodied experience, I‟ve to stop there because the rest is all a 
rational explanation. For example, slowly Nita‟s face – it is actually a very abnormal kind of 
action – goes into a total 90ᵒ angle tilt to her neck. Usually one doesn‟t use his body like that. 
Now there is a melodramatic tradition where bodily movements are used to signify things. A 
very good example is Sahab, Biwi, aur Ghulam where a scene like occurs as pure melodrama. 
There is a scene where Meena Kumari is putting the mohini sindoor [vermillion] on in order 
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to keep her husband at home. Mohini sindoor [a particular brand of vermillion] is supposed to 
perform that magical task. And she sings the song „piya aiso jiya mein samayo gayo re ki 
main tan-man ki sudh budh gawa baithi‟. The way the song is picturised – Guru Dutt is of 
course a master of song picturisation – you see Meena Kumari is making a movement of the 
body in front of the mirror which is an impossible movement, one can‟t move one‟s waist like 
that. A human body cannot move beyond a certain degree. So this is something that is 
allowed in melodramatic representation and Ghatak has taken all the liberties to do that. But 
when I explain this scene – I cannot explain the whole of the emotions, I won‟t even try – but 
if I tell you that it is because the light is used in a certain way and because the head is backlit, 
there is a kind of dust of light that is falling on her hair and her face being perpendicular to 
her neck, all of this gives you a kind of ecstasy that is both pain and pleasure. It is a 
jouissance kind of a thing; it is something that is neither pain nor pleasure. May be I won‟t 
use the word „jouissance‟; it is an ecstatic kind of a situation. Actually it is only after this 
scene, where the body does the most mundane and sordid kind of living in an extraordinarily 
impoverished dwelling, that we go to the mountains [Nita is admitted in a Shillong TB 
Sanatorium]. You actually have a sense of what is coming through this composition. You 
mayn‟t accept it, but if I say that, I‟m actually performing a critical task. Now while I talk 
about the scene in this manner, I‟m already breaking up, rationalizing, creating an argument. I 
cannot just say that Nita has an embodied knowledge, that she has knowledge of her death, 
that she doesn‟t yet know she has TB, but she has a foreboding of some kind of knowledge. 
There is certainly an embodied kind of knowledge in the scene, but I cannot just stop there.  
GM: It is a very valid question. I think you agree to the embodiment of knowledge but that 
we don‟t have verbal words or concepts to express them. While we have this very important 
kind of experience in cinema, the film theories haven‟t tried to incorporate them. The present 
efforts are some of the very basic attempts at theorizing or verbalizing this kind of experience 
which underlies all the rest, our mental reactions, all our intellectual thoughts. Somehow, in 
certain cases, like when you are confronted with a landscape or something like that, you 
cannot even explain why you become nostalgic or afraid or feel some absence or whatever. 
I‟ll like to say that the theory of embodiment is an attempt to discover whether we can 
conceptualize such experiences. As you very correctly said, in an analytical framework, how 
do we do it? How can we explain emotion to another person? It has to be enacted for the other 
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person to feel that emotion. Such enactments are very important in cinema or in theatre or 
even in music perhaps. How do you conceptualize that experience? It is a moot question 
whether through phenomenology or classical Indian theories, some narrative can be put to 
that. 
MB: I‟d like to know what that is. I‟m not an expert in that area. But little that I know of rasa 
theory, it is a very elaborate taxonomy and it is argumentative and its cognitive side is 
extremely strong. It doesn‟t say that there are embodiments that are so ethereal and so beyond 
words that we shouldn‟t try to verbalize. It is exactly the opposite what these people were 
trying to do. The very little that I‟ve seen of Indian aesthetics, it is intellectually extremely 
elaborate; it is not as if they speak in terms of something ineffable, something that cannot be 
captured in words. To a large extent, it is exactly the opposite; it is intellectually very 
stimulating and so on. I don‟t think you have done that but I would be a little careful in falling 
into the trap of mind being associated with the West and heart and emotion with some kind of 
an Indian tradition. This is an extremely dangerous trap. This is why I‟m asking all these 
questions. Even if we start from an Indian aesthetic premise, we would be confronted with an 
extremely intellectualized atmosphere. Little bit of Abhinavagupta that I‟ve seen, his 
arguments represent a most sophisticated form of separation of categories, distinctions, and 
applications. It is a laboratory of the mind from which comes his commentary on Nāṭyaśāstra, 
that‟s a book which I‟ve seen a little bit. For instance, even Western theories are full of some 
kind of non-rational thought – I‟m not doing some kind of a value-judgment here. For 
example, a part of Romantic notion which is still very strong and overbearing, a romantic 
notion of what poetry is, what inspiration is, what an artist ought to be and so on. A large part 
of that is not dependent on a kind of Cartesian mind over body theory. There is a lot of 
emphasis put on intuition, on direct emotions, on one‟s direct response to things and so on. 
Read the Romantic poets who themselves theorize about their own works and you would find 
that it is basically intuitive, spontaneous, overbearing emotions, overflow of emotions, that 
kind of thing and direct perception of something without channeling it. So it is not even true 
that the Western tradition is primarily a mind over body thing. Well, what has happened with 
phenomenology in film studies is that after the structuralist and the poststructuralist period i.e. 
the mid-60s onwards upto early 80s, there is a wide scale reaction against it. To that extent, 
everybody now scoffs at Screen theory to the extent that even the most valuable things that 
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they were doing have been overthrown like the baby with the bathwater. I think 
phenomenology is also serving the purpose of a refuge; one would be a bit wary of that. 
Because obscurantism might creep in like there is something so ineffable that we have to 
leave it at that. Now in relation to most of our experiences, we actually do that, we don‟t talk 
about them or, even if we do, we just say oh! What a wonderful experience! We don‟t usually 
sit down and analyze. But if art has to be taught, if principles of art have to be handed down 
from generation to generation or from the teacher to the student or from friend to friend, if 
anything has to be taught, there is no other way but to provide a rational framework of 
explanation. So, we need to strike a balance first and take into account the fact that there is a 
lot that is purely bodily sensation, especially in a post-modern kind of market situation…the 
haptic is even enhanced by mobile touch-screens, smart phones, the haptic is everywhere, the 
smart screen is hapticity personified, embodied if you like, but the moment we reflect, it is 
one thing to say that media is haptic and another thing to say that my refection on that would 
also be nothing but haptic and embodied. So I don‟t say anything, just go and touch and feel 
it. May be a day would come when we would be able to communicate x with x and not x with 
y. The problem is that, at the moment, we have a separation between the explanatory disourse 
and the original discourse or the original object. In an explanatory discourse, I‟m not sure 
how can we avoid a fundamentally cognitive kind of explanation. Even if we speak of the pre-
rational – Eisenstein himself does it so many times, in 1929, he is all dialectics and montage 
involving this calculation and that calculation in 1929, he goes abroad and in his 1930s 
writing, there is a lot that is intuitive, preverbal, pre-rational and so on and so forth - but the 
way Eisenstein tries to explain it, his explanatory framework is not pre-verbal. For an 
explanatory module to be pre-verbal and pre-rational, we would have to resort to a ritual 
communication. In ritual communication, people communicate through purely rhythmic, 
dynamic movements, energy kind of thing. I‟m not denying that there must be something like 
that happening, there are perceptions that go back and forth between people, anticipating 
things within a certain frame of mind in a ritual situation. It doesn‟t have to be a religious 
ritual, but I‟m calling all that as a ritual situation. I‟m not disrespectful of that kind of 
communication and I‟m not denying that it exists; probably it exists even more than our 
rational lives. But you are trying to create a theoretical framework here. My answer would 
again be a question: how do we go about it? 
333 
 
GM: These are valid points to which an immediate answer cannot be given. While there 
surely is bodily knowledge, like when I‟m weeping, you immediately understand, when you 
are laughing, I immediately understand, but then when you are trying to explain it to 
somebody, then by simply laughing you cannot explain that. The formula that Bharata has 
given in Nāṭyaśāstra – in a given situation, the protagonists act or react in a certain way, more 
than their words, their gestures and postures are more important, it creates an effect that 
generates emotions among audiences. In the second stage of the same formula, he takes 
audience emotion also into consideration for creating rasa. Now, I‟ll be asking you the 
question where is the cognitive part in all this, where does thought occur? In fact, I‟ve raised 
this question in relation to intellectual kind of theatre vis-à-vis Bharata‟s theatre. A large part 
of the formula is a formula of embodiment without which rasa cannot be generated. If I‟ve 
understood correctly, intellectually you cannot attain rasa.  
MB: That‟s the perception of the performance or the film. But we aren‟t talking about the 
perception of characters in the film, not even the perception of audience, including myself, of 
the film. We are talking about another level of discourse here where I put down in words to a 
community of readers what I‟ve experienced and what does it all mean i.e. whether cinema 
has been successful in communicating to us. That rasa has to be intuitively grasped there is 
no quarrel with that – you can call it rasa, in another framework, aesthetic pleasure or ecstasy. 
Bharata himself cannot just say that it is rasa and you have to understand it. You have to 
explain. The moment you divided up something into vibhāva („determinants‟), anubhāva 
(„consequents‟), and vyabhicāribhāva („transients‟), you have already broken up the totality 
of the wholeness into fragments, there is no actual existence of the bhāva („mental state‟), it 
automatically merges into and flows. So it is a logical separation. How can you emotionally 
separate things? One has to answer this question at the explanatory level. There is a huge 
body of very sophisticated thinking right next to us in India that we don‟t use. We only read 
something which a Western critic has written. It is not an either/or situation. I should first 
correct this Western bias by looking at other traditions. That is the first step which I admit 
I‟ve not done. I‟m in sympathy with your project to that extent; but I also must admit that for 
me at an explanatory level, the mind-body dualism doesn‟t really pay. The moment you say 
embodied knowledge, you are already setting it over and against neutral, cognitive aspect of 
things. There is a question to pander: wouldn‟t you, rather, look at the alternative explanatory 
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frameworks which probably can correct some of the imbalances, some of the gaps, and 
absences? It is exactly what happened with structuralism with its semiotic analysis, etc. 
Deleuze‟s reaction was the first major reaction that you cannot have that kind of a linguistic 
format for understanding films. You won‟t be able to explain movement, time, color, light – 
you won‟t be able to explain all these affects. What you are trying to do is to bring back affect 
into play. Now there is a worldwide slide towards that. But because it is also being done by so 
many people, one has to be careful. It is not an either/or or a mind/body or a mind/affect kind 
of a situation. Nor is it a Western or an Indian kind of a thing. For me, for a critical exercise, 
whatever is more apt, more useful, and more precise for understanding something, I would 
adopt. So a comparative framework would be more useful, more interesting. If 
Ānandavardhana or dhvani or Abhinavagupta have concepts that can explain things, they 
have concepts which other traditions haven‟t even thought of - which is quite possible – then 
they should be explored.  
GM: It is only that now my research would be entering into classical Indian theories and your 
riders would be really useful. In fact, I‟ve felt many of the questions which you have raised. 
Going back to your comment that mind-body bifurcation is arbitrary, Ānanadavardhana‟s 
famous sentence „The village is on the river Ganges‟ proves that. He says that while it creates 
a suggestion for coolness for us, it also generates a sense of piety in the mind of the 
worshipper. While the first is an embodied experience, the latter one is not.  
MB: It is contextual, if you believe in the holiness of the river. 
GM: So both embodied and cognitive are combined in the experience and, as you correctly 
say, we would have to find a balance between them. But my point is that you would agree that 
there is a need for research in this area. 
MB: Research is, of course, necessary. My discomfort with people who have tried to apply 
rasa theory to Indian films is that they talk about the characters and what the characters are 
doing to each other. They try to say that this character or this action introduces this rasa. Now 
this is just a taxonomical shift. Why should we only use the taxonomy of the West? Let‟s use 
new words. But using new words is a very, very limited exercise of the theorists. One may 
call it a „source‟ or you may call it vibhāva; the latter is more beautiful because it evokes 
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something like a bhāva. But it should move beyond that. My problem with my friend Amrit 
Gangar is that Amrit is providing new taxonomies, don‟t call it „experimental‟, call it 
„prayoga‟. But you can‟t stop there; you have to see if „prayoga‟ unravels new meanings, 
opens certain doors for me. Other than that just using a new label sounds fine but doesn‟t 
serve much purpose. You have given an example of the landscape. I‟m interested in that. 
Very recently Arindam Chakrabarti has given me a few things to read. It includes an essay by 
K. C. Bhattacharya, one of the greatest philosophers that India has produced in modern times, 
and another by Arindam Chakrabarti himself. They have written about this notion of 
„ownerless emotion‟ using Indian aesthetic theories. They have slowly moved from there to 
show that, within this theory, there is a conception of certain emotions, rasa, which do not 
need to be pinned to a character or a person. This is what K. C. Bhattacharya has said which 
he calls the „sky of the heart‟ („heart universal‟). One implication of that concept is that you 
probably can arrive at an idea by going forward from Abhinavagupta‟s theories where you 
can imagine things or emotions in terms of their autonomy, and not on their dependence on 
individual characters. This is important for me because it helps me understand, not 
embodiment, but why, sometimes, anchoring of all emotions to a person becomes very 
limited. If we un-anchor them in cinema, probably it would become much more interesting 
and meaningful. I‟m thinking of all those films and sequences where I‟ve felt something like 
this is happening. So far I‟d only felt it, but now I see that people have even cogently thought 
about it. These people have the apparatus, the equipment to think because they have the 
Indian aesthetic theory as a support. Arindam da is forcing me to write which I‟m failing. 
May be I‟ll write something but can already see that there is a possibility where understanding 
world cinema, not only Indian cinema, through this lens becomes important. Although they 
haven‟t talked about cinema, but this concept of „ownerless emotion‟ is helping me 
understand films. While he gave me a no. of things to read, I latched onto that because it 
sounded like it can explain to me my memory of cinema. I‟m interested in the use of Indian 
aesthetics in that manner. It is a very personal thing. There is another thing. You can say that 
your job is to understand Indian aesthetic tradition properly. That‟s a different task. I‟m 
neither an aesthetician nor a philosopher. Because I‟m purely a utilitarian, I‟m not 
immediately taken in by the greatness of something Indian; I‟m taken in by their 
sophistication, the range and complexity of some of their ideas. And certain ideas work for 
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me. In a film this rasa is emerging in this moment and that rasa in another moment, I‟m not 
interested. It‟s a classification that doesn‟t help me. 
GM: it is one of the most unsatisfactory ways of doing things. In fact, it can do a lot of 
damage.   
MB: May be not damage, but it is not going anywhere. But also there is a strange underlying 
assumption that Indian popular cinema – I don‟t know what that is – is based on Bharata‟s 
Nāṭyaśāstra. It can be immediately shown that this is entirely wrong. There is no popular 
cinema in the world which has grown on indigenous soil. Cinema from the very beginning 
has its own life and energy precisely because it has no purity. It has always grown at the 
intersection of trends from all over the world, it is a mixture of many things. And content in 
Indian popular cinema is even less explicable. But there may be things happening in 
contemporary cinema in India or elsewhere which may be eminently explicable in terms of 
Indian aesthetic theories. I‟m ready to accept that premise. Since Indian theories are such a 
rich and great body of work and it is here, why should we entirely neglect this and constantly 
look to other sources. That‟s probably our ex-colonial mind-set, a slavish kind of mentality. 
GM: Actually you know Adoor Gopalakrishnan had given a lecture at SRFTI at the 50
th
 
anninversary of Pather Panchali where he had said that our colonial past has ingrained in 
us… 
MB: You have quoted it. 
GM: So what do you think the real situation is with our students or our teaching or our 
understanding of cinema? 
MB: We have to bring more and more of all sorts of alternatives. We shouldn‟t be focused 
only on what Deleuze has said or Laura Marks says. This kind of constant look at some 
distant kind of source in Paris or London is really debilitating. We have this advantage. They 
don‟t know our things, but we know our things. And there are modern Indian philosophers 
who are rethinking some of these categories. I‟m more interested in them because sometimes 
if you are reading a 10
th
 century text, one must remember certain things of the social life, 
economic organization, technology, many things that weren‟t available then. They were 
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talking about things that were radically different from our own. But there is a group of 
modern thinkers in India and abroad who are interested in them. I think there is a renewed 
interest in Indian aesthetics.  
GM: Actually Bimal Krishna Matilal, Jiten Mohanty, Arindam Chakrabarti, Jonardon Ganeri, 
etc, are reinterpreting Indian theories. 
MB: Yes, yes, these are big names, but there are also others. They are still debating the issue, 
they are yet to take a single position. I was reading Sheldon Pollock recently. A very 
interesting essay is on one Kashmiri Śaiva theoretician between Ānandavardhana and 
Abhinavagupta whose text is lost. He is only reading it from the references and quotations by 
others. But he claims that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka‟s theory moves the entire burden of rasa and rasa-
āśraya from the actors to the spectators. If somebody says that then these are intriguing, very, 
very interesting. If I now talk of audience response, why should I use only Western theory? 
This 9
th
 or 10
th
 century is a very interesting, intellectually stimulating period. 
GM: Abhinava takes from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and develops his own theory. 
MB: It should immediately feed into how I think of audience response and so on. Why should 
I shove it aside and concentrate only on reader-response theory or this and that from the 
West? 
GM: As you said they have their own strength but, probably, this also points to the fact that 
these theories have universality built in them. 
MB: This is something that has never appealed to me that to understand Indian stuff, you 
need Indian theories and so on. If there is a valid Indian theory, it should apply to Western art 
also, why not? I should be able to understand Antonioni, you mentioned him isn‟t it? or a test 
case could be to apply to something from Siberia.  
GM: I mentioned Tarkovsky. I‟ll give you only one more question. It concerns the discovery 
of „mirror neurons‟ where the great apes, including humans, get into the same bodily state 
when other members undertake a goal-directed task. In other words, audiences get into the 
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same bodily state as those of the performers due to the firing of similar neurons within their 
own bodies. This militates against the theories of „theory-theory‟ and „simulation theory‟.  
MB:  I‟m not aware of this discovery.  
GM: In fact, it is only in 1996 that this discovery has been made and it has been hailed as one 
of the greatest discoveries since the DNA. This may explain a lot of audience reactions to 
moving images.  
MB: Well, this is important information for me but I can‟t see your line of argument on that 
basis.  
GM: Thank you Dr. Biswas. This has been a critical and enlightening discourse. 
MB: Same here. 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
339 
 
Annexure 3 
Interview 
Dr. Amita Chatterjee, Professor Emerita, Jadavpur University, Kolkata 
January 31, 2014, 2.30 -4.30pm 
 
GM: Thank you Prof. Chatterjee for granting this interview. I‟m doing a PhD in Film 
Research at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK exploring the connection between 
phenomenology, classical Indian theories and embodiment in cinema. In this connection, as a 
Nyāya expert, I‟ll like to ask you some questions. It is important for Nyāya that it deals with 
different cognitive wholes of the same thing seen from different perspectives. This becomes 
important in explaining different camera angles operating in cinema. 
AC: When Nyāya is trying to give a scientific theory of perception, what it is trying to do is 
to define the objective conditions of perception which would apply to individuals per se to 
any perceiver. They aren‟t bringing in the question of perspective at that point even though 
they are all the time talking about embodied perception and they have all the time said that 
one of the preconditions of our having any knowledge is to have our body. But what I feel is 
lacking in Nyāya is that they haven‟t actually explained in detail the mode or nature of our 
bodily experiences, the perception that we have of our body or the feeling that we have of our 
various bodily experiences on which they haven‟t focused at all. If you remember their 
categories or the classifications they have made, it is in terms of internal and external 
perception where external perception gives you the modalities by which you can know the 
world and internal perception makes you aware of your internal state, but not the bodily 
feelings or even the feelings that we have when we know something. It is like what is 
nowadays called what it is like to be a bat or a bat type experience. That is something which 
is lacking in Nyāya. For that I would refer you to K. C. Bhattacharya‟s „Body as Subject‟ or 
„Subject as Freedom‟. But I would like to point out that I personally think that our body is too 
remarkable a source for knowledge and understanding. 
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GM: My topic being very complicated, I believe you are one of the persons in Calcutta who 
can throw some light on it. 
AC: Undoubtedly your topic is very complicated. As I told you I would be very happy to 
interact since not much work has been done in this area. That‟s why I was interested. It so 
happens that I‟m now concentrating on the body as one of my research areas – right now I‟ve 
a project to look at the variations in the Nyāya theory through the lens of cognitive science. 
Immediately that brings me to the concept of the body because, to the Naiyāyika, any kind of 
knowledge is an embodied experience. A disembodied mind cannot have any knowledge. 
They would say that a liberated soul doesn‟t possess any knowledge at all. And that‟s why 
they have been ridiculed very much. Critics said that it is only Gotama, which literally means 
the „best cow‟, who could have propounded this thesis! All other theorists had said that 
liberated souls have cognition. And if you look at various philosophical systems, you would 
find that, excepting for Achintya Vedāvedavāda, in other systems models of liberation are 
very cognitive. They aren‟t taking into account conative or affective aspects at all; ultimately 
they say that self is the nature of cit which is conscious per se. So if some systems claim that a 
liberated soul cannot have knowledge, it goes against the Upaniṣadic saying that self is cit. 
GM: Sorry to interrupt, madam. Prof. Mohanty says that such an uninteresting state of the 
liberated self, where the self is completely blind, is such an unwelcome state… 
AC: Yes, who would want that kind of liberation? Because of their logic and their 
metaphysical beliefs they were led to that kind of a position. And, therefore, they always 
maintained that whenever we have knowledge, it is always embodied knowledge where our 
body plays a vital role in attaining any kind of knowledge. Perception being the primary 
source of knowledge, with all other types of knowledge being dependent on perception, 
perception admits the very important, very salient, role of the body. And it is very much in 
tune with the contemporary theories of embodiment, not only of Merleau-Ponty, but also of 
the cognitive scientists and others who are talking of embodiment nowadays. If you look at 
the Western theories of perception, you would find that what contemporary theories are trying 
to do is to bridge the gap between perception and action. Previously, you know, people used 
to think that while perception is something which pertains to our sensory abilities. Action is a 
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late realization of our perception, of our goal. But there are theories now which hold that 
action is constitutive of perception and perception is nothing but a kind of action. There are 
others who would say that, even if perception is not constituted of action, or it is not an 
action, perception is always for an action. For attaining something, for acting in the world, 
perception is required. And I think the Naiyāyikas would agree with the position that 
perception is a kind of action, but from the point of Indian philosophy, it would be a bit 
problematic to say that perception is a kind of cognition and cognition is different from 
action, but, at the same time, their account is such that it always leads to some action or the 
other. And, I believe, all our perceptual interpretations and even our decision-making, our 
conceptualizations, our concepts of rationalization, all these are really formed by our specific 
type of embodiment. For that I agree with the phenomenologists and Merleau-Ponty. In the 
third wave of cognitive science, the cognitive scientists are pointing out that our cognitions 
are always situated. So if you look at the situated cognition theory, then also you will find this 
emphasis on the body. The three theses that they want to bring together in the theory of 
situated cognition are, first, the theory of embodied cognition which applies to bodily 
perception, secondly, embedded perception or embedded cognition, and, finally, the 
extended-mind theory. So if you think about this embodied cognition, then you will see that 
they make a distinction between two concepts, one is our body image and the other is the 
body schema, and they say that, in our perception, either our body image or our body schema 
is involved in action. This distinction is made by Shaun Gallaghar. We can draw on an active 
example. Say when we are really engaged in the act of perception, we will find that it is not 
the case that while our body schema is involved, our body image might not be present at all. It 
is not like an on-line off-line processing of information. When we think about something, our 
motor cortex or our body is involved. But it has been found that even when we think of some 
of our perceptual experiences, then also certain areas of the motor cortex in the brain get 
excited. Cognitive scientists have done a lot of experiments to show that. First, certain words 
are projected on the screen and, at the same time, you are given certain tasks to perform. 
When you are reading loud, the task is to pull a lever towards you or push it away from your 
body. It was found that when certain words, like laugh, etc., were projected on screen, the 
task of pushing away the lever takes more time. But when you are pulling the lever towards 
you, the action time got much decreased. So when you are reading or being shown an 
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affective scene which is pleasurably affecting you, if there is a consonance between your 
action and analyzing the scene, the reaction time of performing the task always gets 
shortened. In contrast, when there is a dissonance, then reaction time gets longer. On the basis 
of these experiments, they have come to the conclusion that our perception is really an 
embodied perception. By embodiment, as I pointed out, one doesn‟t mean the involvement of 
our body, but we have a body schema in our brain which gets activated whenever we are 
saying, thinking, or perceiving something. Body is very much important for our 
understanding of the world. Initially, you know, only cognitive considerations were taken into 
consideration. But there is another side to it. Most of the time, you would find that the 
scientists are giving the example of a chair. We know a chair is a place to sit upon. Even 
when it is a non-standard type of chair, like a tree-stump, we know that it is a place where we 
can sit. This is because we have a body like this. But if we had a body like a horse, or a deer, 
then we wouldn‟t have thought that a tree-stump is something on which you can sit. But they 
also point out that it is not all biological. Our culture is also responsible for our understanding 
of „chair‟ in this way. For example, the Japanese didn‟t have any concept of „chair‟. They 
were more used to squatting on the floor. When the first ship arrived on the coast of Japan 
carrying a chair, they criticized it as a devil‟s merchandise! 
GM: Sorry to interrupt again, madam. The intentionality of consciousness that Nyāya holds – 
probably one of the earliest in the line – is it, then, not only experiential but also cultural and 
all other things combined as well? 
AC: Yes, but when we analyze or theorize, we do it piecemeal all the time, by focusing on 
certain aspects while neglecting the others. But now that we want to know what are all the 
factors involved in our understanding of the world, we are trying to evolve different type of 
concepts for that purpose and also how our concepts change. And not only that. How our 
brain can compensate for the change of light, etc. If we want to understand all these things, 
then there is no other way but to consider the contribution made by our body and our 
understanding of the body in constructing our theories of perception. And, since in film, this 
constructive part, even in understanding a particular scene, it is very important that we look at 
these problems and hence we cannot move away from embodiment. It mayn‟t be the case as 
Moinak has pointed out that even if it is accepted that the body is an important component but 
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he doesn‟t know how it works vis-à-vis the narrative or a rational interpretation. But both in 
the context of a narrative and a rational interpretation, cognitive scientists are continuously 
trying to find out the contribution of the body, how much of the body is involved in all these. 
They are now saying that there is actually no gap between the mind and the body. We will 
always have to consider it as a mind-body or body-mind together. Moreover, our mind is not 
confined within our body only but it can overflow. And most of the time, it is not the case that 
the world is being replicated in our head when we perceive something. There is a very 
interesting psychological experiment called the „change blindness‟. If you change something 
very slowly in your environment or a scene, the viewer will not detect the change for a very 
long time. For film theory, this aspect becomes very important. If our visual-perceptual 
system had acted like a camera, then it would have taken in the whole scene at a time and 
there would have been no gaps. But, even if we disagree with everything else, gaps have to be 
there because we blink which creates some gap. So we have to compensate for that. That‟s 
why it is not that in perception we are passive receivers of impressions or stimuli from the 
external environment. We are all the time contributing something and constructing our world, 
our objects of perception.  
GM: Prof. Chatterjee, you have reached a point which is very important for cinema. When 
somebody is looking through camera or even one‟s own eyes at, let‟s say, a person sitting 
with some books in front, we are constructing some meaning. We are absorbing this scene 
through an epistemological structure of qualifier-qualified-relationship. We are not taking in 
the items within the scene separately. So when we are constructing a relationship between 
these items, they are really fictional, isn‟t it? These may ultimately be proved right based on 
their „workability‟ in the real world. Thus, in cinema, we are constructing fictions all the time 
of what we are seeing. So perception literally becomes a construction of fictions of what we 
are seeing. 
AC: This is a theory which would be supported by the Buddhists, but not Naiyāyikas. The 
Buddhists have a very rich theory of perception and Richard Gregory, who is a very famous 
psychologist, has said that all our perceptions are fictional. When he was asked how a 
veridical perception is distinguished from a non-veridical perception, he had said that when 
our expectations are fulfilled, then it is a veridical perception, otherwise it remains a non-
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veridical one. Suppose while creating a set you have created a house as a façade. Without 
understanding that if I wanted to enter through the door but couldn‟t, then my expectations 
are not fulfilled and I understand that it is just a façade. Similarly when in everyday life I see 
a table, I don‟t doubt that it will be able to hold my keys; but supposing it was made of such a 
material that it wouldn‟t hold it, then we would understand that it is not a table surface. While 
the Buddhists have this kind of a theory, not the Naiyāyikas because they say that, through 
our perception, we can have direct access to reality. That‟s why where you would find the 
Nyāya theory most relevant in your research is in their theory of extraordinary perception, 
jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa, and not their account of ordinary perception where they are trying to 
grasp the real objects of the world. They are giving us the entire causal mechanism of that 
perceptual process which has little scope for any interpretation there. But their theory of 
jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is relevant particularly in the area where you deal with synesthesia. 
People usually think that synesthesia is not a very common phenomenon; while we are all 
synesthetists in our infancy, as we grow up, certain links in our brain snap. But mostly people 
think that synaesthesia is a kind of aberration, an abnormal way of knowing the world. There 
is a very contemporary way of looking at this jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. The theory that can 
be immediately applied to this is the „cognitive penetrability thesis‟ or „oractic penetrability 
thesis‟. Both of them are present in the case of Nyāya. As you have correctly pointed out, 
what happens in jñānalakṣaṇa is that, if somebody has seen a fragrant piece of sandalwood 
before, then seeing it from a distance, his earlier knowledge would evoke in him some 
memory which would become a part of his sensory apparatus which directly links his sense 
organ to this fragrance. So, when we are having the impression of fragrant sandalwood from a 
distance, it cannot be a visual perception. Similarly, when we see a block of ice, we see that it 
is cold. It so happened that we went to see the film Koni on a very hot summer afternoon. All 
the time Koni was swimming in the film, we felt so refreshed with all that water around us. 
So that gave us the experience of „coolness‟ just by looking at the scene. But, it is not possible 
for our eyes to smell or touch. How does it happen? Some people would say that it is 
inference, while some others would say that it is just memory. But the Naiyāyikas say that it 
is perception. There are also some psychologists in the West who say that it is perception 
because only perception can have this kind of vividness in our experience. Naiyāyikas say 
that it is sāksatkāra i.e. vividness which is the mark of perception. Thus, when we have this 
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memory-retrieval access to the fragrance of sandalwood, the very vividness of this experience 
indicates that it cannot be anything else but perception. What‟s happening here? One mode of 
cognition is penetrating into another mode of cognition. Thus, when memory penetrates our 
perceptual apparatus, it becomes a part of the visual process, and that‟s why the scientists call 
it the “cognitive penetrability thesis”.  
GM: It is surprising that experimental support comes for something which was thought so 
long ago! 
AC: Indeed! I‟ll also like to point out something which this „cognitive penetrability thesis‟ 
tells us. Even when the stimulus is the same, two persons can have different cognitions. Why? 
Because our memories are different. Since our perceptions are memory-driven according to 
Nyāya, we can have two different perceptions of the same object. Here we needn‟t create a 
gap between the seeing of an object and its interpretation which comes after perception; rather 
here the thing itself would be cognized differently due to differences in memory. Because the 
Naiyāyikas say that a child who has always seen a ribbon rose, when she is confronted with a 
real rose, she wouldn‟t have the memory of its fragrance.  So when you are talking about this 
jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa, one way of understanding it is through the synesthetic route and 
another is through the cognitive penetrability thesis. I think two persons would be of great 
help to your studies. One of them is a young student of mine who is pursuing his PhD in MIT, 
Nilanjan Das. I‟ll give you his email. Nilanjan has actually drawn my attention to the 
cognitive penetrability theory. Another person who has thought a lot about it is Arindam 
Chakrabarty.  
GM: Without your reference, Arindam Chakrabarti mayn‟t be accessible.  
AC: Actually Arindam watches all the movies that he has access to and then analyzes and 
discusses it. And he has also read Abhinavagupta thoroughly. For Abhinava, you must talk to 
him. Regarding the cognitive penetrability thesis, it can be seen from the Nyāya perspective 
in this way. Since Nyāya is saying that we have a direct causal link with perception, how can 
we have a different sort of knowing of the same object between two persons? Doesn‟t this 
violate their theory of real access to the world? The answer, as I‟ve already said, lies in the 
346 
 
fact that we can have different perceptions of the same object because our memory images are 
different, our background knowledge of what we can remember are different. 
GM: I‟ll ask you a question here. Let‟s say somebody is sitting in a chair in front of a table on 
which there are some books. As you said, Nyāya would say that we are realistically seeing 
this person, the books and all that is on the table. While the Buddhists might say that we are 
conceptually building up these images, for Nyāya, a relationship is built up between them on 
the basis of the formula „qualifier-qualified-relationship‟ which is experiential in nature. 
Thus, memory comes into play in building up this relationship as well, isn‟t it? 
AC: Yes. You know my current project is to look at the variations in earlier and later Nyāya. 
Nyāya started with what I feel is a very realistic kind of philosophy. But, in course of its 
interactions with other philosophical schools, it changed its theory. But most of the time, we 
don‟t take these changes into consideration. While realism persisted all through, ultimately 
such realism came with a variation. So when we come to this qualifier-qualificand-
relationship in Navya-Nyāya, we find that, in Gaṅgeśa, we have a hint of distinguishing 
between object and content. In other words, the content of our perception is different from the 
objects occurring in the scene. Thus, how the same scene is being presented makes a 
difference between the knowledge of two persons. See this table. If I say that „it‟s a table with 
a bunch of keys‟, then the table is the qualificand and the bunch of keys is its qualifier which 
is one sort of cognition. But, on the other hand, if I describe it as „there is a bunch of keys on 
the table‟, then the bunch of keys become the qualificand and the table the qualifier which is a 
different cognition. In reality, then, what is the case?  While the Navya-Naiyāyikas do not say 
that our perception is a „construction‟, but they do say that it is not „bastobiki‟ („realistic‟) 
which means as the facts are, but it is „baigyaniki‟ („scientific‟) which means that how it 
appears to us which has some amount of construction in it. I had found this in some place 
whose reference I cannot immediately give you. This aspect has been accepted by Gaṅgeśa in 
this qualifier-qualificand-relationship. That I think would give support to your position that, if 
we see a lady sitting with a stack of books in front of her, then whether the lady is perceived 
as being overwhelmed by those books or otherwise would depend on the way the scene is 
presented to the viewer.  
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GM: In a low angle shot, the books would appear to overwhelm her while in a normal angle 
shot she would appear to be in control of the books.  
AC: Even though the Naiyāyikas haven‟t admitted but we know that in many of our theories 
of art, there are three views: bird‟s eye view, normal human point of view, and not natural 
point of view. The artists say that when you are making a sculpture, it becomes important 
where you are going to put that sculpture. On that would depend the proportion of the figure. 
Proportions have to be different depending on whether you are putting it at the base of a 
temple or putting it near the ceiling or in direct line of vision. All these things are taken care 
of in other systems but in Nyāya there is no such discussion…Another important thing I‟ll 
like to point out is that Nyāya is not only talking of „cognitive penetration‟, but also about 
„affective penetration‟. As you know, they explain that the jñānalakṣaṇa type of perception 
explains not only our visual perception of the fragrant sandalwood or cold ice, but that they 
also explain our illusions, our process of recognition, and introspection. In case of illusion, 
they say that who would actually misperceive a rope for a snake? It is a person who not only 
has the memory of a snake but also who has some sort of fear from snake. In the city, I had 
the experience of misperceiving a snake for a rope. When I was returning from somewhere in 
the night, I saw there was a piece of felt lying in front of my door. I said oh! Once again the 
felt has come out and the air-conditioner wouldn‟t be ok. So when I wanted to move it, it 
raised its hood. Staying in Alipur in the heart of the city, I wasn‟t expecting a snake. 
Similarly, Nyāya specifically says that only a person who is desirous of money (rajatarthi 
vyakti) would mistake a shell (mother-of-pearl) as silver. So, there must be some sort of 
desire, some sort of emotion, in the back of one‟s mind when he or she is misperceiving 
something.  So, in case of perception, it is not only that one type of cognition penetrates into 
another type of cognition, but, when we are cognizing something, our emotions play a very 
important role in our perceptions. This is what has been called the oractic penetrability or 
affective penetrability in cognitive science.  
GM: Is there any specific portion of Nyāya where I can find this because, unfortunately, I‟ve 
missed it completely. 
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AC: You will find this in Phanibhusan Tarkavagish‟s first volume of Nyāya Darśana, in the 
Chatusutri account of Vatsyayana Bhasya. It occurs in the very fourth segment where he is 
discussing the definition of perception…The other thing that I would like to talk about is the 
haptic experience. Interestingly, though we find that when the Naiyāyikas are discussing our 
experience of the world, it is dominated by vision. But, while they are giving more stress on 
visual perception, at the same time, they are also saying that whatever can be said of vision 
applies to other modes of perception as well.  
GM: They have said so, have they? 
AC: They have said that. More specifically they have said that whenever we perceive an 
„object‟ – object perception is a very complicated thing – even from your cinematographic 
perspective, we identify a full object. There are so many modalities involved in that process 
of identification. Sometimes we identify an object by right kind of smell, sometimes by shape, 
etc. When you perceive a rose, you also perceive so many things at the same time: you are 
perceiving its smell, texture, colour, petal, softness, etc. So it is very difficult to say what an 
object perception really is. Naiyāyikas, however, have said that an object is perceived only 
through two modalities: one is by touch and another is by vision. And these two modes would 
give us two completely different sets of information about the object. While touching an 
object, we don‟t need any light, like visually challenged people don‟t need any light, but for 
vision, the presence of light is essential. So the qualities of the object known would be very 
different.  
GM: Why not identify through sound, like that of a bird? 
AC: This is for perceiving a full object. There is this controversy that when you are hearing a 
sound – it is present in Nyāya as well as in Heidegger and other phenomenologists -  that 
when you hear a horn, do you hear it only as a horn and then see whether it came from a 
motor car or did you hear it as a motor car horn itself?  In the latter case, we might have 
some sense of that object, but it doesn‟t give us the entire breadth of the object. That we can 
have only through touch and vision. This however forced them to explain a lot of things like 
how can you, through a very small aperture, see a whole object or, while looking through a 
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key hole, how much of an object should be perceivable to a viewer to make him identify that 
object. 
GM: How did they explain that, madam, because it is so cinematic? 
AC: (Laughs) You will find them best in the 2 Vols. of Nyāya Darśana by Phanibhusan 
because he has actually combined most of the views in his own commentary. You just look at 
his „tippani‟ part which involves his personal commentaries. In the 2nd Volume, you would 
find all these discussions. Gangeśa also has discussed a lot on this but the summary or the 
crux you would find in Phanibhusan‟s 2nd Vol. May be when we are looking at an object, 
some part of it is not visible but still we perceive the whole. Or we may never see the 
backside of a tree, but we still see the whole tree. How does that happen? It is not that you 
have perception of different pieces and then combine them or it is not that you are having 
some clues and then inferring the rest. No; Nyāya says that by perceiving a part, you are 
perceiving the whole. What are its mechanisms we have already discussed elaborately and 
that is something which I think would be important for your paper.  
GM: Madam, you gave the very interesting example of the keys on the table. Now may be the 
same thing is being seen by two different persons from the same angle and yet one of them 
sees „the keys being qualified by the table‟ while the other sees it as „the table being qualified 
by the keys‟. How does this difference happen? It is like seeing „cat is on the mat‟ or „mat is 
under the cat‟. Will this difference of perception depend on experience, or memory, or some 
kind of frontality or prominence appearing to one but not the other? 
AC: They haven‟t explained it actually. But if you say that while one person is seeing it from 
the front while the other is seeing it from the side, it mayn‟t be unacceptable to the 
Naiyāyikas. They have said that this sometimes depends on the fiat or the purpose of the 
person looking at it and, in that fiat itself, emotion and all such things enter. And another 
thing they say, which hasn‟t been construed charitably by others, is the concept of the adṛṣṭa. 
But when they are talking about adṛṣṭa, they aren‟t talking about the supernatural, but as 
something that is not yet known. While they have said that two people can have two different 
cognitions of the same thing, they haven‟t said how that can be so. The point is that if the 
same thing seen from two different perspectives gives two different cognitions, then one 
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would have to distinguish between object and content. In this case, Nyāya theory doesn‟t 
remain a realistic theory of cognition: while there is direct access, but there is also mediation 
of the content. We find that while they are admitting different sort of contents, they haven‟t 
said how it happens. May be it can be due to position of the perceivers, may be due to their 
purpose, may be due to emotion or may be due to their fiat.  
GM: Just one more question. From Nyāya theory of perception to Ānandavardhana and 
Bharata, what kind of difference can we expect? Ānandavardhana is bringing in much more 
of emotions. 
AC: Yes, definitely. When they are talking about vibhāva and anubhāva, they are already 
bringing in the emotional parts, also rasa, etc. Another thing. When you go to Abhinavagupta, 
you would find his theory of vimarśa. And there he has really talked about our perception of 
the bodily experiences. In Nyāya, body acts as if it is an external object of perception or when 
the body is feeling pleasure or pain, Nyāya offers an explanation. But we have a peculiar 
feeling of the body which cannot be externally perceived. It is a feeling of being in that bodily 
state, not its feelings of pleasure or pain. It is being in this bodily state which gives me my 
physical identity as well as my place in the world. While Nyāya never discusses it, 
Abhinava‟s theory does. I don‟t know if you have read that book by Arindam Chakraborty 
„Deha-Geha-Bandhutwa‟; it was published by Gangchil and the first essay is on this bodily 
feeling in the context of Jibanananda‟s poetry and he has compared it with Abhinava‟s 
vimarśa. From there you would get many things that you want to explain. And, of course, this 
rasa tattwa and all these things, while there is some sort of discussion in the Navya-Nyāya, 
like when they are discussing lakṣaṇa and vyañjana, but not much. A fully developed theory 
you would find in Bharata and then Abhinava. Another book I think is Yoga-Vasistha. You 
would find that they are really following this cinematographic technology: it takes you back 
and forth from one life to another, from one place to another, analyze things through the eyes 
of different persons like camera is being placed at different places and different cameramen 
are taking these pictures. Yoga Vasistha is a very complicated story about a king who has 
several incarnations. While the story itself is fantastic, the technique and the method used is 
even more so. Sometimes it is flashback, sometimes it is flash forward, sometimes from one 
camera angle, sometimes from another.  
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In the last comment in your paper that during the 50
th
 anniversary of Pather Panchali, Adoor 
Gopalakrishnan had said that our colonial past has ingrained in us a deep sense of self-
deprecation and inferiority which makes Indian students celebrate foreign products more than 
their local products. We cannot put all the blame on the colonial past. That these discourses 
are available in our tradition, it‟s not known to the students at all. For example, we always 
had students from Comparative Literature, Film Studies, English, and Economics; sometimes 
they would ask „since we have such rich tools of discourse, why do our teachers always use 
Western tools?‟ I used to say that‟s our deficiency. And also there is a kind of conservatism 
that an extended reading in interpreting other topics is sacriledgeous. Consequently, we didn‟t 
make these things available to our younger generation. And it is not that it happened in the 
colonial past alone. Even before, it wasn‟t accessible to everybody. It was more a part of an 
esoteric literature and common people didn‟t have access to it. So it never percolated.  
GM: Western scholarship makes everything so palatable, so immediately available to 
everybody. Don‟t you think that there should be some kind of a change in our mind-set that 
we also exist, that we had also thought of many things in the past? 
AC: Yes, you know the problem is this. Prof. Mohanty and Bimal Matilal had to struggle 
throughout their lives just to establish that Indian philosophy is not theology but philosophy 
which the Indians had been doing all along. Despite their efforts, people still feel that 
philosophy is a very European phenomenon. Rorty and his desciples still say that we don‟t 
have that kind of a philosophy. You know if somebody is feigning sleep, you cannot wake 
him. However, many people are working towards this now. In our area, for example, we call 
it „fusion philosophy‟. We don‟t think picking up one particular point from one tradition and 
applying it to solve problems in another is sacriledgeous, as if it would distort or warp the 
tradition itself. That‟s the mind-set from which we would have to come out. We would have 
to be bold enough to admit that while certain things aren‟t applicable to us now even if they 
have been glorified in our tradition, there are some others which can be applied to the present 
context, and may be even solve problems which people in the West have not been able to 
solve. We need to look at the scenario from this perspective. It is only then that we would be 
able to get rid of all this kind of inferiority complex or self-deprecation. Most of the time it is 
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because Sanskrit is a difficult language and we are not well-conversant with Sanskrit now. 
But now you would find that most of the experts in Indian philosophy are from the West.  
GM: Madam, one last question and then we would close. You were mentioning that there is a 
greater awareness now and more work is being done on the Indian concepts. Do you have an 
idea how this process is progressing? 
AC: Yes, it is progressing but many times we are arriving at some conclusion very quickly on 
the basis of some superficial reading. That is distortion. 
GM: It is like a one-to-one connection „Oh! Yeah, this is also in the Indian theories‟.  
AC: Yes. That‟s why Prof. Mohanty says two things. One is that focus more on the 
differences rather than on the similarities and second, as a philosopher, you should never 
quote names. You cannot simply quote something out of context without giving the argument 
which accompanies it. If we avoid these pitfalls, then a dialogue between different traditions 
will really enrich our entire knowledge repertoire. That‟s welcome. 
GM: Thank you so much madam. But you would have to give me those connections with 
whom I would interact. And again when I come back here in august with some more research, 
may be you would permit me to interact with you again. 
AC: It would be my pleasure. As I told you, I‟m also looking at the body. I‟d send you the 
email contact of my student and also Arindam. 
GM: Some introduction to both of them would be required. Indians don‟t easily interact 
unless they get a solid reference.  
AC: I would write to both my student and Arindam. 
GM: Madam, what‟s Nilanjan Das‟s topic? 
AC: Well, you know in Harvard or MIT, you don‟t have to write a book like a thesis. But you 
may write three or four essays which may have some overarching connection but mayn‟t be 
like a book at all. In this context, he told me that he is writing this cognitive penetrability 
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thesis of Nyāya, jñānalakṣaṇa, and asked me to comment on it. He is now working on many 
things and trying to decide which would be his final topic. He is very young but he has read a 
lot already and he is very, very bright. And, of course, Arindam is an authority. So, on film 
and Abhinavagupta, he would respond to you even without my introduction. On the cognitive 
penetrability theory, you give a Google search and you would find two papers, one by Segal 
and another by Fiona Macpherson. Nilanjan was using their thesis to interpret Nyāya. While 
reading his paper, I found that there is so much application of that in Nyāya. I hope these 
discussions would be of some help to you. 
GM: Trust me, many critical areas have been clarified. 
AC: You know while mentioning some point you have mentioned „theory-theory‟ and 
„simulation theory‟ and „mirror neurons‟. You know even now „mirror neurons‟ have only 
been found to have resonance in monkeys like somebody tasting some food or so. On the 
basis of that, people have tried to explain a lot of other things for which we still do not have 
evidence. That‟s more of an expectation. It works only in some areas of cortex and only with 
respect to some stimulants. In the context of human beings, it hasn‟t been established 
experimentally yet. Yes, we do have those mirror neurons and may be in future it would be 
proved.  
GM: I‟d refer you to a book by Rizzolatti… 
AC: Rizzolatti was the first person who discovered this mirror neuron and then they have 
been dealing with knowing other minds which have always been problematic. So they are 
extending this theory rather indiscriminately, almost science fiction like. But one needs to be 
a bit cautious. I think your theory is taking place and I can assure you that nobody has applied 
the Nyāya theory of perception to cinema before.  
GM: On that note madam, I‟d let you go. Thank you very much. I‟m really grateful. 
 
______________________ 
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Annexure 4 
Interview 
 
Suman Mukhopadhyay, Dramatist & Filmmaker 
February 3, 2014; 10.30 – 12.10 pm 
 
GM: Thank you Mr. Mukherjee for granting this interview. I am doing PhD research at the 
University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK on the topic „Cinema and Wild Meaning: 
Phenomenology, Classical Indian Theories, and Embodiment in Cinema‟. The centre of the 
research concerns the question how much of an embodied response goes into our 
understanding of cinema which generally remains under the surface. On this aspect, I‟ll like 
to have your opinion and then go on from there. 
SM: I can start with the comment that anything which is not experienced or sensed by your 
body is never going to be a part of your intellectual capacity. Everything has to be sensed 
through the body; some physical sensibility like sound, smell, heat, cold on your body 
ultimately percolates towards your intellectual perception of the world. I think the body is 
very important that way. The sensations that your body feels through your daily living, 
through your existence, is very important. An intellectual thought which can get provoked 
that way finally translates into your creative expression. It comes primarily, fundamentally, 
out of some kind of bodily senses which gathers into an intellectual understanding of your 
reading, your historical perception, your political perception whatever you can say. I don‟t 
think there is only one intellectual sense which is the brain. I think the whole body is the 
centre of understanding. It can be in your feet, it can be in your elbows, it can be in the mid-
centre of the body. These bodily senses are very important for any creative person and I 
especially speak from my own experience of doing theatre and cinema. We slowly understood 
how your bodily senses give expression to your image of theatrical or cinematic expression. 
Anything which is not understood bodily through your senses cannot be intellectually 
important, it cannot be intellectually perceived. That is one part. If we talk about theatre - 
Nāṭyaśāstra being one area of your study – it helps us to understand our bodily senses or body 
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as a unit, as a powerhouse of expression, and how our bodily senses can be demonstrated in a 
technical way. Nāṭyaśāstra is I think the first book or the first thesis which signals you 
towards that. The theory of rasa („aesthetic emotion‟) or bhāva („mental state‟) – we at the 
beginning of our acting career, as an actor or a director, went through the process of creating 
rasa through our bodies. It is like a signal du frames, a term used by Antoine Artaud. He is 
using the Balinese dancing codes in his theatrical understanding. He was in Paris, saw the 
Balinese dancers and finally found that one theory which he wanted to propagate: how do the 
Balinese dancers use signs as a language. I think it again connects us back to the rasa theory. 
Bharata was also talking about these bodily signs, to create a very independent, authentic 
language of artistic expression. We have mudras („bodily gestures‟) and it is very important 
that these mudras mean something at the level of artistic expression. It means that new 
language of signs is being indicated by Bharata. But again all this has always been processed 
through your understanding of senses. Even today when we talk about the mudras, which has 
now many other historical baggage coming in the form of pre-modern, modern and 
postmodern study of the science of body languages, we think of exploring how different parts 
of the body interact and behave, how the body is intellectually aligned with your thinking, 
your senses, your historical knowledge. These studies have now come but, at the most 
fundamental level, you can see that there is one very strong stress which is that all these have 
come through your senses, your feelings, of how you understand your senses. Even when you 
talk about Stanislavsky much later or about other theories of acting or expression, it all comes 
to how you feel, how you sense, how you are perceived through your body. Even when we 
are talking about integrated histories, we are focusing much on the body politics, about the 
politics of the senses. It is like what happens when a historical rupture happens, when a 
political rupture happens, or a political turmoil happens and how it affects the individual body 
and the body in the social circumstances. I think that if you cannot perceive your reality 
through your body senses, then you cannot express reality, your own creative reality in art. 
That is one thing which I always understood. When I do theatre or cinema, I always make it a 
point to provoke the creative artists, even an actor, a cinematographer, or an audiographer, or 
even my entire collaborating team to go through the experience of perceiving the artistic text 
and the sub-text through their own sensibilities. Such sensibilities are absolutely fundamental; 
these are the organic sensibilities which can be provoked by reading through history or 
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cinema script or a theatre adaptation. So my entire approach in the workshop – when I do 
theatre I do workshops, when I do cinema I do workshops with actors and even brother actors 
– to get to that one point of truth which is not a technical truth, which is not an intellectual 
truth, but the truth that your body can understand. My whole approach is to take you through 
this process of how to give your body an understanding of what you are doing. Coming to 
Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra, he is saying that everything is bhāva. What is bhāva? Bhāva is that 
one point of understanding through your body and how it is coming. It is not only an 
intellectual perception; it is always how the body is sensing anything, how you are responding 
to an emotion. We have our emotions and memory and what is important is our memory. 
How to provoke that memory, how to bring out that memory from a person? I‟ll cite two 
theatre personalities on that.  
       One is Stanislavsky. His theory of affective memory while acting which is a very 
dangerous area actually. When you are saying that ok, this is the emotion I want you to 
emote, now find out a moment in your own memory, your own history, your own existence, 
when you had a parallel emotion. For example, if you are emoting a particular mode of 
sadness, you find out from your own memory when a similar sadness was provoked by some 
event in your own life. When you are trying to do that, you are actually giving yourself pain 
in recalling that incident. It can also be a moment of happiness.  
        The other person is Grotowski who was telling in his acting theory that actors would 
have to burn their bodies. What it means is that the actor would have to go directly from 
instinct to expression, to come to a state of animal instinct in your body. Like when a dog is 
scared, its tail automatically goes inside, it cannot hide that. It is a very instantaneous 
response to anything, like when a dog is scared, its tail goes inside, when it is angry, it barks 
or growls. He wants an actor to get to that point of animal instinct where your bodily response 
automatically becomes your expression. What I‟m saying is that when you are responding 
from instinct to expression, it is a straight journey, there being no intellectual processing 
involved in-between. In such a case, you are burning your body. I don‟t know whether 
Grotowski had any possibility of actually doing that but it was in his workshop theory, acting 
practices, acting classes, all these exercises that Grotowski was proposing was actually to take 
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the actor through this journey. If you go back to Bharata and connect him to Stanislavsky and 
Grotowski, I think he is saying the same thing, only the language is different.  
       Bharata was talking about a more integrated art theory, talking about stage-craft, 
talking about everything. He is talking about the entire vision, the entire artistic range of 
things. One important part is, of course, to talk about the actors. All the great theories – acting 
theories, art theories – talk about the actors because it is all about them. Whether in theatre or 
in cinema, you are actually working with human beings; they are malleable, you can do 
almost anything with them, making them burst into emotions or suppress them. So you are 
actually talking about the human body which is malleable, which can be controlled, which 
can be cued to certain elements so that it can give the right kind of expression that you want. 
An expression is also a bodily gesture, a sudden twinkling of the eye, a certain movement of 
your hand, even standing in absolute stillness is also an expression performed by the body. 
Like once a Kabuki dancer was asked how can he bring it all about just sitting there, how can 
he generate so much energy? The Kabuki dancer replied „Look when I‟m sitting still, I‟m 
doing the entire act in my thought. My body is responding to that movement of thought. So 
while I‟m sitting, I‟m also performing. I‟m bodily sitting idle, but thought is going around, so 
energy is generated.‟ I found this answer to be fabulous. People have a very wrong perception 
of physicality that only when one is jumping around, it is a physical act while sitting still is 
not a physical act. I think you learn to correct this impression from the Eastern art codes. All 
the great European or Western artists – they are mostly from Europe and America – took the 
art theory from the East, like from China, Japan, Balinese forms, Bharata and many others. 
The entire performing codes of different folk forms – they not only took from the classical but 
also from the folk performances – were taken from Chinese, Japanese, and Indian theatres. I 
believe even Brecht highly borrowed from them. And then it is coming back to us as a 
European theory. That‟s the problem. Even the most provocative kind of acting theory 
belonging to the latter half of the modern age, Antoine Artaud, who actually provoked 
Grotowski, who also provoked Peter Brookes, he was receiving his entire knowledge from the 
Balinese dancers, how they are creating this code language, this sign language. So I think this 
is the problem of the hegemony of knowledge that it goes from here to the West and then 
comes back as a new theory which we then perceive as „ok, this is what the Western man has 
said to us‟. This is because we never look back to our own history. We never see what was 
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there in our roots from Persia, to India, to China or Japan. We have these very modern art 
theories, modern performing codes which have been intellectually formulated in great ways. 
We always neglected our own culture. I‟m not talking about some kind of Indian-ness or 
going back to the roots that have been variously used by the funadamentalists of our country, 
even by the fundamentalist theorists of our country. What I‟m talking about is what went 
from here and then came back from the West as a hegemonic theory that „this is what the 
West is giving you‟. We then start quoting Brecht, or Stanislavsky, or Artaud, or Grotowski. I 
think all these were largely present in our own roots which can be redefined. One doesn‟t 
have to take everything; we don‟t take everything from Stanislavsky, we only take whatever 
we need. Even what Stanislavsky did in his acting theory is actually a diary of his 
experiences, of what he went through in his entire acting career. If you see the early writings 
of Stanislavsky and his later writings, you will see that they are totally at loggerheads with 
each other. He was gaining in experience and perceiving new areas of his thought. The more 
we get into this post-modern era or this post-structural era of our understanding of theory, 
society, even the language of the body – of how body has been perceived – even Foucault‟s 
entire theorization was mostly standing on body politics, of how he is using the body. His 
entire theory of sexuality and the jail house are about the body. In fact, he is always talking 
about the body. Body is, thus, always a historical curiosity. And I think all the artists have 
finally to put their trust on their own perception of the body and how the body reacts to 
different situations. This is the primary thing I‟ll like to say now. If you want some more 
specific things, we can talk about that now. 
GM: No, it‟s absolutely fine. Your experiences are revealing for certain aspects of film and 
theatre performance which was not known to me till now. 
SM: Like we talk of integrated history, philosophy and politics, the issue of integration has 
been there since a long time. Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra is an example of being an integrated 
work. In fact, it is a signature of how integrated such a work can be, of how you have 
perceived your entire world of artistic creation, of architecture, texture of theatre, sitting 
position of the audiences where, because of his times, he has taken note of the higher and the 
lower castes...such social hierarchy is part of culture, one can‟t deny that. Through all this, his 
thrust on the body and the rasa and bhāva is very important. The body is important because 
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rasa is not at the level of intellectual perception, it can only be perceived if it is expressed 
through the body. It cannot exist in a hollow, it cannot be a floating signifier, it has to come 
through the body, bhāva has to come through the body. Let‟s talk from the theatre first. I 
studied at a Performance Course in the US. I learnt a lot about integration there. When I asked 
myself why do I have to inspect a Van Gogh‟s painting, why do I need to watch a sculpture, 
why do I have to watch a Mime artist, or even a street hawker, I realized the answer. These 
are all integrated. But when I go back to rasa theory again, I think he was suggesting that you 
have to be a part of the bodily experience – all modern acting theories incorporate that. So 
when I came back and started my workshops, I saw very interesting things happening. One is 
when I was doing a play, I thought that these artists are totally blocked by certain bodily 
gestures and bodily expressions because they are going through the same social interactions, 
mixing with the same social groups, they are going through the same architectural milieu, like 
living in the same urban houses, sitting on similar chairs, shit in commodes, write on tables, 
sitting at a table in the office. We don‟t eat sitting on the floor or walk through sand and mud. 
As a result, slowly a part of our bodily muscles become redundant because we aren‟t using 
them. It is like emotions, you have to use those muscles everyday. But our daily living doesn‟t 
allow that. Even the very architecture of our urban living makes you go on a straight line on 
the footpath or make perfect circles, our vision remains straight, we don‟t have to look down. 
Everybody is getting trained or being modeled on this kind of an urban living. Actors being 
part of that get trapped into this. I, then, did a simple exercise. I took my entire group of 
actors to a remote village in Purulia and did a „Chow‟ [tribal dance] workshop with them. I 
also stayed with them. Not that I wanted to do a „Chow‟ production, I did this just to break 
their bodily ennui. There they practiced everyday by the riverside, on the sand bed. They are 
not walking on the urban roads, they are going through small lanes and by-lanes. All this 
shapes up the intellectual perception of your body into a different experience. You 
immediately realize that the urban structures, urban codes are breaking down. Your body is 
learning new things, your spine is behaving differently because it is no more walking on the 
solid cement or marbled roads. You are realigning the balance of your body in a different 
way. And the moment you realign your body, your emotions are getting realigned also. You 
start getting a different perception of reality. When I was a student in the US, I was told one 
day to act for 48 hrs as a person whose jaws have dropped (what we call in Bengali „han kora 
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chele‟). As a social person, we have been told not to open our lips because one looks like a 
fool that way. When you have dropped your jaws and moving through society, like going in a 
bus or walking, you will see that the world is changing in front of you. People are looking at 
you in a different way. So your entire social parameter is getting challenged because only 
your jaws have dropped! It is absolutely physical. If you just play blind one day, the whole 
relationship, the entire dynamics between you and the society would change.  If you play one 
day that you are lame and walk around the street like that for 24 hrs, you would notice that the 
entire perception, the chemistry, the society, the reality and your body has changed. I use 
these techniques in processing my theatre and cinema. Most of the time, we only see the end 
product. But if you are an artist of that caliber, you actually want to challenge the broad 
processes in which you are doing cinema or theatre. Mostly we are trapped in this given 
process of doing anything. Like when you want to make a film, a certain processing method 
has already been defined for you to which you have to adopt, from making shooting 
schedules, your relation with the actor‟s guild, etc, everything has already been pre-processed. 
So you are coming to make a film where everybody has told you how to make that film. You 
are not given time to relocate your processing, your art. In theatre, more independence is there 
because it hasn‟t yet been invaded by the industrial money. It is still more like an amateur act, 
more like an independent thing. So you can do your theatre differently but these are getting 
more and more difficult.  
       But cinema is difficult because it is so much more dictated by the given order of 
things. The moment you want to something differently you are immediately challenged that 
no, no, this is not the way to do cinema, cinema has a particular discipline, it has to be done in 
a certain way. I always work with my actors in theatre, because, as I told you, cinema doesn‟t 
permit me that freedom. If you call yourself an independent filmmaker, you have to find ways 
to get out of this given model of doing cinema. Otherwise your process will never get 
liberated. When I‟m working with actors, I try to break these physical modes, like I use 
painting and ask the actor to respond to it bodily or respond to a particular music. Supposing 
they are doing a line, but I‟m not getting the required emotion, if I explain to them the 
intellectual background, they get more confused. The next day, if I play a particular music 
and ask them to do the line, immediately their tonality, their texture of doing things changes, 
their pitch changes. The moment music gets into your body, immediately your reading pattern 
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gets affected. It may still be the wrong tone, but the fact is that change has happened. If I ask 
an actor to respond to a painting instead of giving him an intellectual kind of help by using 
verbal language, it works. So these techniques of exposing them to different expressions of art 
are meant to provoke their senses. Instead of intellectually explaining what you want, it is 
better to give them a different kind of material which would help evoke that. The moment the 
actor tries to think more in language and in intellectual terms, like what is the history of 
Bengali stage, etc, he is likely to get more confused. Surely, you have to go through these 
questions as an actor – ok, I‟m this character, what is my background, what is my father 
doing, what school I went, what is my cultural habit, etc, but, finally, these questions would 
help only if you physically and emotionally respond to these things. Finally, all the above 
things have to be evoked, but evocation is actually responding to your body. Anything that is 
not processed through your sense cannot be a part of your intellectuality that is my 
understanding till now.  
GM: This is a very interesting point. It seems that Bharata‟s theory is absolutely geared 
towards what you are saying. 
SM: I think because through this entire bhāva situation – through vibhāva („determinants‟) 
and anubhāva („consequents‟) – that moment is provoked in the actors, it is so important. Not 
only the actors, but even yourself: when you are searching for your own creative area, how to 
provoke yourself to new kinds of thought. It is not what you are trying to get out of others, but 
what you are trying to get out of yourself is very important. I‟ll give an example. I was trying 
to get an actor thrown into a mental contradiction – to be or not to be, something like that. I 
told him that „ok, there is a rope, hold this rope‟. I told the other actors to pull this rope. He is 
thus being pulled on two sides. I asked him how you are physically feeling that. The body has 
memory of this conflict within itself. I told him to remember the physical pain he got. Then I 
asked him to recite the lines while remembering the tussle within his body. The tug of war of 
the body now changes into a different perception, into a change of quality. Thus, I use body 
memory to provoke something which is intellectual. I gather these small exercises from my 
own rehearsal space, from my own processing centre of how our bodies behave. Since we 
hide within our bodies how civilized we are which may be completely different in Paris, we 
have our own perceptions of civilization that is coming out of our own bodies; our own social 
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practices, our own social growing up. I think a woman dressing up in India is very different 
from a woman dressing up elsewhere…it involves a particular perception of what dressing 
means. This is part of our physicality also, how you dress up. The perception of audiences in 
India, or even in the entire South-East Asia, is very different - we engage with our arts in a 
very different way. Like in our culture, we say „Jatra shunte jabo‟ („I‟ll go to hear jatra‟ where 
„jatra‟ is folk-theatre). Thus, we hear jatra („jatra sona‟) and see cinema as a book („boi 
dekha‟). It is thus that we perceive our theatre and cinema. And our audiences engage in a 
dialogue – they don‟t behave like „civilized‟ audiences watching a great work of art. In our 
society, it is always thought that art is part of a social expression and we have a right to 
converse with the performers, to engage with the performance in an active way. We are 
always active, we are connecting in the same manner as Brecht wanted theatre audiences to 
be interactive, like a football spectator so that when a goal is missed somebody in the 
audience says that he is a bad player. In fact, Brecht wanted his audience to comment on 
every aspect of the performance. He didn‟t want a passive audience sitting in the black hole of 
the auditorium; he wanted a very active participation. And this is again coming from the 
cultural practices of the East where, during the folk performances, people are talking, like 
when they say that ok, there is a boring part coming up when I go to sleep, when Jatayu‟s 
lorai with Ravana comes (fight of Jatayu, the bird, with Ravana, the king of Lanka, in 
Rāmāyana), wake me up. So this is part of our cultural understanding, it is not a concise half-
an-hour slot. Such cultural practices were slowly ingrained in us. It comes from an area of 
openness in our interaction with art. But am I shifting from our main area of discussion? 
GM: I think these are all very relevant. Please go ahead. I think in Bharata‟s stage formula, 
audiences literally become a part of the performance which ultimately generates rasa. 
Literally the subjective-objective dichotomy, like you are separate from what is going on in 
the stage, breaks down. Only the whole thing taken together evokes the rasa.  
SM: Yes, it encompasses this entire area…For example, let‟s take architecture – how 
architecture gives our body a different perception. In modern times, we live in an apartment, 
there‟s a kitchen, there is a place for the washing machine, there is a place for the TV; these 
are all givens. One generally doesn‟t experiment with architecture, because it is now 
absolutely unified, codified, all over the world. In this space of daily living, you aren‟t facing 
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any kind of problematic with your body. In order to create, you have to create the 
problematic. If everybody is trying to confine you to a particular kind of body politics, then 
you have to confront it in a different way. Thus, I want to break in my actors the bodily habit 
of going on the straight path, turn full circles, or walk right or left angles; I‟ve to walk on 
uneven places so that your body gets a different perspective.  As I told you before you have to 
take your body through a challenge, and, in the process, your emotions are also getting 
challenged.  
        Let‟s talk about the theatre architecture. Once upon a time, the Greeks used the 
amphitheatre where there is equidistance between the actors and the audience because of its 
circularity. Slowly we broke away from this circularity to a very straight and square box as an 
auditorium now. If you see how Bharata designed his auditorium, it has the same sort of 
circularity. It recognizes the importance of the audiences to be a part of the performance. In 
the history of civilization, if you come to the middle ages and latter times, particularly after 
the Renaissance, the stage is getting more and more squarish with audiences in a black hole 
below and the actors on a stage above which is completely separate from the audiences. Only 
the Shakespearean stage has been an exception to this rule. From the audiences and the actors 
being on the same plane of vision to the audiences looking up at them, the entire perspective 
has changed. Now, modern theatre architecture is going back to the Greek theory. In the new 
re-modeling that is going on, the designers are again talking about re-dynamizing the 
audience-actor relations. It is so important to have this equidistance relationship between the 
audiences and the actors.  
        Now cinema is totally different because cinema actors aren‟t interactive participants 
in the process. It is unfortunately so, because this is the medium. In cinema, actors can only 
respond to the camera or your director or your co-actors. This is a very different way of 
generating emotion because you are emoting to a non-present audience. You cannot depend 
on the small laughter or that small clap from the audiences which enlivens your performance 
on the stage. When you hear somebody sobbing in the audience, it immediately changes your 
whole style of acting. Your body as an actor is also tuned in that way. Suppose you are a 
performer and there is a place where people laugh or clap. One day they don‟t laugh or clap. 
When you are reciting your next lines, you are wondering what went wrong today. These are 
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the questions that are always going through your minds when you are acting on stage. But 
cinema actors don‟t have that advantage. I saw you have mentioned in your note Eisenstein 
and Kuleshov and all that montage. I think it is very important how cinema directors use 
them. After you see Béla Tarr‟s film The Tourin Horse, what stays with you is the sound of 
the wind, you would only be hearing the sound of the wind for the next five days. He has used 
that as a strong reference on the bodily senses like that sound is inside you for the next few 
days. Even when I‟m referring to that cinema now, I‟m hearing that sound. Two things I 
remember about Rashomon is the sound of the rains which is literally consistent throughout 
the film and the final cry of the child found in the temple. I think the way filmmakers shoot 
the sound is symbolic of the fact how sound stays with you. Whenever I think of great 
directors, I think of how they have used the body to convey emotions to the audiences. Say, a 
shot like in Tarkovsky‟s Mirror where the mother is sitting on the fence. One still remembers 
those shots. When nothing else is left of the film, there is that one body sitting on the fence in 
a particular angle which provokes so many histories – history literally topples on you, 
emotions topple on you and you are bathing in those emotions. I think even in Ritwik 
Ghatak‟s use of facial structures, like when he was shooting „je rate more duar guli bhaglo 
jhore‟ in Meghe Dhaka Tara (Cloud-capped Star, 1960), the bodily position of the character 
Nita stays with you. Dialogues don‟t stay with you, but bodies stay with you, sound stays with 
you. And these aren‟t sound like that of music, but sound of the wind, birds, or sea. I think 
these are very important for cinema – for artists who want to create those bodily sensations 
which would stay with you rather than your intellectuality. What comes to you even in the 
reading of a novel is what the Russians call „jamissel‟, an all-pervading sense which stays 
with you. Even Akhtarujjaman Ilyas‟s novel Chile Kothar Sepai that whole history which I 
myself don‟t feel but getting through another artist‟s imagination is what stays with you. 
When you now read history, you remember those moments of perception. An artist‟s job is to 
give that all pervading sense of times which would stay with you for ages. That last walk in 
Satyajit Ray‟s Aparajito (The Unvanquished, 1957) where the camera pans down and then 
finally goes away as Apu (Smaran Banerjee) is walking towards the horizon stays with you. I 
always show that clipping to my actors and tell them that look, it evokes so many things in 
you. In Kozintsev‟s Hamlet, his last walk before he says the last words and dies, that one long 
walk and he knows that he is going to die and the camera holds him from the back just below 
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his shoulder. Hamlet (Innokenti Smoktunovsky) is looking a little halfway towards the back 
with the camera just following him with no physical or facial expression visible, he just walks 
and then sits down on this huge rock and says as his friend comes, there being only one light 
with the rest being in the dark. If you remember one thing from the whole film, it is that one 
single walk it is that one image that stays with you. Shakespeare has written great dialogues 
for his characters, but I still think what you remember are these small moments. Even that last 
run in Godard‟s Breathless (1960), that one ongoing shot at the end of which Michel Poiccard 
would die. These moments are part of your bodily experiences which stays with you much 
beyond those of the dialogues. These are created by filmmakers who respect reality as a 
source of our embodiment, as a physical source of our history. As a filmmaker and theatre 
director I always respect that. 
GM: I‟ll now like to take you back to what Dr. Moinak Biswas has said. While these 
embodied moments are the most important scenes in cinema, yet while teaching he finds that 
embodied effects are difficult to be rationally explained. What do you feel about his 
comments? 
SM: In case I‟m rationally or emotionally reacting to a certain thing which I wouldn‟t be able 
to convey to students or collaborators rationally, I think I‟ll use another medium to convey its 
senses. Like when I„m trying to explain how a movie provoked me, how I felt exalted by it or 
certain moments in it, I would tell it is like when I hear the words „uter gribar moto 
nistabhdhata‟ („silence like the chin of a camel‟), it would provoke a certain kind of image in 
the listeners. This expression is so metaphoric, it evokes a particular imagination. If I can 
convey my feelings through another medium, then I think my listeners would understand that; 
it wouldn‟t be a rational articulation because it is taking another route to articulate that. If I 
say that „Sahabuddiner oi chobita dekhe amar oi chobitar kotha mone poreche‟ („by seeing 
Sahabuddin‟s this painting, I remembered another painting‟), then I have achieved conveying 
my feeling through another means, indirectly. I remembered Goya‟s painting of Spanish Civil 
War after seeing Pontecorvo‟s Battle of Algiers. So, I think you can reconnect in a different 
way. It may be difficult, but there are ways to do so. When I subjected my actor to that pain of 
the tug of war, I was not following the conventional way of explaining his mental conflict 
intellectually; it means to say to an actor that you are sad or you are morose, there are so 
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many layers to being sad. You have to take him to that particular moment where it can 
actually be conveyed. One can always tell them to read a Shakti Chatterjee poetry to feel what 
sadness is. I think one can even give an actor the Ninth Symphony and ask him to hear it for 
the whole night and then think about your character. One doesn‟t go to a theory how 
Lawrence Olivier played Hamlet; you have to find Hamlet within yourself. And if you can 
identify the Prince of Denmark within you, only then you can be that character, otherwise not. 
GM: Thank you Mr. Mukhopadhyaya. It has been an exhilarating interview. Very many 
points have come up which I‟ll have to integrate within my research. 
SM: I thought I will be able to speak only for 10 or 15 minutes! 
GM: In fact, you spoke for 90 minutes. I‟ll let you know what comes up in my further 
research. 
SM: Sure. 
 
________________________ 
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Annexure 5 
Interview 
 
Samik Bandyopadhyay, Marxist Art Critic 
Feb 24, 2015, Tuesday, 10 - 12 noon 
 
GM: I thank you on behalf of myself and the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK for 
granting this interview. Your comments on certain questions placed below will be highly 
appreciated.  
According to some thinkers, a fundamental theory of Indian plays is that Indian 
characters have an unchanging „inner nature‟ which always acts as an inner pull on them 
throughout a play to restore them back to their original state. It belongs to the worldview 
propagated by Indian idealist theories like Advaita Vedānta or Kashmir Śaivism which holds 
that the same underlying substance that has an untarnishable inner nature, undergoes various 
manifestations on the surface. Accordingly, all change in this theory is a superficial change 
not having any effect on the constituting material. Western critics say that it makes Indian 
characters remain internally unchanged throughout the play. In other words, characters don‟t 
really evolve in such works. Changes happen to them only at the superficial level, having been 
brought about by chance occurrences, coincidences, or misunderstandings. Once these are 
cleared up, characters are revealed in their original nature. This is what happens in 
Abhijyāñaśākuntalam or Mṛcchakatikam.  
Do you think this may be a good way to describe Indian commercial films where, in the 
end, characters remain what they have always been in the films?  
SB: The first thing I‟d like to place on record is that I‟m not very strongly clued on to Indian 
philosophical theories. That is not my area of specialization and hence my knowledge of these 
theories would be extremely superficial, facile. The other question is when we talk about 
Indian plays or Indian dramaturgy and the construction of characters within that ambit, I‟ve a 
serious problem in the sense that the presence of Sanskrit plays in our cultural history and our 
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experience has been so marginal. It was an extremely time-bound court theatre meant for the 
entertainment of the kings and the courtiers which never had any relevance for the larger 
society and the mind of the people. So trying to read Indian „plays‟ in terms of the Sanskrit 
body of works, whether it is Abhigyāñaśākuntalam or Mṛcchakatikam or Mūdrārakshasam, is 
meaningless in the sense that I don‟t think they had any impact on the sensibilities of our 
playwrights or our audiences. The large body of work consisting of playwriting, play 
construction, and play making which has been part of the popular tradition, the oral tradition, 
the folk traditions spread all over the country hasn‟t been documented properly. We are barely 
getting into it since the 1960s and ‟70s, as late as that. Thus, we simply do not have any 
history of how these plays were constructed and who responded to them. From this lack of 
history, I can‟t really generalize or philosophize in any way about any Indian theory. Now 
who writes these theories? About Nāṭyaśāstra or Daśarūpakam or Abhinayadarpana, we 
don‟t have any idea about their all-Indian circulation or how many people read them. So I 
don‟t really find any historical continuity and meaning in building upon that body of thought 
and trying to apply them to cinema. That is a very, very fundamental problem for me.  
I describe myself as a critic of the arts – because I dabble in literature, theatre, cinema, 
and the visual arts – with a strong Marxist historical, ideological reading of history which is 
my position of choice. Looking at phenomena from that perspective, Indian commercial 
cinema for me is an industrial product which has tried to relate to people‟s mindset which is 
also not so much as a given but which changes with various political happenings, operation of 
the media, operation of the consumerist mode, the consumerist applications of a massive 
propaganda industry and the way people are affected by this. Since I and you belong to the 
same generation, we have seen this happen in front of our eyes. We cannot identify and pin 
down these shifts through any theory or big psychological shifts scientifically. We can only 
see how different tendencies, different inchoate forces have been operating and how the 
mindset changes, how the response changes. It is compounded by the fact how new physical 
bodies of people come to constitute the new audience. How mass immigration to cities like 
Calcutta or Hyderabad or Bangalore changes everything. When we try to sit in Calcutta and 
try to theorize about audiences, we don‟t have the necessary tools to do so. But still when we 
try to understand why people liked this film but not that, we can‟t even identify the audience 
who are watching these films. Are they the same people who lapped up Uttam-Suchitra films 
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(Bengali commercial film icons) in the 1950s? They are certainly not the same body of 
people. So unless we look at these changing, evolving social bodies, to go through any 
generally given Indian way of looking or Western way of looking I don‟t find them usable in 
any meaningful way. Do we really know the Indian mind? We operate on the basis of a small 
section of people we know in the cities. If we take Bombay films which are extremely popular 
and have a huge market, have we really gone to the places from where ticket money comes? 
They do not come from the cities but from small places. Who are these people and how does 
this entertainment work for them? Are they all employed people? Are they agricultural labor 
who constitute the largest part of the Indian population but are largely invisible who aren‟t 
even taken into consideration in the running of the country? We are going on talking about 
more and more and more industry. How will it affect the people? It will affect the capital, 
accumulation of money, the power. How do they affect the people who are watching the 
films? They are really outside any political and ideological operation of power. How do we 
visualize their viewing practice? This becomes an extremely difficult problem for me for I 
don‟t like to talk nonsense or pass judgments about this is what people like and this they 
don‟t. My young friend Someswar Bhowmik has now opened up a debate in his new book 
„On the Glitz‟. He questions how far can we trust the figures we get of popular Hindi/Bengali 
films? We form our opinion by reading newspapers in the city which are completely 
manipulated by the propaganda machinery of the producers of these films. Do we have any 
means of checking these figures? Someswar goes into their tax accounts and shows that these 
are the taxes they have paid officially. Then how can they say that they have made profits? 
These are cold figures, hard facts. When we are not even sure how many people have watched 
a film, how can we generalize about them?  
GM: Your point is well-taken. Perhaps the extreme diversity of India makes it even more 
complicated. But don‟t you think some effort to understand has to be made even in the interim 
period before the scientific studies come? 
SB: At that level, I‟ll rather avoid bringing in classical Indian theoretical texts or the plays 
because they have never been in the mainstream. Now Sanskrit was never a popular language. 
It belonged to an extremely exclusive coterie of high culture. Moreover, Sanskrit was used by 
the Brahmins as a language of power. We lay down the rules, the codes, etc, in Sanskrit and 
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keep the people out of this magic circle of power. So trying to bring them into our reading of 
popular cinema is completely unacceptable to me. This is de-historicizing the entire process, 
the entire culture.  
GM: My second question is as follows. In contrast to the theory mentioned above, Indian 
realist theories like Nyāya or Buddhism hold that characters don‟t have any inner nature. 
They are „atomic‟ theories where external arrangement and rearrangement of essence-less 
atoms bring about changes on the surface. Accordingly, all change in these theories are 
external in nature. Being devoid of an inner nature, characters are constructed by external 
forces working on them. In this sense, characters undergo real change or evolution which 
cannot be retraced. We see a clear case of such construction in Mahābhārata where not only 
the Panḍavas but also such erudite persons as Bhisṃa and Dronachārya remain silent in the 
name of dharma during Draupadi‟s disrobement in an open courtroom. Even when characters 
resist external pressure, they do so in terms of their earlier construction by the society. 
Western plays seem to be largely based on this theory. Thus, in Greek plays like Oedipus Rex 
or in Shakespearean tragedies like King Lear, Macbeth, or Othello, while characters trace a 
path from point A to B, there being no inner pull working on them, there is no mechanism to 
retrace their steps.  
Do you think some of the Indian characters follow this worldview and undergo evolution 
in Indian works? In which category, for instance, you will place a character like Apu of Apu 
Trilogy or, perhaps, more potently, characters like Somnath Banerjee in Jana Aranya or 
Shyamalendu in Seemabaddha who seem to move along morally questionable paths without 
any hope of return? While, arguably, social circumstances push them into this path which 
they are unable to resist, are these characters morally flawed? Which category should we 
place a character like Antonio Ricci in Bicycle Thieves?   
SB: I think when you bring in these characters and these experiences, even when you bring in 
Oedipus or Hamlet, I see a kind of continuity in the sense that all of them fall within the broad 
realistic tradition of representation. Even Oedipus or Hamlet I‟ll consider within the realistic 
tradition in a way. Their realism arises from the fact that they are solidly placed within a 
historical political context. They carry within and around them a historical situation. Now 
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when you come to Oedipus – Oedipus to Bicycle Thieves is a wonderful journey – I read it at 
two levels. One, the play is written in 5
th
 century BCE Athens in the context of the first 
experimentation ever in the world in direct democracy. And this is the only instance till now – 
as a student of theatre history I‟m telling you - of a state supporting the institution of theatre 
and its practice to that extent. To set up a 20000 strong auditorium with the architecture and 
the engineering to go with it so that 20000 people can watch and listen – the Epidaurus theatre 
has survived since 4
th
 century BCE which reach a point of achievement through stone slabs, 
etc, where sound doesn‟t go out but circulate without reverberation - is wonderful indeed. All 
this is not some kings in the Indian courts patronizing Abhijyāñaśākuntalam, etc, for the 
entertainment of the courtiers in small theatres through highly stylized rules and practices. In 
contrast, 20000 strong audience in Greece where women and slaves had no right to vote as 
they weren‟t considered citizens! Theatre was designed with three performances a day to be 
followed by a kind of festival situation where people can eat and drink and talk about it. It is a 
democratic platform, a space where citizens and non-citizens can talk, the only kind of 
conversation they share institutionally and socially. We have reason to believe that the state 
had felt that the senate where decisions were being taken in a direct democracy tradition had 
an in-built failure in the rise of the oratory and the rhetoric. The orators could get away with 
their art of elocution and impress people temporarily. Since this was going against the grain 
of democracy, the state thought of making use of the larger space of the theatre – the 
celebratory, participatory, democratic space – where a discourse could be created. This 
discourse was about revenge, killing, vendetta, power of the state and its limits like how far 
the state can interfere in family practices and individual practices within the family. Oedipus 
is not a king who inherits but is chosen by the people. So the very first movement of this 
remarkable play is that Oedipus commits his allegiance to the people – he says that I‟ve to 
serve you and if that means destroying myself I‟m game. This is not the voice of a king. It 
means that a large political discourse is opening up. It is a shame when Oedipus is read in 
India, it is determined by the colonial education system and its machinery where it becomes a 
tragedy that goes into hamartia and things like that. It is utter nonsense. If one reads it in its 
historical context, the depth that comes out matches so many modern European treatments. 
Just think of Passolini‟s Oedipus. It is not about destiny and fate or these stupid ideas that the 
Victorians gave us. Aristotle didn‟t have any chance of watching the Greek plays because 
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they were gone by then. Plato was creating a different discourse against tragedy, against the 
play, against the democratic space. His reading and Aristotle‟s questioning him but ultimately 
toeing his line becomes our reading of Oedipus which is scandalous. Oedipus carries the 
history of a man elected by the people in 5
th
 century BCE Athens and his dealings with the 
people who have elected him – how he relates to them, how he serves their interests. It is a 
profoundly democratic historical question that comes to the fore.  
      It‟s the same about Hamlet. Shakespeare writes Hamlet in 1602-03. Barely 38 years 
later in 1640 there is this revolution where, for the first time in the history of the world a king 
is thrown out through a legal process by the electorate through their representatives in the 
Parliament and the decision to behead him. Nowhere in the history of the world before 1640 
has a king been beheaded by a majority parliamentary decision taken by the people. While 
Shakespeare was writing Hamlet barely 38 years before, he could see that things were moving 
in that direction. He is envisaging collapse of the royal power which is already clear to the 
people. It is there, simmering. And in that simmering when he writes Hamlet, he is talking 
about power, the intricate ethics of power. All these powers are defined in a community 
which is going through a process of historical change. That is what comes out of Bicycle 
Thieves also. In Italy during the Second World War, the chaos, the confusion, the collapse of 
all power which becomes acuter and acuter after the war and a man stealing, thieving in that 
historical context. So every major work, from these great classics to the popular works, are to 
be read in a historical context rather than going into the generics of some inner nature of 
characters and Indian theories. At so many levels, cinema is negotiating a very complex 
network of forces, industry, political identity of the viewership – who are these people, where 
do they come from, what do they represent when they watch these films. Industry does their 
kind of psychological reading of a demand which is partly there and partly reconstructed and 
manouvred. They hit the point there – not taking it exactly where it is but making something 
out of it. So, in a way, the Bombay film factory is a highly sophisticated industrial 
organization where it is not a question of what people want and what they get. It is not as 
simple as that. While they have all the machinery to construct and determine people, we poor 
critics have no machinery, not even simple tools to do a flash survey of the people. We don‟t 
have the means to do a sample survey over a week when a hit film comes, to ask some 
questions from the audiences and make some sense out of it. We haven‟t done it ever, neither 
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have we thought of any methodology to do so. But we are very happy to say that since 
thousands upon thousands of people are watching, they must be very traditionally rooted, so 
go back to Abhijyāñaśākuntalam. Who the hell has seen Abhijyāñaśākuntalam? We don‟t 
have any evidence, but we have solid evidence of people who have watched a Greek play 
through memoirs, reminiscences, etc, on the basis of family records that have come down to 
us. Out of these, we reconstruct Greek audiences and the Greek theatre. In contrast, we don‟t 
have evidence of even a single performance of Abhijyāñaśākuntalam or Mūdrārākshaka or 
Mṛcchakatikam. No evidence at all. I‟ve not read Indian philosophy but I‟ve read Nāṭyaśāstra 
and Abhinayadarpana very closely. Since I can read Sanskrit, I‟ve read these works with tikas 
and tikakaras and their translations in English and Bengali by very important scholars and 
have done their comparative studies. On that basis I can say that this is a sort of a 
compendium, of various ideas, of various places which are brought together into a kind of a 
kosha book. And then to give it a sort of authority, bring in Brahma and Bharata and create a 
mythology out of them. Keeping all this in mind, how can you go back to some originary or 
original Indian audience, Indian sensibility, and Indian mind and make an Indian theory out of 
that! However, since we can read Greek theatre and Shakespeare in their context, we can also 
read Bombay cinema and other regional cinemas in their context rather than going into 
philosophy. I‟ll be very happy if somebody does a very serious socio-psychological reading 
based on solid fieldwork, does direct interviews of people, talk closely with producers and 
scriptwriters from where they get their ideas. But film industry, being a myth-manufacturing 
industry also, whenever they are interviewed in the press, you know that they have bought 
this space and talk within that bought space. Bring this chap out of this space and interview 
him independently in a different context of storage and analysis. Nothing, nothing, absolutely 
nothing has been done at that level.  
Because a different mindset was prevailing in the ‟70s, Satish Bahadur, the director of 
Pune Film and Television Institute, was making this experiment in the villages around 
Heggudu, Karnataka where people were exposed to only commercial Kannada or Marathi 
cinema. He had taken 27 films from the National Archives including Pather Panchali, Bicycle 
Thieves, Umberto D, Rashomon as well as some of the documentaries of Bert Haanstra and 
others. Say about 10 people from 10 villages had been interviewed and their reactions noted. 
A document was prepared on how people responded to these classics and published in 
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English. It was also published in Samaj-O-Chalachitra edited by Rajat Ray and Someswar 
Bhowmik where I had translated the piece into Bengali and had also written about the need 
for such kind of work. Soon after, I myself had done some sort of a survey for a youth 
organization which was very superficial at that point of time. I‟d created a questionnaire 
which was circulated among 300 middle class filmgoers spread over colleges, banks, etc. But 
even that bit of a fieldwork, however superficial it might have been, provides at least a 
starting point. But after all these years of so many research projects, so many film studies 
depts., not a single solid fieldwork have been done. Take one film that is running, do an 
extensive interview with people, and see how the film was made and marketed. It is never 
considered a research project here because it demands working with a methodology, hard 
work, and sorting out hard empirical evidence rather than sit at your desk and finish off your 
work! In the absence of such evidence, to theorize that it was all there in Nāṭyaśāstra or that it 
was all there in the Parsee theatre is so fanciful and unscientific.  
GM: In Chitrabani run by Fr. Gaston Roberge we had done such a survey on the Indo-
Bangladesh production Beder Meye Jyotsna. Interviews were conducted in three parts of 
Bengal which was so revealing.  
SB: Exactly. Inspite of official funding and resources, nothing is being done, except this kind 
of facile theorizing. 
GM: In the above context, where would you place characters like Apu or Somnath Banerjee 
of Jana Aranya (The Middle Man)?  
SB: In the 1950s when Pather Panchali happens – I was witness to its making by chance 
because of my relation to Karuna Bandopadyay who was playing the role of Sarbojaya – the 
original booking at Bina, Basusree, and Alochhaya the first booking was for 3 weeks. At the 
expiry of this period, the film was withdrawn. However, by then the film had circulated by 
word of mouth that it was very, very unusual from the rest of traditional films. So it was 
rereleased and became a huge hit. And that piece of nonsense about Cannes recognition – just 
imagine how many people in 1955 knew what Cannes was, whether it was „naak‟ („nose‟ in 
Bengali) or „kaan‟ („ear‟ in Bengali)? And it was not even an award, it was just a citation. So 
people who knew about Cannes wouldn‟t take a citation seriously, and those that were not 
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aware about Cannes, why would they immediately start buying tickets?  Nonsense! So it was 
just word of mouth as well as a great gesture by all major writers who came together in the 
Senate Hall to give Ray a massive civic reception. That was absolutely new, nothing like that 
had ever happened in Indian cinema. All these things add up to build a new audience, 
recognizing a new cinema in all its newness. So a new possibility is opened up. Now the 
question what did people find there? There is something very, very common in the whole 
social history of the time when people in massive numbers were coming from villages to 
Calcutta - their first exposure to Calcutta, learning to live in Calcutta. This experience in the 
‟50s of post-partition, post-second world war consists of a massive economic change. The 
demographic records will tell you that all these processes involved how to deal with the city. 
So the city became a great eye-opener for them all.  
        Another factor in the ‟50s, which was also a part of my growing up in the city, is the 
city‟s resistance to outsiders coming in – the ghoti-bangal [„East Bengal-West Bengal, 
insider-outsider‟] differences really rustle up in this period – that they are going to take a 
share of what we have. With all these happening in the background, here is a humanist 
document which tells a moving story of someone from outside who comes and imbibes the 
culture of the city, its way of living, its progressive and radical ideas and the pains and 
tragedies of growing up there. So something, call it universal, the structure of a child growing 
up and along with that a whole history, a history that is becoming very potent at that point in 
time. This, I think, becomes a sort of form or structure for Satyajit Ray. So Apu is a sort of an 
outsider who is not totally urbanized, who is not as complex as a modern urban character with 
a certain naïveté about him. All his characters, whether it is Shyamalendu (Barun Chanda) in 
Seemabaddha or Ashok (Arun Mukherjee) in Kanchenjungha, are of that kind. These 
characters are not born and bred and roughed up in the city. All those who come into the city 
would identify with them. The characters‟ very point of vulnerability becomes a point of 
relating with them – he is not a star, a powerful man that I‟ll be afraid of and hence admire 
from a distance.  
        Right now I‟m editing a book on the complete prose writings of Soumitra 
Chatterjee. Something which he acknowledges at one point – a good point about which I‟ve 
also thought – is where he says that, in a way, he was an Apu and remains an Apu because he 
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comes from a moffussil town like Krishnanagar and cannot cope with a lot of urban things. 
Hence he has a sort of wide-eyed wonder about the city which makes him vulnerable. He falls 
into pitfalls, he crashes. So Ray deliberately chooses Soumitra Chatterjee for Apu‟s role. This 
is a point of association and identification that the audiences get.  
Now when one goes back to Pather Panchali after all these years - I had this wonderful 
experience a few years ago. In Shantiniketan, they have a small film club called „Bikhhan‟. 
One day when the senior members were chatting, they realized that all the young boys and 
girls from class VI to X had never seen Pather Panchali in any meaningful way. So the big 
hall Gitanjali was hired and the film screened. It was full, children even sat on the stairs and 
laughed and cried and enjoyed the film thoroughly. These children were then asked to write 
their impressions about the film and, if some images came to their mind, to draw them. I was 
asked to release a book made out of these and talk to the children. That is the first time I 
walked into Patha Bhavan – I‟d always read about it and seen it from a distance – and spoke 
about the making of Pather Panchali. I tried to give them a feeling that it was a cooperative 
effort rather than an industrial effort where individual artists were contributing individually 
like Bansi Chandragupta, Subroto Mitra, etc. Also how the film was stopped and resumed 
because there was no money. I also told them about how reality was being pieced together 
and reconstructed and that this is how art deals with reality. At the end, I invited questions. 
They were fascinated by the making of reality in the film – whether this wall was there or 
reconstructed, things like that. The last question came from a young girl who wore glasses. 
She identified herself, looked straight into my eyes and said „You said this film was made 50 
years ago. After 50 years of this film, do we have to see Haranath Chakraborti‟s (a 
commercial Bengali filmmaker) films?‟ You can‟t imagine Gopalan the bitterness, the rage, 
the hatred, the anger that came out of this girl. So this is the kind of impact that can happen. 
      The same kind of thing happened at Heggudu where Satish Bahadur was invited by 
U. R. Ananthamurthy and K. Subanna. The latter two legendary figures, who belonged to 
Lohia‟s party at one point, were trying to find out the relevance of cinema. After the 1957 
elections, Lohia told his people that he was withdrawing from elections because nothing was 
going to happen here. In this context, one has to create these small spaces, these small hubs of 
culture. If there are many such hubs, people will feel and think differently. Only if culture 
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became a part of life, then some change may come. And that is how one of the most modern 
art-forms was brought to one of the most traditional places. Making a single sensibility of this 
is how people respond to cinema, this is how stories are told, the unchanging human essence, 
one rediscovers oneself at the end of a turmoil, etc, I don‟t subscribe to that view.  
GM: A very good point you are making. It is surprising that these experiments are not 
repeated.  
SB: Look at the film society journals now. Whether it is in Bengali or in English, it is so 
esoteric and nostalgic. They never highlight these little experiments, trying to understand and 
analyze them. Has any film journal ever taken any notice of the Heggudu paper, even a little 
quote from there perhaps? 
GM: Hamlet is swayed by a moral dilemma which makes him say „To be or not to be, that is 
the question‟. In Mahābhārata, Arjun‟s moral dilemma may be similarly paraphrased as „To 
fight or not to fight, that is the question‟. Do you think these two characters are similar or 
there are significant differences underlying their similarity on top? 
SB: Now Arjuna belongs so much to mythology and mythology, in a way, is predetermined. 
There is a kind of religion spreading its politics or politics masquerading as religion whatever. 
These characters are concealed within that framework very strongly. So Arjuna will have 
doubt only to be told by Kṛisṇa that this doubt doesn‟t mean anything. Arjuna doesn‟t really 
struggle with his doubt; he never asks himself „to fight or not to fight, that is the question‟. He 
only asks his sakha („mate‟), his guru, everything which Kṛisṇa answers. But Hamlet goes on 
struggling and it‟s not so much a doubt. It is very interesting that just a few months ago I was 
in Berlin and saw this outstanding production of Hamlet by this wonderful new director of 
Schaubühne, Thomas Ostermeier, whom I consider to be one of the greatest directors now 
and who showed his wonderful An Enemy of the People three days ago in Calcutta. He uses 
the „to be or not to be‟ speech thrice. In a way, he starts with it, then uses it where 
Shakespeare uses it, and finally at the end of the play. Each time it is spoken differently. First 
time it comes when two elderly people are trying to fit a coffin in a grave with mounds of 
slushy earth lying around. The coffin doesn‟t fit. Hamlet slowly walks in and sits on the 
mound of earth. A transparent scroll rolls down from top. Hamlet looks at a video-cam in his 
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hand and utters „to be or not to be‟. Audiences get an elongated view of his face and lips on 
the scroll. Here it means do I take a position or not? When the utterance is made in the 
context where Shakespeare uses it, it means since I cannot take a position any longer, do I 
commit suicide or not? The third time it comes after the murder of Gonzalo where Hamlet 
bitterly charges King Claudius with that speech - I won‟t let you be. So for Hamlet doubt is 
not just a doubt, but how can he engage himself. So it is more of an existential thing at one 
end, a question of one‟s political choice, the choice that Sartre was making at one point out of 
his existential angst. Nothing of that is in the predetermined mechanical structuring of the 
Arjuna doubt.  
GM: In Cartesian metaphysics of mind-body duality, mind prevails over the body as centre of 
all human experience and knowledge. Film theory generally follows this line to highlight 
intellectual thought-processes at the cost of embodied experiences of cinema. Thus, for 
example, film sensations, which generate spectacular effects among film viewers, are 
generally castigated. However, since ordinary viewers enjoy such film sensations - even go to 
the cinema halls only to experience them – there seems to be a gap in our film theories.  
Do you think this has impoverished our understanding of cinema?  
SB: When you talk of embodiment, I would make a distinction between embodiment and 
embodiment of the thought of an experience or emotion. Embodiment is vital to any 
performance act as opposed to a speech act whether a film or any kind of performance. So 
why would I identify or recreate embodiment with the body used for sensationalizing which is 
only one use of the body? The jumping body, the leaping body, the violent body, these are 
certain circuits of embodiment or bodifications, are these the only meaning of embodiment? 
Obviously Lamberto Maggiorani in Bicycle Thieves is a great piece of embodiment of his 
bewilderment. He is not embodying some abstract idea; he is embodying the crisis. A whole 
lot of crisis - a crisis which is personal, political, and universal where man as labour goes into 
a market but the market won‟t buy the labor. So it‟s a philosophical crisis, it is a moral crisis, 
it is an individual crisis, it is a crisis of daily survival, all these are embodied with so few 
words spoken. That is the charm of great cinema where you don‟t go on philosophizing in 
words, letting the body go elsewhere. So why should body be identified with just sensations? 
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The body can operate in so many different ways. Embodiment is, however, vital. After the 
initial intellectual thrill and novelty of what Godard had given me, I find Godard extremely 
boring and banal when he revels just in theorizing and talking, even sensationalizing the 
talking, rather than embodiment. I still believe strongly in embodied cinema.  
GM: The word haptic experience is increasingly being used in film discourse. This coinage 
has been popularized by Phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. It says 
that certain experiences cannot be explained at the intellectual level alone. Thus, for instance, 
in Pather Panchali, when Apu and Durga run through „kashbon‟, while Durga has a strange 
audio experience in listening at a telegraph pole, Apu has an unknown visual experience in 
seeing a train for the first time. These experiences heighten their haptic experiences of nature. 
Similarly, in Meghe Dhaka Tara, when Neeta discovers her sister and lover‟s treachery, she 
asks her brother to sing „Je raate more duar guli‟ along with her. While she sings, Ghatak 
picturises her from all odd angles, the resulting experience appearing to generate a strong 
haptic experience for audiences which are difficult to explain intellectually.  
Will you like to comment?  
SB: I think it follows from your earlier question. To take it out of the body and to recast it in 
verbality is, I think, not possible. You can‟t translate an embodiment into a verbal act or a 
speech act. Once it is embodied, it is embodied. One has to take it as an embodied experience 
and the way it affects you. 
GM: Classical Indian theories, which originated and flourished primarily during 1
st
 
millennium CE, have a strong streak of embodiment in them. Do you think their application 
to a modern art-form like cinema will serve any useful purpose now?  Dr. Moinak Biswas, in 
his interview to me, expressed his discomfort by saying that new taxonomies like rasa, 
vibhāva, etc, were being used indiscriminately from Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra without explaining 
what they stood for. Thus, he says that the Meghe Dhaka Tara scene alluded above is 
explained as generating a rasa of pathos among the audiences. Dr. Biswas says that, as a 
teacher, he cannot simply say that it is rasa and stop there. There need to be further 
explanatory categories of Indian theories if they are to make sense to the students at all.   
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Would you like to comment? 
SB: I‟ve already expressed my utter dissatisfaction about supposedly Indian theories – 
historically I question these theories. Even when you talk of embodiment in Indian theories, 
what embodiment is really there? I‟ve not found any serious piece of discourse where, in the 
so called classical Sanskrit theoretical literature on performing arts about the quality of the 
body, nature of the body, etc. There is a very, very conscious mechanical attempt to change 
them into categories, classes, denominations, etc, etc. Even about the rasa – how can you limit 
something to nine rasas and, then, another says oh, there is a tenth rasa. I find it so stupid and 
so mechanical. Now there are descriptions of nṛtyabhangis, of the karaṇas. What is about the 
embodiment there? It is just certain forms of the body, certain distortions or particular bends 
of the body, that‟s all. That is not embodiment. You are only trying to give a certain form of 
the body a certain meaning – the mechanical expression of converting a thing into a mūdra, 
coding expression of the body rather than allowing the body its freedom. New feelings, new 
experiences that are extremely modern which come with the evolving life and its pressures 
and its histories. Take, for example, the entire experience of a mass death at an unexpected 
moment, like say the experience of Hiroshima and those who survive that shock. How can 
their experience be codified? There can‟t be a mūdra for this, a single bhangi or karaṇa. So 
restricting or constricting the body to certain codified mechanical expressions, I consider it as 
disembodiment. You aren‟t allowing your body to get into an experience. I give the rasa and 
so now play the rasa through the body. I give you a simple mechanical sign for that. The 
entire embodiment business and the problem for people like Artaud or Artaud‟s clueless 
chelas [„disciples‟] like Grotowski and Eugenio Barba have absolutely limited recording of 
Asian experiences. Artaud had very little effect and Grotowski sent his chela Barba to do it on 
behalf of him. Barba was again trying to codify things, limit things into an extremely facile 
cultural anthropology. Nobody takes it seriously. The natural plasticity of the body responds 
to intellectual experiences and emotional experiences, ideas and physical hits, both kinds. As 
I said, I‟ll like force, even abstract force, to be embodied in cinema of course and wonderful 
things have been done at that level.  
GM: In contrast to Dr. Biswas, Suman Mukhopadhyay holds a contrary view. He thinks that 
embodiment is crucial for human experience and knowledge. He says that anything which is 
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not experienced or sensed by one‟s body is not going to be a part of his or her intellectual 
capacity. An intellectual thought provoked through the body finally translates into a creative 
expression. Anything which is not understood bodily through one‟s senses cannot be 
intellectually important, it cannot be intellectually perceived. 
Do you agree? 
SB: I don‟t agree with him entirely because human beings are capable of abstract thought. 
Why do I deny it? But where I would agree with Suman is that even the most abstract of 
thoughts we try to get into our senses and, in a way, try to embody that to that extent. But if 
somebody says that a thought which cannot be embodied, which cannot be part of my senses 
or sensibility until it becomes organic that I‟m not prepared to accept. There is always this 
reaching out as part of human capacity to attractions, to ideas. Importance of the idea is 
tremendous for human growth, for human life. Some of the ideas may even get lost while I 
negotiate with ideas in an intellectual exercise. Why should I deny the intellectual part of this 
exercise? Why should I think that the physical is superior to the intellect? I‟m not saying, 
however, that the mind is superior to the body. I‟m giving them equal leverage. There should 
be a continuous interweaving, an interplay between a dialectic between mind and body. I‟m 
only not prepared to say that if it is not absorbed in the body then it is useless.  
GM: Here I‟d like to make a point. Head of Department of neuroscience at UCLA, António 
Damátio, has written a book, Descartes‟ Error, in 1994 which has become quite famous. He 
says that every intellectual thought invariably passes through the bodily loop which he calls 
the „somatic marker‟ through which the body gives its inputs into that. When a person takes a 
final decision, it becomes a kind of intuitive decision based on both. Sometimes it may even 
supercede the intellectual part in what is called the „gut feeling‟.  
Do you think it challenges your opinion somewhat? 
SB: I made the point that I‟d like them to be dialectically interrelated giving them equal 
leverage. They are intertwined, you cannot separate them. But, of course, if a neuroscientist 
has scientific facts to prove it, that‟s another matter.  
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GM: There is also another important discovery involving „mirror neurons‟ in 1995 by 
Rizzolatti and others. When a great ape, including human beings, observe a „goal-directed 
activity‟ like somebody trying to reach at something, the same type of neurons – that‟s why 
called „mirror neurons‟ – are triggered in the observer‟s body as well which put them in the 
same mental state as the performer. So watching a goal-directed scene in theatre or cinema 
puts the viewers also in the same mental state as the characters. 
SB: Literally reliving the scene, very interesting. 
GM: Suman Mukhopadhyay says that Asian performing arts have influenced Western 
systems on the basis of their theories of embodiment. Thus, Antoine Artaud coined the term 
signal du frames after watching how Balinese dancers use sign of the body as a language. He 
claims that Bharata‟s Nāṭyaśāstra is practically the first thesis in the world in this regard 
which uses the semiotic language of the body to create a very independent, authentic language 
of artistic expression. The body is important for him because rasa is not at the level of 
intellectual perception; it cannot exist in a hollow, it cannot be a floating signifier. Rasa and 
bhāva has to come through the body. 
SB: I‟ve already answered that. I think that there is too much of a codification, rather than an 
embodiment. Ok, it‟s a kind of semiotic, the signs are there. It‟s a kind of a lexicon. But, in 
the process, you are limiting the body; you aren‟t helping the body to a natural response. I 
think there is also – and that is one of the underlying currents of the Nāṭyaśāstra – a politics 
in it on which I take a serious position. On the basis of my serious reading of the Nāṭyaśāstra, 
I think that Bharata is scared of the different lokāyatas and loukik performances – the 
lokadharmīs – because it is such an independent spontaneous embodiment which can be 
dangerous to the authority of the state. So you have to codify it, to bring everything within 
control, to bring the body to extremely predetermined defined expressions. So this rasa has 
this expression, this bhāva has that, other bhāvas, the subsidiary bhāvas, even the hierarchy of 
bhāvas, this massive controlling machinery is power-driven, is authority-driven which is 
strongly reactionary. I deliberately use the word „reactionary‟, it doesn‟t allow freedom of the 
body. Your responses to natural stimuli creating different forms, you don‟t allow that. In the 
Nāṭyaśāstra, the form of the body is virtually taped and measured and linearized, even your 
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complexion. It is a strongly state-oriented reactionary system. You have to read the politics of 
the Nāṭyaśāstra. I‟m sorry to say very few people have read the Nāṭyaśāstra. They read only 
certain sections of it which are very quotable. And then you have the nṛṭyabhangis and 
karaṇas which the dancers have taken up. Nāṭyaśāstra has been fragmented conveniently by 
different interpreters.  
GM: Suman Mukhopadhyay further says that the Body contains marks of civilization which 
can be historically read. For example, while urban codes align a person‟s body in a particular 
way, the moment one gets away from there into, say, rural areas, realignment of the body 
starts which also realign emotions. In the process, one starts getting a different perception of 
reality altogether. In this sense, the body has a deep philosophical and political significance.  
Will you like to comment? 
SB: I very strongly think about the body, I‟ve written about it also. Let‟s read a portion from 
my article „The Cultural Body of the Community‟ from Our Stage: Pleasures and Perils of 
Theatre Practice in India (Eds. Sudhanva Despande, Akashara K. V, Sameera Iyengar, New 
Delhi: Tulika Books, 2009, pp. 35-40): 
There was a time when we were thinking a lot about a single Indian theatre and how 
different regional idioms could contribute to this Indian theatre. That agenda has been 
toppled in the last few years, but fresh attempts are now being made to reconstitute the 
old agenda and bring it back under a different guise, under different pretensions. 
Performances travelling from one part of the country to another and travelling abroad, 
there seems to be a slowly building up politics that India should have a single theatre that 
has a certain pattern that becomes more easily understandable. There is a certain pattern 
of theatre, a certain kind of theatre that would get audiences; the same kind, class, and 
taste coming from audiences in all the different cities of India and also abroad that would 
be the best choice. In fact Sadanand Menon has been reminding us again and again of the 
new situation that there is a National Knowledge Commission which proposes to bring in 
something called „Creative Industries‟ under the category of „Tourism‟ rather than the 
category of „Culture‟ or „Performances‟. So culture and performance has been thrust 
aside from the knowledge system. If you have to send things abroad or bring people 
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down to watch things, they should be easily understandable to an international clientele, a 
standardized clientele – let them have something called „Indian‟. As this pressure grows, 
it becomes important to take a stand, that every region, however small it may be, not just 
Bengali or Marathi or Manipuri, but even within each, there would be different 
performance cultures. I‟m very deliberately not using the word “idiom” because, in the 
earlier scenario, idioms added up to one single theatre language.  
Talking of performance cultures, they are not necessarily growing out of the performance 
and its practices but grow from a larger field of cultural experience and cultural 
protection. Under these circumstances, a matter of Indian theatre is itself a strategy of 
defense and resistance. Of the distinctive locales of Indian theatre cited at points where 
the performance body forms a seamless continuum with historical body of a community. 
If theatre performance is the product/expression of the actor‟s body so that the body is the 
product of a culture defined as a way of living. The body that has to negotiate with the 
slush on which we walk to make our way to the lecture theatre uses them and bears them 
in a way which is very different from the practice and habits of a body which is more 
accustomed to a paved floor. That is only a simple and quite basic instance of the body‟s 
ways and means. Even when the body is trained in skills, gestures, and styles that are not 
elements of habit or natural practice, it needs to retain forms of the primary stimuli to 
bring forth the look of familiarity that makes first contact with the body of the 
community. The wide range of elements that go into making the actor‟s body includes the 
daily acts of the means of living, his or her diet, and the way he or she eats, he or she 
wears, he or she speaks, in his or her natural surroundings. Even when the body acquires 
a style, it doesn‟t quite abdicate itself; rather it accommodates the style.     
 
I‟m harping on this point for quite some time now that the body is local; it is very, very 
culture-specific when it comes to performance. And this conscious attempt to standardize is a 
market attempt, is a globalizing attempt. To me that is a standard body, a standard practice. 
Even this evocation or the reinsertion of the Nāṭyaśāstra in our discourse is part of this forced 
standardization process. And even these references to Barbas and Artauds because that is the 
international clientele and they would love it if you can standardize it. The entire body 
experience is just stored in the Nāṭyaśāstra for them to de-codify and read it for the market. 
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GM: Soumitra Chatterjee in a recent interview to me has said that three different types of 
acting was available in Bengali theatre during 19
th
-20
th
 century Bengal viz. nāṭyadharmī or 
exaggerated formal performance, lokadharmī or natural, realistic performance, and a third 
variety in-between the two. He, thus, claims that both Satyajit Ray‟s realism and Ritwik 
Ghatak‟s formalism were already deeply rooted in the tradition of Bengali performing arts.  
Will you like to comment?    
SB: I‟m again not convinced about that. In my knowledge and in whatever I‟ve studied, it 
gives me another impression altogether. It is a very, very complex range of styles and 
conventions. For example, what about the local performances that have also made their way 
into theatre and cinema? What would you call that? If he says that lokadharmī is a realistic 
thing, so many of the performance modes even in West Bengal has this easy movement 
between singing and dancing and verbalizing. This distinction of the verbal theatre where the 
speech dominates is a completely Victorian importation. Even in European theatre history, 
even in early British theatre history, the convention was that there was no distinction between 
music, dance, and the verbal theatre. So speech and the dancing body, they were enmeshed 
together. It was one single thing which has stayed on in the Opera. And later on when the 
music part takes over in the Opera, it accommodates theatre within the music. And in Ballet, 
while the verbal thing gets thrown out, the music is literally incorporated into the body of the 
dancer as part of the corpus. But the verbal theatre, the speech-dominated theatre separated 
from these, becomes the art thing. It also becomes the urban mode. You go back to the 
gambhira, to the alkaps, where the music, the dance, and the verbal all go together. To bring 
the music and the dance into the verbal, you can‟t have the so-called realistic acting. You are 
working at different levels at the same time which survives in the Jatra. What about that? I 
would call that lokadharmī. And the realistic theatre is a completely European importation 
which we acclimatize of course. I never say go back to the so-called purity because there is no 
purity in performances; they grow. The body changes with changing circumstances. As I said, 
if you walk on the slush and walk on a paved surface, your gait of the body, the pressure 
points within the body, all become different. The body becomes different in the process.  
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      And then you have to relate to your cultural body, your social body, the body of the 
people around you, the body of the community around you. The way you talk to them, your 
gestures, your voices become part of your bodily expression. If you have to survive, you have 
to speak in a certain manner, and then you speak in another manner below and above your 
level. So a hierarchy comes into play through your body. This kind of realistic theatre is also 
there. So these distinctions between lokadharmī, etc, don‟t mean much to me. I‟m sorry. In 
fact, lokadharmī is a much, much wider concept.  
GM: In fact Suman Mukhopadhyay was telling that he took his entire theatre group to Purulia 
and made them walk and sit on the sand. He says that the entire urban setting of straight 
footpaths, circles, sitting on chairs generates particular meanings and emotions. He had also 
noticed during a short course in America that one was made to drop his jaw for a whole day 
and watch the reaction of people around him. 
SB: Yes 
GM: One last question. Will you like to comment on the current crop of Bengali films? Do 
you think they are socially relevant?  
SB: What I feel works at two levels. There is a feeling that Bengali cinema has lost out to 
Bombay cinema anyway. So we can only survive at the level of these Inoxes, etc, through 
small audiences which is a kind of a spill-over. I travel to a lot of moffussil and district towns 
where there are practically no cinema houses. In several towns, I found very, very shabby 
cinema halls – even in places like Purulia or Baharampore. People watch films on the dvds 
which are pirated. Producers don‟t get any money out of that. So they make as much as one 
can from whatever is being screened at the moment in big city malls or Inoxes. It results in 
two things: 
a) A cushy audience which goes to have their popcorns and relax and are comfortable. In 
the meantime, let the images come and go, that kind of a thing. 
b) As part of a larger consumerist politics, show life lived in great comfort and lush splendor 
and make them a little bit jealous – well, if I could have that, etc, etc. This becomes 
embedded in all the films that I‟ve watched. Do people watching them really live in that 
kind of comfort?  
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There is a strange kind of unreal world in which these films circulate. I don‟t feel drawn to 
watch these films except when somebody tells me that an actor has done a good piece of 
acting or there is a good idea in it. I‟ve lost interest; I watch only 3 or 4 films a year now. Not 
interested – it is a sad state of affairs. 
GM: True. It is indeed sad. 
SB: Very, very sad indeed. It is not reflecting any reality at all. There is only the possibility 
that something coming out of the blue like Pather Panchali or even I remember in case of 
Subarnorekha which had problems with the distributor and was lying in cans for years which 
made Ritwik babu more and more alcoholic, more frustrated. Then when it comes, it is such 
a thrill. It circulates, people talk about it and there are literary magazines which run debates 
on it, there are 4 or 5 articles on it which you don‟t see about any film now. The whole 
institution of film reviewing is also out; it is only story-telling now. Earlier whether we agree 
with them or not, there were film critics who had their strong positions. Even in the big 
institutional press whether it is Sebabrata Gupta or Probodh Bandhu Adhikary and in The 
Statesman, of course, Amalendu Dasgupta. Now film actors do the reviews. It is sad indeed. 
GM: Thank you very much for this in-depth interview. 
 
____________________________ 
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Annexure 6 
Interview 
Dr. Ashish Avikunthak, Lecturer, Dept. of Filmmaking,  
Rhodes Island University, USA 
GM: Thanks for granting this interview. I‟m conducting a series of interviews of academics, 
philosophers, and film personalities in connection with my PhD thesis at the University of 
East Anglia, UK dealing with the applicability of phenomenology and classical Indian 
theories to cinema. The focus is on the question how much of embodiment underlies our 
intellectual understanding of cinema. You have been an experimental filmmaker who is also 
deeply interested in Indian philosophy. Your films are literally representations of some of 
those philosophical principles. Will you like to give me an idea about your interest in this 
area? 
AA: My films didn‟t emerge from an interest in Indian philosophy. I look at my cinema as a 
way that has opened a world for me. I came from a political background, from Gandhian 
politics which is also a fundamentally metaphysical form of politics. However, when I made 
this film on Kalighat Fetish, I realized that while my films are very unconscious, they are 
made consciously. The idea is to make something that you have never seen. There are two 
kinds of filmmakers. One kind makes a film that is already in your head and you produce it. I 
find that kind of filmmaking pointless. I‟ll rather make films that I‟ve not seen. You go 
through a process and then when you see the film, it starts talking to you; it is as if your 
unconscious is talking to you in a Freudian sense. However, I look at my own cinematic texts 
as a conversation with myself. For me cinema is a way through which I negotiate my being in 
the world. Even my earlier one-shot films that I made during 1994-95 had very strong 
philosophical roots, they are existential films. Then the Kalighat film happened during which 
I became deeply religious. I realized that some kind of a strong Tantric thing was happening. 
That‟s when I started reading and subsequently most of my films are negotiating some kind of 
an Indian philosophy which I would call ritualistic. I‟m more interested in philosophy‟s 
ritualistic basis, could be Tantric but I‟m not sure. 
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GM: This is an interesting point. What do you mean by this ritualistic aspect? Things that we 
see our Purohits and Pandits keep doing? 
AA: No, no. You know when I look at any act, I understand that there is an ontological basis 
to it and that ritualistic and epistemic worldviews are involved. I‟ll try to frame it for you. 
What happens in India I think is that India being faced with modernity received a powerful 
onslaught of ideological inputs in a very violent way. Lord MacCauley said that we want 
„brown sahibs‟ who would be Indians in flesh and blood but think like the British. This makes 
thinking epistemic and being Indian ontological. What modernity has done is to transfer our 
epistemology into a modern space. Thus, we speak English but eat our dal-bhat („rice and 
gravy‟), we think in English but listen to Hindusthani classical music. So what I think has 
happened in India – which hasn‟t happened in China because that was a different trajectory 
altogether – is an interesting hybridization where the subjectivity of an individual has been 
split between an epistemic and an ontological self in which epistemic is modern while 
ontology remains pre-modern (for lack of a better word). Thus, ritual has an ontological root 
within which also there is a further division between epistemic and ontological in the sense 
that Sanskrit texts remain epistemic whereas rituals remain ontological. With 200 years of 
modernity, even our own understanding of the Sanskrit epistemic world has been mediated by 
modernity. For instance, I and you wouldn‟t have read Upaniṣad if it wasn‟t translated in 
English. Gita, for instance, becomes an essentially modernist text because modern Britishers, 
the Brahmo Samaj and a whole branch of Hindu modernists picked it up. Gita is also very 
interesting because it is almost structured like the New Testament, like the parables, Jesus 
talking, etc. It is interesting why Gita becomes important in our contemporary times because 
the modern Britishers decided to translate it. Our own understanding of religion – as 
modernity and post-modernity would tell you – is mediated by ideas coming from a modern 
framework. I would even argue that even the Sanskrit College here or in Madras was set-up 
by the British. The way we speak, I would argue, is also modern. There was a great story of 
Bengali Pandit from the Sanskrit College had gone all the way to Cambridge to meet Max 
Müller. When he enters Max Müller‟s office, he offers a prasasti [eulogizes] to Max Müller 
in Sanskrit who could not understand because Max Müller could only read Sanskrit but not 
speak the language. Our understanding of pre-modern has also been corrupted by modernity; 
it is only the ontological which is not corrupted. This ontological space in its most 
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uncorrupted form is the ritualistic. For example, in cinema, we see Ghatak catering to that 
ontological space in Ajantrik where he sets this very interesting juxtaposition between the 
technological apparatus in the form of a car and the Adivasi space in Jharkhand where he 
shoots the film. I think Ghatak is the first filmmaker who signals to that ontological ritualistic 
space in the form of fissures into his modern text which Ray does right in his last film 
Agantuk where Utpal Dutt is eventually sitting among the Santhals who are dancing. My 
argument is that ritual is the uncorrupted, the less sullied by modernity. When I was working 
among the Adivasis in Narmada, I saw that kind of unsullied-ness, uncorrupted-ness. I think 
this whole ritual fixation comes to me from my days in Narmada.  
GM: It is also the archaeological aspect of your work. 
AA: No, the archaeology happened a little later. Pre-cinema, I was doing a particular kind of 
work among the Adivasis. So I look at ritual as the only space that hasn‟t been penetrated by 
modernity. I find ritual space as a place of solace where I can have a conversation with my 
past.  
GM: Tell me what are you trying to find really? Isn‟t it a good thing that certain modern 
thoughts have percolated into our studies? We are able to rediscover our studies in a new 
light; new meanings are coming out of it. On the other hand is your idea of this completely 
unsullied ritualistic space. Don‟t you think there should be some kind of an interaction 
between the two? 
AA: I‟m not interested in discovery. My whole cinematic journey is not about discovery, it is 
a journey. I don‟t know where I‟m going. I‟m not an anthropologist in that sense. I think I‟m 
interested in me as a chronicler, a traveler in a certain journey; not journey to discover, but 
journey for the sake of journey. Journey itself becomes an important act, an important fact 
rather than reaching a particular point. I think what has happened with me is a disenchantment 
with modernity. It might have come from my work in Narmada Bachao Andolan where there 
is total disenchantment with a big dam produced by a post-colonial state. The whole idea of 
this post-colonial modernity is a very problematic space even in its most democratic form, in 
its most beautiful form. So I would rather be someone else. This is where I found Ghatak very 
useful. The big difference between Ghatak and Ray is that Ray‟s cinematic ideology is an 
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apology for post-colonial modernity in a very base way. He holds that modernity has 
happened, it has been thrust upon us and it has been tragic. Look at any films of his, it is a 
tragic modernity. Take his Apu Trilogy at the end of which Apu throws his novel into the 
ravine, the novel which epitomizes the most high form of modernity is being discarded, it is 
tragic. Or look at Kanchenjungha or Mahanagar, you may look at his whole Oeuvre 
including his last Agantuk, the figure of Ray as a subject is a tragic figure. But the tragic 
figure has always also been a ray of hope. So, for Ray, post-colonial modernity is tragic but 
there is also hope. In case of Ghatak, because he comes from a partition framework, post-
colonial modernity isn‟t only tragic, it is also devastating. There is no escape. It is the end. He 
doesn‟t give you any hope. However, what he does – and that is very important for me – in 
his films he gestures towards these spaces which haven‟t been tragic. What you see in the 
case of Ajantrik, while there is a tragic end, you also have the Adivasis. What you see in the 
last film Jukti Takko ar Gappo, you have the Chow dance. In his films he gives these 
openings which I think is very useful, which gives me hope. I think Ritwik Ghatak is more 
useful than Ray. In Ray, there is hopelessness – the tragic hero is the hopeful hero, but there is 
nothing else other than being completely modern. The fact that in his music he is hugely 
inspired by German and European modernity…whereas if you look at Ghatak, because he 
comes from a partition framework, in the end there is no way out but then there are those 
moments of rupture. These moments of opening can give you a certain sense of foundation. 
The fact that I come from a partition family in Punjab, I think I relate to this complete sense 
of devastation – what you may call the Refugee Mentality – has survived in me. In this 
context, what I think happens with cinema or, modernity in general, is that the ontological 
space becomes a space for a very useful conversation. I think my cinema moves in that 
direction. 
GM: Actually you are trying to find some kind of a hope. But the picture seems to be very 
bleak. Are you unconsciously trying to find out what it is? 
AA: I think it is a very conscious act. I find Tantra very useful. Even within its epistemic 
framework – the books that are coming out on this – it remains the most unsullied by 
modernity. Although, we have to understand that modernity is inevitable. We are all modern. 
I‟m modern in the most acute sense. I teach in an American university. I‟m not escaping 
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modernity because there is no possibility of escape. But I definitely think that I want to have a 
conversation with the pre-modern world. And Ghatak opens up that space for me.  Ghatak 
does, Mani Kaul does, Kumar does, Om Dar Badar does, Kal Avirathi does. They provide 
spaces where there is an opening. That‟s why I shoot at places like Kumbh or Vrindavan. 
That‟s why I think more than discovering, I‟m struggling with a certain distinction between 
what I‟m and what I can be or could have been. It‟s a struggle, it‟s a dead struggle. One can 
only be struggling. It‟s not a struggle to find a place. I think the struggle itself is more 
important than the journey. In the activist world, it is said that „sangharsh karna jaroori hai‟ 
(„it is important to keep on struggling‟). „Sangharsh korne ke baad kya hoga, kaise hoga…‟   
(„what will happen after the struggle…‟); to keep struggling is more important than the end 
result. I‟m happy that for me it‟s a struggle because I think struggle is important.  
GM: You have taught in Yales and now you teach at the Rhodes Island University. The kind 
of person that you are, your very attire, your films, how do the Western students react to you? 
AA: You know I‟ve shown my films all over Europe, but I‟ve only met with 
misunderstanding. One thinks that it is almost like a hermeneutical misunderstanding. Even 
though they think they have understood, but they haven‟t. That is something I find in India 
also. I find a perpetual misunderstanding happening everywhere.                        
 
_____________________________ 
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Annexure 7 
Interview 
 
Soumitra Chatterjee, Film Actor-Dramatist 
18
th
 February, 2015, 11.30 – 1.30pm 
 
GM: I thank you on behalf of myself and the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK for 
granting this interview. My research topic concerns the application of phenomenology, 
classical Indian theories, and embodiment to cinema in order to discover meanings that 
remain under its surface. In this connection, I‟ll like to have your reaction on the following 
issues. 
    According to some thinkers, a fundamental theory of Indian plays is that Indian 
characters have an „inner nature‟ which always acts as an inner pull on them to restore them 
back to their original status. Western critics say that, in this sense, characters don‟t really 
change or evolve in Indian works; by virtue of their unchanging basic nature, they always 
remain what they have always been throughout the play. Under the circumstances, changes 
happen to them only at the superficial level, having been brought about by chance 
occurrences, or coincidences, or misunderstandings. Once these are cleared up, characters are 
invariably restored back to their original status. This is what happens in 
Abhigyāñaśakuntalam or Mṛcchakatika.  
    Where do you place this theory in the context of Indian cinema? Will you like to 
elaborate on the basis of characters you have played?  
SC: I don‟t really agree with this. Anywhere where there is a narrative, whether in the two 
epics or the drama – say, for instance, Greek drama of Aeschylus or Euripides or 
Shakespearean tragedies – we find that there is always the chance of a character developing 
from one state to another. That is not only true in the case of Greek or Elizabethan drama but 
also true in the case of Indian drama. For example, the narrative of Abhijñānaśākuntalam is 
progressing from one phase to another. The sheer refusal of the King Duṣyanta to recognize 
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Śakuntala as his bride is a few steps removed from what was before. Not to accept Śakuntala 
is not just a betrayal, it also involves a difference of the classes although it is not as clearly 
defined as in a modern play. The beauty and harmony of Kālidasa‟s writing conceals this 
inner conflict between two different viewpoints of two different classes, the king‟s class and 
the ordinary class. Finally the King remembers although it takes the form of the symbolic 
anguriya (signet ring) found inside the belly of a fish. Coming on the back of remembrance is 
the resolution part in Gustav Frettal‟s pyramid structure of a play with the beginning going up 
to a climax and then resolution going down again. That way you cannot totally stamp it with 
characters having an inner compulsion to remain where they are. They change also. King 
Duṣyanta undergoes change thrice: when he comes to the forest and marries Śakuntala, then 
when he leaves her, and finally when he accepts her in a resolved relationship. In this sense, 
in Abhijñānaśākuntalam, which is not historic and where the conflict is not so clearly etched 
as generally happens in an European play like King Lear or Othello, there is a struggle, there 
is class difference. Later on the kind of theatre that evolved in say Bengali theatre is an 
admixture of European theories and our traditional Jatra (Bengali folk form). But from the 
very beginning those who fathered Bengali theatre, chiefly Girish Chandra Ghosh, were 
steeped in European literature particularly Shakespeare. Girish Ghosh was also a scholar who 
used our epics very well. His writings became the mainstay of Bengali theatre which is, 
however, much removed from the non-secular plays written for the Jatra. In the Bengali 
theatre, the evolution of a character had to take place. Take, for instance, his play 
Billamangal. The main character there is not standing in one frame only. He is continuously 
evolving with the plot. Even on the day of his father‟s annual shraddha (ritual offering) 
ceremony, he most reluctantly comes back from a brothel. He finishes the ritual most 
nonchalantly and rushes back to his lady love in the brothel. His mental state is so enamored 
with her that he crosses the raging river in a stormy night by holding onto an old dead body 
thinking it to be a piece of wood. When he finds the brothel closed, he climbs its wall by 
holding onto a snake thinking it to be a rope. He doesn‟t even realize that he has an awful 
smell. His lady-love asks him to show her the piece of wood with which he had crossed the 
river. When she discovers that it is an old dead body, she says that she has entertained many 
customers, but not one like him. She tells him that instead of putting such passion in the 
service of a woman, if he gives it to God, his life will change. With that comment 
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Billamangal starts changing. He questions what have I been doing so far? He becomes a 
mendicant in search of God. One day, when he was asleep on the banks of a river – the river 
keeps coming in the play probably as a symbol of life - he is awakened by footsteps to find an 
extremely beautiful married woman. Forgetting his search for God, he follows her to her 
house to find that she is married to a baniya (businessman). When her husband returns, he 
confesses to him that he is smitten by her beauty and will like to have her. Since the couple 
had vowed to Lord Kṛsṇa that they will not refuse the desires of an atithi [guest] in line with 
the earlier tradition, husband agrees. In spite of strong internal resistance, when the lady 
comes to the bedroom, he changes again. He keeps looking at her and thinking that, if it is her 
flesh he desires, then it would become like the dead body he had encountered earlier, it is 
maya („illusion‟). He then asks for her hair-pin and tells her to go back and tell her husband 
that nothing has happened. With the pin, he stabs his eyes to become blind saying to himself 
that he will no more be misled by outer vision but look inside to find God. It is almost like the 
Greek tragedy here. It is a marvelous play where, despite being so classical, its character is 
not bound by any inner compulsion. He is moving from one kind of realization to another. In 
King Lear or in Hamlet, the problem is in action. Procastrination in the form of a soliloque „to 
be or not to be, that is the question‟ brings out the inner turmoil of a dilemma. The suffering 
of this dilemma finally drives Hamlet to action even though at a very late stage. His killing of 
Polonius is not an action driven by thought, no; but avenging his dead father by killing his 
uncle is. Through the swordfight he resolves his procastrination, but it is too late.                      
GM: Do you think Hamlet‟s dilemma is different from Arjuna‟s? 
SC: In a way they are similar because, for Arjuna, it is not only a question of whether to fight 
or not to fight, but chiefly one of taking up arms against his near and dear ones. Kṛsṇa says 
that you have to get rid of weakness at the moment of crisis. That Arjuna couldn‟t asunder 
these bonds totally even when he was fighting them – dilemma remains unresolved in his 
mind to some extent – is revealed in later times when, at the end of the epic, he along with 
others is taken to hell while Yudhisthir is made to pass through there only once because he 
tells a half-truth. When he is finally asked to enter the heaven, he is aghast listening to the 
cries of misery and torment emanating from there. They are telling „Raja, don‟t go away. 
Because of you, there is a cool breeze blowing which is giving relief from our agony‟. He 
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then asks „If I go what will happen to them?‟ He is answered that they will continue to remain 
there and suffer. Yudhisthir says that, in such a case, he will also remain with them; if he has 
to go to heaven, these people also will have to go. For his puṇya [virtue], they are also 
ultimately released. 
GM: In the above context, where do you place Satyajit Ray‟s Apu? 
SC: Apu – particularly Apu – is a little different in character because it is basically a saga. It is 
not a drama. It is the story of a child growing up, going into the world, and then entering Apur 
Sansar (World of Apu, 1959). „Sansar‟ here doesn‟t mean immediate family, no; here it 
occurs in the real sense of the word, the world-at-large. That way, there are not many 
dramatic moments in the film, but there are umpteen number of incidents, various experiences 
through which this very intelligent, inquisitive, and sensitive man goes through life. His 
growth is so typical of an ordinary middle class Bengali who grows from being a village boy 
to be a part of the larger world. He is steeled through various experiences – he loses his 
father, mother and his sister, and finally his wife – who finally comes back to claim his son. 
Taking him on his shoulder, he goes to face the world as the river flows by his side. 
GM: Can we say that Apu has evolved rather than being what he has always been? 
SC: After the revolution that occurred with Pather Panchali, latter day plays and Indian 
cinema started being made in a very different way. A host of brilliant filmmakers like Ritwik 
Ghatak, Mrinal Sen, etc, arrived on the scene at the same time whose works are somewhat 
different including their characters. They, however, had something very common in them. 
They completely moved away from the typical, traditional, non-secular works which 
primarily exhibited religious sentiments. However, some of these are more dramatic, more 
theatrical like Ritwik - he used his experience in theatre in an extremely fascinating cinematic 
style which sometimes worked and sometimes didn‟t. When you see Titus Ekti Nadir Naam, 
you can feel the pulse of theatre flowing under its plot. Some of his films even candidly use a 
theatrical plot like his film Komal Gandhar. This cinema is totally different from earlier films 
like Sikandar, etc. Even Bimal Roy‟s Udayer Pathe – although it is based on a literary work 
which concentrates on middle class struggle so different from religious works – is ultimately 
not as powerful as a Pather Panchali or Ajantrik. Cinematically they are so different.  
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However much we may discuss the differences between Satyajit Ray and Ritwik Ghatak, 
what we forget is that none of them made political films which Mrinal da made. Satyajit‟s 
film which is political underneath is Hirak Rajar Deshe – it is a political allegory. Otherwise 
both Satyajit and Ritwik made social films. Social reality was their subject. They wanted to 
bring in social anomalies, social agonies, struggle between classes, etc, that people were 
suffering from. That way they are very much similar with almost all their films, except 
Satyajit‟s Jana Aranya, ending in hope. For example, at the end of Titus, where the river has 
completely dried up, Ritwik makes a child blow his bhenpu (whistle made of a leaf) which is 
such a powerful testimony to hope in future. Even Satyajit could have claimed the ending to 
be his! 
Cinematically, however, Ritwik, because of his early life in the theatre, went on using 
theatrical elements, but Sayajit hardly did that except perhaps in his film Sakha Prosakha or, 
to some extent, in Jana Aranya. In fact, Jana Aranya is the only film of Ray which leaves a 
bad taste in the mouth. He made it deliberately so. I like the film enormously. It is unlike any 
other Indian film – it looks at us so critically. In Aranyer Dinratri, you will again find that, 
even though characters are encircled in their own lives, but they do evolve. They undergo 
experiences which make each one of them a new man. Particularly Ashim – who is the most 
educated, talented and capable of the lot – has some amount of meanness in him. He always 
wants to be the leader, behaves like one, and is also very snooty and snobbish. His sense of 
superiority is, however, crushed by this girl who teaches him a lesson of his life, how to be a 
man and not a leader. That‟s a wonderful revelation for Ashim who goes on the way of 
becoming a man. Although the film ends in ambiguity – although he takes her telephone 
number, nobody knows whether they are in love and shall meet again – so many possibilities 
are opened up. It is a beautiful ending.  
GM: Do you think commercial film characters remain what they have always been in Indian 
cinema or do they evolve? 
SC: Characters remain what they are, even though they have become more clever. Mumbai 
film industry, with the help of a retenue of scriptwriters and spin doctors, constructs plots so 
cleverly that you can recognize the characters to be coming from today‟s milieu but they are 
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generally similar to characters of thousand year old epics - larger than life and heroic, none of 
whom would sell a friend‟s sister like in Jana Aranya. Commercial films straightjacket 
everything in black and white.  
GM: In contrast to Mumbai commercial characters, what do you think of Bengali commercial 
cinema?  
SC: As already mentioned, even though, most of the time, Mumbai characters aren‟t ordinary 
or normal, sometimes they do, however, portray ordinary people, their way of life, their 
society. But, generally, they are formula films. In Kolkata, because they have to compete with 
Mumbai films, most of them, though not all, are literally made as Hindi films in Bengali 
language.  
GM:  Do you see Somnath of Jana Aranya to be a morally flawed character?  
SC:  He is a weak person. He doesn‟t have the courage of his conviction. That‟s why you 
know – I shouldn‟t say this – Ray had deliberately chosen Pradip Mukherjee to play the role. 
He is an extremely good-looking guy who looks rather imbecile at times. You will never 
think that he will stand up in support of a cause or he can fight an adversity. He will accept 
whatever is served on his plate. Ray‟s choice of actors are so revealing of his characters.  
GM: In Bicycle Thieves, Antonio Ricci ultimately tries to steal a bicycle. Will you place him 
in the same category as Somnath? 
SC: He is not morally flawed because life forces him to be a thief. He is not weak as 
Somnath. The essential transport of his livelihood having been stolen in midst of thievery 
going on all around him, he is forced to steal. He is not morally flawed like Somnath. In all 
fairness, I would have done the same under similar circumstances. I would have said to Ricci 
„Ok, you have done well‟. De Sica – despite being a matinee-idol himself in his time – how 
could he find such a man who almost epitomizes middle class struggle? 
GM: In which category will you like to place characters you have portrayed in Bengali 
commercial films like in Saat Paakey Bandha or Sansar Seemantey? Do they stand apart from 
other commercial films? 
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SC: They do, Sansar Seemantey certainly. Ajoy Kar and Tapan Sinha, the respective 
filmmakers, are two people who are middle-roaders. They knew that their existence would be 
jeopardized if they went any further. But both of them were very efficient filmmakers having 
a lot of ruchi (culture), a stamp of taste and culture in them. They exercised an unobtrusive 
kind of amalgamation of both art and commercial cinema that were there at the time. Both 
Ajoy Kar, and more so Tapan Sinha, went on developing throughout their career. Tapan Sinha 
started with Ankush but then his filmmaking gradually started embracing more serious aspects 
of life. He developed from film to film in leaps and bounds. Just think of Ek Doctor Ki Maut 
– what a marvelous film. Then, Admi Aur Aurat, or even some aspects of Atanka, then 
Wheelchair – he went on making serious films without the garb of art cinema. Ajoy Kar‟s 
films were also firmly rooted in the soil of Bengali culture. They were not esoteric Hindi 
films.  
GM: Since they primarily dealt with upwardly mobile middle class Bengali families, they are 
etched deep in our hearts. 
SC: Yes. Sansar Seemantey is, however, a little different. It is better from these kinds of films 
because it almost crosses the demarcation line between a bold film, an artistic film, and a 
commercial film. That is because of the strength of its story. Sansar Seemantey is one of the 
finest short stories of Bengal. The story itself demands so much of realism. Even though there 
are a lot of dramatic and theatrical moments in the film, they have somehow mixed well with 
other intents of the film. 
GM: You have touched upon both serious and commercial films. What is your opinion about 
the current state of affairs in Bengali cinema? The products seem to be so homogenized. 
There is a joke going around that if a modern lady is to be shown, she has to be seen smoking 
a lot, drinking a lot, and keep hopping from bed to bed!  
SC: It has probably come away somewhat from that kind of a formula. Those who create such 
characters have no intention of making a modern film.  
GM: Is it homogenization bred by globalization that is killing our creativity?  
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SC: No, it is not globalization that is doing the damage for Bengali films; it is rather the 
Mumbaization of our films. South Indian films are even a stage ahead of Mumbai films in this 
respect. Not even a Govinda can dance like a Prabhu Deva! While Govinda has timing and is 
pleasant, Prabhu Deva is pure dance. My daughter is a Bharat Natyam dancer. One day I saw 
her intently watching a video. She said I‟m watching the best dancer of Mumbai, Prabhu 
Deva.  
GM: You had once said that a history of evolution of film acting in Bengali cinema should be 
written. Will you like to elaborate on this statement?   
SC: There has been some writing on acting in Bengali theatre but not on Bengali cinema. I‟ve 
noticed that in Bengali films there have been distinct variations in acting. While some of them 
appear to be bad habits – like theatrical acting from old time Jatra or theatre – which have 
percolated into cinematic acting, it is but strange that a strong streak of natural or realistic 
acting have been a part of Bengali films right from the beginning. Rather surpirisingly, this 
line of acting came from theatre. In Bengali theatre, there were three very distinct streams of 
acting – I hate to call them schools. One was from the olden times coming from Jatra with 
chanting and ranting and what not but very efficient in their own way; another was a via 
media between realistic acting and theatricality involving Girish Ghosh and, even, to some 
extent, Sisir Bhaduri; the third stream consisted of realistic acting by Ardhendu Sekhar 
Mustafi and others which was utterly naturalistic. There were a number of followers of 
Ardhendu‟s style, like Jogesh Choudhury or Manoranjan Bhattacharya, even Sisir Bhaduri 
himself. A great example of this style of acting is Kanu Banerjee who was selected by Ray for 
his first film role as Sarbojaya‟s husband in Pather Panchali. No one will be able to 
differentiate his acting from that of modern cinema. You also must have watched Jogesh 
Choudhury in old Bengali films like Saap Mochan or Sesh Parichay where Kanan Devi sings 
„Toofan Mail‟ – her father‟s role is played by Jogesh Choudhury. Monoranjan Bhattacharya 
also you might have seen in Sambhu Mitra‟s Pathik or Bimal Roy‟s Udayer Pathe. Film 
actors who were typically suited for film acting became a blessing in disguise for Bengali 
cinema right from the beginning which saved it from a lot of theatrical rubbish. I‟m basically 
a theatre actor, I love acting on the stage. But I don‟t want to mix the two things. When I act 
in cinema, my goal is to give the best of cinematic acting. 
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GM: Have you ever done something like method acting here? 
SC: No, because my kind of naturalistic or realistic acting came from theatre to whom I‟ve 
always remained loyal. There is, of course, some kind of an unconscious early influence from 
Hollywood cinema which I watched profusely during my school days. I even bunked classes 
regularly to watch them which were then freely shown all over Bengal. I was even caught by 
my parents and punished for that. Those films must have left some marks. I, of course, had 
my own matinee idols, like the actor who played in Double Life and A Tale of Two Cities. 
Later, it was Montogomery Clift, and, even later, Marlon Brando to some extent. But my idol 
in the Indian cinema is Balraj Sahani who will forever remain so for me.  
GM: Thank you so much for this illuminating interview. 
 
___________________ 
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